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The Right to Mental Integrity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: Cognitive Human Enhancement Technologies

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Law and Artificial Intelligence

Part of the book series: Information Technology and Law Series ((ITLS,volume 35))

Abstract

This chapter provides an analysis of philosophical and legal aspects of AI-driven cognitive human enhancement technologies that complement human rights norms in the context of the right to mental integrity. The philosophical analysis focuses on extended cognition theories in philosophy of mind. Such theories individuate a list of criteria to assess whether an external artefact can be cognitively integrated with human cognitive processes. This chapter shows that two AI-cognitive human enhancement technologies—brain computer interfaces and intelligent personal assistants—do not completely satisfy the criteria of extended cognition due to their unique capabilities. Subsequently, the legal analysis concentrates on the debate on the right to mental integrity to see whether the human mind is safeguarded in the face of such concerns at international and European levels. Although the right to mental integrity has been recognized in international and European human rights law, the meaning and the scope of the concept has remained unclear. To fill this gap, this chapter engages with the issue of an adequate form of cognitive integration and assumes that, if external artefacts such as AI-cognitive human enhancement technologies are not completely or sufficiently integrated with human cognitive processes, such artefacts may not serve mental integrity of individuals. In the light of this analysis, this chapter comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to introduce absolute protection to mental integrity in conjunction with mental privacy to protect the individual from any intrusion of mental states.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Kommers et al. 1992.

  2. 2.

    The debate is available at Neuralink Progress Update, Summer 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVvmgjBL74w Accessed on 22 February 2021.

  3. 3.

    Knapp (2019) Elon Musk Sees His Neuralink7 Merging your Brain with A.I. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2019/07/17/elon-musk-sees-his-neuralink-merging-your-brain-with-ai/?sh=37883c754b07. Accessed on 22 February 2021.

  4. 4.

    Ienca and Andorno 2017.

  5. 5.

    See SIENNA 2018 D.3.1. The project developed six categories of HET: cognitive, affective, moral, physical, cosmetic, and longevity; see also a detailed report of European Parliament STOA 2009.

  6. 6.

    See SIENNA 2018 D.3.1., p. 5. As noted in the report, the definition is adapted from a similar definition established by the European Parliament STOA 2009.

  7. 7.

    SIENNA 2018 D.3.1., p. 19.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    Wolpaw and Winter Wolpaw 2012.

  10. 10.

    Umair et al. 2017. See a more detailed definition in Wolpaw and Winter Wolpaw 2012, p. 3: “A BCI is a system that measures central nervous system (CNS) activity and converts it into artificial output that replaces, restores, enhances, supplements, or improves natural CNS output and thereby changes the ongoing interactions between the CNS and its external or internal environment.”

  11. 11.

    Binnendijk et al. 2020.

  12. 12.

    Burke et al. 2015.

  13. 13.

    Zhang et al. 2020.

  14. 14.

    SIENNA 2018 D 3.1, p. 34.

  15. 15.

    Le and Wartschinski 2018, p. 45. For a tentative ontology and classification of different kinds of cognitive assistants, see Maier et al. 2019.

  16. 16.

    See Amazon (2018) Alexa Skills Kit. https://developer.amazon.com/en-US/docs/alexa/ask-overviews/what-is-the-alexa-skills-kit.html. Accessed 21 February 2021.

  17. 17.

    The two criteria were individuated by Maedche et al. 2016.

  18. 18.

    For a review of application domains of such systems, see also Knote et al. 2018.

  19. 19.

    These are related to intelligence, clarity and creativity, which are the three targets for interventions of cognitive enhancement individuated by the Sienna Report, see Sect. 25.2 of this chapter.

  20. 20.

    Big Data and AI can lead to hypernudge, a more insidious, dynamic, and efficacious form of nudge, see Yeung 2017 on this point.

  21. 21.

    It is important to note that there are dense theoretical debates about different approaches on extended cognition, however, it is beyond the aim of this chapter to engage with these theories in detail. Therefore, we will only consider the first wave of extended cognition.

  22. 22.

    Clark and Chalmers 1998. For a recent perspective on this position, see Clark 2008. However, to be precise, the extended cognition is distinguished from the extended mind thesis, according to which cognitive states such as beliefs and others can have as their supervenience base extra-organismic elements, see on this point Carter et al. 2018.

