Abstract
In the post-Cold War era, the Security Council has delved into a variety of environmental issues as they relate to international peace and security, including climate change, preventive diplomacy and trans-boundary waters, the impact on the environment of the exploitation of natural resources in armed conflict, and the protection of the environment in armed conflict. Such issues have been addressed in the context of a broadening understanding of the organ’s mandate to maintain international peace and security, although the Council’s engagement on them remains controversial among some of its members. In spite of these political difficulties, there has been significant activity in the Council in recent years on these matters, especially the relationship between climate change and security. The Security Council’s role is not to protect the environment or to settle environmental disputes as a court or tribunal may. But the UN Charter and the Security Council’s practice provide a framework that allows the Council to play a role—and, possibly, to play an even bigger role in the future—in addressing environmental disputes and in engaging more generally in environmental challenges, when it perceives that they are pertinent to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Keywords
- Security Council
- Climate change
- Sea level rise
- International peace and security
- Peaceful settlement of disputes
- Conflict prevention
- Collective security
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- 1.
Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945 (UN Charter), Chap. VI.
- 2.
UN Charter, Article 41. See also Krisch 2012b, MN 30-33.
- 3.
See Sect. 21.3.
- 4.
The other five are the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat and the International Court of Justice.
- 5.
UN Charter, Article 24(1).
- 6.
UN Charter, Article 25.
- 7.
- 8.
See, for example, UN Charter, Articles 10-14 and Wood 2007, para 21.
- 9.
- 10.
UN Charter, Article 41.
- 11.
- 12.
UN Charter, Article 39; de Wet and Wood 2013, para 9.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
Krisch 2012a, MN 13.
- 17.
E.g., S/RES/918 of 17 May 1994; S/RES/713 of 25 September 1991; S/RES/1132 of 8 October 1997.
- 18.
E.g., S/RES/1368 of 12 September 2001; S/RES/1373 of 28 September 2001; S/RES/2178 of 24 September 2014 and S/RES/2462 of 28 March 2019.
- 19.
E.g., S/23500 of 21 January 1992; S/RES/1441 of 8 November 2002; S/RES/1540 of 28 April 2004 and S/RES/2105 of 5 June 2013.
- 20.
E.g., S/RES/688 of 5 April 1991; S/RES./713 of 25 September 1991 and S/RES/1325 of 31 October 2000.
- 21.
E.g., S/RES/767 of 24 July 1992; S/RES/918 of 17 May 1994; S/RES/1208 of 19 November 1998; S/RES/1314 of 11 August 2000 and S/RES/2165 of 14 July 2014.
- 22.
E.g., S/RES/2500 of 4 December 2019.
- 23.
E.g., S/PRST/2018/9 of 8 May 2018 and S/RES/2482 of 19 July 2019.
- 24.
E.g., S/RES/841 of 16 June 1993; S/RES/1132 of 8 October 1997 and S/RES/2337 of 19 January 2017.
- 25.
E.g., S/RES/2177 of 18 September 2014; S/PRST/2014/24 of 21 November 2014 and also S/PV.4087 of 10 January 2000, which was an open debate on the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa; S/RES/1308 of 17 July 2000 encouraged voluntary HIV/AIDS testing and counselling for peacekeeping troops.
- 26.
E.g., S/RES/2177 of 18 September 2014; S/RES/2439 of 30 October 2018; and S/PRST/2019/6 of 2 August 2019. See also S/PV.7279 of 14 October 2014; S/PV.7318 of 21 November 2014 and S/PV.7502 of 13 August 2015.
- 27.
S/RES/2532 of 1 July 2020 considered ‘that the unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’. See also S/2020/663 of 8 July 2020 and S/2020/765 of 30 July 2020 for a compendium of briefings and statements made at virtual Security Council meetings related to COVID-19.
- 28.
S/23500 of 21 January 1992.
- 29.
S/PV.7926 of 18 April 2017, Statement of Uruguay, p. 9, also statements of the United States, p. 4, United Kingdom, p. 19, Senegal, p. 18.
- 30.
S/PV.7926 of 18 April 2017, p. 12; see also statement of Kazakhstan, p. 8, Egypt, p. 9 and Bolivia, pp. 22–23.
- 31.
UN Charter, Article 1(1); Wolfrum 2012, MN 21-22.
- 32.
- 33.
Krisch 2012a, MN 27-29.
- 34.
S/RES/687 of 3 April 1991, para 3.
- 35.
S/RES/833 of 27 May 1993, para 4.
- 36.
Ibid., para 5.
- 37.
Ibid., para 6. See also S/RES/1862 of 14 January 2009 and S/RES/1907 of 23 December 2009, in which the Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea in order to force Eritrea, inter alia, to settle its dispute with Djibouti regarding their boundary and missing Djiboutian combatants.
- 38.
See Sect. 21.5.3.
- 39.
S/RES/687 of 3 April 1991, para 16.
- 40.
For more on this, see Krisch 2012a, MN 27-29.
- 41.
UN Charter, Article 39; Krisch 2012a, MN 13.
- 42.
Goodrich and Hambro 1946, p. 146.
- 43.
- 44.
In ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping’ (S/24111 of 17 June 1992, para 20), the Secretary-General defines ‘preventive diplomacy’ as ‘action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’; see also S/2011/552 of 26 August 2011, the Secretary-General’s report, ‘Preventive Diplomacy, Delivering Results’.
- 45.
S/PRST/1999/34 of 30 November 1999; S/PRST/1998/28 of 16 September 1998 and S/PRST/1997/46 of 25 September 1997. See also Security Council Report 2017, p. 7.
- 46.
S/PRST/2000/25 of 20 July 2005.
- 47.
Security Council Report 2017, p. 7; S/PRST/2002/2 of 31 January 2002.
- 48.
S/RES/1625 of 14 September 2005.
- 49.
Ibid., preamble.
- 50.
Ibid., para 4.
- 51.
Ibid., para 2.
- 52.
E.g., S/PV.8546 of 12 June 2019, a briefing on ‘Conflict prevention and mediation’; S/PV.7857 of 10 January 2017, a ministerial-level open debate on conflict prevention and sustaining peace; S/PV.7561 of 17 November 2015, a ministerial-level open debate on ‘Security, development and the root causes of conflict’; S/RES/2150 of 16 April 2014 calling on states to prevent and fight against genocide, and other serious crimes under international law, reaffirming the principle of responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; S/PRST/2013/4 of 15 April 2013 on ‘Prevention of conflicts in Africa: addressing the root causes’; S/PRST/2011/18 of 22 December 2011 on preventive diplomacy. Prevention has also been a theme in the Security Council’s attention to terrorism, for example S/PV.7690 of 11 May 2016, an open debate focusing on countering the narratives and ideologies of terrorism. On youth and violent extremism: S/PRST/2019/15 of 12 December 2019 on the role African youth can play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts S/RES/2419 of 6 June 2018 reaffirming the important role that youth and youth-led civil society can play in peacebuilding and sustaining peace; S/PV.7432 of 23 May 2015, a high-level open debate on the role of youth in countering violent extremism and promoting peace. Prevention was also a theme in the Council’s discussion on conflict in the Middle East, S/PV.8600 of 20 August 2019, for example in the Statement of the Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, p. 3, Peru, p. 15, Kuwait, p. 16 and Côte d’Ivoire, p. 23; see also Security Council Report 2017, pp. 8–9.
- 53.
S/2015/446 of 17 June 2015, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, para 71; Security Council Report 2017, p. 10.
- 54.
Kron 2019, p. 249.
- 55.
