Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Human Dignity and Human Security in Times of Terrorism pp 123–151Cite as

Remedying Violations of Human Dignity and Security: State Accountability for Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation

  • 770 Accesses

Abstract

International intelligence cooperation , an essential tool to counter terrorist threats, has increased exponentially since the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). At the same time, the means and methods employed post-9/11 have resulted in serious violations of international human rights law. The interstate system of invocation of responsibility has proven ill-fitted to hold States to account for their wrongful acts in the counterterrorism intelligence cooperation context, leaving States immune and victims without redress. This chapter therefore proposes a new analytical perspective, using the concept of international legal accountability as a tool to examine the various alternative ways in which States are being held to account for their intelligence activities in breach of international human rights law. The analysis also shows that alternative forms of State accountability play a significant role in remedying violations of human dignity and human security , making them valuable processes for victims of intelligence operations.

Keywords

Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity ; the birthright of every person—in every civilization. a

George W. Bush

aThe White House 2002.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
EUR   29.95
Price includes VAT (Finland)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
EUR   139.09
Price includes VAT (Finland)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
EUR   186.99
Price includes VAT (Finland)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
EUR   186.99
Price includes VAT (Finland)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    UN Security Council (2001) Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Doc. S/RES/1373, paras 2(b), 2(e) and 3.

  2. 2.

    For an account of the practices used by the CIA and its partners in the ‘global war on terror’, see US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014. For reading keys, see Black and Raphael 2015.

  3. 3.

    On this topic, see in particular Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2011; UN General Assembly (2009), Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3; UN General Assembly (2010) Human Rights Council: Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment , Manfred Nowak; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention represented by its Vice-chair, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances represented by its Chair, Jeremy Sarkin, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42. Apart from a very partial success in Italy, no judicial investigation has led to a final judgment at the national level providing full redress to the victims, and no person directly involved in these operations has served any sentence.

  4. 4.

    On this issue, see Forcese 2011.

  5. 5.

    International Law Commission (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts. In: UN General Assembly (2001) International Law Commission: Report on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN Doc. A/56/10, pp 76–143 (ASR), Articles 4 and 12.

  6. 6.

    Brunnée 2005, p 30.

  7. 7.

    Nowak 2005, paras 214–215; Schabas 2015, paras 228–229.

  8. 8.

    Clause 39.

  9. 9.

    E.g. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) (ECHR), Article 5(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR), Article 9(1); American Convention on Human Rights , opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR), Article 7(1); African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981 1520 UNTS 217 (entered into force 21 October 1986), Article 6.

  10. 10.

    UN Human Rights Committee (2014) General comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, para 9; CCPR, Delgado Paez v Columbia, Views, 12 July 1990, Communication No. 195/1985, para 5.5. The ECtHR and IACtHR have yet to rule on the notion of ‘security of the person’ independently of the right to liberty, but use the notion of due diligence or positive obligations under other provisions to address interpersonal violence.

  11. 11.

    For a summary of the definitions and influences in political sciences, see Roznai 2015, pp 2–3.

  12. 12.

    Van Kempen 2013, p 10; Newman 2001.

  13. 13.

    Locke 1689, Chapter 6, Section 93.

  14. 14.

    Van Kempen 2013, p 11.

  15. 15.

    E.g. ECtHR, Osman v The United Kingdom , Grand Chamber Judgment, 28 October 1998, Application No. 23452/94 (Osman case), para 116; IACtHR, Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Judgment, 29 July 1988, IACtHR Series C No. 4, paras 172–175.

  16. 16.

    Waldron 2010, pp 35–36.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., p 146. See also Luban 2014 and Cole 2003.

  18. 18.

    See the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of security: “1. The state of being free from danger or threat” and “1.3 The state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or anxiety”. Lexico (2019) Definition of security in English. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/security. Accessed 4 October 2018.

  19. 19.

    Waldron 2010, p 45.

  20. 20.

    As Waldron puts it, “an enhanced ability to combat terrorism is not the same as an actual diminution of the terrorist threat” (Ibid., p 44).

  21. 21.

    Ibid., p 45.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., p 13 (emphasis in original).

  23. 23.

    See UN Economic and Social Council (2006) Commission on Human Rights : Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay , UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120, para 23, on Guantánamo: “the objective of the ongoing detention is not primarily to prevent combatants from taking up arms against the United States again, but to obtain information and gather intelligence on the Al-Qaida network”. See also Scheinin 2017, p 595: “suspected terrorists—or even persons only suspected of knowing something of relevance—are reduced to mere means when they are tortured to extract information, without any intention to bring them before a court for their possible crimes”.

  24. 24.

    ASR, above n 5.

  25. 25.

    However, ibid., Article 19 makes it clear that acting under the influence of direction, control or coercion of another State does not constitute an excuse or a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in and of itself, so that the directed or coerced State can still incur primary responsibility for its wrongful act. More generally, see below on issues of shared responsibility in intelligence cooperation .

  26. 26.

    Staberock 2012, p 352.

  27. 27.

    Duffy 2015, p 802.

  28. 28.

    The renewed interest for the issue of democratic oversight and accountability of intelligence services, observable through the high number of reports and research articles on the topic in the last 15 years, is possibly one of the most significant policy changes stemming from the publicity of the CIA -led programme.

  29. 29.

    At least one detainee (Gul Rahman) died in CIA custody as a result of torture . Another CIA detainee, Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, was killed in Libyan custody after being rendered to Libya by the CIA .

  30. 30.

    Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2007 emphasises the vital role played by the NATO framework in authorising and preserving secrecy around the CIA -led programme. See below, Sect. 7.4.2.1.

  31. 31.

    The exact number is the object of debate: UN General Assembly (2010) Human Rights Council: Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment , Manfred Nowak; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention represented by its Vice-chair, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances represented by its Chair, Jeremy Sarkin, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42 identified 44; Open Society Justice Initiative 2013 identified 54; Raphael et al. 2016 identified 65 countries involved in known rendition operations through the mapping of rendition flights and 17 more linked to suspicious circuits.

  32. 32.

    For prisoners’ details, see Rendition Research Team (2019) The Rendition Project: Prisoners. https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/prisoners/index.html. Accessed 4 July 2019.

  33. 33.

    UN General Assembly (2010) Human Rights Council: Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment , Manfred Nowak; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention represented by its Vice-chair, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances represented by its Chair, Jeremy Sarkin, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42; UN General Assembly (2009), Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3.

  34. 34.

    Black sites were used for the incommunicado interrogation and detention of CIA detainees and were found in Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay , Lithuania, Morocco, Poland, Romania and Thailand. See generally Black and Raphael 2015. For an account of European States’ involvement, see also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2006, 2007, 2011.

  35. 35.

    Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Djibouti are known to have received detainees from the US for the purpose of using interrogation techniques amounting to torture . See UN General Assembly (2010) Human Rights Council: Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment , Manfred Nowak; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention represented by its Vice-chair, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances represented by its Chair, Jeremy Sarkin, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42.

  36. 36.

    See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2006, 2007; Raphael et al. 2016.

  37. 37.

    See UN General Assembly (2009), Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3, paras 51–57.

  38. 38.

    ASR, above n 5, Articles 12, 16 and 41.

  39. 39.

    See generally US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014; Raphael et al. 2019; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2006, 2007, 2011; UN General Assembly (2010) Human Rights Council: Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment , Manfred Nowak; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention represented by its Vice-chair, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances represented by its Chair, Jeremy Sarkin, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42.

  40. 40.

    Under ASR, above n 5, Article 16, constructive knowledge of the programme would be deemed enough. See Moynihan 2018. The key test in IHRL is whether the State exercised ‘due diligence’ to prevent its territory from being used to commit human rights violations, and, in case of breach, diligence to then investigate, prosecute and provide redress accordingly. See Osman case, above n 15.

  41. 41.

    ASR, above n 5, Commentary to Article 26, para 5 and Commentary to Article 40, para 5; ICJ, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment, 20 July 2012, [2012] ICJ Rep 422 para 99.

  42. 42.

    Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment , opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) (CAT).

  43. 43.

    Ibid., Articles 12 and 13.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., Article 4.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., Article 2.

  46. 46.

