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Inherent Limitations of the Vertical System of Enforcement

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Abstract

This chapter studies the grounds which States may invoke to refuse to surrender individuals under the ICC Statute. States can challenge the admissibility of a case before the ICC which undertakes a two-pronged appraisal of complementarity, namely the State action assessment and the genuineness assessment. The latter test need not be undertaken if there subsists State inaction. Inactivity and gravity generate admissibility. The genuineness assessment necessitates an assessment of the State’s conduct with a human rights lens. Various permutations are examined especially in the light of the Saif Al-Islam conundrum and in the context of the ‘same conduct’ requirement with a special focus on the proceedings against Simone Gbagbo. The three facets of ne bis in idem, namely the res judicata facet, the concurrence facet and the complementarity facet, are analysed. Other grounds for refusal include the postponement of the execution of a request for surrender, competing requests and conflicting obligations, and specific requirements under national law. In terms of the latter, emphasis is placed on the doctrine of abuse of process in a plural-State hypothetical scenario. Likewise, such scenario sheds a light on the application of diplomatic privileges and immunities, both personal and functional. Three main arguments are deployed to make a case against the latter type of immunities where proceedings before the ICC are concerned. The tension between Articles 27 and 98 is exposed. The extent to which the rule of speciality, the only traditional extradition-based ground for refusal in the ICC Statute, can be invoked, is examined.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sluiter 2002, pp. 175–176.

  2. 2.

    Occasionally, some jurists use the term ‘compliance’ inter-changeably (Cumes 2006, p. 347).

  3. 3.

    This is also known as the ‘Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals’ and was set to begin functioning on 1 July 2013 [see Briefing by Presidents (2011) SC/10476, 6678th Meeting entitled ‘Funding Shortfalls, Lack of State Cooperation , Personnel Retention Threaten Timely Completion of International Tribunals’ Tasks’. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10476.doc.htm. Accessed 13 May 2014]. The date set for completion of cases was 31 December 2014. For a time it was felt that this target had become a realistic possibility since, as held by ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, ICTY has managed to secure the surrender of all requested indictees [see Briefing by Presidents (2011) SC/10476, 6678th Meeting entitled ‘Funding Shortfalls, lack of State Cooperation , Personnel Retention Threaten Timely Completion of International Tribunals’ Tasks’. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10476.doc.htm. Accessed 13 May 2014].

  4. 4.

    See http://www.icty.org/sid/10874. Accessed 13 May 2014; see also Tolbert and Kontić 2009, pp. 135–138.

  5. 5.

    Mochochoko 1999, pp. 310–314, cited in Swart 2002a, p. 1596, n. 24.

  6. 6.

    Young 2001, p. 338.

  7. 7.

    Simon Young states that the following are the three grounds for refusal of cooperation :

    1. i.

      States might argue that their domestic procedural requirements for arrest and surrender have not been met in the particular case, giving Senator Pinochet ’s unfitness to stand trial as a typical example;

    2. ii.

      States might resort to substantive grounds for refusal which are constitutionally entrenched, such as the non-extradition of its own nationals;

    3. iii.

      States may object to the Court’s failure to provide the same human rights and fair trial standards as the custodial state . He gives the constitutional prohibition of life imprisonment (applicable in Colombia) or the mandatory provision of a trial by jury as examples, concluding that ‘surrender should only be possible if the International Criminal Court provided the same degree of rights protection as in the custodial state ’ (Young 2001, pp. 338–339).

    I will show, throughout this chapter, that these should not be tantamount to substantive impediments per se, as Simon Young contends whilst seemingly conflating extradition and surrender. Although this chapter will manifest that State discretion is significant, that the measuring tape is in the hands of States, and that ultimately the process of surrender heavily relies on local norms and domestic laws, the power and discretion of the State seem to be exaggerated by Young, whose study is probably one of the most comprehensive in the field of surrender law. Admittedly however, Simon Young’s observations find refuge in the fact that the ICC Statute does not have a counterpart to ICTY’s Rule 58 which expressly obliges States to surrender notwithstanding any legal impediment under national law and/or any extradition treaty. His approach by means of which ‘the precise scope of legitimate national law objections to surrender will have to be determined in the context of the Statute, its drafting history and underlying purpose’, is certainly praiseworthy and goes to show that any domestic hurdles to surrender cannot be considered in isolation. (Young 2001, p. 340).

  8. 8.

    Towards the end of his thought-provoking study, Simon Young postulates four categories of objections, these being:

    1. I.

      procedural;

    2. II.

      substantive;

    3. III.

      human rights; and

    4. IV.

      conflicting international obligations.

    (Young 2001, pp. 349–355).

  9. 9.

    ‘These include competing requests for extradition of a suspect, problems with the request which may impede or prevent the execution of the request, execution of the request may affect an ongoing investigation or prosecution, the cooperation request would make the State Party act inconsistently with its obligations under international law or diplomatic immunity of a person or international agreements, concerns about the accused’s human rights being violated and sovereignty claims’ (Mutyaba 2012, p. 946).

  10. 10.

    These are stumbling blocks, hurdles, obstacles which hinder surrender.

  11. 11.

    It is important to note that ‘the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear marks the demarcation line between proceedings concerning the situation and proceedings concerning the case’ [ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Decision on the Applications for the Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 17 January 2006, Case No. ICC-01/04, para 65, cited in Olásolo 2007, p. 194].

  12. 12.

    The admissibility of a case is not a pre-requisite for the issuance of an international arrest warrant [Judgement on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 1 Entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58”, Situation in the DRC , Case No. ICC-01/04, Appeals Chamber, 13 July 2006, Ground of Appeal B (a), paras 42–45. In: Klip A, Sluiter G (2010) (eds) Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals : The International Criminal Court: 2005–2007, Vol. 23, Intersentia, Cambridge, pp. 85–100].

  13. 13.

    For an analysis of the history of negotiations relating to Article 72 of the ICC Statute , see Behrens 2002, pp. 116–119. For a comprehensive analysis of this ground for refusal, see Roggemann 2002, pp. 1–24.

  14. 14.

    Triffterer 2002, p. 74.

  15. 15.

    Swart and Sluiter 1999, p. 124.

  16. 16.

    See, for example, Klip 2010, p. 286.

  17. 17.

    Ciampi 2010, p. 543.

  18. 18.

    Sluiter 2009, p. 252.

  19. 19.

    Knoops 2002, p. 15.

  20. 20.

    André Nollkaemper explains that the authority of dicta cannot be presumed but must be earned. He postulates four conditions for this purpose, these being:

    1. i.

      institutional effectiveness;

    2. ii.

      substantive effectiveness;

    3. iii.

      remedial effectiveness; and

    4. iv.

      the quality of individual decisions.

    (Nollkaemper 2011, pp. 256–264).

  21. 21.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya , Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya , Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, 31 March 2010, Case No. ICC-01/09, paras 28–32.

  22. 22.

    Carsten Stahn’s development of the concept of ‘qualified deference’ merits close scrutiny. Stahn opines that, rather than abolishing the ‘same conduct ’ test altogether, three techniques can be employed to give sufficient space to domestic investigations and prosecutions, whilst retaining checks and balances inherent in the complementarity regime. These are (1) flexibility towards domestic jurisdictions to investigate and build the case after the filing of an admissibility challenge; (2) greater monitoring after deference; and (3) consideration of conditions to admissibility (Stahn 2015, p. 258).

  23. 23.

    Stahn 2015, p. 231.

  24. 24.

    Article 176(2) of the ICC RPR (2002) Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court.

  25. 25.

    Article 89(2) of the ICC Statute [ICC Statute (1998) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court].

  26. 26.

    Nouwen 2011, p. 227.

  27. 27.

    For a user-friendly, simplistic but comprehensive, analysis of the admissibility test, including a step-by-step set of guidelines, see El Zeidy 2011, pp. 217–222; see also Stegmiller 2010, pp. 160–173; see also Stegmiller 2013, pp. 484–488. For a thorough textual analysis of the same, see Robinson 2010, pp. 81–88; see also Robinson 2011, pp. 463–475.

  28. 28.

    This principle is not defined within the ICC Statute . Its historical roots derive from the aut dedere aut judicare rule (Buchan and Johnsson 2012, pp. 102).

  29. 29.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest under Article 58, 10 February 2006, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para 4.

  30. 30.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun et al., Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, paras 12–17, cited in Schabas 2010, p. 366, n. 28.

  31. 31.

    Situation in the DRC , above n. 12, para 52; ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Katanga, Decision on the Evidence and Information Provided by the Prosecution for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, 5 November 2007, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, para 17; Prosecutor v Harun et al., above n. 30, para 18, all cited in Schabas 2010, pp. 366–367, n. 35.

  32. 32.

    Muthoni Wanyeki 2012, pp. 1 and 13.

  33. 33.

    Capital News (2013) From the ‘Ocampo Six ’ to the ‘Bensouda Three ’. http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/09/from-the-ocampo-six-to-bensouda-three/. Accessed 3 June 2014.

  34. 34.

    Such challenge does not invalidate substantive decisions to issue an international arrest warrant delivered prior to the making of the challenge [see Article 19(9) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25, and ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Validity of the Arrest Warrant, 9 January 2011, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, para 10].

  35. 35.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Decision on the Postponement of the Execution of the Request for Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Pursuant to Article 95 of the Rome Statute, 1 June 2012, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, para 28.

  36. 36.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Decision on the Request for Suspensive Effect and Related Issues, 18 July 2013, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11.

  37. 37.

    OTP 2003, p. 21.

  38. 38.

    Nsereko 2013, p. 432.

  39. 39.

    This is a ‘potential buyer’s contractual right to meet the terms of a third party’s higher offer’ (Garner 2004, p. 1350).

  40. 40.

    See Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25, which deals specifically with the determination of unwillingness.

  41. 41.

    Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, above n. 29.

  42. 42.

    OTP 2003.

  43. 43.

    El Zeidy 2008, pp. 157–207 on unwillingness and pp. 222–237 on inability .

  44. 44.

    Greppi 2008, p. 65.

  45. 45.

    Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, above n. 29, para 29, unsealed pursuant to ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision to Unseal the Warrant of Arrest Against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Related Documents, 17 March 2006, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.

  46. 46.

    UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 1998, para 19.

  47. 47.

    Ocampo 2005, pp. 3–4.

  48. 48.

    El Zeidy 2008, p. 160.

  49. 49.

    El Zeidy 2008, p. 161.

  50. 50.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, 25 September 2009, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA8, para 78, cited in Stahn 2015, p. 229, n. 6.

  51. 51.

    The term ‘gravity threshold ’ is sometimes used inter-changeably with the term ‘threshold of criminality ’ (Russo 2012, p. 447), probably to denote the level of moral opprobrium in the act or omission.

  52. 52.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , Decision on Côte d’Ivoire Challenge to the Admissibility of the Case Against Simone Gbagbo , 11 December 2014, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/12, para 19.

  53. 53.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 36.

  54. 54.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 27.

  55. 55.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Republic of Kenya , Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, 30 August 2011, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11 OA, paras 2 and 61, cited in Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 28, notes 46–47.

  56. 56.

    Bergsmo 1998, pp. 29 and 43.

  57. 57.

    OTP 2003, pp. 8–9.

  58. 58.

    Holmes 2002, p. 674.

  59. 59.

    Čengić 2010, p. 187.

  60. 60.

    In IACtHR, Paniagua Morales et al. v Guatemala (Panel Blanca {The case of the White Van}), 8 March 1998, Series C, No. 37, paras 94, 139, 160, 169, 171, 178, and in IACtHR, Maritza Urrutia v Guatemala, 27 November 2003, Series C, No. 103, paras 104, 119, 124–126, the IACtHR found that a genuine investigation requires the State to use all the legal means at its disposal in the conduct of a serious criminal process that identifies the suspects involved and leads to actual trial and appropriate punishment if necessary (El Zeidy 2008, p. 167, n. 56).

  61. 61.

    Mohamed El Zeidy analyses ECtHR Grand Chamber, McCann and Others v UK, 27 September 1995, Application No. 18984/91, para 161; ECtHR Grand Chamber, Anelia Kunchova Nachova et al. v Bulgaria, 6 July 2005, Application Numbers 43577/98 and 43579/98, para 113; ECtHR Fourth Section, Borislav Yevgenyevich Poltoratskiy v Ukraine, 29 April 2003, Application No. 38812/97, para 126; ECtHR, Sergey Kuznetsov v Ukraine 29 April 2003, Application No. 39042/97, para 106; ECtHR Former Second Section, İsak Tepe v Turkey, 9 May 2003, Application No. 27244/95, paras 181–182; and IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodrίguez v Honduras, 29 July 1988, Series C, No. 4, para 177.

  62. 62.

    El Zeidy 2008, pp. 207–211.

  63. 63.

    OTP 2003, p. 8.

  64. 64.

    This theory is also put forward by Kevin Jon Heller (Heller 2012).

  65. 65.

    OTP 2018, para 10.

  66. 66.

    van den Wyngaert and Ongena 2002, p. 726.

  67. 67.

    Pichon 2008, p. 194.

  68. 68.

    OTP 2018, para 12.

  69. 69.

    OTP 2018, para 11.

  70. 70.

    OTP 2018, para 8.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Public Redacted Version of the Corrigendum to the ‘Defence Response to the Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute , 31 July 2012, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, para 217.

  73. 73.

    Powles 2012, p. 8.

  74. 74.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Public Redacted Version of the Response to the Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi , 18 February 2013, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, para 11, cited in Stahn 2015, p. 235, n. 49.

  75. 75.

    For an analysis of the concept of genuineness in terms of Article 17(1)(b), see Nouwen 2011, pp. 216–220.

  76. 76.

    O’Donohue and Rigney 2012.

  77. 77.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi , 31 May 2013, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, paras 216–219.

  78. 78.

    Mégret and Samson 2013, Abstract, p. 581.

  79. 79.

    For a thorough analysis of this criterion, see El Zeidy 2008, pp. 222–237.

  80. 80.

    This theory postulates that the concepts of independence and impartiality in Article 17(2)(c) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25, create a due process requirement, whereby proceedings in which an individual is easier to convict because of violations of his due process guarantees are not conducted independently or impartially. Anne Bishop however rightly advocates that for a State to be deemed to be unwilling in terms of Article 17(1)(b) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25, the proceedings must not merely not be conducted impartially and independently, but they must also be conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice (Bishop 2013, pp. 411–412).

  81. 81.

    A list of such scholars, together with their works, may be found in Bishop 2013, p. 398, n. 65.

  82. 82.

    Aksenova 2017, pp. 80–81.

  83. 83.

    Powles 2012, p. 7.

  84. 84.

    Mégret and Samson 2013, p. 583.

  85. 85.

    Article 17(3) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  86. 86.

    Buchan and Johnsson 2012, pp. 105.

  87. 87.

    This states that the proceedings in the domestic State must be conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice, for unwillingness to subsist.

  88. 88.

    Trahan 2017, p. 843.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Court of Assize , Tripoli, Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi et al., Death Sentence, 28 July 2015, 630/2012; see also OTP 2018, para 12.

  91. 91.

    Jurdi 2017, p. 205.

  92. 92.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in Libya , Judgment on the Appeal of Abdullah Al-Senussi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi , Gaddafi and Al-Senussi ’, 24 July 2014, Case No. ICC-01/11-01 OA6, paras 230–231, cited in Stahn 2015, p. 232, n. 22.

  93. 93.

    Aksenova 2017, p. 80.

  94. 94.

    Mégret and Samson 2013, pp. 583–584.

  95. 95.

    Although this is a settled matter, it is not devoid of being subjected to diverse views. Kevin Jon Heller , in defence of radical complementarity , opines that ‘as long as a State is making a genuine effort to bring a suspect to justice, the ICC should find his or her case inadmissible regardless of the conduct the State investigates or the prosecutorial strategy the State pursues’ (Heller 2016, p. 664). In supporting Heller ’s idea, Miles Jackson advances the concept of regional complementarity , this being tantamount to an institutional or geographical extension of radical complementarity , conveying that a genuine prosecution by a lawfully constituted regional tribunal should be considered as a prosecution by a State such that the case is inadmissible before the ICC (Jackson 2016, pp. 1069–1071).

  96. 96.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Judgment on the Appeal of Libya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi , 21 May 2014, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA4, paras 83–84.

  97. 97.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 77, para 135.

  98. 98.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 32.

  99. 99.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 34.

  100. 100.

    Rastan 2017, p. 26.

  101. 101.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, paras 39–42.

  102. 102.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 78.

  103. 103.

    Le Monde Afrique (2018) Côte d’Ivoire : Simone Gbagbo Recouvre la Liberté. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/08/08/cote-d-ivoire-simone-gbagbo-recouvre-la-liberte_5340499_3212.html. Accessed 30 August 2018.

  104. 104.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire , Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , Prosecution’s Request to Access Material and Provide Observations in the Article 19(1) Admissibility Proceedings, 25 September 2018, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/12, paras 2 and 3.

  105. 105.

    Bishop 2013, pp. 407–408.

  106. 106.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Decision on the OPCD Requests in relation to the Hearing on the Admissibility of the Case, 2 October 2012, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, para 9, cited in Akhavan 2016, p. 1047, n. 16.

  107. 107.

    Prosecutor v Katanga, above n. 50, para 56, cited in Akhavan 2016, p. 1045, n. 15.

  108. 108.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 96, para 44, cited in Akhavan 2016, p. 1054, n. 39.

  109. 109.

    Bishop 2013, p. 389.

  110. 110.

    Heller 2006, pp. 255–280.

  111. 111.

    OTP 2003, p. 8.

  112. 112.

    Mégret and Samson 2013, p. 585.

  113. 113.

    Akhavan 2016, p. 1058.

  114. 114.

    Bishop 2013, pp. 403–404 and 409–410.

  115. 115.

    Mégret and Samson 2013, Abstract, p. 581.

  116. 116.

    Bo 2014, p. 531.

  117. 117.

    Bo 2014, p. 532.

  118. 118.

    Bo 2014, p. 533.

  119. 119.

    El Zeidy 2008, pp. 158–159.

  120. 120.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 77.

  121. 121.

    Such assessment is more objective and fact-driven than the unwillingness assessment (Holmes 2002, p. 677).

  122. 122.

    In practice, to shelter is to shield. However ‘shelter’ is here being used to distinguish between shielding (the first criterion) and the other two separate criteria in Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25, especially since the latter two criteria (unjustified delay, and independence and impartiality ) are ‘simply corollaries of the concept’ of shielding (Holmes 2002, p. 675). In fact, proceedings which shield a person are also proceedings which are not independent and impartial. There is thus an overlap between such criteria (Holmes 2002, p. 676).

  123. 123.

    Young 2001, p. 337.

  124. 124.

    Vervaele 2005, pp. 101–106.

  125. 125.

    Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.

  126. 126.

    van den Wyngaert and Ongena 2002, p. 707.

  127. 127.

    The Special Panel for Serious Crimes, República Democrática de Timor-Leste, Dili District Court, The Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes v Wiranto et al., Legal Ruling Concerning the Applicability of Ne Bis in Idem at the Arrest Warrant Stage of the Proceedings, 5 May 2005, Case No. 05/2003, para 19, cited in Warrant of Arrest for Wiranto, Deputy General Prosecutor v Wiranto, Case No 05/2003, The Special Panels for Serious Crime. In: Klip A, Sluiter G (2009) (eds) Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals : Timor Leste: The Special Panels for Serious Crimes 2003–2005, Vol. 16. Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford/Portland, pp. 64 and 82.

  128. 128.

    IACtHR, La Cantuta v Perú (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 29 November 2006, Series C No. 162, para 153.

  129. 129.

    See references to the impotant La Cantuta case in Sects. 13.5 and 16.7.2.

  130. 130.

    van den Wyngaert and Ongena 2002, p. 721.

  131. 131.

    Article 20(1) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  132. 132.

    ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić, 19 April 2004, IT-98-33-A, para 218, cited by Daqun 2009, p. 305.

  133. 133.

    Daqun 2009, p. 305.

  134. 134.

    The ICC has devised a testing mechanism to determine (in) admissibility under Article 17(1)(a) and(b) of the ICC Statute . The ICC held that the following questions must be posed and replied to:

    1. i.

      whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions; and

    2. ii.

      whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned.

    [Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, above n. 50, para 78].

  135. 135.

    Nsereko 2013, p. 443.

  136. 136.

    Ambos 2010, p. 35.

  137. 137.

    Jehani A (2013) Declaration of Libya ’s representative to the ICC. http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/07/18/314481/libya-must-hand-over-gaddafis-son-icc/. Accessed 11 October 2015.

  138. 138.

    This was ‘due to the failure of his transfer from the custody of the Zintan rebels to the central authorities in Tripoli’ (Jurdi 2017 p. 211).

  139. 139.

    Nebehay S (2017) Gaddafi Son’s Trial Unfair, Should be Sent to ICC: UN, Reuters, World News. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-gaddafi-un-idUSKBN1600W8. Accessed 10 April 2018, cited in ICD (2017) http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/. Accessed 10 April 2018.

  140. 140.

    See Sect. 9.3.

  141. 141.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case under Article 19(1) of the Statute, 10 March 2009, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, para 28.

  142. 142.

    Heller 2005, p. 257, cited in Bernard 2011a, b, p. 879.

  143. 143.

    ICC Trial Chamber II, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the Statute), 16 June 2009, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, para 48.

  144. 144.

    There are terminological differences between ‘non bis in idem and ‘ne bis in idem . The ad hoc tribunals adopt the former phrase, whereas the ICC Statute adopts the latter phrase (Naqvi 2010, n. 27, p. 291). The ne bis in idem rule, commonly referred to by jurists as the prohibition of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit (Harris et al. 2009, p. 270) is considered to be a fundamental human right which partakes of the due process [fair trial] guarantees. Although some jurists use the terms inter-changeably (Bohlander 2008, p. 541; Conway 2003, p. 217), double jeopardy and ne bis in idem are not identical concepts. ‘Double jeopardy operates only within a single legal system while the identity of the prosecuting power is not relevant to the application of non bis in idem . Non bis in idem relates to numerous issues including the recharging of an accused with the same or another offence, the framing of an indictment, the sentencing of an accused on multiple convictions (double punishment), new trials, appeals, revision, the relationship between courts and between States’ (Daniels 2006, pp. 2–3). The difference is exposed simplistically but concretely by Sean Murphy who states that ‘[n]on bis in idem addresses the possibility of repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in different legal systems, whereas double jeopardy generally refers to repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in the same legal system’ (Murphy 1999, pp. 81–82).

  145. 145.

    Spinellis 2002, pp. 1151–1161.

  146. 146.

    This portrays the right not to be tried again by the ICC after the acquittal or conviction by another court.

  147. 147.

    This denotes the right not to be tried again by another court after acquittal or conviction by the ICC [Article 20(2) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25].

  148. 148.

    Kleffner 2008, p. 119.

  149. 149.

    This legal provision encompasses any proceedings before any court (with the exception of the ICC), not necessarily a domestic court.

  150. 150.

    Neuman 2014, p. 323. The pretext to the expansion in jurisdiction of such court is explained in Paulussen and Dorsey 2012, p. 235.

  151. 151.

    Article 17(1)(c) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  152. 152.

    El Zeidy 2008, p. 285.

  153. 153.

    Kleffner 2008, p. 119.

  154. 154.