S/PV.5663 and Resumption 1 of 27 April 2007. It should be noted the presidency of the Council rotates monthly in an order based on the English language alphabet. Among other functions, Council presidents chair the organ’s meetings during the month and help to organize the monthly program of work with the Security Council Affairs Division of the UN Secretariat. In this later role, they often decide to pursue discretionary events or products (i.e., resolutions or presidential statements) reflecting their interests. Meetings held on climate change or other environmental issues are often such discretionary events.
- 56.
S/2007/211 of 16 April 2007 is the Group of 77+China letter; S/2007/203 of 12 April 2007 is the NAM letter.
- 57.
S/PV.5663 of 17 April 2007, statement by Slovakia, p. 4.
- 58.
Ibid., statement by the United Kingdom, p. 2.
- 59.
Ibid., statements by China, pp. 12–13, Russia p. 17, and South Africa, pp. 15–17.
- 60.
Ibid., statements by Pakistan, pp. 24–25 and Namibia, pp. 31–32 and S/PV.5663 Resumption I of 17 April 2007, statements by Egypt, pp. 4–5; Sudan, pp. 11–12 and Cuba, pp. 26–27.
- 61.
S/PV.6587 and Resumption 1 of 20 July 2011.
- 62.
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, entered into force, 21 March 1994.
- 63.
S/PRST/2011/15 of 20 July 2011.
- 64.
This is the authors’ interpretation based on various discussions with UN officials and Security Council diplomats.
- 65.
Cousins 2013, pp. 208–209.
- 66.
S/PV.6587 of 20 July 2011, p. 20. Portugal stated that the German-led initiative to discuss climate change and security in the Council should be ‘a step towards a consistent and regular consideration of the issue by the Security Council, based on reliable information on specific situations where climate-related phenomena are negatively affecting peace and security.’
- 67.
S/PV.6668 of 23 November 2011.
- 68.
Ibid., statements by China, pp. 24–35, Russia, pp. 17–18 and India, pp. 23–24.
- 69.
S/PV.7499 of 30 July 2015, for example, in the statements of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, p. 3, Samoa, p. 5, Seychelles, pp. 8–9, Chile, p. 15, Spain, p. 16, Malaysia, pp. 18–19, United Kingdom, pp. 21–22, Jordan, p. 22, United States, p. 26 and Lithuania, p. 27.
- 70.
S/PV.7818 of 22 November 2015, for example, in the statements of New Zealand, p. 24, France, p. 25, Spain, p. 28 and Kazakhstan, p. 29.
- 71.
S/PV.8144 of 20 December 2017, for example, in the statements by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, p. 2, Japan, pp. 3–4, Sweden, p. 78, United Kingdom, p. 10, France, pp. 11–12 and Italy, p. 21.
- 72.
S/PV.8307 of 11 July 2018.
- 73.
S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019.
- 74.
Ibid., statements by India, pp. 42–43, Iran, p. 64 and Algeria, pp. 80–82.
- 75.
Ibid., statements by Fiji pp. 31–32, Maldives, pp. 28–29, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, p. 58 and the Dominican Republic, pp. 23–25.
- 76.
S/2020/751 of 28 July 2020.
- 77.
Non-Council members submitted their statements in writing in keeping with working methods adopted by the Council during the COVID-19 pandemic.
- 78.
S/2020/830 of 24 August 2020. This was a summary of the meeting produced by Germany.
- 79.
S/2020/929 of 21 September 2020, See Sect. 21.3.3.
- 80.
S/2020/1090 of 5 November 2020.
- 81.
S/2021/198 of 25 February 2021.
- 82.
Arria-formula meetings are not official Council meetings. They can be either closed or open to the wider UN membership and civil society. Experts with specialized knowledge from within and outside the UN system can participate in these meetings; this is different from the most common closed meeting format, closed consultations, in which only UN officials and Council members can participate. Open Arria-formula meetings can be used to enhance awareness of issues of particular interest to the host(s) of the meeting.
- 83.