    ECtHR, Al-Nashiri v Poland, Judgment, 24 July 2014, Application No. 28761/11 (Al-Nashiri 2014); ECtHR, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, Judgment, 24 July 2014, Application No. 7511/13 (Abu Zubaydah 2014); ECtHR, Al-Nashiri v Romania, Judgment, 31 May 2018, Application No. 33234/12 (Al-Nashiri 2018); ECtHR, Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania, Judgment, 31 May 2018, Application No. 46454/11 (Abu Zubaydah 2018).

  47. 47.

    ECtHR, El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Grand Chamber Judgment, 13 December 2012, Application No. 39639/09 (El-Masri case); ECtHR, Nasr and Ghali v Italy, Judgment, 23 February 2016, Application No. 44883/09 (Nasr and Ghali case); CCPR, Mohammed Alzery v Sweden, Views, 10 November 2016, Communication No. 1416/2005 (Alzery case).

  48. 48.

    CAT, above n 42, Articles 4–9. States are “accountable for violations of rights under the [ICCPR] which [their] agents commit upon the territory of another State”. CCPR, López-Burgos v Uruguay, Views, 29 July 1981, Communication No. 52/1979. By analogy with procedural obligations under the right to life : ECtHR, Jaloud v The Netherlands , Grand Chamber Judgment, 20 November 2014, Application No. 47708/08. In addition, a State’s failure to investigate, criminally prosecute or allow civil proceedings—or efforts to block or hinder such proceedings—relating to allegations of torture or other forms of ill-treatment constitutes de facto denial of an effective remedy . UN Committee against Torture (2012) General comment No. 3 (2012): Implementation of article 14 by States parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/3.

  49. 49.

    CAT, above n 42, Article 15.

  50. 50.

    Some authors argue that actionable use of intelligence obtained through torture creates a market for such intelligence and goes against the spirit of the CAT. See Scheinin and Vermeulen 2011. This position is also supported UN General Assembly (2014) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment , Juan E. Méndez, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/60; International Commission of Jurists 2009, para 85; UN General Assembly (2009), Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , Martin Scheinin, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3, para 20. See also UK House of Lords, A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004); A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Conjoined Appeals), Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause, 8 December 2005, [2005] UKHL 71, p 30, where the House of Lords approvingly quoted McNally JA in S v Nkomo 1989: “[i]t does not seem to me that one can condemn torture while making use of the mute confession resulting from torture , because the effect is to encourage torture ”.

  51. 51.

    Wills and Born 2011. See also the statement by UK High Court, R (Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office), Judgment, 4 February 2009, [2009] EWHC 152 (Admin), paras 69–70.

  52. 52.

    Lander 2009, p 142.

  53. 53.

    An emblematic example is the cooperation framework established by the classified NATO agreement of 4 October 2001, in effect making NATO “a platform from which the United States obtained the essential permissions and protections it required to launch CIA covert action in the war on terror”. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2007, para 90. See also US refusal of cooperation (often accompanied by threats of cessation of intelligence cooperation ) with investigations in the UK, Canada, Italy, Germany and before the ECtHR; and European States failure to cooperate with supra-national investigations. Documented in Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2006, 2007, 2011. Analysed in Born and Wills 2011, p 210.

  54. 54.

    Notwithstanding the fact that counterterrorism policies in breach of human rights law have been widely demonstrated as ineffective, and torture has been time and again shown to yield no reliable intelligence . See Rejali 2009.

  55. 55.

    “Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences”. Bovens 2007, p 450.

  56. 56.

    “International legal accountability involves the legal justification of an international actor’s performance vis-à-vis others, the assessment or judgment of that performance against international legal standards, and the possible imposition of consequences if the actors fails to live up to applicable legal standards”. Brunnée 2005, p 24.

  57. 57.

    Schedler 1999.

  58. 58.

    Both terms are borrowed from Rubenstein 2007.

  59. 59.

    ASR, above n 5, Article 44. See also e.g. ECHR, above n 9, Article 35(1); ICCPR, above n 9, Article 41(1)(c); ACHR, above n 9, Article 46(1)(a). For a discussion on the substantive or procedural character of this rule, see Crawford and Grant 2007.

  60. 60.

    Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2011; Council of Europe Venice Commission 2015.

  61. 61.

    OAS General Assembly (1979) Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights , Resolution No. 447, Article 20(b).

  62. 62.

    American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, opened for signature April 1948, 1 Annals of the OAS 130 (entered into force 2 May 1948).

  63. 63.

    The authority of the IACHR to issue precautionary measures in respect of Member States of the OAS is provided for under Article 25 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. The Commission has affirmed at several occasions the “international obligation that [OAS] member States have to comply with precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ”. IACHR (2005) Resolution No. 1/05, para 1.

  64. 64.

    For an early account of the role played by precautionary measures in the Guantánamo Bay situation, see Tittemore 2006. On IACHR precautionary measures generally, see Rodríguez-Pinzón 2013.

  65. 65.

    IACHR, Djamel Ameziane v United States, Report on Admissibility, 20 March 2012, Petition No. 900-08.

  66. 66.

    164th Extraordinary Period of Sessions of the IACHR, Mexico.

  67. 67.

    IACHR, Khaled El-Masri v United States, Report on Admissibility, 15 April 2016, Petition No. 419-08.

  68. 68.

    See OAS (2019) Decisions regarding the US Detention Center in Guantanamo.

    https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/decisions/Guantanamo.asp#Visita. Accessed 4 October 2018, Section ‘Requests of Permission to Conduct a Visit’.

  69. 69.

    IACHR (2006) Resolution No. 2/06 on Guantanamo Bay Precautionary Measures ; IACHR (2006) Resolution No. 2/11 regarding the Situation of the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, United States: MC 259-02.

  70. 70.

    IACHR 2015.

  71. 71.

    On the legal value accorded to the Declaration, see IACtHR, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights , Advisory Opinion, 14 July 1989, IACtHR Series A No. 10, para 45, stating that “the American Declaration is for [OAS Member States] a source of international obligations related to the Charter of the Organization”.

  72. 72.

    E.g. IACHR 2015, para 96: “the indefinite detention of persons still held at Guantánamo without charge after more than a decade, mainly for the purpose of obtaining intelligence , constitutes a serious violation of their right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article I of the American Declaration”.

  73. 73.

    Above n 42.

  74. 74.

    Above n 9.

  75. 75.

    United States, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005; US Supreme Court, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Decision, 29 June 2006, Case No. 05-184; US Supreme Court, Boumediene v Bush, Decision, 11 June 2008, Case No. 06-1195.

  76. 76.

    Also known as el-Zery.

  77. 77.

    For a factual summary, see Raphael et al. 2019, p 296.

  78. 78.

    The explanation could however simply be that their arrest and rendition took place three months before the launch of the CIA programme, symbolised by the capture of Abu Zubaydah.

  79. 79.

    UNCAT, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v Sweden, Decision, 25 May 2005, Communication No. 233/2003 (Agiza case).

  80. 80.

    Ibid., para 13.4.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., para 9.4.

  83. 83.

    Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).

  84. 84.

    Alzery case, above n 47.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., para 11.6.

  86. 86.

    See the conclusions in UN Human Rights Committee (2006) Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3, para 16:

    The Committee is concerned that in practice the State party appears to have adopted a policy to remove, or to assist in removing, either from the United States or other States’ territories, suspected terrorists to third countries, for the purpose of detention and interrogation , without the appropriate safeguards to protect them from treatment prohibited by the Covenant. The Committee is also concerned by numerous, well-publicized and documented allegations that persons sent to third countries in this way were indeed detained and interrogated under conditions grossly violating the prohibition contained in article 7, allegations that the State party did not contest.

    See also paras 20–22.

  87. 87.

    A thorough ombudsman investigation was conducted in 2005, but no criminal investigation was opened afterwards.

  88. 88.

    El-Masri case, above n 47.

  89. 89.

    For a factual summary, see Raphael et al. 2019, pp 241–242.

  90. 90.

    Alzery case, above n 47, para 11.6.

  91. 91.

    El-Masri case, above n 47, para 211.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., para 218.

  93. 93.

    Above n 9.

  94. 94.

    El-Masri case, above n 47, para 239.

  95. 95.

