Skip to main content

Davidson’s Paratactic Approach

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Theories of Intensionality
  • 299 Accesses

Abstract

One prominent version of sententialism is Donald Davidson’s paratactic account. Davidson provided a novel approach to the analysis of indirect quotation statements.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Of course, one may still have concerns about how it is that a brain state may ‘samesay’ an utterance. But this problem is not strictly relevant to the problem of analysing quantified attitude reports, as in such cases there will be no utterance of a content sentence which will need to ‘samesay’ a brain state.

References

  • Arnauld, B. R. (1976). Sentences, utterance, and samesayer. Noûs, 10(3), 283–304.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1978). Belief and synonymy. The Journal of Philosophy, 75(3), 119–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1984a). On saying that. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation (pp. 93–108). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1984b). Thought and talk. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation (pp. 155–170). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lepore, E., & Loewer, B. (1989). You can say that again. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 14(1), 339–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lepore, E., & Ludwig, K. (Eds.). (2013). A companion to Donald Davidson. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. (1973). Davidson on saying that. Analysis, 33(4), 138–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1971). Quantifiers and propositional attitudes. In L. Linsky (Ed.), Reference and modality (pp. 101–111). London: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiffer, S. (1987). Remnants of meaning. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segal, G., & Speas, M. (1986). On Saying ðǝ†. Mind and Language, 1(2), 124–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, K. (1998). Truth and meaning: An introduction to the philosophy of language. London: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to David Parsons .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Parsons, D. (2016). Davidson’s Paratactic Approach. In: Theories of Intensionality . Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2484-9_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics