1 Introduction to the Simulation

The purpose of this paper is to develop a multilayered view of the rules of gaming for and simulations of international politics, especially with respect to the changeability of rules through the exercise and analysis of a game and simulation about the 2010 Senkaku boat collision incident.

Games and simulating international politics can be traced back to board games that copied and abstracted battles, such as the games go, shogi, and chess, although these games are mainly for entertainment. The use of games and simulations, such as for academic research efforts and exercises, has mainly been led at universities and institutes in the United States since World War II. Models of gaming and simulations reached their peak in the 1960s but declined in the 1970s because of issues with the validity. On the other hand, in the United States and other countries, gaming and simulations are still used as education and policy-making tools at universities and institutions.

Many kinds of games and simulations of international politics are recognized today (cf. Loggins, 2009, pp. 401–407), and most use fixed rules. However, can we think of another type of gaming and simulations? Actors, such as states and persons, and systems mutually influence each other and work in dynamic ways, not only in international politics but also in society. Thus, rules and institutions are not continuous forever; they are changeable and evolving. Actors influence systems; systems are changed, and they change actors at the same time.

Based on real society and international relations, can gaming and simulations use changeable rules? The “Senkaku game” discussed below is a trial of a history retrospection and a repeated type of gaming and simulation with this ability. We call this type of gaming and simulation repeated and retrospective (R&R) type of simulation game.

The Senkaku game is a simulation of a series of occurrences involving the arrest and indictment of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat by Japan in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (hereinafter the Senkaku Islands), which occurred in 2010. The actors are Japan, China, and the United States, which also serves as chairperson. The goal is to reproduce an incident that actually occurred in a simulation game. Secret goals and restrictions are given to each actor. The simulation game is conducted to follow the rules.

A feature of this simulation game is that the rules change to reproduce the incident, but the actors themselves do not change. This is a rule-oriented type of simulation game. As players also learn the situations, of course, a change of rules alone does not necessarily result in a change to an actor’s actions. However, the main purpose of this simulation game is to change the external conditions of the framework.

This kind of rule-oriented view is another approach to gaming and simulationFootnote 1 based on the tendency of games and simulations to copy reality by bringing actors close to reality. For example, Hermann and Hermann (1967, pp. 400– 416; Hermann 1989, pp. 365–380) carried out a simulation game about the outbreak of World War I. They used psychological tests and chose players whose personalities resembled those of major political leaders to try to control the simulation game through the actors’ behavior. Of course, this is a usual type of approach to simulation games of international politics. However, we can seek another type of simulation gaming.

Although the Senkaku game was not created from such a viewpoint at first, the players received opportunities to think about the relations among rules, systems, and actors from rule-oriented view.

We would like to discuss the Senkaku game and the results of one exercise of the game, as well as an analysis of IR theories. We argue that simulation games with changeable and evolving rules have multiple levels.

2 The Repeated and Retrospective (R&R) Type of Simulation

Game on the Diplomacy Surrounding the Senkaku Boat Collision Incident in September 2010

2.1 Historical Background of the 2010 Collision Incident

The islands that the Japanese government calls the Senkaku Islands, which their Chinese and Taiwanese counterparts call Diaoyu-Tai (Diaoyu-Yu) and Diaoyu-Shan (Diaoyu Dao), are located in the East China Sea. China, Japan, and Taiwan have each claimed territorial sovereignty over the islands, especially since 1971.Footnote 2 The territory consists of eight small islands that are now uninhabited, although Japanese people lived on them in the past. Taiwan and China have insisted on their legitimacy in claiming territorial sovereignty over the islands because of an annexation based on the peace treaty that ended the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Japan has insisted that the islands have always been an inherent part of Okinawa Prefecture. Many fishing boats operate near the islands, and some Chinese and Taiwanese fishing boats have operated in the vicinity under de facto Japanese control.

On September 7, 2010, a fishing trawler from mainland China was fishing near the islands when it collided with a boat from the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). The JCG arrested the captain of the ship, but both sides claimed that the other intentionally caused the collision. Two days later, the JCG sent the captain of the ship to a district prosecutor, in order to be charged with obstruction of a public officer.