    Al-Nashiri 2014, above n 46; Abu Zubaydah 2014, above n 46. For more information on the Abu Zubaydah case, see Chap. 5 ‘Dignity Denied: A Case Study’.

  96. 96.

    Nasr and Ghali case, above n 47, para 302.

  97. 97.

    See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2007, para 198.

  98. 98.

    Al-Nashiri 2018, above n 46; Abu Zubaydah 2018, above n 46.

  99. 99.

    El-Masri case, above n 47, especially para 206.

  100. 100.

    Al-Nashiri 2014, above n 46, para 516; Abu Zubaydah 2014, above n 46, para 511: “the Court concludes that the treatment to which the applicant was subjected by the CIA during his detention in Poland at the relevant time amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention”.

  101. 101.

    Scheinin 2014.

  102. 102.

    Al-Nashiri 2018, above n 46, para 675; Abu Zubaydah 2018, above n 46, para 640.

  103. 103.

    While the ‘high value detainees’ currently held at Camp Seven, Guantánamo Bay , do have limited access to lawyers, all their communications are classified, they are held in solitary cells and do not have access to phones or communal activities. IACHR 2015, especially para 122. For a US account of conditions of detention, see US Department of Defense 2009.

  104. 104.

    Agiza case, above n 79.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., and to a lesser extent the El-Masri case, above n 47, and the Nasr and Ghali case, above n 47.

  106. 106.

    The White House 2002.

References

Articles, Books and Other Documents

  • Aldrich RJ (2009) Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem. Intelligence and National Security 24(1):26–56

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black C, Raphael S (2015) Revealed: The Boom and Bust of the CIA’s Secret Torture Sites. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2015-10-14/revealed-the-boom-and-bust-of-the-cias-secret-torture-sites. Accessed 4 October 2018

  • Bovens M (2007) Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework. European Law Journal 13(4):447–468

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brunnée J (2005) International Legal Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 35:21–56

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Choi S-W (2010) Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law? Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(6):940–966

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cole D (2003) Their Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Standards. International Journal of Legal Information 31:290–311

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Council of Europe (2011) Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies in the European Union. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201109/20110927ATT27674/20110927ATT27674EN.pdf. Accessed 4 July 2019

  • Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2006) Rapporteur Dick Marty: Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states, CoE Doc. 10957

    Google Scholar 

  • Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2007) Rapporteur Dick Marty: Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report, CoE Doc. 11302 rev.

    Google Scholar 

  • Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2011) Rapporteur Dick Marty: Abuse of state secrecy and national security: obstacles to parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of human rights violations, CoE Doc. 12714

    Google Scholar 

  • Council of Europe Venice Commission (2015) Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services, CoE Doc. CDL-AD(2015)010

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford JR, Grant TD (2007) Local Remedies, Exhaustion of. MPEPIL. http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e59. Accessed 4 October 2018

  • Duffy H (2015) The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Duffy H (2017) Detention and Interrogation Abroad: The ‘Extraordinary Rendition’ Programme. In: Nollkaemper A, Plakokefalos I, Schechinger J (eds) The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 89–127

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Forcese C (2011) The collateral casualties of collaboration: The consequences for civil and human rights of transnational intelligence sharing. In: Born H, Leigh I, Wills A (eds) International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability. Routledge, London, pp 72–97

    Google Scholar 

  • IACHR (2005) Resolution No. 1/05

    Google Scholar 

  • IACHR (2006) Resolution No. 2/06 on Guantanamo Bay Precautionary Measures

    Google Scholar 

  • IACHR (2006) Resolution No. 2/11 regarding the Situation of the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, United States: MC 259-02

    Google Scholar 

  • IACHR (2015) Towards the Closure of Guantánamo. OAS. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Towards-Closure-Guantanamo.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2019

  • International Commission of Jurists (2009) Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights. International Commission of Jurists, Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  • International Law Commission (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts. In: UN General Assembly (2001) International Law Commission: Report on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN Doc. A/56/10, pp 76–143

    Google Scholar 

  • Lander S (2009) International intelligence co-operation. In: Andrew C, Aldrich RJ, Wark WK (eds) Secret Intelligence: A Reader. Routledge, London, pp 140–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Locke J (1689) Two Treatises of Government, II. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Luban D (2014) Torture, Power, and Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Moynihan H (2018) Aiding and Assisting: the Mental Element under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. International & Comparative Law Quarterly 67(2):455‑471