They included: a meeting on the ‘Security dimensions of climate change’ (co-hosted by the United Kingdom and Pakistan on 15 February 2013); ‘Climate change as a threat multiplier for global security’ (Spain and Malaysia on 30 June 2015); ‘Security implications of climate change: sea level rise’ (Ukraine in cooperation with Germany on 10 April 2017); ‘Preparing for security implications of rising temperatures’ (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Maldives, Morocco, Sweden, the Netherlands, Peru and the United Kingdom on 15 December 2017) and ‘water, peace and security’ (Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Netherlands, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia and Italy on 26 October 2018).
- 84.
S/2017/403 of 5 May 2017 was the UN’s report on the visiting mission.
- 85.
S/2017/181, para 2r.
- 86.
S/2017/403 of 5 May 2017, para 91.
- 87.
S/RES/2349 of 31 March 2017, para 26.
- 88.
Ibid.
- 89.
S/PRST/2020/3 of 11 February 2020, p. 3; S/PRST/2019/7 of 7 August 2019, p. 4; S/PRST/2018/16, p. 4.
- 90.
S/PRST/2019/10 of 12 September 2019, pp. 1–2; S/PRST/2018/17 of 10 August 2018, p. 2.
- 91.
S/RES/2499 of 15 November 2019, preamble; S/RES/2448 of 13 December 2018, preamble.
- 92.
S/RES/2474 of 31 May 2019, preamble; S/RES/2461 of 27 March 2019, para 21; S/RES/2431 of 30 July 2018, preamble and S/RES/2408 of 27 March 2018, preamble.
- 93.
S/RES/2480 of 28 June 2019, preamble and S/RES/2423 of 28 June 2018, preamble and para 68.
- 94.
S/RES/2429 of 13 July 2018, preamble and para 47.
- 95.
S/RES/2502 of 19 December 2019, preamble.
- 96.
S/RES/2567 of 12 March 2021, preamble.
- 97.
S/RES/2461 of 27 March 2019, para 21.
- 98.
S/RES/2429 of 13 July 2018, para 47.
- 99.
S/2020/849 of 27 August 2020.
- 100.
S/2020/751 of 28 July 2020, p. 21.
- 101.
Ibid., statements by Belgium, p. 10, Germany, p. 13, Estonia, p. 14, the United Kingdom, p. 16 and the Dominican Republic, pp. 19–20.
- 102.
Ibid., statements by the United Kingdom, p. 16 and Indonesia, p. 23.
- 103.
SC/13179 of 25 January 2018.
- 104.
Ibid.
- 105.
S/PV.7818 of 22 November 2016.
- 106.
Ibid., Statement by Secretary-General António Guterres, p. 3.
- 107.
Ibid., Statement by Danilo Türk, p. 6.
- 108.
S/PV.7959 of 6 June 2017.
- 109.
Ibid., Statement by Secretary-General António Guterres, p. 2.
- 110.
Ibid.
- 111.
ICJ, Dispute over the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala (Chile v Bolivia). For background on the case, see https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/162. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 112.
S/PV.7959 of 6 June 2017, Statement by Egypt, p. 13.
- 113.
Ibid., Statement by Russia, pp. 13–14.
- 114.
Ibid., Statement by Ethiopia, p. 19.
- 115.
S/2020/355 of 1 May 2020, p. 2.
- 116.
S/2020/409 of 14 May 2020.
- 117.
Ibid., p. 2.
- 118.
S/2020/480 of 2 June 2020, pp. 2–3.
- 119.
Ibid, p. 3.
- 120.
S/2020/636 of 1 July 2020.
- 121.
Ibid., p. 3.
- 122.
S/2021/351 of 12 April 2021 is the letter from Sudan. S/2021/354 of 13 April 2021 is the letter from Egypt.
- 123.
S/2021/376 (16 April 2021).
- 124.
Interview with former Security Council diplomat, 10 May 2021.
- 125.
S/PV.3977 of 12 February 1999.
- 126.
