The Rebel with the Magnifying Glass: Armed Non-State Actors, the Right to Life and the Requirement to Investigate in Armed Conflict

Niyo, Joshua Joseph

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-399-3_4

The Rebel with the Magnifying Glass: Armed Non-State Actors, the Right to Life and the Requirement to Investigate in Armed Conflict

Joshua Joseph Niyo^9,10,11

Chapter
First Online: 29 October 2020

332 Accesses
4 Altmetric

Part of the Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law book series (YIHL,volume 22)

Abstract

Seventy years on from the promulgation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the protection of the right to life remains a central theme in the context of armed conflict. Particularly, Common Article 3 of the Conventions has been a pivotal gateway into the regulation of the conduct of armed non-State actors during military operations. Furthermore, the increasing prosecutions of their members for war crimes has prompted the requirement for them to review their own behaviour, especially with regard to alleged unlawful killings during military operations. This chapter, therefore, analyses the scope of the legal obligations of armed non-State actors with regard to the protection of the right to life in armed conflict, and it explores the existence and application of an obligation for these actors to investigate credible allegations of the unlawful loss of life, arising from their military conduct during non-international armed conflicts. As armed non-State actors can be considered to bear obligations under both international humanitarian law and human rights law, the chapter explores whether there exists an obligation to investigate under the international humanitarian law framework, as well as the impact of the international human rights law framework on the possible investigative obligation of armed non-State actors.

Keywords

Right to life
Obligation to investigate
International humanitarian law
International human rights law
Armed non-State actors
Non-international armed conflict
Conduct of hostilities
Law enforcement
Lethal force
Effective investigation

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (Canada)

eBook: USD 84.99; Price excludes VAT (Canada)

Softcover Book: USD 109.99; Price excludes VAT (Canada)

Hardcover Book: USD 149.99; Price excludes VAT (Canada)

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
See, e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV), Article 3.
2.
Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 356. As indicated in the Commentary, during the time of drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, ‘Convention in Miniature’ was the expression used to point out the brevity and self-contained nature of the draft Article, which was ultimately adopted as Common Article 3.
3.
Moir 2015, para 64.
4.
Moir 2002, p 25; Cullen 2010, p 25.
5.
Ibid., p 36.
6.
Sivakumaran 2015, pp 416, 431, paras 4, 64 respectively.
7.
See GC IV, above n 1, Article 1.
8.
See, e.g., UN Security Council (2015) Resolution 2217 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2217, para 17 on the Central African Republic, in which the Security Council invoked its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and called upon ANSAs to issue clear orders prohibiting all violations against children under the applicable international law, which included IHL.
9.
See, ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment (Merits), 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 220.
10.
See Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 125.
11.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP II), Article 1.
12.
See Henckaerts 2005, p 197.
13.
See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp 311–314, Rule 89.
14.
See, specifically, ibid., pp 313–314.
15.
Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 589.
16.
See commentary on Rule 189 (on respecting and ensuring respect for IHL) in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, p 498.
17.
See Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, paras 879, 896 on investigating and prosecuting violence to life as a serious violation of CA 3. See also, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp 607–608, Rule 158 on investigating war crimes, which includes serious violations of CA 3.
18.
See, UN Human Rights Committee (2018) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, paras 27, 64.
19.
For example, the ICRC Customary IHL Study unmistakably omits ANSAs when referring to the obligation to investigate, even if it admits that the obligation subsists in NIAC situations. See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, p 608.
20.
ECtHR, McCann and Others v The United Kingdom, Judgment, 27 September 1995, Application No. 18984/91, para 147: “one of the basic values of the democratic societies”; UN Human Rights Committee (2018) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, para 2.
21.
See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 3.
22.
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 25; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2015, paras 13, 32–35.
23.
UN Human Rights Committee (2018) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, para 64; Quénivet 2008.
24.
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2011, p 62.
25.
International Committee of the Red Cross 2013, p 7.
26.
Ibid., p 6.
27.
See International Committee of the Red Cross 1987, p 599, para 1871; Park 2018, p 104.
28.
Murray 2017, p 112, para 5.01.
29.
Ibid., p 113, para 5.08.
30.
AP II, above n 11, Article 13(3). See, generally, Murray 2017, p 114, para 5.09; Sassòli 2019, pp 276–277, paras 8.120–8.122.
31.
Doswald-Beck 2011, pp 163–165.
32.
Sassòli and Olson 2008, pp 613–616.
33.
Quénivet 2008, pp 352–353.
34.
See, Milanovic 2015, p 31, para 13 on how extra-territorial NIACs challenge the IAC/NIAC binary. Indeed, extraterritoriality can also be a matter for consideration in NIACs.
35.
For a general position on the three points for evaluation, see Park 2018, p 211.
36.
Doswald-Beck 2006, p 887.
37.
Henckaerts 2005, pp 198–200.
38.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp 3, 25, Rules 1 and 7.
39.
Ibid., p 19, Rule 6; AP II, above n 11, Article 13(3).
40.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp 237, 239, Rule 70.
41.
Doswald-Beck 2006, p 889.
42.
Park 2018, p 112.
43.
Ibid.
44.
See GC IV, above n 1, Article 3(1); AP II, above n 11, Article 1(1).
45.
See GC IV, above n 1, Article 3(1); AP II, above n 11, Article 13(3). See also International Committee of the Red Cross 1987, p 1453, para 4789 where the commentary suggests the use of force against members belonging to ANSAs at any time, without reference to any conditions.
46.
Doswald-Beck 2006, p 889.
47.
Melzer 2009, p 33.
48.
Ibid., pp 33–34.
49.
See Sassòli 2019, p 277, para 8.122.
50.
See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp 5–6.
51.
Ibid., pp 21, 239–240.
52.
Schabas 2014, p 370; Melzer 2009, p 79.
53.
Schabas 2014, p 371.
54.
UN Human Rights Committee (2018) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, paras 12–14.
55.
For an extensive analysis on this matter in two recent pivotal publications on the application of IHRL to ANSAs, see Fortin 2017; Murray 2016.
56.
Fortin 2017, pp 65–68.
57.
See ibid., p 38. See also ibid., note 50, where she explains that “in many ways, the law enforcement paradigm is often presented as referring to all parts of the legal framework that falls outside of the conduct of hostilities paradigm”.
58.
See Gill 2013, p 261.
59.
Ibid.
60.
Fortin 2016.
61.
Fortin 2017, pp 51–59.
62.
Ibid., p 65.
63.
Gowlland-Debbas 2010, pp 126–130. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1 (Tadić), para 87 in which the Appeals Chamber expounds on the impact of IHRL on the laws of armed conflict, which culminated in a comprehensive IHL framework of rules applicable in NIACs.
64.
See this approach, generally, in Cassese 1981; Kleffner 2011; Sivakumaran 2015. The focus in this regard revolves around the different theories on how IHL binds ANSAs, namely (1) the customary law (and general principles) theory, (2) the treaties and third parties theory, (3) the de facto control theory, (4) the prescriptive jurisdiction theory, and (5) the state ratification theory.
65.
See, Sassòli 2019, p 196, para 6.68; Murray 2015, pp 101–102; Sivakumaran 2006, pp 370–371.
66.
See approach in Fortin 2017, pp 118–151, 152–173 for a treatment of IHL and IHRL respectively. See also Murray 2016, pp 23–50, 59–77 for a more general approach.
67.
See the approach in Murray 2016, pp 82–119.
68.
See Burniske et al. 2017; Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2016. Both are pivotal studies on the practice of the UN bodies with regard to the application of IHL and IHRL to ANSAs.
69.
See, e.g., UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2332 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2332 (Syria); UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2274 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2274 (Afghanistan); UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2265 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2265 (Sudan); UN Security Council (2015) Resolution 2216 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2216 (Yemen); UN Security Council (2015) Resolution 2211 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2211 (Democratic Republic of Congo). See also UN General Assembly (2013) Resolution: The situation in Afghanistan, UN Doc. A/RES/68/11; UN General Assembly (2012) Resolution: The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/RES/66/253 B; UN General Assembly (2003) Resolution: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. A/RES/58/196.
70.
See, e.g., UN Security Council (2017) Resolution 2340 (2017), UN Doc. S/RES/2340 (Sudan); UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2295 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2295 (Mali); UN General Assembly (2016) Resolution: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN Doc. A/RES/71/198; UN General Assembly (2015) Resolution: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, UN Doc A/RES/69/248.
71.
See, e.g., UN Security Council (2008) Resolution 1834 (2008), UN Doc. S/RES/1834 (Central Africa Republic and Chad); UN General Assembly (2003) Resolución: Situation des droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo [Resolution: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo], UN Doc A/RES/57/233.
72.
See for example UN Security Council (2010) Resolution 1925 (2010), UN Doc. S/RES/1925 (Democratic Republic of the Congo); UN General Assembly (2015) Resolution: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, UN Doc A/RES/69/248.
73.
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2016, p 10.
74.
See, e.g., Nowak (2008) Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak: Mission to Sri Lanka, UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/3/Add.6; UN General Assembly (2002) Resolución: Situación de los derechos humanos en la República Democrática del Congo [Resolution: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo], UN Doc. A/RES/56/173; UN Security Council (2008) Resolution 1814 (2008), UN Doc. S/RES/1814 (Somalia).
75.
See, e.g., the firm language in UN Security Council (2009) Resolution 1863 (2009), UN Doc. S/RES/1863 (Somalia), paras 15, 19, in which the Security Council grounded the Resolution in an invocation of Chapter VII authority.
76.
See, AP II, above n 11, Article 1(1), which indicates that the Protocol “develops and supplements” CA 3, “without modifying” CA 3’s existing conditions of application.
77.
Moir 2002, pp 193–194.
78.
Fortin 2017, pp 35–39.
79.
See extensive analysis in Droege 2007; Sassòli 2019, pp 433–437, paras 9.26–9.38.
80.
Clapham 2015, p 735, para 88.
81.
Ibid., paras 87–88.
82.
This is the import of the rejection of a combatant status in NIACs; rendering fighters who are not state forces punishable for taking part in hostilities, and not the state armed forces. See Crowe and Weston-Scheuber 2013, pp 49–50. See also Solis 2016, pp 252.
83.
Members of ANSAs, if captured, “may be treated as criminals”—a purely law enforcement-centred approach. See Kolb and Hyde 2008, p 205. See also Quintin and Tougas 2020, p 374.
84.
See Kretzmer et al. 2014, p 212.
85.
See this observation in International Committee of the Red Cross 2011, p 18.
86.
This was emphasised in International Committee of the Red Cross 2011, p 14.
87.
Heffes and Bellal 2018, p 127; Sivakumaran 2011, p 241.
88.
Somer 2007, p 659.
89.
See ibid., pp 659–660; Sivakumaran 2011, p 241; Sassòli 2019, p 585, para 10.221.
90.
Sivakumaran 2011, p 241. This was also mentioned in International Committee of the Red Cross 2011, p 14.
91.
Sassòli 2007, p 255.
92.
Heffes and Bellal 2018, p 127.
93.
Sassòli 2019, p 585, para 10.221; International Committee of the Red Cross 2011, p 14.
94.
International Committee of the Red Cross 2013, p 5.
95.
This was highlighted in International Committee of the Red Cross 2015, p 18.
96.
See Daboné 2011, p 399.
97.
Kolb and Hyde 2008, p 17.
98.
Kretzmer et al. 2014.
99.
Ibid., p 199.
100.
Ibid., pp 211–213.
101.
Ibid., pp 204–205.
102.
See Erickson 1978.
103.
Kretzmer et al. 2014, p 214.
104.
Corn 2015, pp 284–285.
105.
Kretzmer et al. 2014, pp 219–220.
106.
Ibid., p 197.
107.
Dinstein 2009, pp 4–6.
108.
Dinstein 2016, p 23.
109.
Melzer 2009, pp 78–79.
110.
See Dinstein 2016, p 23.
111.
To the extent that hostilities can lead to death due to armed operations, the ICRC concedes—which is the logic expounded here. However, the ICRC insists that CA 3 “is not suited to assessing the lawfulness of the conduct of hostilities”. See Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 543.
112.
Boothby 2012, p 433; Cassese 1984, p 107; Bond 2016, pp 346–349. However, see opposite view in Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, paras 540, 542.
113.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp 313–314.
114.
Kretzmer et al. 2014, pp 204-205.
115.
Melzer 2009, pp 78–79.
116.
See, Somer 2007, pp 683–684.
117.
Boothby 2012, p 433.
118.
See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, p 61.
119.
See the importance of the procedural right to life in armed conflict discussed in Park 2018, pp 115–117.
120.
To “ensure” here does not necessarily reflect the normative reference in CA 1. It is used to draw out the need for the effectiveness of protection that would come from a procedural dimension to the protection of life by ANSAs. However, Zegveld contemplates a link between CA 1 and ANSAs with regard to the obligation to ensure respect. See Zegveld 2002, p 67.
121.
See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 4, para 8. Although the reference here to giving “practical effect” is with regard to IHRL, this makes sense for IHL as well. This is because there is an obligation as well with regard to life, which should be effectively complied with. It is proposed here that the logic holds in both legal frameworks.
