Skip to main content

FASER128: Cryptanalysis and Its Countermeasure

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
  • 880 Accesses

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 655))

Abstract

Many symmetric key encryption schemes have been designed to ensure the confidentiality of data only. Data integrity plays an important role of security in various encryption scheme. Assuming this fact, many researchers have focused their research to design Authenticated Encryption (AE) schemes that provide both confidentiality and authenticity. FASER is one of them which was submitted in CAESAR competition and withdrawn in later due to an attack reported in the paper [6]. It has two parent ciphers namely FASER128 and FASER256. Cryptanalysis of FASER128 was studied by the authors in [6, 7] and mentioned some serious flaws in the design of the crypto algorithm. Due to these flaws, both the parent ciphers of the FASER have been withdrawn. In this paper, we study the cryptanalysis of FASER128 by key recovery attack and discuss some weaknesses. We have also suggested some modifications of cryptoalgorithm to avoid the key recovery attack.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  1. CAESAR: Competition for authenticated encryption: Security applicability and robustness. https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caeser.html

  2. Argen, M., Londhahl, C., Hell, M., Johansson, T.: A survey on fast correlation attack. Crypt. Commun. 4(3), 173–202 (2012)

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Bellare, M., Kohno, T., Namprempre, C.: Authentication encryption in SSH: provably fixing the SSH binary packet protocol. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS-9), pp. 1–31. ACM Press (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bellare, M., Namprempre, C.: Authenticated encryption: relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 531–545. Springer, Heidelberg (2000). doi:10.1007/3-540-44448-3_41

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Chaza, F., MacDonald, C., Avanzi, R.: FASER v1: Authenticated encryption in a feedback shift register, CAESER (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Xu, C., Zhang, B., Feng, D.: Linear cryptanalysis of FASER128/256 and TriviA-ck. In: Meier, W., Mukhopadhyay, D. (eds.) INDOCRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8885, pp. 237–254. Springer, Cham (2014). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13039-2_14

    Google Scholar 

  7. Feng, X., Zhang, F.: A real time key recovery attack on the authenticated FASER128. Cryptology ePrint Arxhive, Report 2014/258 (2014). http://eprint.iacr.org/

Download references

Acknowledgement

The authors greatly indebted to Ms. Neelam Verma, Scientist G and Ms. Anu Khosla, Director, SAG, DRDO for their full cooperation and financial supports. The third author wishes to express his thanks to DRDO headquarter for DRDO fellowship.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to M. K. Dubey .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this paper

Cite this paper

Dubey, M.K., Gaba, N., Bedi, S.S. (2017). FASER128: Cryptanalysis and Its Countermeasure. In: Giri, D., Mohapatra, R., Begehr, H., Obaidat, M. (eds) Mathematics and Computing. ICMC 2017. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 655. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4642-1_11

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4642-1_11

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-4641-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-4642-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics