UN Security Council Sanctions and International Peace and Security: Context, Controversies and (Legal) Challenges

Murphy, Ben L.

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-515-7_8

Ben L. Murphy⁷

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Abstract

The focus of this chapter is UN Security Council sanctions; that is, coercive measures short of the use of military force taken under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Since the late 1990s, the Council has undergone a seismic shift in its sanctioning practice, from imposing blanket sanctions against states towards targeting individuals apparently implicated in global terrorism. As a result of this shift, this area of the Security Council’s practice has, in recent times, courted a high degree of controversy. Criticisms centre on the lack of due process guarantees provided to those targeted, which culminated in the now notorious Kadi litigation before the courts of the European Union, and other high-profile decisions of regional and domestic courts. This chapter situates these developments, first in light of the Council’s ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ and, secondly, in the context of a broader conversation on the legality and legitimacy of Security Council decision-making under Chapter VII.

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Notes

1.
UN Charter (1945), Article 39.
2.
UN Charter (1945), Article 42.
3.
Cortright et al. 2008, p. 206.
4.
On the Security Council’s voting procedures, see UN Charter (1945), Article 27(3).
5.
UNSC Res 1267 (1999); UNSC Res 1989 (2011); UNSC Res 2253 (2015).
6.
See similarly Hooper 2018, p. 613.
7.
Hovell 2016a, p. 114.
8.
See e.g., ibid.; Hurd 2007; Bianchi 2006.
9.
See instead van Aaken et al. 2019.
10.
White 2018, p. 7.
11.
UNSC Res 687 (1991) and UNSC Res 773 (1992).
12.
UNSC Res 1373 (2001) and UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004).
13.
Pellet and Miron 2013, para 1.
14.
Kelsen 1950, p. 706. ‘Law is, by its very nature, a coercive order. A coercive order is a system of rules prescribing certain patterns of behaviour by providing coercive measures, as sanctions, to be taken in case of a contrary behaviour…’.
15.
Pellet and Miron 2013, para 4.
16.
Ibid., para 16.
17.
ibid., para 23.
18.
Schachter 1994, p. 12 (emphasis added). See further Cassese 2005, p. 339. Cassese follows a similar line of reasoning as Schachter in categorising Article 41 measures as sanctions ‘properly so-called’ or sanctions ‘stricto sensu’.
19.
Schachter, Ibid.
20.
UN Charter (1945), Article 1(1).
21.
Kelsen 1950, p. 294. For an alternative view, see Gowlland-Debbas 1994. Gowlland-Debbas examines the Security Council’s role in the enforcement of international obligations from the framework of analysis provided by the doctrine of state responsibility. Her central point is that the Security Council has become increasingly involved in the enforcement of international law (e.g. the establishment under Chapter VII of Tribunals for the Enforcement of Humanitarian Law in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). However, it is not clear that this signifies that the Council’s primary function has become that of an international law enforcement agency. On this point, see Gill 1995, p. 33. ‘The enforcement activities of the Council are adjective to its primary function as a collective security organ’.
22.
Kelsen 1948, p. 788.
23.
Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 77; Krisch 2012, p. 1310.
24.
E.g. Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 78.
25.
Ibid.
26.
See, e.g., Lockerbie (Libya V US) (Provisional Measures) [1992] ICJ Rep 114 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry), para 176.
27.
Abi-Saab 2001, p. 32.
28.
ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries’ (2011) UN Doc A/66/10, p. 47.
29.
‘The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council.’
30.
Even when, in 1921, the Assembly of the League adopted guidelines stipulating that the Council could recommend to States that economic enforcement measure would be appropriate, this did not change the essentially hortatory nature of the Council’s role, and unilateral nature of the implementation of sanctions.
31.
Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) [1995] IT-94-AR72, para 35.
32.
Ibid.
33.
Orakhelashvili 2011, p. 26.
34.
Krisch 2012, p. 1310.
35.
Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) [1995] IT-94-AR72, para 31; Lockerbie (Libya v UK) (Provisional Measures) [1992] ICJ Rep 3, paras 35–40.
36.
Case Concerning Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) [1984] (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) ICJ Rep 132, para 107.
37.
UNSC Res 232 (1966). See further, UNSC Res 253 (1968); UNSC Res 277 (1970).
38.
UNSC Res 418 (1977).
39.
Van den Herik 2014, p. 431.
40.
UNSC Res 713 (1991) and UNSC Res 757 (1992) (arms embargo and economic sanctions following military involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina); UNSC Res 1160 (1998) (arms embargo concerning activities in Kosovo).
41.
UNSC Res 733 (1992) (arms embargo following outbreak of civil conflict).
42.
UNSC Res 748 (1992); UNSC Res 883 (1993) (arms and air traffic embargo in context of refusal to extradite perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing).
43.
UNSC Res 788 (1992) (arms embargo following ceasefire violations).
44.
UNSC Res 841 (1993) (arms embargo and petroleum sanctions in response to the failure of the military regime to restore the legitimate government).
45.
UNSC Res 918 (1994) (arms embargo in context of systemic internal violence).
46.
UNSC Res 1054 (1996); UNSC Res 1070 (1996) (restrictions on Sudanese officials abroad following an assassination attempt against the Egyptian President).
47.
UNSC Res 1132 (1997) (arms embargo and petroleum sanctions following military coup).
48.
UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) (travel restrictions and asset freeze against Taliban regime, following failure to extradite Usama bin Laden).
49.
E.g. O’Connell 2002; Craven 2002.
50.
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’ (1995) UN Doc A/50/60-S/1995/1, para 70.
51.
UN Doc S/1995/300 (1995).
52.
O’Connell 2002, p. 63; Mueller and Mueller 1999, p. 49. ‘No one knows with any precision how many Iraqi civilians have died as a result [of the sanctions], but various agencies of the United Nations … have estimated that they have contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths.’
53.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (2000) UN Doc ECN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, at para 6.
54.
E.g. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Economic Rights General Comment 8, ‘The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1997) UN Doc E/C.12-1997/8.
55.
UNSC Res 864 (1993) (arms embargo and petroleum sanctions, following UNITA’s failure to observe a ceasefire agreement).
56.
See UNSC Res 1267 (1999); UNSC Res 1333 (2000).
57.
Cortight et al. 2008, p. 207.
58.
Van den Herik 2014, p. 431.
59.
The ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, ‘Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work’ (2018), para 6(n).
60.
Hovell 2016a, p. 14.
61.
Ibid., p. 16.
62.
Van den Herik 2014, p. 4.
63.
‘Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/497, para 24.
64.
See UNSC Res 1822 (2008), para 19.
65.
Hovell 2016a, p. 20.
66.
See Krisch 2012, p. 1315.
67.
See, e.g., UNSC Res 1988 (2011).
68.
See further Security Council Provisional Rules of Procedure, rule 37.
69.
Krisch 2012, p. 1318.
70.
Fassbender 2006, p. 28.
71.
Ibid., p. 11.
72.
In accordance with the Statute of the ICJ (1945), Article 38(1).
73.
ECHR (1950), Article 6(2).
74.
ICCPR (1966), Article 12; ECHR (Protocol 4) (1963), Article 2.
75.
ICCPR (1966), Article 18; ECHR, Article 9.
76.
ICCPR (1966), Article 6; ECHR, Article 2.
77.
For this argument, see De Wet 2004, pp. 219–220.
78.
ICCPR (1966), Article 17; ECHR, Article 8.
79.
AGOSI v UK [1987] (ECrtHR, Chamber) App no 9118/90.
80.
Conditions of Admission (Advisory Opinion) [1948] ICJ Rep 57, para 64.
81.
Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) [1995] IT-94-AR72, para 28.
82.
See Behrami (General Court) (ECrtHR) [2007] App Nos 7142/01 and 78166/01, para 128.
83.
De Wet 2004, p. 144.
84.
UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) (1974).
85.
After decades of negotiations, the Court now has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. See ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘Draft resolution proposed by the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly Activation of the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression’ (2017) UN Doc ICC-ASP/16/L.10.
86.
The Council has never made a determination of an ‘act of aggression’ and has only made a determination of a ‘breach of the peace’ on four occasions.
87.
Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 61.
88.
Ibid., p. 62.
89.
Ibid., p. 63.
90.
Ibid., p. 62.
91.
Kelsen 1950, p. 727.
92.
Prosecutor v Joseph Kanyabashi (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) [1997] ICTR-96-15-T, para 20.
93.
Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 58 (emphasis in original).
94.
See, e.g., De Wet 2004, p. 377.
