Abstract
This chapter focuses on at a few selected issues and experiences of Infrastructure PPPs in India. It starts with a brief analysis of Value for Money (VfM) in India’s road sector projects. It then provides three extensive case studies: the Dabhol Power Project; the Delhi Power Distribution experience; and the Delhi International Airport Project to provide an in-depth view of the real-life issues involved with infrastructure PPPs in India.
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Notes
- 1.
In Japan, government guidelines require that the public sector must construct a Public Sector Comparator (PSC) and demonstrate that the PPP option provides better value for money (VfM) before adopting a PPP project. (Source: Grimsey and Lewis 2005).
- 2.
Government of India, Planning Commission (Secretariat for Infrastructure) (2010).
- 3.
This section draws heavily upon Pratap (2011).
- 4.
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2007).
- 5.
In BOT projects, the private sector builds the road, operates it for the contracted period, and then transfers it to the public sector. In return, the private sector receives a fixed amount of money from the government every 6 months, which we call annuity. BOT (toll) projects are similar except that the government allows the private sector to toll the road for the contract period instead of providing annuity.
- 6.
In many low-demand road projects, tolls may not be sufficient to enable financial closure of the project even after availing the maximum possible Viability Gap Funding (40% of the Total Project Cost). Therefore, availability-based annuity payments from the government may be an important means to generate private interest for such projects.
- 7.
National Highways Development Program (NHDP) is the flagship program of the Government of India for road development. The main component of NHDP Phase I is the Golden Quadrilateral Project which connects the four megacities of Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, and Delhi.
- 8.
It is important to choose operational projects as promised benefits may not always materialize. To the extent that there are slippages in implementation, the value for money to the government from PPPs would come down.
- 9.
Column 4 of Tables 2 and 4 shows the project cost estimated by the contracting agency, NHAI. Optimism bias in project estimates arises, inter alia, from underestimating project costs. We assume (conservatively) an optimism bias of 25% in the NHAI estimates on the basis of data on 4 projects [2 BOT (Annuity) projects and 2 BOT (Toll) projects] where the average difference between the project cost estimated by NHAI and the cost at financial closure was 39.5%. These projects are: Nellore Bypass (optimism bias 19%), Maharashtra Border–Belgaum (78%), Nellore–Tada (15%) and Tumkur–Neelmangala (46%).
- 10.
See the Report of the Core Group on Financing of the National Highway Development Program (http://www.pppinindia.com/pdf/NHDP.pdf) for phasing of the construction cost.
- 11.
Report of the Core Group on Financing of the National Highway Development Program (http://www.pppinindia.com/pdf/NHDP.pdf) page 23.
- 12.
Government of India (Department of Road Transport and Highways). Model concession agreement for annuity-based projects (http://www.nhai.org/annuity.pdf).
- 13.
The UK public sector authorities also assessed projects with a 6% real discount rate until recently.
- 14.
Government of India (Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation) (2008).
- 15.
PPPs offer strong incentives to finish the project early, since profits rise with increased annuity payments. Such incentives are usually absent (or weaker) under traditional procurement.
- 16.
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (2008).
- 17.
According to a World Bank study, the average cost overrun in 28 completed national and state highway projects was 24%. (Source: World Bank 2008).
- 18.
Consolidating over 14 studies for UK, Australia, France, and Norway, Bain finds that the average construction cost overrun in PPPs (at 13%) is around half that observed in conventionally procured projects, and the range of outturn costs is significantly narrower. Even the lower construction cost overrun may not represent a risk to the public sector as Bain finds that experienced PPP contractors with strong balance sheets and reputations will complete their obligations as intended and at their own risk. To illustrate the point, Bain says that in the case of the Spencer Street Station PPP in Melbourne, the contractor (Leighton) admitted it had suffered significant losses yet completed the works with no additional payments from the public sector. (Source: Bain 2010).
- 19.
Fitzgerald (2004). In the Fitzgerald study, when the discount rate was reduced from 8.65 to 5.7%, the value for money went down from 9 to −6%.
- 20.
Projects are first bid out on BOT (Toll) basis; if they are unviable on BOT (Toll) basis, they could be implemented on BOT (Annuity) basis. Projects that are not viable on either BOT (Toll) or BOT (Annuity) could be implemented through Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contracts. (See, for example, Lok Sabha unstarred question number 2437 answered on 27 August 2012).