China urged Japan to immediately release the captain and his crew, but on September 10, the local public prosecutor’s office extended the captain’s detention. Because of this situation, China canceled some diplomatic meetings with Japan, even though the trawler and the other crew members besides the captain had been released. Opposing his detention, China detained four Japanese businesspersons of a Japanese corporation in China for allegedly filming military targets. On September 24, Japan released the captain, and on October 9, all of the Japanese businesspersons were released by China. In November, a video of the collision was leaked to YouTube.

During this period, the heads of the two states took part in international conferences, including the UN General Assembly in New York City, the ASEM in Brussels, and the G20 Meeting in Seoul, but there were no bilateral meetings with fruitful results on this issue. For the success of the APEC meeting in Yokohama (November 2010), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan felt that it was imperative not to let the Chinese president cancel the Yokohama meeting because of the collision. Additionally, the Japanese economy depended on Chinese markets and materials, especially rare metals from China. On the other hand, both for China and Japan, the disputes over the island become more and more insoluble because the patriotic passion surrounding the issue grew in each nation year by year.

2.2 Game Rules (Rules for the First Time Playing)

2.2.1 Actors

The actors shall be the three states, Japan, China, and the United States (who must also serve as chairperson). They shall completely exclude internal actors (provincial or bureaucracy levels of government, media, NGOs, companies, specialists or civilians, etc.) according to their respective, rationally selected models of international politics. However, the interests of these internal groups are embedded to some degree in secret goals and conditions (see the Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1 Proceedings of the game ※ each round, the order of the presentation of state actors is as follows: Japan → China → United States
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Table 2 Acquired point for both states
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2.2.2 Educational Goal of This Game

The purpose of this game is to let students play the roles of the state actors that negotiated with each other regarding this issue; as if they were working inside the state actor, they will know the vital and changing national interests and perceptions. Additionally, we call this type of gaming “repeated and retrospective” (R&R). In R&R-type games, the students first play the game. Upon review, they will consider the gap between the gameplay and history. Then, they will alter the rules of the game and play again. Through this repetition process, the students are expected to approach the historical facts they perceive, and the rules of the game itself will become more perfect.

Based on the reality they perceive, this game belongs to the category of “incomplete” games, in which players do not know the others’ goals, interests, or restrictions. The goals are kept secret. However, after the second game, the players will change the actors’ goals and restrictions based on each stage of the history, making this a “rule-generating” game.

2.2.3 Running the Simulation in the Past

This game was first run in December 2010. After the first trial, the players innovated new rules; since then, this game has been played annually in the Seminar (International Politics) class and the Crisis Management Simulation class. The next chapter is based on the March 2015 playing of the game in the seminar.

3 The Students’ Completed Games

In this chapter, we will explain the games played by the students and analyze these games in view of international relations theories.

3.1 The First Play of the Game by Students

This simulation was a role-playing game in which each student played an actor: Japan, China, or the United States. Each player responded to the other states and calculated its points on each turn. Finally, each player’s points were compared during the final stage, and then it was decided which state had won.

In the first round, Japan arrested the captain and his crew, and China demanded their release. Japan prosecuted the captain and never released him until the third round. China imposed economic, cultural, and diplomatic sanctions against Japan as countermeasures and demanded that the crew not be prosecuted again. China also detained four Japanese businesspersons on suspicion of spying.

At a US–Japan summit meeting at the General Assembly Meeting of the United Nations in New York, Japan demanded a US–Japan joint declaration by the United States that the Senkaku Islands were included in the area covered by the US–Japan Security Treaty, and the United States promised to take the appropriate steps. In the Japan–China negotiations, Japan requested the attendance of Chinese President Hu Jintao at the APEC summit held in Yokohama. China replied that Japan must be willing to release the captain and his crew; if not willing, China would impose further sanctions on Japan. Both Japan and China had not made promises then, and their requests were parallel. They faced the same situation during the secret negotiations. Japan desired to exchange the Chinese captain for the Japanese businesspersons who were detained in China. China replied and demanded again not only the release of the captain and his crew but also the discontinuation of the inspection of the Senkaku Islands by Mr. Nakaima, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture, as well as a declaration of nondisclosure for the video that depicted the attack on the Japanese Coast Guard by the Chinese fishing boat.

