Clarifying Conversations: Understanding Cultural Difference in Philosophical Education



The goal of this essay is to explain how Wittgenstein’s philosophy may be helpful for understanding and addressing challenges to cross-cultural communication in educational contexts . In particular, the notions of “hinge,” “intellectual distance,” and “grounds” from On Certainty will be helpful for identifying cultural differences . Wittgenstein’s dialogical conception of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations will be helpful for addressing that cultural difference in conversation. While here can be no panacea to address all potential sources of confusion, Wittgenstein’s philosophy has strong resources that are helpful for curbing some of our human tendencies to misunderstand another person.


Wittgenstein Certainty Communication Cultural differences Education 


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Chinese University of Hong KongShenzhenChina

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