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The Arquebus Volley Technique in China, c. 1560: Evidence from the Writings of Qi Jiguang

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Abstract

Military historians have argued that the emergence in Europe of the musketry volley fire technique and the concurrent development of systematic infantry drill were of epochal importance for world history, a key part of the famous ‘military revolution’ that underlay Europeans’ purported military advantage over the other peoples of the world. This article shows that the arquebus volley technique was described in the writings of the famous Chinese military thinker Qi Jiguang by 1560, well before the most commonly accepted date for the technique’s introduction in Europe. Qi Jiguang’s drill techniques were part of a long and unbroken military tradition stretching back to China’s Tang dynasty, in which drill – and the volley technique itself – played a central role. The implications for our understanding of global military history are profound. As we learn more about Asian military history, we will increasingly question standard narratives of our global military past.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Michael Roberts, cited in David Eltis, The military revolution in sixteenth-century Europe (London: Tauris & Co., 1998), p. 8.

  2. 2.

    See Bert Hall, Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, technology, and tactics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 149.

  3. 3.

    Geoffrey Parker, The military revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 20.

  4. 4.

    G. Parker, The Cambridge illustrated history of warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 391.

  5. 5.

    Among those who have suggested that Qi Jiguang did not make use of arquebuses in any significant way are Ray Huang and Jean-Marie Gontier. R. Huang, 1587, A year of no significance: The Ming dynasty in decline (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 172, 171; J-M. Gontier, “Qi Jiguang, un stratège de la dynastie Ming, 1528–1587”, Institut de Stratégie Comparée, Commission Française d’Histoire Militaire (2012), chap. 1, part 3.3 and various sections in chap. 2.

  6. 6.

    Willem Lodewijk letter to Maurice of Nassau describing the ‘countermarch’, Dec. 1594, in Koninklijke Huisarchief, The Hague, Manuscript (Ms.) A22-1XE-79, last two pp., cited in Geoffrey Parker, “The limits to revolutions in military affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the legacy”, The Journal of Military History, vol. 71, issue 2 (2007), p. 339.

  7. 7.

    J. Lipsius, De militia romana. Antwerp: Ex officina Plantiniana, apud viduam & filios Ioannis Moreti, 1614. Copy held at Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University. For more on the influence of classical models on European war-making in the early modern period, see M. Scott, “The victory of the ancients: Tactics, technology, and the use of classical precedent”, Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 1992, examination of the musketry volley technique on pp. 116–22.

  8. 8.

    J. de Landtsheer, “Justus Lipsius’s De militia Romana”, in Karl A.E. Enenkel et al. eds., Recreating ancient history (Leiden: Brill, 2002); Peter Dear, “The mechanical philosophy and its appeal”, in Marcus Hellyer, ed., The Scientific Revolution (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 101-29; D. Parrot, The business of war: Military enterprise and military revolution in early modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 97–99; and, most important, G. Parker, “The limits to revolutions in military affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the legacy”, The Journal of military history vol. 71, issue 2 (2007), pp. 331−72.

  9. 9.

    E. van Reyd, Histoire der Nederlantscher Oorlogen begin ende Voortganck tot den Jaere 1601. Leeuwarden: Gilbert Sybes, p. 162. I found this source through the wonderful Parker, “The limits to revolutions in military affairs”.

  10. 10.

    Ms. A22-1XE-79, last two pp.

  11. 11.

    Martin de Equiluz, Milicia Discurso, y Regla Militar, del Capitan Martin de Eguiluz, Bizcayno. Antwerp: Casa Pedro Bellero, 1595, p. 69. I found this source through the excellent Fernando González de León, “Spanish military power and the military revolution”, in Geoff Mortimer ed., Early modern military history, 1450–1815 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 25–42.

  12. 12.

    Parker, “The limits to revolutions in military affairs”, p. 337. He also cites a couple other examples.

  13. 13.

    On the 1522 European battle, see León “Spanish military power and the military revolution”, p. 28. Leon in turn cites C. Oman (A history of the art of war in the sixteenth century. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1937), but I found no clear evidence that that volley fire was occurring. See Oman, A history of the art of war in the sixteenth century, 181. On volley fire at Mohács, see Gábor Ágoston, Guns for the sultan: Military power and the weapons industry in the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 93–94; Gábor Ágoston, “Firearms and military adaptation: The Ottomans and the European military revolution, 1450–1800”, Journal of World History, vol. 25, issue 1 (2014), pp. 16–24; Günhan Börekçi, “A contribution to the military revolution debate: The Janissaries’ use of volley fire during the long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593–1606 and the problem of origins”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, vol. 59, issue 4 (2006), pp. 407–38.

