Setting the Theoretical Framework and Methodology

  • Huiqi YanEmail author


In general, this research uses the empirical data collected to connect theories about how the regulated actors comply with regulatory laws and rules and the factors that affect the regulated actor’s compliance behavior. Before analyzing the regulated actors’ regulatory compliance and compliance motivations, it is necessary to introduce the theoretical and methodological foundations prepared for the whole project.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Public AdministrationCentral South UniversityChangshaChina

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