Challenges Facing Dialogic Consensus

Abstract

This chapter explores some practical difficulties that will inevitably be encountered in the clinical setting characterized by expanded technological capacity and value pluralism within the stakeholder group. Responding to these entails more intensive analysis of the Habermasian notions of discourse theory of morality and communicative action, and especially aligning them with his theory of the ways of knowing. By basing the dialogue around a way of knowing characterized by self-reflectivity, each member of the stakeholder group can be: (1) facilitated in seeing technological capacity as merely a factor to be considered—but not necessarily the determinative factor; and, (2) to take better account of the interpretations offered by other members of the decision-making group. That is, without listening, there can be no knowing. It makes sense that we cannot have a discussion about morals if we do not have the words for the concepts and if we do not agree about the meanings of the words. We will argue that, practical difficulties in achieving the ideal dialogue notwithstanding, the process described herein has both applicability and great merit for moral decision making in clinical settings.