  14. 14.

    See especially G. Nimwegen, G. Nakajima Gakusho, “16 shiji 40 niandai de shuangyu zousi maoyi yu oushi huoqi” [The smuggling on the twin islets and European firearms in the 1540s], in Zheng Fangping and Zhang Jie eds., Zhoushan Puluo yu dongya hai yu wenhua jiaoliu [Zhoushan Puluo and cultural interaction with East Asian sea region] (Zhejiang: Zhejiang University Press, 2009), pp. 100–12, and Parker, “The limits to revolutions in military affairs”. But see also Jan P. Puype, “Victory at Niewupoort, 2 July 1600”, in Marco van der Hoeven eds., Exercise of arms: Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568–1648 (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

  15. 15.

    León, “Spanish military power and the military revolution”, p. 29.

  16. 16.

    Thomas F. Arnold, War in sixteenth-century Europe: Revolution and Renaissance”, in Jeremy Black ed., European warfare, 1453–1815 (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 35.

  17. 17.

    Parker, The Cambridge illustrated history of warfare, p. 3.

  18. 18.

    Matthew Stavros, “Military revolution in early modern Japan”, Japanese Studies, vol. 33, issue 3 (2013), pp. 250–51.

  19. 19.

    Geoffrey Parker, “The artillery fortress as an engine of European overseas expansion, 1480–1750”, in James Tracy ed., City walls: The urban enceinte in global perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 414. See also Parker, The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, pp. 140–41. He and many others have argued that Nobunaga employed the technique in the famous battle of Nagashino in 1575, with three thousand arquebusiers divided into three rows that fired in turn defeating the enemy’s cavalry charges. Stavros, “Military revolution in early modern Japan”, pp. 248–52; Brown, “The impact of firearms on Japanese warfare, 1543–98”, p. 239; Perrin, Giving up the gun: Japan’s reversion to the sword, 1543–1879, pp. 17–20; Haskew et al., Fighting techniques of the oriental world, AD 1200–1860, pp. 54–62, 94 and 189. This is debatable. As two scholars of Japanese history have recently written, “the commonly accepted story that attributes the victory [at Nagashino] to three thousand harquebusiers who, arrayed in three ranks, alternated rank by rank in stepping forward to fire enfilades and rearward to reload their weapons, is a myth”, in Ōta et al., The chronicle of Lord Nobunaga (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 42. In another work, Jeroen Lamers is a bit more circumspect, writing “whether or not Nobunaga actually operated with three rotating ranks cannot be determined on the basis of reliable evidence”. See Jaroen Lamers, Japonius Tyrranus: The Japanese warlord, Oda Nobunaga reconsidered (Leiden: Hotei, 2000). The emphasis on Nagashino perhaps misses the point. There seems little doubt that the Japanese did indeed use the technique at other battles. Thomas D. Conlan, Weapons and fighting techniques of the samurai warrior, 1200–1877 AD (London: Amber Books, 2008), p. 170.

  20. 20.

    Parker, “The limits to revolutions in military affairs”, pp. 336–37.

  21. 21.

    I do elsewhere, in the forthcoming work, The gunpowder age: China, military innovation, and the rise of the West in world history, 900–1900.

  22. 22.

    LBSJ, 242 (Zaji, juan 2 [Mixed entries], Chulian tonglun [Grooming soldiers]).

  23. 23.

    Fan Zhongyi and Tong Xigang, Mingdai wokou shilüe (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), pp. 259–60.

  24. 24.

    JXXS14, p. 56. As one of the anonymous reviewers of this article has pointed out, it is curious that Qi Jiguang emphasises the arquebus’s accuracy. In Europe muskets were considered inaccurate, and tests have suggested that such inaccuracy is inherent to smoothbore ballistics. Is it possible that Qi Jiguang and other East Asian war-makers used rifled muskets? Rifled arquebuses were known in both Europe and East Asia, used for hunting and by snipers. Indeed, the Portuguese gun that famously inspired the Japanese to adopt the musket was a hunting gun and quite possibly rifled. But rifled guns were slower to load than smoothbore arquebuses, because the pellet had to be rammed down the barrel with force. On European battlefields, smoothbore arquebuses were preferred because they were faster to load. Yet we must take seriously Qi Jiguang’s and others’ persistent claims for the accuracy of arquebuses. Other facts, too, raise the possibility of rifling: in East Asia arquebuses and muskets were known as “bird guns” (hunting guns); Qi Jiguang discussed the necessity during loading of driving pellets into the barrel with force (see below); and there are even data about target practice by Korean musketeers during the 17th century that suggest levels of accuracy considerably higher than seems compatible with models of smoothbore ballistics (on those tests, see Kang H.H., “Big heads, bird guns and gunpowder bellicosity: Revolutionizing the Chosŏn military in 17th century Korea”, Undergraduate dissertation, Emory University, Department of History, 2013, pp. 25–26). So it is possible that East Asian musketeers used rifled weapons. It is certainly a topic worthy of future research.