- 21.
Maximum 20% of the Total Project Cost from the Government of India and another 20% from the project sponsoring authority like a state government.
- 22.
According to the Committee on Infrastructure (Government of India), NHAI could put up toll facilities only on 58.7% of 11,037 km of completed highways across the country (as quoted in The Economic Times. May 1, 2009). This percentage has gone up lately with NHAI being able to put up toll facilities on 93% of the 13,911 km of completed highways in the country (Source: National Highways Authority of India 2013). In our sample of 17 BOT projects, while the private sector could put up toll facilities in all 9 BOT (toll) projects, the public sector was able to put up toll facilities on only 4 of the 8 BOT (annuity) projects, with no toll facilities on the following projects: Tuni-Dharmavaram, Dharmavaram-Rajahmundry, Nellore Bypass, and Panagarh-Palsit projects. [Reply to Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) Question No. 1869; replied on December 1, 2009].
- 23.
Out of the 9 BOT (toll) projects considered, one was delivered before time, three were delivered on time, while five suffered a time overrun of an average of 12.2 months. However, in the case of the Satara—Kagal road, out of the overall delay of 21 months, there was delay of nine months in the implementation of additional items of work. If allowance is made for such delays, that are not due to deficient performance of the concessionaire, the time overrun in the case of the entire sample of BOT (toll) projects decreases to just over 2 months. (Source: Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2008).
- 24.
Cost overrun is only applicable to item-rate contracts and not to PPP contracts, whether given on BOT (Toll) or BOT (Annuity) basis. In item-rate contracts, there is a provision of payment of escalation due to delays. In case the PPP project is delayed due to reasons attributable to the contractor, liquidated damages are to be imposed and no escalation is paid. For example, the Total Project Cost (TPC) of Delhi–Gurgaon Highway is Rs. 7.10 billion (Rs. 5.55 billion as per concession agreement and Rs. 1.55 billion as per change of scope of the project) whereas the completion cost to the concessionaire (up to 31 March 2011) is Rs. 14.06 billion as per their balance sheet. But, the concessionaire is liable for all this cost overrun. Escalation is paid only in case where the delay is beyond the control of the concessionaire.
- 25.
Since Government assumes higher risk in BOT (Annuity) projects compared to BOT (Toll) projects, its returns are higher in the case of BOT (Annuity) projects.
- 26.
As we have seen in Chap. 4, the key drivers of VfM have been identified as risk transfer, long-term nature of contracts (including whole life costing), use of an output-based specification, competition, performance measurement and incentives, and private sector management skills. (Source: Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE 2000).
- 27.
As we have seen, there is a negative value for money to the government from NHDP Phase 1 projects. However, when cost overrun in conventional procurement is accounted for (24%; see footnote 18), the overall VfM becomes (+) 3.5%.
- 28.
US House of Representatives (Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform) (2002).
- 29.
In late 1998, MSEB purchased part of Enron’s equity stake, which dropped Enron’s share to 65%. In 2004, GE and Bechtel acquired the bankrupt Enron’s stake in the project for a paltry sum of $23 million to raise their own share to 85%. Since 2005, the entire equity of the project is held by Indian public sector companies and financial institutions.
- 30.
Rao (2001).
- 31.
Prayas Energy Group (2001).
- 32.
Lamb (2006).
- 33.
The Economist (2001).
- 34.
Financial Times. January 12, 2002. The Enron Affair—Shadowy Path to State Approval.
- 35.
As reported in ‘US House of Representatives (Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform) (2002).’
- 36.
Economic and Political Weekly. 2004. Power: Costly Mess.
- 37.
Business Wire (2005).
- 38.
Ministry of Power (2007).
- 39.
As per an answer given by the Indian Minister of Power in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha Unstarred Question number 1509 answered on August 4, 2006).
- 40.
Project Finance International (2008).
- 41.
As per an answer given by the Indian Minister of Power in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha Unstarred Question number 536 answered on Nov 24, 2006).
- 42.
Project Finance International (2005).
- 43.
As per an answer given by the Indian Minister of Power in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha Unstarred Question number 3588 answered on August 25, 2006).
- 44.
