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The Legitimacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

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Contemporary International Criminal Law Issues

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Abstract

Over the years, the international community has established international courts to eliminate the culture of impunity in relation to international crimes, and to enforce a culture of accountability. A critical success factor for these courts is ensuring that they are perceived as legitimate instruments of law, to provide justice to those affected by any crimes committed and to rebuild the judicial landscape within post-conflict societies. However, the legitimacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—established following the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis—has been questioned, due in part to: its location in Tanzania, its focus on prosecuting only members of the Hutu ethnic group, the employment of former génocidaires, and the acquittals and early releases of those considered most responsible for the 1994 genocide. This chapter uses an empirically oriented approach to identify and examine the measures taken by the ICTR to promote its legitimacy and detaches the term legitimacy from its normative legacy. The chapter will focus on two specific events—the Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza case and the removal of the ICTR’s chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, in 2003—which challenged the ICTR’s legitimacy and forced the Tribunal to adopt legitimisation activities in order to repair its legitimacy. The aim is to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of legitimacy, while examining whether the ICTR’s short-term need for legitimacy affected its longer-term objectives. The chapter is based on data collected through desk and archival research, and interviews conducted between 2019 and 2020.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cryer et al. 2019, pp. 28–43; Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011, pp. 471–472.

  2. 2.

    Møse 2005; Oomen 2009; Shany 2012; Vasiliev 2015.

  3. 3.

    Interviews and archival research took place both in the field (Rwanda and Tanzania) and as part of desk research between 2018 and 2020. All interviews are anonymised. Dates are not included given that they can be used to trace back to the interviewee. Consent was asked, and forms were signed, for all interviews. This research was approved by Maastricht University’s Ethics Review Committee Inner City faculties.

  4. 4.

    BBC (1994) http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/6/newsid_2472000/2472195.stm. Accessed 21 September 2021; Guardian (1994) https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/apr/09/rwanda. Accessed 21 September 2021; New York Times (1994) https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/14/world/anarchy-rules-rwanda-s-capital-and-drunken-soldiers-roam-city.html. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  5. 5.

    Des Forges 1999, pp. 10–12.

  6. 6.

    The UN estimates that 800,000 people lost their lives during the 1994 genocide. UN Security Council 1999, S/1999/1257. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-inquiry-actions-of-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda-s19991257. Accessed 21 September 2021; the Government of Rwanda refers to over one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu victims of genocidal violence. www.gov.rw/home/history. Accessed 21 September 2021; while Human Rights Watch places the number closer to 500,000 victims (Des Forges 1999, pp. 15–16).

  7. 7.

    Moderate Hutu are those generally considered as having supported the power-sharing agreement negotiated during the Arusha Accords, which would have enabled the Tutsi-led RPF to gain power and to work alongside the Hutu government.

  8. 8.

    Members of the Twa ethnic group were also heavily involved in the conflict, both as perpetrators and victims. They are rarely mentioned in relation to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The ethnic divisions that were intrinsic to Rwandan society prior to and during the 1994 genocide no longer exist in Rwanda. Since 2001, identifying individuals with the ethnic labels—Hutu, Tutsi or Twa—is considered as “divisionist” in Rwanda (Rwandan Law No. 47/2001).

  9. 9.

    Des Forges 1999, pp. 15–16; Drumbl 2007, p. 81; Moghalu 2005, p. 17. With a growing number of Tutsi refugees living in Uganda, the “Front Patriotique Rwandais” (Rwandan Patriotic Front—RPF) was established in Kampala in 1988. The aim of this political and military movement was to return to Rwanda and to overthrow the Rwandan government. The RPF launched their first major attack against the Hutu government in Rwanda on the 1 October 1990, marking the start of the Rwandan Civil War (Moghalu 2005, pp. 13–14).

  10. 10.

    Des Forges 1999, pp. 15–16; UN Security Council 1999, S/1999/1257.

  11. 11.

    Penal Reform International 2006, p. 1. https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2021. Schabas 2005, p. 883.

  12. 12.

    Brannigan and Jones 2009, p. 197; Ferstman 1997, p. 859; Moghalu 2005, p. 37.

  13. 13.

    UN Security Council 1994, S/1994/1115.

  14. 14.

    Formal name: International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

  15. 15.

    UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955.

  16. 16.

    ICTR 2010.

  17. 17.

    Cryer et al. 2019, pp. 137–142; Klip and Sluiter 2003, p. 239; Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011, p. 44.

  18. 18.

    Chapter VII of the UN Charter addresses “action with respect to threats to the peace breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”.

  19. 19.

    Cryer et al. 2019, p. 127.

  20. 20.

    UN Security Council 1994a, S/PV.3453, p. 15.

  21. 21.

    Forsythe 2009, p. 121; Peskin 2008, p. 168. China considered the events that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 as an internal conflict and therefore a matter for Rwanda, rather than the UN, to address (Bonner 1994; Forsythe 2009, p. 121).

  22. 22.

    Oomen 2009, p. 184.

  23. 23.

    UN Security Council 2006, S/2006/176, para 2.

  24. 24.

    UN Security Council 1994a, S/PV.3453, p. 16.

  25. 25.

    Møse 2005, p. 1.

  26. 26.

    UN General Assembly 1996, a/51/399-S/1996/778, p. 15.

  27. 27.

    Andreopoulos et al. 2010, p. 171.

  28. 28.

    Moghalu 2005, pp. 136–143; Oosterveld and McManus 2002, p. 822.

  29. 29.

    Peskin 2005, p. 951.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., pp. 950–951.

  31. 31.

    Des Forges 1999, p. 58.

  32. 32.

    Gacaca can be loosely translated to “justice amongst the grass”. These community-based courts, inspired by Rwandan tradition, were re-introduced in Rwanda from 2005 to 2012, in order to address the backlog of cases related to the 1994 genocide waiting for trial in conventional domestic courts (Clark 2010).

  33. 33.

    Oomen 2009, pp. 188–189.

  34. 34.

    Vasiliev 2015, p. 5.

  35. 35.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, 18 June 1997, ICTR-96-15-T, pp. 3–4.

  36. 36.

    With the exception of Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian national, who played a key role in broadcasting Hutu propaganda as a presented for the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines. In 2000, Ruggiu pleaded guilty to two charges: crimes against humanity (persecution), and direct and public incitement to commit genocide (ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 1 June 2000, ICTR-97-32-I).

  37. 37.

    Bonner 1994, A3; Schabas 2006, p. 388.

  38. 38.

    Moghalu 2005, p. 71; Straus and Waldorf 2011, p. 61.

  39. 39.

    Moghalu 2005, pp. 136–143; Straus and Waldorf 2011, pp. 176–178.

  40. 40.

    ICTR (2003) https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/security-council-appoints-separate-prosecutors-two-ad-hoc-un-tribunals. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  41. 41.

    ICTR 2003, S/2003/946, pp. 6 and 11. https://unictr.irmct.org/en/documents/completion-strategy-reports. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  42. 42.

    The investigation regarding the deaths of fifteen Rwandans, including 13 clergy, at Gakurazo in June 1994, was transferred to the Rwanda judiciary, which resulted in the prosecution of four low-ranking RPF soldiers (Bouka 2013, p. 3; Straus and Waldorf 2011, p. 180).

  43. 43.

    Drumbl 2007, pp. 86, 96–97; Ohlin 2005, pp. 748–749.

  44. 44.

    Nicholson 2017; Schiff 2010; Vasiliev 2015.

  45. 45.

    Vasiliev 2015, p. 10.

  46. 46.

    Nicholson 2017, pp. 658–659.

  47. 47.

    Vasiliev 2015, pp. 11–12.

  48. 48.

    Epstein 2014, p. 6; Hilbink 2012, pp. 592–595.

  49. 49.

    Plato and Jowett 2009, pp. 382, 444.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., p. 530.

  51. 51.

    Aristotle et al. 1998, pp. 9–12.

  52. 52.

    Plato and Jowett 2009, p. 530.

  53. 53.

    Aristotle et al. 1998, p. 100.

  54. 54.

    Hardin 2007, pp. 241–243; Hobbes 1998, p. 89.

  55. 55.

    Rousseau 1997, p. 60.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., pp. 138–139.

  57. 57.

    Locke 2014, p. 7—original emphasis.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., pp. 24–25.

  59. 59.

    Weber 1922b; original title: Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft.

  60. 60.

    Brinkerhoff 2005.

  61. 61.

    Bodansky et al. 2013.

  62. 62.

    Bitektine 2011.

  63. 63.

    Deephouse et al. 2017; Suchman 1995.

  64. 64.

    Oomen 2009, p. 175.

  65. 65.

    Beetham 2013, p. 20.

  66. 66.

    Beetham 1991, pp. 15–20; Hazan 2006, p. 46; Oomen 2007, p. 144; Suchman 1995, p. 574.

  67. 67.

    UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955, p. 1.

  68. 68.

    Gallimore 2006, p. 2.

  69. 69.

    Sikkink 2011.

  70. 70.

    Cryer et al. 2019, pp. 3–8; Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011, pp. 3–34; Vasiliev 2015, pp. 5–8.

  71. 71.

    Suchman 1995, p. 573–575.

  72. 72.

    Peskin 2005, p. 951.

  73. 73.

    Hurd 1999, p. 379.

  74. 74.

    Shelton 2008, pp. 543–544

  75. 75.

    Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 171.

  76. 76.

    Helfer and Slaughter 1997, pp. 389–391.

  77. 77.

    Schiff 2010, p. 42.

  78. 78.

    Shany 2012, p. 253; Vasiliev 2015, p. 6.

  79. 79.

    Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002; Meyer et al. 2013.

  80. 80.

    Hybels 1995, p. 243.

  81. 81.

    Bassiouni 1994, pp. 1192–1193, 1197; Cassese 1998, pp. 12–13; Drumbl 2007, pp. 144–148.

  82. 82.

    Suchman 1995.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., pp. 578–579.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., pp. 579–582.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., pp. 582–583.

  86. 86.

    Deephouse et al. 2017, pp. 23–24.

  87. 87.

    Also referred to as legitimation.

  88. 88.

    Creed et al. 2002, p. 492; Deephouse et al. 2017, p. 21; Reyes 2011, p. 782.

  89. 89.

    Suchman 1995, pp. 586, 595–597.

  90. 90.

    Ashforth and Gibbs 1990.

  91. 91.

    Ibid., p. 180.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., p. 178.

  93. 93.

    All interviews are anonymised. Dates are not included given that they can be used to trace back to the interviewee.

  94. 94.

    Strauss and Corbin 1990.

  95. 95.

    Clark 2010, pp. 33–45.

  96. 96.

    Beetham 1991, pp. 15–20.

  97. 97.

    UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955; ICTR 2010; ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence. https://unictr.irmct.org/en/documents/rules-procedure-and-evidence. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  98. 98.

    Cryer et al. 2019, p. 137.

  99. 99.

    Galaskiewicz 1985; Salancik and Pfeffer 1978.

  100. 100.

    Gallimore 2006, p. 1.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., p. 2.

  102. 102.

    Interviewee T18.

  103. 103.

    ICTR 2010, Article 16. https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Statute_en_fr_0.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2021; ICTR 2015, rule 33. All press-related matters were originally managed under the Press and Information Section, renamed the Press and Public Affairs Unit in 2001.

  104. 104.

    Tribunal Voices 2008, video 89. http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/video/89. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  105. 105.

    ICTR 2010, Article 20.

  106. 106.

    Interviewee T5.

  107. 107.

    Dieng 2004.

  108. 108.

    Interviewees T10, T16, T17 and T19.

  109. 109.

    Dieng 2000.

  110. 110.

    Dieng 2005.

  111. 111.