Arria-formula meeting on “Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict”, 7 November 2018. http://webtv.un.org/search/protection-of-the-environment-during-armed-conflict-security-council-arria-formula-meeting/5859032430001/?term=Arria-formula%20Protection%20of%20the%20Environment%20during%20Armed%20Conflict&sort=date. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 127.
Arria-formula meeting on “Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict”, 9 December 2019. http://webtv.un.org/search/arria-formula-meeting-on-protection-of-the-environment-during-armed-conflict/6114430670001/?term=Arria-formula%20Protection%20of%20the%20Environment%20during%20Armed%20Conflict&sort=date. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 128.
E.g., Statements by Kuwait and Belgium in 7 November 2018 meeting, above n 126.
- 129.
Arria-formula meeting on ‘Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict’, 9 December 2019, above n 127.
- 130.
Ibid.
- 131.
Arria-formula meeting on ‘Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict’, 7 November 2018, above n 126.
- 132.
Security Council Report (2020), Yemen: Mandate Renewal on UNMHA and Council VTC on the FSO Safer oil tanker. https://www.whatsinblue.org/2020/07/yemen-mandate-renewal-of-unmha-and-council-vtc-on-the-fso-safer-oil-tanker.php. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 133.
Ibid.
- 134.
S/2020/721 of 17 July 2020.
- 135.
Ibid., p. 2.
- 136.
Ibid.
- 137.
S/2020/929 of 17 September 2020.
- 138.
SC/14307 of 17 September 2020.
- 139.
S/PV.5705 of 25 June 2007; S/PV.6982 of 19 June 2013 and S/PV.8372 of 16 October 2018.
- 140.
E.g., S/PV.5705 of 25 June 2007, statement by Ghana, p. 13; S/PV.6982 of 19 June 2013, statements by Togo, p. 15 and Guatemala, p. 19 and S/PV.8372 of 18 October 2018, statement by Poland, p. 15.
- 141.
E.g., S/PV.5705 of 25 June 2007, statement by Ghana, p. 14; S/PV.6982 of 19 June 2013, statement by Republic of Korea, p. 22 and S/PV.8372 of 16 October 2018, statements by France, p. 16, the United Kingdom, p. 18 and Kazakhstan, p. 19.
- 142.
E.g., S/RES/2293 of 23 June 2016, para 7(g), preamble and S/RES/2399 of 30 January 2018, para 21(e), preamble.
- 143.
Penney 2018, p. 31.
- 144.
Brown et al. 2007, p. 1147.
- 145.
S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019, statements by Russia, p. 16, and India, p. 43.
- 146.
E.g., S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019, statements by Russia, p. 16 and India, p. 43.
- 147.
Interview with UN Security Council diplomat, 24 March 2020.
- 148.
S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019.
- 149.
See e.g., General Assembly 66th session, statements by Zimbabwe, 22 September 2011 (gadebate.un.org/en/66/Zimbabwe—accessed 30 April 2021), Cuba, 26 September 2011 (gadebate.un.org/en/66/cuba—accessed 30 April 2021) and Venezuela, 27 September 2011 (gadebate.un.org/en/66/Venezuela-bolivarian-republic—accessed 30 April 2021).
- 150.
On this challenge, see Conca 2019, pp. 6–8.
- 151.
E.g., S/PV.8212 of 22 March 2018, statement by Sweden, p. 11; S.PV.8307 of 11 July 2018, statement by Kazakhstan, p. 12 and S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019, statements by Estonia, p. 34, the European Union, p. 44, Portugal, p. 47, the African Union, p. 55 and Trinidad and Tobago, p. 62.
- 152.
E.g., S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019, statements by Germany, p. 12, France, p. 19, the Dominican Republic, pp. 24–25 and Sweden, p. 53.
- 153.
E.g., S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019, statements by Belgium, p. 10, Peru, p. 18, France, p. 19, Spain, p. 44, Portugal, p. 47 and Sweden, p. 53.
- 154.