As per an answer given by the Indian Minister of Power in the Indian Parliament (Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question number 243 answered on August 13, 2007).
- 45.
As per an answer given by the Indian Minister of Power in the Indian Parliament (Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question number 2871 answered on September 10, 2007).
- 46.
Ministry of Power (2008).
- 47.
CRISIL and ICRA (2006).
- 48.
Annual Report of the Central Electricity Authority of India for FY 2005–2006 (www.cea.nic.in).
- 49.
Government of India (Ministry of Finance) (2008).
- 50.
CRISIL and ICRA (2006).
- 51.
Local currency is Rupees (Rs.). The exchange rate as on 26 August 2016 is US$1 = Rs. 67.03.
- 52.
Reliance Infrastructure subsequently acquired 51% stake in BRPL and BYPL. Besides the three zones that were privatized, Delhi coverage area includes the areas under the New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) and those in the Cantonment served by the Military Engineering Services (MES). NDMC is a Municipal Council entrusted with the responsibility of distribution of electricity to some consumers in the New Delhi area under Sections 195–201 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act (1994). It has obligations of a Licensee under the Electricity Act (2003) in respect of these portions of the New Delhi area. MES is also a deemed Licensee. NDMC and MES provide electricity in these areas as public sector distribution organizations.
- 53.
This political commitment was reflected in, for example, making government entities pay their electricity bills and providing security personnel in law enforcement drives against power theft.
- 54.
A transitional subsidy of Rs. 34.50 billion was provided to the three private distribution companies in the first 5 years of privatization (2002–07). It is likely that the privatization initiative would have failed without this subsidy, unless the government was willing to raise retail power tariffs substantially above politically feasible levels.
- 55.
By 2001, Delhi Vidyut Board’s (the predecessor government-owned utility) total liabilities were more than 6 times its asset base [Source: Kennedy School of Government (2007)]. Over 85% of the existing liabilities were left with the government-owned holding company and only the balance was transferred to the three newly formed distribution companies (Source: Agarwal et al. 2003, p. 2).
- 56.
Net commercial loss of Delhi Vidyut Board in 2001–02 was Rs. 11.96 billion.
- 57.
The only customer segment that is subsidized is the segment that consumes 0–200 units of electricity per month. This is akin to ‘lifeline tariffs’ for this segment. The amount of subsidy is estimated at Rs. 2.50 billion per annum.
- 58.
Now known as Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited (TPDDL).
- 59.
AT&C loss in NDMC area was 11.9% in 2010–11 up from 11.5% in 2005–06.
- 60.
For example, NDPL has invested Rs. 3.50 billion in the first 5 years (2002–07) to upgrade the distribution system in its area.
- 61.
Capital expenditure is being incentivized through the regulatory system as the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) approved capital expenditure earns a return and the over-achievement of AT&C loss reduction targets resulting from such capital expenditure earns extra returns for the discoms. For example, NDPL has claimed that it has achieved the AT&C loss level of 13.1% in FY 2010–11 as against the targeted 17%. NDPL has claimed a total benefit of Rs. 1.32 billion on account of this over-achievement.
- 62.
In the case of NDPL, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) has been implemented for all consumers with demand of 15 kilo Watt (kW) and above, who represent 30,000 users, or about 3% of its total consumer base, but contribute to almost 60% of the revenue. As per an estimate, implementation of AMI for large consumers is the reason for more than 90% of the quantitative achievements of NDPL.
- 63.
In the pre-privatization period (FY 1991–FY2002), there were 6 Tariff Orders and the overall tariff hike was about 15% per annum with the range across consumer categories being 13–18%. In the post-privatization period (FY 2003–FY 2012), there have been 7 Tariff Orders and the tariff hike has been at an average rate of 6.3% per annum.
- 64.
Regulatory assets reflect the unfunded difference between the actual DERC approved costs of discoms and what has been accounted for by DERC in the form of tariff hike. The estimated revenue deficit for FY 2012–13 of the three discoms at the 2011–12 tariff levels is Rs. 14.02 billion, while the accumulated revenue deficit till FY 2010–11 (along with carrying cost) is Rs. 69.19 billion (corresponding numbers for NDPL are Rs. 2.96 billion and Rs. 20.65 billion). Regulatory assets would have to be liquidated through future tariff hikes. Keeping the tariffs low with provision for future hikes would burden the consumers by interest cost which, in any case, has to be recovered from the consumers. Longer the delay, the higher the interest cost.