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Newman E (2001) Human Security and Constructivism. International Studies Perspectives 2(3):239–251

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nowak M (2005) U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn. Engel, Kehl am Rhein

    Google Scholar 

  • Nowak M, Charbord A (eds) (2018) Using Human Rights to Counter Terrorism. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • OAS General Assembly (1979) Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution No. 447

    Google Scholar 

  • Open Society Justice Initiative (2013) Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition. Open Society Foundation. https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/655bbd41-082b-4df3-940c-18a3bd9ed956/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2019

  • Raphael S, Black C, Blakeley R (2019) CIA Torture Unredacted. The Rendition Project. https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/190710-TRP-TBIJ-CIA-Torture-Unredacted-Full.pdf. Accessed 19 October 2019

  • Raphael S, Black C, Blakeley R, Kostas S (2016) Tracking Rendition Aircraft as a Way to Understand CIA Secret Detention and Torture in Europe. The International Journal of Human Rights 20(1):78–103

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rejali D (2009) Torture and Democracy. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rodríguez-Pinzón D (2013) Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Legal Status and Importance. Human Rights Brief 20(2) 13–18

    Google Scholar 

  • Roznai Y (2015) The Insecurity of Human Security. Wisconsin International Law Journal 32(1):95–141

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubenstein J (2007) Accountability in an Unequal World. The Journal of Politics 69(3):616–632

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schabas WA (2015) The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Schedler A (1999) Conceptualizing Accountability. In: Schedler A, Diamond L, Plattner MF (eds) The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 13–28

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheinin M (2014) The ECtHR Finds the US Guilty of Torture—As an Indispensable Third Party? EJIL: Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ecthr-finds-the-us-guilty-of-torture-as-an-indispensable-third-party/. Accessed 4 October 2018

  • Scheinin M (2017) Terrorism. In: Moeckli D, Shah S, Sivakumaran S (eds) International Human Rights Law, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 580–596

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheinin M, Vermeulen M (2011) International law: Human rights law and state responsibility. In: Born H, Leigh I, Wills A (eds) International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability. Routledge, London, pp 252–274

    Google Scholar 

  • Staberock G (2012) Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism: Towards a Human Rights and Accountability Framework? In: Salinas de Frías AM, Samuel K, White ND (eds) Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 353–387

    Google Scholar 

  • The White House (2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf. Accessed 4 July 2019

  • Tittemore B (2006) Guantánamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A Case for International Oversight in the Struggle Against Terrorism. Human Rights Law Review 6(2):378–402

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • UN Committee Against Torture (2006) Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 19 of the Convention. Conclusions and Recommendations: United States of America, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2

    Google Scholar 

  • UN Committee against Torture (2012) General comment No. 3 (2012): Implementation of article 14 by States parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/3

    Google Scholar 

  • UN Economic and Social Council (2006) Commission on Human Rights: Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120

    Google Scholar 

  • UN General Assembly (2009) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3

    Google Scholar 

  • UN General Assembly (2010) Human Rights Council: Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention represented by its Vice-chair, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances represented by its Chair, Jeremy Sarkin, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42

    Google Scholar 

  • UN General Assembly (2014) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/60

    Google Scholar 

  • UN Human Rights Committee (2006) Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3

    Google Scholar 

  • UN Human Rights Committee (2014) General comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35

    Google Scholar 

  • UN Security Council (2001) Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Doc. S/RES/1373

    Google Scholar 

  • US Department of Defense (2009) Review of Department Compliance with President’s Executive Order on Detainee Conditions of Confinement. https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/REVIEW_OF_DEPARTMENT_COMPLIANCE_WITH_PRESIDENTS_EXECUTIVE_ORDER_ON_DETAINEE_CONDITIONS_OF_CONFINEMENTa.pdf. Accessed 4 October 2018

  • US Department of the Army (1992) Field Manual 34–52: Intelligence Interrogation. http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf. Accessed 4 October 2018

  • US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014) Committee Study of Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program. https://fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-rdi.pdf. Accessed 4 October 2018