122.
See Callamard (2018) Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on armed non-State actors: the protection of the right to life, UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/44, para 75.
123.
Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 154.
124.
Ibid., para 154.
125.
See the discussion of the multiplicity in number and form of ‘decentralised non-state armed groups’ in International Committee of the Red Cross 2018, pp 46–47.
126.
Mettraux 2005, p 130.
127.
See Tadić, above n 63, para 133.
128.
Ibid., para 134.
129.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002), Article 8(2)(c)(i).
130.
Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 879; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp 607–608.
131.
See a similar line of argumentation in Somer 2007, p 684.
132.
See IMT (Nuremberg), France et al. v Hermann Wilhelm Göring et al., Judgement, 1 October 1946, IMT Trial Proceedings Volume 22.
133.
The thrust of individual criminal responsibility in NIACs. See Meron 1995, p 561.
134.
See Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, paras 884–886.
135.
La Haye 2008, p 121.
136.
See Meron 1995, p 574, where he emphasises that “[w]ar crimes under the “Hague law,” i.e., those perpetrated in the conduct of hostilities, should also be punishable when committed in noninternational (sic) armed conflicts”.
137.
See ICTY, Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljević, Judgment, 29 November 2002, Case No. IT-98-32-T, paras 193–204, and then para 205 (for comparison). See also ICC 2011, Article 8(2)(c)(i)(1) on the elements of the war crime of murder.
138.
Cassese 2013, pp 182, 187.
139.
Jackson 2019, p 410.
140.
See ICTY, Prosecutor v Enver Hadžihasanović, Mehmed Alagić and Amir Kubura, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72 (Hadžihasanović et al.), para 16.
141.
Ibid., para 22.
142.
Ibid., para 16.
143.
Cassese 2013, p 187; Jackson 2019, p 410–411.
144.
ICTY, Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić, Judgment, 29 July 2004, Case No. IT-95-14-A, para 417. See also ICC, Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 8 June 2018, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 A (Bemba), paras 167–170.
145.
Cassese 2013, p 192.
146.
See Bemba, above n 144, para 182 in which it seems to be taken for granted by both the Trial and Appeals Chambers that Mr. Bemba as a commander should have a process in place to adequately investigate and prosecute allegations of crimes.
147.
See Bassiouni 2008, pp 732–733.
148.
See Hadžihasanović et al., above n 140, para 13.
149.
Schmitt 2011, p 83.
150.
Sassòli and Olson 2008, p 615, there n 77.
151.
See UN Human Rights Committee (2018) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, para 64 in which investigation is highlighted for, “alleged or suspected” violations of the right to life in situations of armed conflict.
152.
This is re-emphasised in Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978), Article 1.
153.
See Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 145, where the positive nature of this facet of respect for the Conventions can be deduced from the fact that “States are thus required to take appropriate measures”.
154.
See, e.g., GC IV, above n 1, Article 146(1) where it is required that states “undertake to enact” legislation, which provides “effective penal sanctions” for grave breaches.
155.
See GC IV, above n 1, Article 146(3).
156.
See argument in Margalit 2018, p 86.
157.
See Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, paras 2896–2897, particularly with regard to the impact of the Rome Statute of the ICC (which includes serious violations of AP II) on State practice.
158.
See detailed discussion of this expansive approach in Tan 2016, pp 204–206. See also Cohen and Shany 2011, pp 42–44.
159.
See Gaeta 2015, p 741, para 10.
160.
Pictet 1952, p 367.
161.
Zegveld 2002, p 67.
162.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp 608, 618, Rules 158, 161.
163.
Ibid., p 608.
164.
See Agreement on the Application of International Humanitarian Law between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian Democratic Party, Croatian Democratic Community, concluded 22 May 1992, Article 5(2).
165.
See UN Security Council (1998) Resolution 1193 (1998), UN Doc. S/RES/1193 (Afghanistan), para 6.
166.
See, particularly, AP II, above n 11, Article 6(2). One of the requirements mentioned is the centrality of individual criminal (penal) responsibility.
167.
See, AP II, above n 11, Article 6(1).
168.
Somer 2007, pp 670–671.
169.
See, AP II, above n 11, Article 6(1).
170.
See, Somer 2007, p 684 where Somer addresses the implication of a requirement on ANSAs to prosecute war crimes, particularly in light of the principle of equality of parties.
171.
Henckaerts 2003, p 133.
172.
See the object and purpose rule in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), Article 31(1). It is suggested that the object and purpose of the criminal trials suggested in CA 3 and Article 6 AP II would not be achieved unless there is the presumption that investigations take place to fulfil these requirements.
173.
Somer 2007, p 684. This rehashes the point emphasised throughout the chapter about the centrality of the equality of belligerents in understanding IHL obligations, even in NIACs. Somer roots his analysis in a similar way.
174.
Emphasis added. See, e.g., GC IV, above n 1, Article 146(1).
175.
Lubell et al. 2019, p 7, para 31.
176.
Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 145.
177.
See GC IV, above n 1, Articles 3(1)(a), 147 referring to “murder of all kinds” and “wilful killing” respectively. See also Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 2819, where the object and purpose of this obligation is pointed out with regard to both grave breaches and other serious violations of the Conventions.
178.
Dörmann and Henckaerts 2016, para 2840.
179.
See ibid., paras 2841, 2842, 2843, and 2845 respectively.
180.
See Schmitt 2011, p 55, where he indicates quite emphatically that “[e]ffectiveness is an implicit characteristic of all investigations”.
181.