    Translated from French: “Notre image était très importante. Nous en étions conscients. Nous voulions empêcher les gens de penser que nous n'étions pas impartiaux, nous avons donc fait attention à la façon dont nous nous représentions. […] L'environnement était tendu. Cela faisait partie de note vie privée. Nous devions toujours avoir un bon comportement. Nous ne pouvions pas organiser de fêtes par exemple, ni inviter de grands groupes, car cela donnerait facilement une image négative.” (Interviewee T23)

  112. 112.

    Interviewee M2.

  113. 113.

    Translated from French: “Il n'y avait pas de stratégie de communication. Comme toutes les grandes institutions. Les gens qui y travaillaient ne savaient pas ce qu’ils étaient censés communiquer ou comment, alors ils s’assuraient simplement de promouvoir le TPIR de toutes les manières possibles. Ils ont toujours cherché à le placer sous un bon éclairage. Le manque de ressources n’était certainement pas un problème.” (Interviewee M3)

  114. 114.

    Translated from French: “Les Rwandais n'étaient pas intéressés, y compris du gouvernement rwandais. C'était un défaut majeur. En fait, le TPIR a conservé une image négative tout au long et n’a pas fait grand-chose pour améliorer leur image.” (Interviewee M1)

  115. 115.

    Interviewee T18.

  116. 116.

    Interviewees M1, M2 and M3.

  117. 117.

    Meyer et al. 2013, pp. 169–171.

  118. 118.

    RTML played a pivotal role in broadcasting the Hutu propaganda, inciting violence against individuals from the Tutsi ethnic group, prior to and during the 1994 genocide.

  119. 119.

    Translated from French: “Avez-vous rencontré le juge [nom]? Il m'a dit qu'il ne ferait pas la même chose que le juge [nom]. Il était très méprisé par de nombreux Rwandais en raison des libérations anticipées.” (Interviewee CS9).

  120. 120.

    Moghalu 2005, p. 102.

  121. 121.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 5–7.

  122. 122.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Order for transfer and provisional transfer, 3 March 1997, ICTR-97-19-DP.

  123. 123.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 17 November 1998, ICTR-97-19-1.

  124. 124.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 108.

  125. 125.

    Ibid.

  126. 126.

    Interviewee M2.

  127. 127.

    Moghalu 2005, p. 108; Peskin 2008, pp. 181–182; The New Humanitarian (1999) https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/179881. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  128. 128.

    Tribunal Voices (2008) video 89. http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/video/89. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  129. 129.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Order, ICTR-97-19-AR72, 25 November 1999.

  130. 130.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 108.

  131. 131.

    Ashforth and Gibbs 1990, p. 183.

  132. 132.

    Peskin 2008, p. 182.

  133. 133.

    See amicus curiae brief filed by the Rwandan government on 15 February 2000.

  134. 134.

    ICTR (2000) https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/barayagwiza-be-tried-ictr. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  135. 135.

    Ibid.

  136. 136.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Judgement and Sentence, 3 December 2003, ICTR-99-52-T, pp. 28–29.

  137. 137.

    Moghalu 2005, pp. 111–113; Peskin 2008, p. 183.

  138. 138.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, Separate Declaration, 31 March 2000, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 7.

  139. 139.

    Moghalu 2005, p. 137.

  140. 140.

    Apuuli 2009; Bouka 2013.

  141. 141.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 31 March 2000, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 2.

  142. 142.

    Moghalu 2005, p. 134.

  143. 143.

    ICTR (2000) https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/prosecutor-outlines-future-plans. Accessed 21 September 2021; Moghalu 2005, p. 133; Peskin 2008, pp. 188–189.

  144. 144.

    Thomson 2017, p. 185.

  145. 145.

    The Globe and Mail (2016) https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/kagame-government-supporters-complicated-un-efforts-to-investigate-crimes/article32524359/. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  146. 146.

    Moghalu 2005, p. 133; Peskin 2008, pp. 188–191.

  147. 147.

    Peskin 2008, pp. 187, 212–213. The reason given for the suspension of all cooperation with the Tribunal was the poor treatment of witnesses (ibid., p. 213).