This meant that Japan would not diminish its point by releasing the captain and his crew. In contrast to Japan, because China had failed to release the captain and his crew, China also failed to prove its position at that phase. At this point, China’s diplomatic and political options were restricted. At last, in the Policy Development phase, Japan avoided a strict promise. China was disappointed; therefore, China decided and declared not to end the sanctions.

The diplomatic negotiations continued with the Japan–China negotiation phase in the fourth round and the Hawaii and Hanoi summits in the fifth round. In all of the phases, Japan demanded the release of the businesspersons and an end to the sanctions, while China insisted on the release of the captain and his crew. In the Hawaii summit meeting between Japan and the United States, the United States declared again that the Senkaku Islands were included in the area covered by the US–Japan Security Treaty. After the declaration, China had no other diplomatic or political options. Although Japan eventually failed to be visited by President Hu at APEC in Yokohama, the Japanese point total was +31 and the Chinese point total was −35, and thus Japan won. This was quite a different outcome from the historical reality.

3.2 Follow-Up Meeting with the Students and the Second Game

In the follow-up meeting, two main opinions were pointed out by the players. Student A, who played as China, said that the players of this game were only political actors, so Japan could lead the game because of the arrest of the captain and other crew members. China could only use sanctions as a diplomatic card, so this was not a favorable condition for China. Student B pointed out the important role of economic actors. To improve the game, it would be necessary to introduce economic actors and economic factors into the game. The other opinion was that the United States in this game was a one-sided actor, which was unfair to China, and that the United States could declare the “alliance card” many times. For the game to become realistic, restricting the frequency it could be declared was important and necessary.

Student C pointed out that the economic dimension is important because almost all states, including Japan and China, are part of the worldwide system of economic interdependence. None of the states can stand alone. If a dispute should happen and the current economic situation should end, the economy should be damaged not for one state but for both states because of their interdependence. Thus, the game should have introduced the economic factor of interdependence.

Following the discussions, the rules of the game were revised. First, to maintain continuity and lift up the political thresholds (the condition of the gameover) of each side, a censure motion against the Japanese Prime Minister being adopted in the Diet would automatically result in −40 points, while the downfall of the Chinese political threshold would automatically result in −50 points. Second, China could impose diplomatic, economic, and cultural sanctions as countermeasures against Japan. In the first game, these sanctions were imposed at the same time, but their sanctions could be chosen separately under the new rules. The choices were not only sanctions but also included the restriction of Japanese businesspersons. Third, the US–Japan joint declaration of the area covered by the US–Japan Security Treaty could be made only once during the game and only at the Hawaii meeting. Furthermore, to introduce the dimension of economic interdependence to the game, if both states refused to compromise, their points would decrease every round.

The game was short the second time. Although it proceeded with the same situation as the first game until the Hawaii summit, it suddenly finished at that time. The Japanese government kept the captain detained, and China’s points kept decreasing. Finally, at the Hawaii summit, the United States declared the application of the Security Treaty over the islands, and then China’s points dropped to −50. In the second game, China lost again.

3.3 Analysis from the Perspective of International Relations Theory

This incident took place in the East China Sea between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. Unlike the recent European continent, East Asia has been under the Cold War. There have been many conflicts between China, the Philippines, and Vietnam, not only in the East China Sea but also in the South China Sea, along what is called the “Nine-Dotted Line.” Because of the similar international situations in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, this case has universal applicability to the East and Southeast Asian states.