95.
‘The duty is imperative and the limits are categorically stated’. Lockerbie (Libya v USA) (Provisional Measures) [1992] ICJ Rep 114 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry), p. 171.
96.
UN Charter (1945), Article 1(1).
97.
UN Charter (1945), Article 1(2).
98.
UN Charter (1945), Article 1(3).
99.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ 151, p. 168.
100.
De Wet 2004, p. 193. See further Peters 2012, p. 812. ‘The ‘purposes’ as enumerated in Article 1 are so sweeping and abstract that [it] is hardly conceivable that the Council take any decision which cannot be said to further them’.
101.
Peters 2012, p. 812.
102.
Ibid.
103.
Daugirdas 2016, p. 335.
104.
These arguments draw heavily on Peters 2012, pp. 822–825.
105.
Reinisch 2001, p. 143.
106.
See, e.g., UNSC Res 1456 (2003), para 6. ‘States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular, international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.’
107.
See, e.g., ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’ (29 June 2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11, at 2: ‘The Council reiterates the need to ensure that sanctions are carefully targeted in support of clear objectives and designed carefully so as to minimize possible adverse consequences’.
108.
Interpretation of the Agreement between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 73, pp. 89–90.
109.
Peters 2012, p. 824.
110.
Ibid.
111.
De Wet 2004, pp. 187–191; Orakhelashvili 2005, p. 59; Tzanakopoulos 2011, pp. 70–72.
112.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 53.
113.
Orakhelashvili 2005, pp. 77–78.
114.
Orakhelashvili 2005, p. 68.
115.
De Wet 2004, p. 188.
116.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v Serbia & Montenegro) (Provisional Measures) (Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) [1993] ICJ Rep 407, para 440.
117.
De Wet 2004, pp. 189–190; Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 71. ‘…if States cannot escape the operation of jus cogens, they certainly cannot create an [international organisation] which is unbound by it’.
118.
Statute of the ICJ (1945), Article 1.
119.
Certain Expenses (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, p. 168.
120.
UN Charter (1945), Article 59.
121.
Statute of the ICJ (1945), Article 34(1).
122.
HM Treasury v Ahmed and others [2010] UKSC 2, para 4.
123.
Abelrazik v Canada [2009] FC 580, para 51.
124.
Krisch 2012, p. 1318.
125.
UN Charter (1945), Articles 25 and 103.
126.
Nada v Switzerland (Grand Chamber) [2012] App no 10593/08, paras 175–180.
127.
Al-Dulimi & Montana Management v Switzerland (Grand Chamber) [2016] App no 5809/08, para 140; Al-Jedda v UK (Grand Chamber) [2011] App no 27021/08, para 102.
128.
Ibid.
129.
Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-0000, para 181.
130.
Ibid., paras 213–214.
131.
Ibid., paras 221–222.
132.
Kadi v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR I-0000.
133.
Ibid., para 278.
134.
Ibid., para 303.
135.
Hovell 2016a, pp. 31–32.
136.
E.g. Isiksel 2010, p. 559.
137.
Kadi v Council & Commission [2005] ECR II-0000, para 181.
138.
Hovell 2016b, pp. 157–158.
139.
Rawls 1971, p. 364.
140.
UNGA Res 60/1 (2005), paras 106–109.
141.
Hovell 2016a, p. 21.
142.
UNSC Res 1904 (2009). The Resolution acknowledged in its preamble that the Office had been established as a direct result of the ‘challenges, both legal and otherwise, to the measures implemented by member states’.
143.
For a compelling defence of the Ombudsperson procedure, see, generally, Hovell 2016a.
144.
Franck 1990, p. 24.

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School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
Ben L. Murphy

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School of Law, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Sergey Sayapin
School of Law, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Rustam Atadjanov
National Law School of India, Pune, India
Umesh Kadam
Law and Social Sciences, University of Derby, Derby, UK
Gerhard Kemp
School of Law, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar
Bristol Law School, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
Noëlle Quénivet

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Murphy, B.L. (2022). UN Security Council Sanctions and International Peace and Security: Context, Controversies and (Legal) Challenges. In: Sayapin, S., Atadjanov, R., Kadam, U., Kemp, G., Zambrana-Tévar, N., Quénivet, N. (eds) International Conflict and Security Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-515-7_8

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