Abstract
Multitenancy is the biggest advantage of computing, where physical resources are shared among multiple clients. Virtualization facilitates multitenancy with the help of the hypervisor. Cloud providers virtualize the resources like CPU, network interfaces, peripherals, hard drives, and memory using hypervisor. In a virtualization environment, many virtual machines (VMs) can run on the same core with the help of the hypervisor by sharing the resources. The virtual machines (VMs) running on the same core are the target for the malicious or abnormal attacks like side-channel attacks. Cache-based attack in the cloud is one of the side-channel attacks. Cache is one of the resources shared among different VMs on the same core. The attacker can make use cache behavior and can perform the cache-based side-channel attack on the victim. In this paper, we explore different types of cache designs, categories of cache-based side-channel attacks and existing detection and mitigation techniques for cache-based side-channel attacks.
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Ainapure, B.S., Shah, D., Rao, A.A. (2018). Understanding Perception of Cache-Based Side-Channel Attack on Cloud Environment. In: Sa, P., Sahoo, M., Murugappan, M., Wu, Y., Majhi, B. (eds) Progress in Intelligent Computing Techniques: Theory, Practice, and Applications. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 719. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3376-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3376-6_2
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