Lubell et al. 2019, p 7, para 30.
182.
Ibid., para 31.
183.
See Gaggioli 2017, pp 27, 30 where she emphasises that “[i]t would indeed be impossible to prosecute alleged war criminals without having previously conducted an effective criminal investigation”.
184.
See Gaggioli 2017, p 41. Gaggioli indicates the unfortunate reality in NIAC practice that murders of civilians are sometimes disguised as deaths in combat. She then makes the case for the need to clearly understand and verify what took place and whether the killing of civilians actually amounts to serious IHL violations.
185.
Lubell et al. 2019, p 7, para 32.
186.
Cohen and Shany 2011, p 59; Schmitt 2011, p 55; Margalit 2018, p 68–69.
187.
See, generally, Gaggioli 2017.
188.
See conclusions in Fortin 2017, pp 281–282 where she explains the rationale in viewing ANSAs with control of territory as de facto states for purposes of examining conduct that is impersonal and relates to the community.
189.
UN Security Council (1998) Resolution 1193 (1998), UN Doc. S/RES/1193 (Afghanistan), para 6.
190.
Ibid., para 12.
191.
Ibid., para 14.
192.
Alston (2006) Report of the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions. UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53, para 36; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2015), para 20; UN Human Rights Committee (2018) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, para 64.
193.
United Nations 1990, preambular para 3.
194.
See ibid., Principle 8.
195.
Ibid., Principle 4.
196.
Ibid.
197.
See ibid., Principle 6.
198.
See ibid., Principle 11(f).
199.
Ibid., Principle 22.
200.
Ibid.
201.
Indeed, in Cohen and Shany 2011, p 62 it is noted that “the most important component of a proper investigation is its effectiveness”.
202.
See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 4; Callamard (2018) Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on armed non-State actors: the protection of the right to life, UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/44, para 75.
203.
See Cohen and Shany 2011, p 59; Tan 2016, p 220.
204.
Margalit 2018, p 67; Murray 2017, p 334, para 17.28.
205.
See, Murray 2017, p 334, para 17.28. See also Tan 2016, pp 213–220 for an extensive critique of the lack of standards for reporting and investigation in the IHL framework.
206.
Tan 2016, p 223.
207.
See Gaggioli 2017, p 50.
208.
This is inferred from carrying the argument of the need to provide practical effect mentioned by Callamard to its logical conclusion. See argument in Callamard (2018) Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on armed non-State actors: the protection of the right to life, UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/44, p 16, para 75.
209.
See Callamard’s argument regarding restricting ANSAs to IHL establishing inequality of obligations in Callamard (2018) Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on armed non-State actors: the protection of the right to life, UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/44, p 7–8, para 28. See also Somer 2007, p 688 where he argues for an analogous application of IHRL, rather than importation of IHRL qua human rights law in order to respect the equality of belligerents.
210.
See the import of the principle of effectiveness in Fortin 2017, p 274.
211.
Ibid., pp 37–38.
212.
See argument in ibid., p 243.
213.
See Lubell et al. 2019, p 7, para 32. See also Murray 2017, pp 333–335, paras 17.25, 17.30 respectively; Tan 2016, p 220.
214.
See AP II, above n 11, Article 6(2) (emphasis added).
215.
See Lubell et al. 2019, p 24, Guideline 7 ‘Independence and Impartiality’.
216.
Consider the implication in ANSAs of the standard in ibid., para 123. See also, Murray 2017, p 335, para 17.33.
217.
This would be the import for ANSAs of the principle stated in UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 8, para 31.
218.
Lubell et al. 2019, p 24, para 125. See also Margalit 2018, p 54.
219.
See the standard in Lubell et al. 2019, pp 24–25, paras 126–128. See also UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 8, para 28.
220.
See the general standard in Lubell et al. 2019, p 26, para 135.
221.
See Gaggioli 2017, p 46 where she highlights problems in this regard as dominant in NIACs.
222.
See the general position regarding the need for a separate empowered investigative team to carry out the work diligently in UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 8, para 27.
223.
See the general standard in Lubell et al. 2019, p 26, para 135.
224.
This is the import for ANSAs of the position in Gaggioli 2017, p 48.
225.
The Minnesota Protocol details what is necessary to be addressed in a comprehensive investigation. See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 7, para 25.
226.
See the general position in Lubell et al. 2019, p 26, para 136.
227.
See Lubell et al. 2019, p 28, Guideline 9 ‘Promptness’. Consider also the standard in Tan 2016, p 222.
228.
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 7, para 23.
229.
See Lubell et al. 2019, p 28, para 143 for a general position on the principle.
230.
See the discussion in Gaggioli 2017, p 47 on the importance of time in preserving the evidence in an investigation.
231.
See Lubell et al. 2019, p 28, para 144.
232.
See ibid., para 145.
233.
See ibid., para 145. See also Murray 2017, p 337, para 17.39.
234.
See Lubell et al. 2019, p 28, Guideline 10 ‘Transparency’. See also UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016, p 8, para 32. See also Tan 2016, p 222.
235.
Lubell et al. 2019, p 29, para 147.
236.
See, ibid., paras 150–151 as would be applicable here to ANSAs.
237.
See UN Security Council (2005) Resolution 1612 (2005), UN Doc. S/RES/1612 in which the Security Council established a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations committed against children in times of armed conflict. Previously, only parties that recruit and use children were included in the lists annexed to the annual report. With subsequent practice, the UN Security Council now endorses lists of armed forces and groups who kill and maim children, commit sexual violence against children, attack schools and hospitals, and abduct children. Compliance with internal investigations by an ANSA would go a long way in influencing its delisting.