  • Van Kempen PH (2013) Four Concepts of Security—A Human Rights Perspective. Human Rights Law Review 13(1):1–23

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Waldron J (2010) Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Wills A, Born H (2011) International intelligence cooperation and accountability: Formidable challenges and imperfect solutions. In: Born H, Leigh I, Wills A (eds) International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability. Routledge, London, pp 277–308

    Google Scholar 

Case Law

  • CCPR, López-Burgos v Uruguay, Views, 29 July 1981, Communication No. 52/1979

    Google Scholar 

  • CCPR, Delgado Paez v Columbia, Views, 12 July 1990, Communication No. 195/1985

    Google Scholar 

  • CCPR, Mohammed Alzery v Sweden, Views, 10 November 2016, Communication No. 1416/2005

    Google Scholar 

  • ECtHR, Osman v The United Kingdom , Grand Chamber Judgment, 28 October 1998, Application No. 23452/94

    Google Scholar 

  • ECtHR, El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Grand Chamber Judgment, 13 December 2012, Application No. 39639/09

    Google Scholar 

  • ECtHR, Al-Nashiri v Poland, Judgment, 24 July 2014, Application No. 28761/11

    Google Scholar 

  • ECtHR, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, Judgment, 24 July 2014, Application No. 7511/13

    Google Scholar 

  • ECtHR, Jaloud v The Netherlands , Grand Chamber Judgment, 20 November 2014, Application No. 47708/08

    Google Scholar 

  • ECtHR, Nasr and Ghali v Italy, Judgment, 23 February 2016, Application No. 44883/09

    Google Scholar 

  • ECtHR, Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania, Judgment, 31 May 2018, Application No. 46454/11

    Google Scholar 

  • ECtHR, Al-Nashiri v Romania, Judgment, 31 May 2018, Application No. 33234/12

    Google Scholar 

  • IACHR, Djamel Ameziane v United States, Report on Admissibility, 20 March 2012, Petition No. 900-08

    Google Scholar 

  • IACHR, Khaled El-Masri v United States, Report on Admissibility, 15 April 2016, Petition No. 419-08

    Google Scholar 

  • IACtHR, Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Judgment, 29 July 1988, IACtHR Series C No. 4

    Google Scholar 

  • IACtHR, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights , Advisory Opinion, 14 July 1989, IACtHR Series A No. 10

    Google Scholar 

  • ICJ, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment, 20 July 2012, [2012] ICJ Rep 422

    Google Scholar 

  • UK High Court, R (Binyam Mohamed v Secretary of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Judgment, 4 February 2009, [2009] EWHC 152 (Admin)

    Google Scholar 

  • UK House of Lords, A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004); A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Conjoined Appeals), Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause, 8 December 2005, [2005] UKHL 71

    Google Scholar 

  • UNCAT, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v Sweden, Decision, 25 May 2005, Communication No. 233/2003

    Google Scholar 

  • US Supreme Court, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Decision, 29 June 2006, Case No. 05-184

    Google Scholar 

  • US Supreme Court, Boumediene v Bush, Decision, 11 June 2008, Case No. 06-1195

    Google Scholar 

Legislation

Treaties

  • African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981 1520 UNTS 217 (entered into force 21 October 1986)

    Google Scholar 

  • American Convention on Human Rights , opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978)

    Google Scholar 

  • American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, opened for signature April 1948, 1 Annals of the OAS 130 (entered into force 2 May 1948)

    Google Scholar 

  • Charter of the Organisation of American States, opened for signature 30 April 1948, 721 UNTS 324 (entered into force 13 December 1951)

    Google Scholar 

  • Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment , opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987)

    Google Scholar 

  • European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953)

    Google Scholar 

  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

    Google Scholar 

  • Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy

    Sophie Duroy

Authors
  1. Sophie Duroy
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sophie Duroy .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Research Department, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Christophe Paulussen

  2. Department of Law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy

    Martin Scheinin

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Duroy, S. (2020). Remedying Violations of Human Dignity and Security: State Accountability for Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation. In: Paulussen, C., Scheinin, M. (eds) Human Dignity and Human Security in Times of Terrorism. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-355-9_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-355-9_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-354-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-355-9

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

search

Navigation