  25. 25.

    It’s important to note that he adopted the arquebus not to counter other arquebuses but the heavy arrows of the enemy. The greater range of the arquebus provided an advantage. LBSJ, p. 241 (Zaji, juan 2, Chulian tonglun).

  26. 26.

    LBSJ, p. 242 (Zaji, juan 2, Chulian tonglun).

  27. 27.

    See, for instance Ray Huang, A Year of no significance, pp. 168–69; I.C. Archer et al., World history of warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 198; S. Turnbull, Pirate of the Far East (Oxford: Osprey, 2012), p. 52; Marvin C. Whiting, Imperial Chinese military history, 8000 BC–1912 AD (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2002), p. 449.

  28. 28.

    Wang Zhaochun has shown how the teams were altered for the conditions of northern China, with more guns and different tactics. See Wang Z.C., Shijie huoqi shi [World history of firearms] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2007), pp. 202–4.

  29. 29.

    I discuss the deep heritage of volley fire – used for crossbows – in two forthcoming works that will be published. The gunpowder age: China, military innovation, and the rise of the West in world history, 900–1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press) and “Late medieval divergences: Comparative perspectives on early gunpowder warfare in Europe and China”, Journal of Medieval Military History.

  30. 30.

    JXXS18, p. 38 (in juan 2).

  31. 31.

    JXXS18, p. 94 (toward the end of juan 8).

  32. 32.

    JXXS14, pp. 136. For more on this 14-juan version of the Jixiao xinshu, see Fan, “Jixiao xinshu shisi juanben de chengshu shijian he neirong” [The compilation of, and content of the 14-chapter Jixiao xinshu], pp. 368–85.

  33. 33.

    JXXS14, pp. 152–53.

  34. 34.

    Carl von Clauswitz, On war (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), especially pp. 119–21. I’m indebted to Sally Paine, who helped clarify Clausewitz’s thought for me.

  35. 35.

    Clausewitz, On War, 122.

  36. 36.

    JXXS14, 124–26.

  37. 37.

    Charles Oman, cited in J. Kelly, Gunpowder: Alchemy, bombards, and pyrotechnics – The history of the explosive that changed the world (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 71.

  38. 38.

    P. Smith, “Meaning and military power: Moving on from Foucault”, Journal of Power, vol. 1, issue 3 (2008), especially ff. 285.

  39. 39.

    JXXS14, p. 59.

  40. 40.

    JXXS14, p. 59.

  41. 41.

    JXXS14, p. 135.

  42. 42.

    JXXS14, p. 135.

  43. 43.

    JXXS14, p. 135.

  44. 44.

    JXXS14, p. 135.

  45. 45.

    See, for example, Haskew et al., Fighting techniques of the oriental world, p. 44.

  46. 46.

    Huang, A year of no significance, pp. 171–72.

  47. 47.

    Gontier, “Qi Jiguang, un stratège de la dynastie Ming, 1528-1587”, ch. 1, section 3.3.

  48. 48.

    LBSJ, 325ff (“Zaji”, juan 6, Chebu qijie [Explaining cooperation between wagon, infantry and cavalry]). See also, Wang, Shijie huoqi shi, p. 147.

  49. 49.

    See Hall, Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, pp. 178–79.

  50. 50.

    See for example, Wang, Shijie huoqi shi, pp. 147–48.

  51. 51.

    JXXS14, pp. 135–36.

  52. 52.

    JXXS14, p. 57.

  53. 53.

    T. Andrade, Lost colony: The untold story of China’s first great victory over the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 191–92, 239, 309–310.

  54. 54.

    Andrade, Lost colony, pp. 130–31.

  55. 55.

    Zhao Shizhen, “Gongjin heji chongshu” [Proposal for the deployment of musket-arquebus], cited in B.W. Nan, “Zhongguo gudai de niaochong yu Riben” [Japan and the niaochong (musket arquebus) of historical China], Shixue jikan, issue 2 (1994), p. 65.

  56. 56.

    Swope, A dragon’s head and a serpent’s tail, pp. 75–77.

  57. 57.

    Nan, “Zhongguo gudai de niaochong yu Riben”, p. 65.

  58. 58.

    Nan, “Zhongguo gudai de niaochong yu Riben”, p. 65.

  59. 59.

