Abstract
This chapter examines the operational implications of rationality concepts. First, we introduce various types of rationality concepts and examine their relationship. We emphasize how they can be represented by operators over binary relations. Second, we introduce and examine the concept of a choice function, which is a consequence of operations over some binary relation. Third, we discuss extensions of a binary relation.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Bossert and Suzumura (2010 ) also divide properties of binary relations into two classes: the first is the class of richness properties, and the second is the class of coherence properties. Basically, the class of simple properties corresponds to richness properties, and the class of composite properties corresponds to coherence properties . However, the correspondence is an approximate one. First, symmetry, asymmetry, and antisymmetry are simple, but it is difficult to regard them as richness properties. Second, semi-transitivity and the interval-order property are composite properties, but they also have some aspects in common with richness properties.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
The money-pump argument is attributed to Raiffa (1968).
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
See Sen (1970).
- 10.
- 11.
In strong path independence, only triplets are considered to be path independent. Bandyopadhyay (1988) considers more general choice procedures for each menu \(A \subseteq X\).
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
Hansson (1968) provides the formal proof.
- 15.
Moore (1982 ) provides an introduction to the axiom of choice and related subjects.
- 16.
Aliprantis and Border (2006 ) explain the implications and significance of Zorn’s Lemma.
- 17.
- 18.
Inada (1954 ) provides an alternative proof of Arrow’s extension theorem.
- 19.
Arrow (1951) assumes that \(R|_A \subseteq \Delta \). That is, his assumptions are stated as follows: Let R be a quasi ordering on X, let \(A \subseteq X\) be such that \(R|_A \subseteq \Delta \), and let \(R'\) be a ordering on A. Note that \(R'\) is an extension of \(R|_A\) since \(R'\) is complete on A. Then, Proposition 3.10 is a generalization of Arrow’s result. Our proof is modeled after Cato (2012a), which presents an alternative proof of Arrow’s result.
- 20.
A binary relation R is monotonic if, for all \(x,y \in X\),
$$ x \ge y \Rightarrow (x,y) \in R. $$.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
Sen (1995) also discusses the significance of preferences in this class.
- 24.
See Debreu (1954).
- 25.
Scott and Suppes (1958 ) provides the representation theorem.
- 26.
- 27.
References
Aliprantis, C. D., & Border, K. C. (2006). Infinite dimensional analysis: A hitchhiker’s guide (3rd ed.). Berlin: Springer.
Andrikopoulos, A. (2007). A representation of consistent binary relations. Spanish Economic Review, 9(4), 299–307.
Armstrong, W. E. (1939). The determinateness of the utility function. The Economic Journal, 49(195), 453–467.
Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choice and individual values. New York: Wiley. (2nd ed. 1963).
Bandyopadhyay, T. (1988). Revealed preference theory, ordering and the axiom of sequential path independence. The Review of Economic Studies, 55(2), 343–351.
Blau, J. H. (1979). Semiorders and collective choice. Journal of Economic Theory, 21(1), 195–206.
Bossert, W., & Suzumura, K. (2010). Consistency, choice and rationality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bossert, W., Sprumont, Y., & Suzumura, K. (2005). Consistent rationalizability. Economica, 72(286), 185–200.
Bradley, R. (2015). A note on incompleteness, transitivity and Suzumura consistency. In C. Binder, G. Codognato, M. Teschl, & Y. Xu (Eds.), Individual and collective choice and social welfare (pp. 31–47). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Cato, S. (2012a). Szpilrajn, arrow and suzumura: Concise proofs of extension theorems and an extension. Metroeconomica, 63(2), 235–249.
Cato, S. (2012b). A note on the extension of a binary relation on a set to the power set. Economics Letters, 116(1), 46–48.
Cato, S. (2014). Menu dependence and group decision making. Group Decision and Negotiation, 23(3), 561–577.
Debreu, G. (1954). Representation of a preference ordering by a numerical function. In R. Thrall, C. Coombs, & R. Davis (Eds.), Decision Processes (pp. 159–166). New York: Wiley.
Duggan, J. (1999). A general extension theorem for binary relations. Journal of Economic Theory, 86(1), 1–16.
Fishburn, P. C. (1973). Interval representations for interval orders and semiorders. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 10(1), 91–105.
Fishburn, P. C. (1975). Semiorders and choice functions. Econometrica, 43(5/6), 975–977.
Fishburn, P. C. (1997). Generalizations of semiorders: A review note. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 41(4), 357–366.
Hansson, B. (1968). Choice structures and preference relations. Synthese, 18(4), 443–458.
Inada, K. I. (1954). Elementary proofs of some theorems about the social welfare function. Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, 6(1), 115–122.
Iritani, J., Kamo, T., & Nagahisa, R. I. (2013). Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(1), 155–171.
Luce, R. D. (1956). Semiorders and a theory of utility discrimination. Econometrica, 24(2), 178–191.
Moore, G. H. (1982). Zermelo’s axiom of choice: Its origins, development, and influence (Vol. 8). Studies in the history of mathematics and physical sciences. New York: Springer.
Moulin, H. (1985). Choice functions over a finite set: A summary. Social Choice and Welfare, 2(2), 147–160.
Ok, E. A. (2002). Utility representation of an incomplete preference relation. Journal of Economic Theory, 104(2), 429–449.
Plott, C. R. (1973). Path independence, rationality, and social choice. Econometrica, 41(6), 1075–1091.
Raiffa, H. (1968). Decision analysis, reading. Mass: Addison-Wesley.
Scott, D., & Suppes, P. (1958). Foundational aspects of theories of measurement. Journal of Symbolic logic, 23(2), 113–128.
Sen, A. K. (1969). Quasi-transitivity, rational choice and collective decisions. Review of Economic Studies, 36(3), 381–393.
Sen, A. K. (1970). Collective choice and social welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day.
Sen, A. K. (1993). Internal consistency of choice. Econometrica, 61(3), 495–521.
Sen, A. K. (1995). Rationality and social choice. American Economic Review, 85(1), 1–24.
Suzumura, K. (1976). Remarks on the theory of collective choice. Economica, 43(172), 381–390.
Suzumura, K. (1983). Rational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suzumura, K. (2004). An extension of Arrow’s lemma with economic applications. COE-RES Discussion Paper Series (Vol. 79).
Szpilrajn, S. (1930). Sur l’extension de l’ordre partiel. Fundamenta Mathematicae, 16, 386–389.
Tyson, C. J. (2008). Cognitive constraints, contraction consistency, and the satisficing criterion. Journal of Economic Theory, 138(1), 51–70.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Development Bank of Japan
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cato, S. (2016). Rationality and Operators. In: Rationality and Operators. SpringerBriefs in Economics(). Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1896-1_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1896-1_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-10-1895-4
Online ISBN: 978-981-10-1896-1
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)