The Many Roads to Compliance: Explaining the Complexity of Patterns Contributing to Pesticide Compliance

  • Huiqi YanEmail author


So far, all the variables defined and designated in the compliance model have been examined in isolation, and this has provided some good insights into the data. However, it does not allow for a better understanding of the complex interactions and combinations of motivations that may explain compliance.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Public AdministrationCentral South UniversityChangshaChina

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