    Wu Zhao, “16 zhi 17 shiji Riben huoqi zai Dongya quyu de liubu yu yingxiang kaoshu” [The spread and influence of Japanese firearms in East Asia in the 16th to 17th century] Dongfang luntan, vol. 2 (2013), p. 15.

  60. 60.

    See Kenneth Swope, A dragons head and a serpents tail: Ming China and the first great East Asian war, 1592–1598 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2009), especially pp. 163–64, 125–28 and 246.

  61. 61.

    Li Rusong, cited in Swope, A dragons head and a serpents tail: Ming China and the first great East Asian war, p. 163.

  62. 62.

    On these reforms, see Andrade et al., “A Korean military revolution”; on the victories over the Russians, see Kang, “Big heads and Buddhist demons: The Korean musketry revolution and the northern expeditions of 1654 and 1658”.

  63. 63.

    JXXS14, p. 49.

  64. 64.

    He Rubin, Bing lu [book of military equipment and techniques], 1606, juan 12, cited in Li Yue, “Ming dai huo qi de pu xi” [Firearms system of the Ming peiord], MA dissertation, Dongbei shifan daxue, Department of History, 2012, p. 16. Rubin believed that the reasons had to do with the intense northern winds, which had a tendency to blow the powder out of the musket’s flashpan, as well as with the greater speed of the fast lance, which was less accurate than the musket but much easier to load and thus more effective against mounted adversaries.

  65. 65.

    Nakajima, “16 shiji 40 niandai de shuangyu zousi maoyi yu oushi huoqi”. The collection Nakajima used is Zhu Wan, Biyu zaji [Mixed entries of Biyu], 12 juans, originally published in the Jiajing Period, probably around 1549.

  66. 66.

    Tonio Andrade, The gunpowder age: China, military innovation, and the rise of the West in world history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); “Late medieval divergences: Comparative perspectives on early gunpowder warfare in Europe and China”, Journal of medieval military history, vol. 13 (2015), pp. 247–76.

  67. 67.

    Arnold, “War in sixteenth-century Europe: Revolution and Renaissance”, p. 37.

  68. 68.

    Arnold, “War in sixteenth-century Europe: Revolution and Renaissance”, p. 37.

  69. 69.

    Peter Lorge, The Asian military revolution: From gunpowder to the bomb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 20–22.

  70. 70.

    Parker, The Cambridge illustrated history of warfare, p. 3.

  71. 71.

    Scholar Xu Baolin has noted that there were more than a thousand military treatises published during the Ming period, which seems to be more than any previous comparable period. Most of them were published in the late Ming. See Xu Baolin, Zhongguo bingshu tongjian [Comprehensive reference of military treatises of China] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990), pp. 19–22.

  72. 72.

    W.F. Cook, The Hundred Years War for Morocco: Gunpowder and the military revolution in the early modern Muslim world (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 42.

  73. 73.

    Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, pp. 93–94; Ágoston, “Firearms and military adaptation: The Ottomans and the European military revolution”, pp. 16–24; Börekçi, “A contribution to the military revolution debate”, pp. 407–38.

  74. 74.

    Joseon Wangjo Sillok, juan 118 (1447/11/15), cited in Kang, “Big heads, bird guns and gunpowder bellicosity: Revolutionizing the Chosŏn military in seventeenth century Korea”, pp. 42–43.

  75. 75.

    V. Lieberman, “Protected Rimlands and Exposed Zones: Reconfiguring Premodern Eurasia”. Comparative studies in society and history, vol. 50 (2008); V. Lieberman, Strange parallels Southeast Asia in global context, c. 800–1830, 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003–2009).

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Correspondence to Tonio Andrade .

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I am grateful to the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, Emory University’s College of Arts and Sciences, and the Emory University History Department for helping support the research for this article. I also wish to thank two Emory undergraduates who played a special role in the gestation of this article: Kirsten Cooper and Hyeok Hweon Kang. Kirsten read through the German translation of Qi Jiguang’s manual (Qi Jiguang 1980), and what she found helped inspire me to dive deeply into the Chinese versions of Qi Jiguang’s three main military manuals (JXXS18, JXXS14, and LBSJ). Hyeok Hweon Kang’s research in Korean musketry also proved an inspiration. I am proud that each of these talented young historians is pursuing a Ph.D. I am grateful, finally, to the editors of the Journal of Chinese military history and especially its anonymous reviewers, whose advice greatly improved this article.

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Andrade, T. (2017). The Arquebus Volley Technique in China, c. 1560: Evidence from the Writings of Qi Jiguang. In: Sim, Y. (eds) The Maritime Defence of China. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4163-1_5

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