  23. 23.

    Among scholars that make use of the thesis of extended cognition in relation to technology are included: Smart 2018, Carter and Palermos 2016, Ludwig 2015.

  24. 24.

    Hernandez-Orallo and Vold 2019.

  25. 25.

    Pellegrino and Garasic 2020.

  26. 26.

    Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8.

  27. 27.

    The criteria are listed by Clark 2010, p. 46 and are called the Glue and Trust Conditions, see also Clarks 2011, p. 79 ff.

  28. 28.

    Clark 2011, p. 131 ff, Clark 1997.

  29. 29.

    See on this point Nalepa et al. 2018.

  30. 30.

    See Bernard and Arnold 2019.

  31. 31.

    Palermos 2014, p. 33.

  32. 32.

    Morana et al. 2019.

  33. 33.

    I.e., by changing the brain directly. This is the criterion adopted by Vincent et al. 2020 to distinguish between “core” and “penumbral” neurointerventions.

  34. 34.

    Recently, another author that draws from extended cognition theory has been Carter 2020. He discusses the two terms of ‘cognitive integration’ and ‘cognitive enhancement’ and advances the thesis that the notion of enhancement as such is “theoretically unimportant for accounting for why certain kinds of high-tech epistemic dependence genuinely threaten to undermine intellectual autonomy and others such kinds of dependence don’t” (Ivi, conclusions). Another recent attempt to connect enhancement and extended cognition can be found in Carter and Pritchard 2019, who propose a “cognitive achievement account of cognitive enhancement”. However, a distinction between enhancement and ‘extension’ as used in this chapter should be drawn: an ‘extension’ includes a move beyond intracranialism, i.e., the conception that locates cognitive processes inside the brain, and does not influence cognition but rather constitutes it. Adopting the terms ‘extension’ and ‘cognitive integration’ could arguably be a way to conceptually sharpen the understanding of some forms of HETs.

  35. 35.

    This is the reason why some extended cognitive theorists decided to adopt distinct views, see Palermos 2014 and the second wave of extended cognition, for example Heersmink 2015. Heersmink argues that cognitive integration comes in degree and requires different dimensions, i.e., information flow, reliability, durability, procedural and informational transparency, individualization, transformation (how the cognitive processes change with the use of artefact). An artefact has not to be equally integrated in all dimensions. On the issues related to the parity principle, see also Heinrichs 2017.

  36. 36.

    Chung et al. 2017. See Mecacci and Haselager 2017 for an interesting ethical framework regarding mental privacy and brain reading. In the predominant typology of influence types used in bioethics literature, manipulation is an influence that subverts agents’ rational capacity and bypasses mental processes such as understanding, and it has been understood as a term “in-between” rational persuasion and coercion by force, see Faden and Beauchamp 1986, Blumental-Barby 2012.

  37. 37.

    Ienca and Haselager 2016.

  38. 38.

    This has been called “the Googlization of health research”, see on this Sharon 2016, 2020.

  39. 39.

    Jiang 2019.

  40. 40.

    Ienca et al. 2018.

  41. 41.

    Gilbert et al. 2017.

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Chambers and Beaney 2020.

  44. 44.

    A hermeneutical approach to technologically mediated sense making via AI-powered voice assistants can be found in Kudina 2021. On affective BCIs, see Steinert and Friedrich 2020.

  45. 45.

    Indeed, it is suggested that when it comes to robotics and HETs, in Europe, some anchor point “can be found in the common heritage of human rights and values” for regulatory dilemmas posed by such devices. See the debate in Leenes et al. 2017. See also an example of using human rights as “normative anchor points of governance” in the context of human enhancement technologies in Ruggiu 2018.

  46. 46.

    Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953, 213 UNTS 221. Article 8 of the Convention: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” It is important to note there are discussions assessing the relationship between emerging technologies and freedom of thought claiming that Article 9 of the ECHR should be understood as an absolute right to protect the integrity of the forum internum. However, considering the current jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 9, it is hard to consider neural activities or the assessment of cognitive processes as “thought”. Therefore, this section only focuses on the case-law interpreting the concept of mental integrity. See a recent discussion on the freedom of thought and brain computer interfaces in O’Callaghan and Shiner 2021.