  148. 148.

    Interviewee CS7.

  149. 149.

    Translated from French: “Elle était surtout intéressée par son image. Pas les victimes. Ils n’avaient pas suffisamment d’informations sur ces autres crimes. Si elle avait eu cela, elle aurait porté l'affaire devant les tribunaux. Elle ne l’a pas fait. Comment a-t-elle pu s'adresser au gouvernement pour dire qu'elle voulait les poursuivre. C'était voué à l'échec. Elle aurait dû trouver un autre moyen. Nous avons une mauvaise image de Carla Del Ponte. Elle était une forte procureure italienne. Elle était habituée à la mafia. Elle voulait montrer ses compétences. Mais amener cette justice pour détruire la paix et le gouvernement? Ce n'était pas juste.” (Interviewee T9).

  150. 150.

    Moghalu 2005, p. 134; Peskin 2008, pp. 187, 213.

  151. 151.

    Peskin 2008, pp. 218–219; UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955, para 2.

  152. 152.

    UN Security Council 2003, S/RES/1503, para 8.

  153. 153.

    ICTR (2003) https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/security-council-appoints-separate-prosecutors-two-ad-hoc-un-tribunals. Accessed 21 September 2021; UN 2003. https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7858.doc.htm. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  154. 154.

    ICTR 2010, Article 15(3).

  155. 155.

    Peskin 2008, pp. 220–221.

  156. 156.

    Translated from Italian: “cacciata dal Ruanda perché volevo fare giustizia. [...] Se mi fossi piegata sarei ancora al mio posto” (La Repubblica, 2003). http://www.repubblica.it/2003/i/sezioni/esteri/delponte/delponte/delponte.html?refresh_ce. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  157. 157.

    Translated from French: “Avec le FPR, les procureurs ont fait un choix. Ils devaient faire une distinction entre les crimes. Carla Del Ponte a mélangé les choses. Les crimes sont tellement différents. Ce sont des niveaux différents. Le TPIR voulait montrer qu'il faisait quelque chose. Ils n’ont pas poursuivi toutes les personnes impliquées dans le génocide. Le prêtre et l'évêque ont été tués par le FPR. Ces personnes ont été jugées au Rwanda sous la surveillance du TPIR. Le TPIR devait commencer par les criminels les plus importants. Les crimes les plus importants.” (Interviewee T9)

  158. 158.

    Peskin 2008, pp. 220–221; Schabas 2008, p. 389.

  159. 159.

    Jambonews (2006) https://www.jambonews.net/en/actualites/20160204-closing-interview-with-the-president-of-the-international-criminal-tribunal-for-rwanda-ictr-part-ii/. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  160. 160.

    Ibid.; Peskin 2008, pp. 224–226.

  161. 161.

    UN Security Council 2003, S/RES/1503.

  162. 162.

    ICTR 2003, S/2003/946. https://unictr.irmct.org/en/documents/completion-strategy-reports. Accessed 21 September 2021.

  163. 163.

    Apuuli 2009; Bouka 2013; Deephouse et al. 2017, p. 26; Peskin 2008, pp. 219–220; Schabas 2008, p. 389.

  164. 164.

    UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955, Article 1.

  165. 165.

    ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Order, 25 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-AR72.

  166. 166.

    Del Ponte and Sudetic 2011.

  167. 167.

    Apuuli 2009; Bouka 2013.

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  1. NIOD, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Claire M. H. Boost

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  1. Arusha, Tanzania

    Takeh B. K. Sendze

  2. Centre for African Justice, Peace and Human Rights, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Adesola Adeboyejo

  3. Doughty Street Chambers, London, UK

    Howard Morrison

  4. Centre for African Justice, Peace and Human Rights, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Sophia Ugwu

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Boost, C.M.H. (2023). The Legitimacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). In: Sendze, T.B.K., Adeboyejo, A., Morrison, H., Ugwu, S. (eds) Contemporary International Criminal Law Issues. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-555-3_4

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