Constructivists such as Karl Deutsch, Emanuel Adler, and Michael N. Barnett have pointed out that the security community structure on the European continent and all states that contribute to European regional organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), prevents many incidents by following certain norms (Adler and Barnett 1998). Each state can imagine other states’ behaviors easily. A game that is played by European states is not a game with imperfect information, since they can solve disputes under certain norms (Switky 2004).Footnote 3

Therefore, under circumstances in which norms are shared by actors, the possibility of solving these conflicts will increase because conflicts tend to arise over means, not values.Footnote 4 Also, in the OSCE, all ambassadors attend Permanent Council meetings in Vienna once a week, so even if a conflict happens, all participating states can contact other states easily. This is a kind of confidence-building measure (CBM) that helps European states solve their conflicts easily.

In the Asian region, there is no comprehensive security mechanism or security community; instead, there are only hub-and-spoke systems like the United States and Japan, the United States and South Korea, and China and North Korea.

Under this regime, these states have no common understanding about conflicts and do not share norms. If a certain conflict happens, it becomes a conflict about values-6 and tends to last longer.

In this simulation game, both Japan and China were pursued to promote their national interests to the maximum. In this situation, both state had few incentives to compromise on the conflict, and they failed to reach an agreement to solve the conflict. Because the damage to China if it compromised with Japan would be relatively high and the only card China had was to restrict Japanese businesspersons on suspicion of spying, they had no possibility of winning by compromising with Japan.

In Asia, there are no organizations that hold regular meetings like the OSCE, and there are limited chances for nations to keep in touch with each other. Thus, it is difficult for both Japan and China to predict the actions and reactions of other states and difficult to agree on an optimal solution for both Japan and China. This situation is called a prisoner’s dilemma. Because of this situation, diplomatic relations between Japan and China are not plus-sum relations but zero-sum relations, as this game showed. Figure 1 shows such a prisoner’s dilemma in this game. For Japan, to release the Chinese captain and his crew is X1, and to not release them is X2. For China, to release Japanese businesspersons is Y1, and to not release them is Y2. The most preferred situation for Japan was for the Japanese businesspersons to be released and the Chinese captain and his crew not to be released. The worst case for Japan was the opposite of the most preferred situation. For China, in contrast to Japan, for the Chinese captain to be released and the Japanese businesspersons not to be released was the best situation, while the worst situation was the best situation of Japan. For Japan, the ranking from the best situation to the worst situation is as follows: X2–Y1 > X1–Y1 > X2–Y2 > X1–Y2. For China, these situations are as follows: X1–Y2 > X1–Y1 > X2–Y2 > X2–Y1. This figure shows that the best solution for both states is X1–Y1. In this game, however, both states chose X2–Y2 because neither state had any intention of compromising with the other state.6 Negotiation between Japan and North Korea is one typical example.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Preferences of Japan and China

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Kenneth Waltz (1959) pointed out exactly that international disputes were reflective of the internal structures of states. In this game, the Chinese government could not compromise with Japan because the legitimacy of the Chinese communist government’s governance partly depends on the nationalism of the people. Although it is not enough to think about this element in this game, the Chinese government had a strong attitude toward Japan because of its win.

4 Conclusion

This scenario is based on a historical incident that occurred between Japan and China. The Senkaku Islands have been a focal point of national security for both Japan and China. This accident was not only an attack by a fishing boat on the JCG; in both states, this incident challenged the government’s reputation, which is why one government could not compromise with the other. In reality, the Japanese government released the captain and his crew, as demanded by the Chinese government. The game, however, was quite different from the historical reality; therefore, we have to follow up the rules of this game to approach real politics.

This game was not a reiterative game for the future. The players only have to think of winning, not the long-term consequences. The results of the game can be understood by neorealism theory. In real history, however, Japan and China reached a compromise, and they reached X1–Y1 in Fig. 1. A hypothesis in terms of neoliberal institutionalism theory is that the liability was carried by both Japan and China during the incident, and economic interdependence affected both Japan and China. If the incident had dissolved, the economies of both China and Japan would have been damaged, so they chose to compromise.

Many territorial disputes have existed in East and Southeast Asian states. Generally speaking, many diplomatic negotiations are what we call quiet diplomacy, and these negotiations about ongoing disputes or issues cannot be seen by people. This simulation game led students to understand the history of international diplomacy and politics more easily.