- 65.
As per the company, BRPL is the only company in India and one of the few companies in the world that uses Optical Download System for downloading meter data.
- 66.
Saxena (2010).
- 67.
The period considered for Delhi is 2001–02 to 2010–11 while for Orissa, the period is 1999–00 to 2009–10.
- 68.
Gassner et al. (2007, p. 3).
- 69.
As per the World Bank-PPIAF Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (ppi.worldbank.org), a project is deemed to have been canceled if one or more of the following events occur before the end of the contract period: the private company physically abandons the project (such as withdrawing all staff); the private company ceases operation or halts construction for 15% or more of the contract’s expected life following the revocation of the license or repudiation of the contract by the relevant authority; the private company sells or transfers its economic interest in the project to the public sector.
- 70.
Delhi Government owns 49% of these companies through the holding company, Delhi Power Company Limited.
- 71.
The debt–equity ratio (a measure of leverage) of the three private Delhi discoms in 2009–10 was BRPL (18), BYPL (13), and NDPL (1.40). The leverage was very high in the case of BRPL and BYPL.
- 72.
Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) was constituted by the Delhi Government on March 3, 1999 and became operational from December 10, 1999. DERC’s approach to regulation is driven by the Delhi Electricity Reform Act (2000), the Electricity Act (2003), the National Electricity Policy (2005), and the Tariff Policy (2006). These Acts mandate the Commission to take measures conducive to the development and management of the electricity industry in an efficient, economic and competitive manner which, inter alia, includes tariff determination.
- 73.
Other norms are: Operation & Maintenance expenses like employee expenses (9%), depreciation (3–4%), Return on Capital Employed (6–7%), and income tax (0.5–1%).
- 74.
Gassner et al. (2007). This study found that, except for electricity concessions, there is no evidence of a systematic change in residential prices as a result of PSP, pointing to the economic and political difficulties in aligning tariffs with the cost of service across the developing world.
- 75.
On 30 June 2010, Chairman, DERC conveyed to Delhi Government that the three private discoms have a surplus of Rs. 35.77 billion that needs to be adjusted through a downward tariff revision in FY 2010–11. On 15 December 2010, DERC sent ‘Statutory Advice’ to Delhi Government acknowledging the resource crunch being faced by Delhi discoms and calling for a tariff increase.
- 76.
High Court of Delhi, Judgment pronounced on 23 May 2011 on WP (C) No. 4821/ 2010 (p 31) [http://delhicourts.nic.in/MAY11/NAND%20KISHORE%20GARG%20VS%20GOVT%20OF%20NCT%20OF%20DELHI.pdf, accessed 30 Dec. 2012].
- 77.
Truing-up exercise is designed to fill the gap between the actual expenses at the end of the year and anticipated expenses estimated at the beginning of the year. Truing-up exercise is necessary as there would always be variation between projections and actuals.
- 78.
Government of India, Ministry of Finance (2011).
- 79.
Letter dated 21 January 2011 from Secretary, Ministry of Power to Chairman, Appellate Tribunal for Electricity.
- 80.
Six states have not revised tariffs for more than 5 years.
- 81.
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, ‘Judgment dated 11 November 2011 in OP No. 1 of 2011’ pp. 85–88 (http://aptel.gov.in/judgements/OP%20NO.1%20OF%202011.pdf, accessed 30 Dec. 2011).
- 82.
Ministry of Power, ‘Tariff Policy’ (6 Jan. 2006), clause 5.3(h)(4) p 7 [http://powermin.nic.in/whats_new/pdf/Tariff_Policy.pdf, accessed 20 April 2013].
- 83.
No surcharge is necessary in case of NDMC where a surplus of about Rs. 4 billion exists as on 31 March 2011.
- 84.
Haldea (2011, pp 159–90).
- 85.
However, as per TPDDL, during 2010–11, as against the standards of performance with regard to percent billing mistakes (0.2%) and percent faulty meters (3%), actual achievement has been 0.03% and 0.34%, which implies that the company has over-achieved even these targets.
- 86.
Airports Council International website (http://www.aci.aero/Airport-Service-Quality/) viewed on 13 July 2014.