  47. 47.

    ECtHR, Tysiac v. Poland, No. 5410/03, 20 March 2007, para 107.

  48. 48.

    Marshall 2009, p. 3.

  49. 49.

    ECtHR, Bensaid v. United Kingdom, No. 44599/98, 6 February 2001, para 47.

  50. 50.

    ECtHR, Taliadorou and Stylianou v. Cyprus, No. 39627/05 and 39631/05, 16 October 2008, par. 57-58. See also ECtHR, Kyriakides v. Cyprus, No. 39058/05, 16 October 2008. See also the case of Bati and others v. Turkey where the ECtHR emphasized that various forms of ill-treatment without leaving physical marks can harm mental integrity, no. 33097/96, and 57834/00, 3 June 2004, par. 114. It is important to note that these judgments should be considered in the light of Article 5 of the proposed Artificial Intelligence Act by the European Commission. Article 5 of the AI Act prohibits AI practices that manipulate individuals’ behaviours through “subliminal techniques” that can cause “physical or psychological harms”. See a recent comment on the proposed AI Act in Biber 2021.

  51. 51.

    The Convention on the Rights of Person with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, adopted on 13 December 20o6 and opened for signature on 30 March 2007.

  52. 52.

    Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Nizza, 7 December 2000, in force 1 December 2009, OJ 2012 No. C-326/2. Article 3(1) of the Charter: “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity.”

  53. 53.

    Michalowski 2014.

  54. 54.

    Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, entered into force on 1 December 1999.

  55. 55.

    Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 4 April 1997, para 22.

  56. 56.

    CJEU, Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council (2001) ECR-I 7079, para 70.

  57. 57.

    Bublitz 2020.

  58. 58.

    Bublitz 2020, pp. 387–408. See also the report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2020. In the US, there is an initiative called “NeuroRights Initiative” established by the Columbia University, working to incorporate five specific neuro-rights into international human rights law namely, the right to personal identity, the right to free will, the right to mental privacy, the right to equal access to mental augmentation, and the right to protection from algorithmic bias, available at https://neurorightsfoundation.org/mission. In the world, Chile took the first step on neuro-rights to prevent the misuse of artificial intelligence and neurotechnology, see the debate in Munoz “Chile- right to free will needs definition”, 29.10.2019, available at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03295-9.

  59. 59.

    Bublitz 2020, p. 387 (arguing that although legal systems engage with bodily integrity in detail even in exceptional situations such as pregnancy or organ transplantation, they highly disregard the interventions on the human mind).

  60. 60.

    See Lavazza 2018.

  61. 61.

    See Bublitz 2013.

  62. 62.

    See a discussion on the challenges of informed consent in implantable BCI research in Klein 2016, who identifies six core risk domains as central to the informed consent, namely safety, cognitive and communicative impairment, inappropriate expectations, involuntariness, affective impairment, and privacy and security. In terms of informational privacy, the author discusses that BCI systems are able to generate a trove of potentially intimate personal information, such as toileting, sex, counselling children, comforting a loved one, unexpressed thoughts, personality characteristics, or emotions.

  63. 63.

    Ligthart et al. 2020; Ienca and Andorno 2017.

  64. 64.

    For some dystopian examples of state surveillance already happening in China see a well-written article in Anderson (2020) The Panopticon is Already Here https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/. Accessed on 21 February 2021.

  65. 65.

    Schmerling (2019). The Ethical and Legal Implications of Brain-Computer Interfaces https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3762798,00.html. Accessed on 22 February 2021.

  66. 66.

    Floridi 2016; Hallinan et al. 2014.

  67. 67.

    SIENNA D.3.2 2019; See also Ruggiu 2013, Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001 (arguing two approaches to dignity: “dignity as empowerment” and “dignity as constraint”). These two approaches were mentioned in the case of Vo v. France, No. 53924/00, 8 July 2004, para 40.

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    Sümeyye Elif Biber & Marianna Capasso

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Biber, S.E., Capasso, M. (2022). The Right to Mental Integrity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: Cognitive Human Enhancement Technologies. In: Custers, B., Fosch-Villaronga, E. (eds) Law and Artificial Intelligence. Information Technology and Law Series, vol 35. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-523-2_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-523-2_25

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  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-522-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-523-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

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