See Sect. 21.2.
- 155.
Private discussion with UN Secretariat official, 23 March 2020.
- 156.
Climate Security Expert Network website. https://www.climate-security-expert-network.org/start. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 157.
Initiated by Germany and Nauru in August 2018 and currently consisting of 50 member states, the goal of the Group of Friends to collaborate in generating ideas for climate change and security policy, enhancing public awareness of the issue, and strengthening the UN’s engagement on climate-security matters.
- 158.
Brown 2019a.
- 159.
Jayaram 2019.
- 160.
Brown 2019b.
- 161.
See Sect. 21.3.
- 162.
A/60/L.1 f 20 September 2005, para 9.
- 163.
S/PRST/2018/1 of 18 January 2018, p. 1.
- 164.
S/RES/1625 of 14 September 2005. See also Sect. 21.2.
- 165.
S/RES/2282 of 27 April 2016.
- 166.
S/RES/1625 of 14 September 2005, para 4a.
- 167.
A/RES/70/262 of 27April, 2016.
- 168.
S/RES/2282 of 27 April 2016, preamble.
- 169.
Ibid, emphasis added.
- 170.
- 171.
E.g., S/2020/751 of 28 July 2020, statement by Brazil, p. 46.
- 172.
The UNFCCC secretariat (known as UN Climate Change), established by the General Assembly in 1992, consists of some 450 staff persons and supports international climate change efforts, including the negotiations that led to the 2015 Paris Agreement.
- 173.
S/PRST/2011/15 of 20 July 2011. See also, for example, S/PV.8307 of 11 July 2018, statements by France, p. 14 and the Maldives, on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States, p. 26 and S/PV.6587 of 20 July 2011, statements by Nauru, on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, p. 23 and by Australia, pp. 24–25.
- 174.
S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019, statement by Belgium, p. 10.
- 175.
Ibid., statement by Peru, p. 18.
- 176.
For example, though the Security Council is regularly seized of the situation in Syria, in December 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing the ‘Independent, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011’, A/RES/71/248 of 21 December 2016, para 4. See also Johnson 2014, pp. 106–115.
- 177.
Emphasis added.
- 178.
E.g., S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019, statements by Belgium, p. 10, Poland, p. 13, Peru, p. 18, France, p. 19 and the Dominican Republic, p. 24 on climate change and S/PV.7818 of 22 November 2016, statements by Ukraine, p. 14, New Zealand, p. 23 and Egypt, p. 25 on water scarcity.
- 179.
See Sect 21.3.1.
- 180.
S/PRST/2011/15 of 20 July 2011, see Sect 21.3.1.
- 181.
S/2019/913 of 29 November 2019, para 21–22, 82; S/2019/430 of 24 May 2019, para 26–27 and S/2018/1065 of 29 November 2018, para 25–26.
- 182.
S/2019/1005 of 30 December 2019, paras 59, 95; S/2019/549 of 5 July 2019, paras 28, 51, 56, 71, 88–89 and S/2018/1175 of 28 December 2018, paras 19, 20, 55, 62, 94.
- 183.
S/PV.8731 of 24 February 2020, statement by Dan Smith, pp. 6–8.
- 184.
S/2019/73 of 28 January 2019.
- 185.
S/RES/22 of 9 April 1947.
- 186.
The ICJ has dealt with several environmental disputes, e.g., Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgement, 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14; Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France), Judgement, 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253 and Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v France), Judgement, 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 457.
- 187.
Eklöw and Krampe 2019, p. 37.
- 188.
Ibid.
- 189.
S/PRST/2002/2 of 31 January 2002 in the case of the ad-hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; S/PRST/2001/3 of 31 January 2001 in the case of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations; and S/RES/1612 of 26 July 2005 in the case of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.
- 190.
While the Informal Experts Group on Women, Peace and Security was established through resolution 2242 of 13 October 2015, the Informal Experts Group on Protection of Civilians was formed in 2009 without an authorizing Council product.