- 87.
Government of India, Ministry of Finance (2014).
- 88.
Government of India, Planning Commission (2012).
- 89.
Pandey et al. (2010).
- 90.
Clause 18.1 (b) of OMDA.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Total Project Cost of DIAL (Rs. crore)
Project cost (T1, T2, and T3) | Project cost as per approved master development plan | Project cost at the time of financial closure | Final project cost as per DIAL |
|---|---|---|---|
Airfield (Runway, Taxiways, etc.) | 368.80 | 1,765 | 2,634 |
Apron | 252.50 | ||
Passenger Terminals (including City side access roads, bridges, etc.) | 4,098.40 | 4,669 | 6,836 |
Cargo Terminals | 22 | Nil | Nil |
Airport Service Building and Airport Connection Building | Nil | Nil | 160 |
General Aviation Terminal | 130 | 762 | 754 |
Rebuilding of Terminal 1B and Revamping Arrival Terminal | 340 | ||
Revamping of Terminal 2 | 105 | ||
Total Hard Costs | 5,316.70 | 7,196 | 10,384 |
Preliminaries and Other Overheads | 244 | 1,279 | 1,320 |
Funding Costs (IDC and Lenders Fee) | 534 | ||
Contingency | 512 | ||
Upfront Fee paid to AAI | 150 | 150 | 150 |
Metro | Nil | 350 | 350 |
Rehabilitation of Runway 10–28 | Nil | Nil | 110 |
Delhi Jal Board Infrastructure Funding | Nil | Nil | 54 |
New ATC Tower with Equipment | Nil | Nil | 350 |
Security Capex | Nil | Nil | 139 |
Total Project Cost | 6,756.70 | 8,975 | 12,857 |
Appendix 2: Consolidated Financials for DIAL from FY2011 to 2013
Unless otherwise specified, all monetary values are in Rs. crore
31/03/2013 | 31/03/2012 | 31/03/2011 | |
|---|---|---|---|
Balance sheet [Abstract] | |||
Equity and liabilities [Abstract] | |||
Shareholders’ funds [Abstract] | |||
Share capital | 2,450.00 | 2,450.00 | 2,450.00 |
Reserves and surplus | −1,380.69 | −1,453.21 | −367.81 |
Total shareholders’ funds | 1,069.31 | 996.79 | 2,082.19 |
Share application money pending allotment | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Non-current liabilities [Abstract] | |||
Long-term borrowings | 6,047.92 | 5,740.94 | 5,229.90 |
Other long-term liabilities | 2,149.30 | 2,183.21 | 2,409.43 |
Long-term provisions | 89.55 | 108.57 | 118.48 |
Total non-current liabilities | 8,286.77 | 8,032.72 | 7,757.81 |
Current liabilities [Abstract] | |||
Short-term borrowings | 0.00 | 856.50 | 600.00 |
Trade payables | 472.33 | 233.35 | 182.53 |
Other current liabilities | 2,087.75 | 2,134.43 | 1,896.95 |
Short-term provisions | 39.22 | 35.79 | 23.29 |
Total current liabilities | 2,599.30 | 3,260.07 | 2,702.77 |
Total equity and liabilities | 11,955.38 | 12,289.58 | 12,542.77 |
Assets [Abstract] | |||
Non-current assets [Abstract] | |||
Fixed assets [Abstract] | |||
Tangible assets | 8,913.60 | 9,078.93 | 9,836.80 |
Intangible assets | 461.90 | 473.07 | 448.48 |
Tangible assets capital work-in-progress | 47.74 | 124.33 | 86.79 |
Total fixed assets | 9,423.24 | 9,676.33 | 10,372.07 |
Non-current investments | 182.59 | 177.86 | 155.45 |
Long-term loans and advances | 97.59 | 128.99 | 197.62 |
Other non-current assets | 892.20 | 717.67 | 16.83 |
Total non-current assets | 10,595.71 | 10,700.85 | 10,741.97 |
Current assets [Abstract] | |||
Current investments | 109.00 | 52.61 | 145.65 |
Inventories | 9.59 | 9.47 | 2.72 |
Trade receivables | 524.80 | 245.43 | 125.21 |
Cash and bank balances | 241.28 | 309.44 | 290.10 |
Short-term loans and advances | 71.88 | 89.62 | 316.37 |
Other current assets | 403.12 | 882.16 | 920.75 |
Total current assets | 1,359.67 | 1,588.73 | 1,800.80 |
Total assets | 11,955.38 | 12,289.58 | 12,542.77 |
Unless otherwise specified, all monetary values are in Rs. crore
01/04/2012 to 31/03/2013 | 01/04/2011 to 31/03/2012 | 01/04/2010 to 31/03/2011 | |