References

Articles, Books and Other Documents

African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2015) General Comment No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life (Article 4)
Google Scholar
Alston P (2006) Report of the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions. UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53
Google Scholar
Bassiouni M (2008) The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 98(3):711–810
Google Scholar
Bond J (2016) Application of the Law of War to Internal Conflicts. Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 3:345–384
Google Scholar
Boothby W (2012) The Law of Targeting. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Google Scholar
Burniske J, Modirzadeh N, Lewis D (2017) Armed Non-State Actors and International Human Rights Law: An Analysis of the Practice of the U.N. Security Council and U.N. General Assembly. Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict. https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/33117816. Accessed 12 June 2020
Callamard A (2018) Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on armed non-State actors: the protection of the right to life, UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/44
Google Scholar
Cassese A (1981) The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 30(2):416–439
Google Scholar
Cassese A (1984) The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and Customary International Law. UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 3:55–118
Google Scholar
Cassese A (2013) Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press. Oxford
Google Scholar
Clapham A (2015) The Complex Relationship Between the Geneva Conventions and International Human Rights Law. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P, Sassòli M (eds) The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 701–735
Google Scholar
Cohen A, Shany Y (2011) Beyond the Grave Breaches Regime: The Duty to Investigate Alleged Violations of International Law Governing Armed Conflicts. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 14:37–84
Google Scholar
Corn G (2015) Regulating Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Thoughts on Bridging the Divide between the Tadić Aspiration and Conflict Realities. International Law Studies 91:281–322
Google Scholar
Crowe J, Weston-Scheuber K (2013) Principles of International Humanitarian Law. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham
Google Scholar
Cullen A (2010) The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
Daboné Z (2011) International law: armed groups in a state-centric system. International Review of the Red Cross 93(882):395–424
Google Scholar
Dinstein Y (2009) The International Law of Belligerent Occupation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
Dinstein Y (2016) The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
Dörmann K, Henckaerts J-M (2016) Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Cambridge University Press/ICRC, Geneva
Google Scholar
Doswald-Beck L (2006) The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all the answers? International Review of the Red Cross 88(864):881–904
Google Scholar
Doswald-Beck L (2011) Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Google Scholar
Droege C (2007) The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict. Israel Law Review 40(2):310–355
Google Scholar
Erickson R (1978) Protocol I: A Merging of the Hague and Geneva Law of Armed Conflict. Virginia Journal of International Law 19(3):557–594
Google Scholar
Fortin K (2016) The Application of Human Rights Law to Everyday Civilian Life Under Rebel Control. Netherlands International Law Review 63:161–181
Google Scholar
Fortin K (2017) The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Google Scholar
Gaeta P (2015) The Interplay Between the Geneva Conventions and International Criminal Law. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P, Sassòli M (eds) The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 737–753
Google Scholar
Gaggioli G (2017) A legal approach to investigations of arbitrary deprivations of life in armed conflicts: The need for a dynamic understanding of the interplay between IHL and HRL. Questions of International Law. http://www.qil-qdi.org/legal-approach-investigations-arbitrary-deprivations-life-armed-conflicts-need-dynamic-understanding-interplay-ihl-hrl/. Accessed 12 June 2020
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (2016) Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council. Academy In-Brief No. 7. https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/InBrief7_web.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2020
Gill T (2013) Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: A Plea for Mutual Respect and a Common-Sense Approach. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 16:251–266
Google Scholar
Gowlland-Debbas V (2010) The Right to Life and the Relationship between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. In: Tomuschat C, Lagrange E, Oeter S (eds) The Right to Life. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, pp 123–150
Google Scholar
Heffes E, Bellal A (2018) “Yes I Do”: Binding Armed Non-State Actors to IHL and Human Rights Norms through Their Consent. Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 12(1):120–136
Google Scholar
Henckaerts J-M (2003) Binding Armed Opposition Groups through Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary Law. In: College of Europe/International Committee of the Red Cross (2003) Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium: Relevance of International Humanitarian Law to Non-State Actors, 25th-26th October 2002. https://www.coleurope.eu/content/publications/pdf/Collegium27.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2020
Henckaerts J-M (2005) Study on customary international humanitarian law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict. International Review of the Red Cross 87(857):175–212
Google Scholar
Henckaerts J-M, Doswald-Beck L (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
ICC (2011) Elements of Crimes. https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2020
International Committee of the Red Cross (1987) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/ICRC, Geneva
Google Scholar
International Committee of the Red Cross (2011) International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/report/31-international-conference-ihl-challenges-report-2011–10-31.htm. Accessed 12 June 2020
International Committee of the Red Cross (2013) Expert Meeting: The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts. https://shop.icrc.org/the-use-of-force-in-armed-conflicts-expert-meeting.html?___store=default. Accessed 12 June 2020
International Committee of the Red Cross (2015) International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts. Accessed 12 June 2020
International Committee of the Red Cross (2018) The Roots of Restraint in War. ICRC, Geneva
Google Scholar
Jackson M (2019) Command Responsibility. In: de Hemptinne J, Roth R, Van Sliedregt E (eds) Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 409–432
Google Scholar
Kleffner J (2011) The applicability of international humanitarian law to organized armed groups. International Review of the Red Cross 93(882):443–461
Google Scholar
Kolb R, Hyde R (2008) An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts. Hart Publishing, Oxford
Google Scholar
Kretzmer D, Ben-Yehuda A, Furth M (2014) ‘Thou Shall Not Kill’: The Use of Lethal Force in Non-International Armed Conflicts. Israel Law Review47(2):191–224
Google Scholar
La Haye E (2008) War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