- 191.
S/PV.8451 of 25 January 2019.
- 192.
E.g., S/PRST/2019/8 of 20 August 2019 on the 70th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions; S/RES/2409 of 27 March 2018, paras 11, 14, 19, preamble and S/RES/2459 of 15 March 2019, paras 26, 37, preamble.
- 193.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978, Articles 35(3) and 55(1).
- 194.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 45, p. 151.
- 195.
See also ibid. Rule 44, p. 147 on due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment during conflict, as well as the application of the precautionary principle to environmental damage.
- 196.
See, for example, S/RES/2399 of 30 January 2018, para 21(b), which imposed sanctions on individuals ‘[i]nvolved in planning, directing, or committing acts in the CAR that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law’.
- 197.
E.g., S/PRST/2019/8 of 20 August 2019, where the Security Council recalled the ‘the importance of ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, ending impunity for violations and abuses, and ensuring accountability’; S/RES/2499 of 15 November 2019, paras 15, 21 and 33 and S/RES/2405 of 8 March 2018, paras 23, 33, 38 and preamble.
- 198.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, entered into force 1 July 2002, Article 4.2.(b)(iv). Of course, in future referrals by the Security Council to the ICC, it is possible the ICC Prosecutor could eventually indict perpetrators for committing such acts.
- 199.
S/RES/1976 of 11 April 2011, preamble.
- 200.
Ibid., para 7.
- 201.
Ibid., para 8. See also S/RES/2020 of 22 November 2011, para 24. After the Secretary-General reported on the issue a couple of times, noting the difficulties of collecting relevant data due to lack of Somali capacity a suggesting that international anti-piracy forces take up the issue, the Security Council did not follow up with any concrete action on the issue of illegal dumping. See S/2011/661, Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of Somali natural resources and waters, of 25 October 2011; S/2012/783 of 22 October 2012, Section VIII and S/2013/623 of 21 October 2013, Section IX.
- 202.
Security Council Report 2008, Update Report No. 4: Myanmar, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_4130257.php. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 203.
Ibid.
- 204.
Ibid. Other Council members were sceptic that such an approach was warranted and the relevance of the responsibility to protect to natural disasters. For more on this, see Conca 2019, p. 13; A/CN.4/3057, Summary record of the 3057th meeting of the International Law Commission of 4 June 2010; Junk 2015, p. 88. Nevertheless, this does not take away from the capacity of the Security Council to use enforcement measures in such situations if it deems it necessary.
- 205.
Cousins 2013, pp. 201 and 206.
- 206.
Conca 2019, p. 14.
- 207.
See ibid., p. 12, on “climate refugees” and “statelessness”.
- 208.
See Sect. 21.2.2.
- 209.
S/RES/687 of 3 April 1991, para 16.
- 210.
Ibid., para 18.
- 211.
S/RES/1483, para 21; see also the UNCC website, https://uncc.ch/home. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 212.
See https://uncc.ch/home. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 213.
E.g., S/AC.26/2005/10 of 30 June 2005, para 1.
- 214.
See https://uncc.ch/follow-programme-environmental-awards-0. Accessed 30 April 2021.
- 215.
See ibid.
- 216.
S/AC.26/Dec.258 of 8 December 2005. For an assessment of the UNCC’s work, see Payne 2016.
- 217.
Scott and Ku 2018, p. 2. On climate change in particular, the authors note: ‘There has been growing recognition of the need for far-reaching, complementary efforts requiring enhanced coordination on the part of all international institutions’.
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Acknowledgment
The authors would like to thank Ewout Stoefs, Karin Landgren and Sir Michael Wood for their valuable comments on this chapter.
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Romita, P.M., Sthoeger, E. (2022). A Growing Role for the UN Security Council?. In: Sobenes, E., Mead, S., Samson, B. (eds) The Environment Through the Lens of International Courts and Tribunals. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-507-2_21
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