|---|---|---|---|
Statement of Profit and Loss [Abstract] | |||
Disclosure of revenue from operations [Abstract] | |||
Disclosure of revenue from operations for other than finance company [Abstract] | |||
Revenue from sale of products | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Revenue from sale of services | 3155.91 | 1409.17 | 1164.10 |
Other operating revenues | 88.12 | 83.46 | 79.05 |
Total revenue from operations other than finance company | 3244.03 | 1492.63 | 1243.15 |
Total revenue from operations | 3244.03 | 1492.63 | 1243.15 |
Other income | 80.85 | 38.32 | 18.52 |
Total revenue | 3324.88 | 1530.95 | 1261.67 |
Expenses [Abstract] | |||
Cost of materials consumed | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Changes in inventories of finished goods, work-in-progress and stock-in-trade | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Employee benefit expense | 119.56 | 142.61 | 139.34 |
Finance costs | 657.46 | 681.02 | 331.73 |
Depreciation, depletion and amortization expense [Abstract] | |||
Depreciation expense | 399.87 | 412.07 | 254.47 |
Amortization expense | 14.32 | 14.38 | 13.89 |
Total depreciation, depletion and amortization expense | 414.19 | 426.45 | 268.36 |
Other expenses | 2074.15 | 1190.30 | 1000.00 |
Total expenses | 3265.36 | 2440.38 | 1739.43 |
Total profit before prior period items, exceptional items, extraordinary items and tax | 59.52 | −909.43 | −477.76 |
Prior period items before tax | 13.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Exceptional items before tax | 0.00 | −162.12 | 0.00 |
Total profit before extraordinary items and tax | 72.52 | −1071.55 | −477.76 |
Total profit before tax | 72.52 | −1071.55 | −477.76 |
Tax expense [Abstract] | |||
Current tax | – | 13.85 | 0.00 |
Deferred tax | 0.00 | 0.00 | −27.56 |
Total tax expense | 0.00 | 13.85 | −27.56 |
Total profit (loss) for period from continuing operations | 72.52 | −1085.40 | −450.20 |
Total profit (loss) for period before minority interest | 72.52 | −1085.40 | −450.20 |
Total profit (loss) for period | 72.52 | −1085.40 | −450.20 |
Earnings per equity share [Abstract] | |||
Basic earnings per equity share [INR/shares] | 0.30 | −4.43 | −3.57 |
Diluted earnings per equity share [INR/shares] | 0.30 | −4.43 | −3.57 |
Nominal value of per equity share [INR/shares] | 10.00 | 10.00 | 10.00 |
Appendix 3: Growth of Indian Civil Aviation Sector
1960–61 | 1970–71 | 1980–81 | 1990–91 | 1999–00 | 2004–05 | 2008–09 | 2009–10 | 2010–11 | 2011–12 | 2012–2013 | 2013–14 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1. Total fleet strength | ||||||||||||
(i) Air India | 13 | 10 | 17 | 24 | 26 | 36 | ||||||
(ii) Indian Airlines | 88 | 73 | 49 | 56 | 53 | 60 | ||||||
(iii) Air India Ltd. (Erstwhile National Aviation Company of India Limited) | 108 | 113 | 98 | 9t | 95 | 99f | ||||||
2. Revenue ton-Kilometers ₹ (crore) (i) Air India | 7.56 | 27.52 | 98.01 | 138.10 | 145.65 | 221.80 | ||||||
(ii) Indian Airlines | 10.0 | 20.00 | 40.03 | 69.92 | 74.03 | 101.73 | ||||||
(iii) Air India Ltd. (Erstwhile National Aviation Company of India Limited) | 328.40 | 353.30 | 367.70 | 360.30 | 3346 | 3910.00 | ||||||
3. Number of passengers carried (Lakh) (i)Air India | 1.25 | 4.87 | 14.18 | 21.61 | 33.50 | 44.40 | ||||||
(ii) Indian Airlines | 7.90 | 21.30 | 54.29 | 78.66 | 59.30 | 71.32 | ||||||
(iii) Air India Ltd. (Erstwhile National Aviation Comapany of India Limited) | 117.80 | 117.50 | 127.80 | 134.30 | 141.83 | 154.06 | ||||||
4. Passengers handled at (Lakh) | ||||||||||||
AAI Airports | N.A. | N.A. | 107.38 | 177.23 | 390.35 | 592.84 | 442.54 | 508.71 | 596.43 | 684.00 | 683.87 | 717.8 |