Lubell N, Pejic J, Simmons C (2019) Guidelines on Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Law, Policy, and Good Practice. Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights/ICRC. https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/104871/guidelines-investigating-violations-ihl_policy_good-practice.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2020
Margalit A (2018) Investigating Civilian Casualties in Time of Armed Conflict and Belligerent Occupation: Manoeuvring between Legal Regimes and Paradigms for the Use of Force. Brill/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston
Google Scholar
Melzer N (2009) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law. ICRC, Geneva
Google Scholar
Meron T (1995) International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities. The American Journal of International Law 89(3):554–577
Google Scholar
Mettraux G (2005) International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Google Scholar
Milanovic M (2015) The Applicability of the Conventions to ‘Transnational’ and ‘Mixed’ Conflicts. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P, Sassòli M (eds) The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 27–50
Google Scholar
Moir L (2002) The Law of Internal Armed Conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
Moir L (2015) The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P, Sassòli M (eds) The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 391–414
Google Scholar
Murray D (2015) How International Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State Armed Groups. Journal of Conflict and Security Law 20(1):101–131
Google Scholar
Murray D (2016) Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups. Hart Publishing, Oxford
Google Scholar
Murray D (2017) Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Google Scholar
Nowak M (2008) Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak: Mission to Sri Lanka, UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/3/Add.6
Google Scholar
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2011) International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2020
Park I (2018) The Right to Life in Armed Conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Google Scholar
Pictet J (1952) Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. ICRC, Geneva
Google Scholar
Quénivet N (2008) The Right to Life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. In: Arnold R, Quénivet N (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, pp 331–353
Google Scholar
Quintin A, Tougas M-L (2020) Generating Respect for the Law by Non-State Armed Groups: The ICRC’s Role and Activities. In: Heffes E, Kotlik M, Ventura M (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice. Asser Press/Springer, The Hague/Berlin, pp 353–386
Google Scholar
Sassòli M (2007) Ius Ad Bellum and Ius in Bello—The Separation between the Legality of the Use of Force and Humanitarian Rules to Be Respected in Warfare: Crucial or Outdated? In: Schmitt M, Pejic J (eds) International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines—Essays in Honour of Yoram Dinstein. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, pp 241–264
Google Scholar
Sassòli M (2019) International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare and Controversies. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham
Google Scholar
Sassòli M, Olson L (2008) The relationship between international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts. International Review of the Red Cross 90(871):599–627
Google Scholar
Schabas W (2014) The Right to Life. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 365–386
Google Scholar
Schmitt M (2011) Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed Conflict. Harvard National Security Journal 2:31–84
Google Scholar
Sivakumaran S (2006) Binding Armed Opposition Groups. International & Comparative Law Quarterly 55(2):369–394
Google Scholar
Sivakumaran S (2011) Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict. European Journal of International Law 22(1):219–264
Google Scholar
Sivakumaran S (2015) The Addressees of Common Article 3. Clapham A, Gaeta P, Sassòli M (eds) The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 415–432
Google Scholar
Solis G (2016) The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
Somer J (2007) Jungle justice: passing sentence on the equality of belligerents in non-international armed conflict. International Review of the Red Cross 89(867):655–690
Google Scholar
Tan A (2016) The Duty to Investigate Alleged Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Outdated Deference to an International Accountability Problem. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 49(1):181–238
Google Scholar
UN General Assembly (2002) Resolución: Situación de los derechos humanos en la República Democrática del Congo [Resolution: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo] (2002), UN Doc. A/RES/56/173
Google Scholar
UN General Assembly (2003) Resolución: Situation des droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo [Resolution: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo], UN Doc A/RES/57/233
Google Scholar
UN General Assembly (2003) Resolution: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. A/RES/58/196
Google Scholar
UN General Assembly (2012) Resolution: The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/RES/66/253 B
Google Scholar
UN General Assembly (2013) Resolution: The situation in Afghanistan, UN Doc. A/RES/68/11
Google Scholar
UN General Assembly (2015) Resolution: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, UN Doc A/RES/69/248
Google Scholar
UN General Assembly (2016) Resolution: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN Doc. A/RES/71/198
Google Scholar
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2016) The Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinnesotaProtocol.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2020
UN Human Rights Committee (2018) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (1998) Resolution 1193 (1998), UN Doc. S/RES/1193
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2005) Resolution 1612 (2005), UN Doc. S/RES/1612
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2008) Resolution 1814 (2008), UN Doc. S/RES/1814
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2008) Resolution 1834 (2008), UN Doc. S/RES/1834
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2009) Resolution 1863 (2009), UN Doc. S/RES/1863
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2010) Resolution 1925 (2010), UN Doc. S/RES/1925
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2015) Resolution 2211 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2211
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2015) Resolution 2216 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2216
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2015) Resolution 2217 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2217
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2265 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2265
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2274 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2274
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2295 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2295
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2332 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2332
Google Scholar
UN Security Council (2017) Resolution 2340 (2017), UN Doc. S/RES/2340
Google Scholar
United Nations (1990) Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/BASICP~3.PDF. Accessed 12 June 2020
Zegveld L (2002) Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar

Cases

ECtHR, McCann and Others v The United Kingdom, Judgment, 27 September 1995, Application No. 18984/91
Google Scholar
ICC, Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 8 June 2018, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 A
Google Scholar
ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment (Merits), 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14
Google Scholar
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226
Google Scholar
ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1
Google Scholar
ICTY, Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljević, Judgment, 29 November 2002, Case No. IT-98-32-T
Google Scholar
ICTY, Prosecutor v Enver Hadžihasanović, Mehmed Alagić and Amir Kubura, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72
Google Scholar
ICTY, Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić, Judgment, 29 July 2004, Case No. IT-95-14-A
Google Scholar
IMT (Nuremberg), France et al. v Hermann Wilhelm Göring et al., Judgement, 1 October 1946, IMT Trial Proceedings Volume 22
Google Scholar

Treaties

Agreement on the Application of International Humanitarian Law between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian Democratic Party, Croatian Democratic Community, concluded 22 May 1992
Google Scholar
Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950)
Google Scholar
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978)
Google Scholar
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978)
Google Scholar
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002)
Google Scholar
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980)
Google Scholar

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
Joshua Joseph Niyo
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland
Joshua Joseph Niyo
Faculty of Law, Uganda Christian University, Mukono, Uganda
Joshua Joseph Niyo

Authors

Joshua Joseph Niyo
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joshua Joseph Niyo .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Criminal Law Section, Section Military Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Prof. Terry D. Gill
School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
Prof. Robin Geiß
Department of Law/Public Law, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Prof. Heike Krieger
Research Department, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands
Dr. Christophe Paulussen

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Niyo, J.J. (2021). The Rebel with the Magnifying Glass: Armed Non-State Actors, the Right to Life and the Requirement to Investigate in Armed Conflict. In: Gill, T.D., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 22 (2019). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 22. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-399-3_4

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-399-3_4
Published: 29 October 2020
Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-398-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-399-3
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)