Joint Venture Int’I Airports | 646.16 | 72884 | 837.87 | 939.00 | 910.14 | 972.68 | ||||||
Total at Indian Airports | 1088.70 | 1237.6 | 1434.3 | 1623.10 | 1594 | 1690.48 | ||||||
5. Cargo handled at AAI Airports (Thousand tons) | ||||||||||||
AAI Airports Joint Venture | N.A. | N.A. | 178.70 | 377.3 | 797.41 | 1278.47 | 561.42 | 592.95 | 726.52 | 703.43 | 650.41 | 636.48 |
Int’I Airports | 1140.57 | 1366.76 | 1621.92 | 1576.56 | 1540.14 | 1641.13 | ||||||
Total at Indian Airports | 1701.99 | 1959.71 | 2348.44 | 2279.99 | 2190.55 | 2277.91 |
Source Government of India (Ministry of Finance) (2014)
Appendix 4: Revenues and Net Income of Delhi Airport
Appendix 5: Timeline of the Delhi Airport PPP
11 September 2003 | Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) set up to decide on key issues regarding privatization of Mumbai and Delhi airports |
|---|---|
October 2003 | Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) sets up the Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) to assist the EGoM |
December 2003 | IMG appoints ABN AMRO Bank as the Financial Consultant |
February 2004 | Issue of invitation to register Expression of Interest |
May 2004 | General Elections in India. Incumbent NDA defeated and UPA comes to power |
June 2004 | EGoM reconstituted |
June 2004 | Air Plan, Australia appointed as the Global Technical Advisor, AMSS as Legal Consultants and TVA as accounting and tax advisor. FC, GTA and LC grouped as Evaluation Committee (EC) under the chairmanship of Executive Director, Airports Authority of India (AAI) |
October 2004 | IMG reconstituted |
April 2005 | Commencement of RFP stage with the release of RFP documents and draft transaction documents |
August 2005 | Issue of final transaction documents |
September 2005 | Submission of bids by parties; commencement of evaluation by EC |
November 2005 | EC submits evaluation report; only two consortia pass qualification threshold of 80%—GMR-Fraport and Reliance-ASA |
November 24, 2005 | Evaluation Report of EC sent to GRC for independent review of evaluation undertaken by EC |
December 2, 2005 | IMG meeting to discuss issues raised in the EC’s evaluation but no consensus achieved |
December 5, 2005 | MoCA informs all bidders that no one had been disqualified on technical grounds and that all technical bids will be reevaluated based on comments by the IMG and GRC |
December 14, 2005 | EC submits revised evaluations to the IMG and the EGoM |
December 21, 2005 | EGoM reviews results of the IMG Meeting and decides to set up CoS to help prepare final recommendations. CoS in turn sets up GETE headed by E Sreedharan |
January 2006 | GETE submits final score with GMR-Fraport as the only qualifying consortium; recommends no further bids |
January 24, 2006 | EGoM reviews GETE report, decides to award Delhi airport to GMR-Fraport, but at highest bid price |
January 31, 2006 | Financial bids opened; Delhi awarded to GMR-Fraport |
April 4, 2006 | AAI signs OMDA with DIAL |
May 3, 2006 | AAI hands over IGI Airport to DIAL on “as is where is” basis |
2008 | AERA established to regulate the economic aspects of airports |
2010 | Modernized IGI Airport opened to traffic |
2012 | CAG comes out with its audit report on IGI Airport |
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Pratap, K.V., Chakrabarti, R. (2017). Analysis and Case Studies of a Few Infrastructure PPPs in India. In: Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure . India Studies in Business and Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3355-1_11
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