    The reference to conduct as opposed to crimes entails that the ICC ne bis in idem rule prohibits the re-trial for the same fact, not for the same offence. This is further made clear owing to the use of the term ‘crime’ in Article 20(2) of the ICC Statute . Andre de Hoogh unequivocally equates ‘conduct’ to ‘fact’ (De Hoogh 2009, p. 92). This conclusion is also confirmed by Jann Kleffner who equates conduct to behaviour, meaning that conduct ‘thus involves a de facto as opposed to a de jure appraisal’ (Kleffner 2008, p. 119). It also echoes the decision ECtHR Third Section, Franz Fischer v Austria, 29 May 2001, Application No. 37950/97, para 25, to the effect that ‘the wording of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 does not refer to the same offence but rather to the trial and punishment again for an offence for which the applicant has already been finally acquitted or convicted. Jurists have detected a danger to this approach, consisting in the fact that a person may be tried on the same facts but for a lesser charge’ (van den Wyngaert and Stessens 1999, p. 791). In other words, the facts remain the same but the other lesser offence would be comprised and involved within the greater offence, just like a Matryroshka doll which fits perfectly within the others. Distinctively, however, Article 14(7) of the ICCPR [ICCPR (1966) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] refers to the same offence. This complicates matters since the latter treaty may be said to constitute ‘the only universal definition one may identify’ (Naqvi 2010, p. 293, n. 27). On the other hand, it is doubted whether the ICCPR (see above) should constitute the litmus test which ensures that ne bis in idem rights are safeguarded. The ICCPR (see above), in fact, does not guarantee ne bis in idem with respect to national jurisdictions of two or more States, but only outlaws double jeopardy in relation to an offence already adjudicated within a given State [HRC, A.R.J. v Australia, 28 July 1997, Communication No. 692/1996, para 6.4]. The effect of all this uncertainty is that ‘ne bis in idem is subject to too many variants as to qualify as a general principle of law or a clear customary rule’, (Naqvi 2010, p. 306) although low common denominators may be identified in the pursuit of a future rule of general international law. (Conway 2003, pp. 237–238). In terms of the ius prosequi, this equates to a less burdensome journey towards the desired tangible crystallization of the defeat of impunity for core crimes. This is further accentuated by the fact that the ICC Statute considers ne bis in idem as a procedural bar to jurisdiction , and not a fair trial guarantee in its own right.

  155. 155.

    Nouwen 2011, p. 213.

  156. 156.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 96, paras 71–73; Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 92, para 119, both cited in Stahn 2015, p. 229.

  157. 157.

    Rastan 2010, p. 91, n. 30.

  158. 158.

    van den Wyngaert and Ongena 2002, pp. 724–726.

  159. 159.

    Rastan 2010, pp. 92–93.

  160. 160.

    van den Wyngaert and Ongena 2002, pp. 723–724.

  161. 161.

    Rastan 2010, p. 92.

  162. 162.

    ICC Elements of Crimes (1998) International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes.

  163. 163.

    Aizman 2016. This sharply contrasts with Pakistan, which requires full penetration to prove rape, where courts have gone as far as holding that the presence of semen in the victim’s vagina is an insufficient indication of rape (HRW 1999, p. 36, n. 79).

  164. 164.

    Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Others, above n. 55, paras 39–40.

  165. 165.

    Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Others, above n. 55, paras 39 and 40.

  166. 166.

    Such steps include measures directed at ascertaining whether suspects are responsible for that conduct, interviews of witnesses or suspects, the collection of documentary evidence and the carrying out of forensic analyses [Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Others, above n. 55, paras 40–42, cited in Stahn 2015, p. 236, notes 53 and 54].

  167. 167.

    Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Others, above n. 55, paras 40–42, cited in Stahn 2015, p. 236, n. 55.

  168. 168.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 78.

  169. 169.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 65.

  170. 170.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 70.

  171. 171.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, paras 70–71.

  172. 172.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, paras 73 and 76.

  173. 173.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 30.

  174. 174.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Decision Requesting Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi , 7 December 2012, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, para 122, cited in Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 31, n. 53.

  175. 175.

    Divisional Court, UK, Smakowski and Zestfair Ltd v Westminster City Council, (1990), 154 J.P. 345 DC, Crim. L.R. 1990 Jun 419–421, cited in Richardson 2007, pp. 1307–1308.

  176. 176.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Decision Requesting Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi , 7 December 2012, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, para 14, cited in Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, para 35, n. 65.

  177. 177.

    Nsereko 2013, p. 444.

  178. 178.

    Nouwen 2011, pp. 212–214.

  179. 179.

    Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, above n. 29, paras 38–40.

  180. 180.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 96, para 62.

  181. 181.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 96, para 72.

  182. 182.

    Payam Akhavan contends that ‘even an ongoing investigation in its early stages (i.e. that relates to “aspects” of the ICC case but does not yet reveal its full contours) will not satisfy the “same conduct test”’ (Akhavan 2016, p. 1054).

  183. 183.

    Bo 2014, p. 521.

  184. 184.

    Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, para 40, cited in Akhavan 2016, p. 1045, n. 9.

  185. 185.

    Tallgren and Reisinger Coracini 2008, p. 692, n. 129.

  186. 186.

    ECtHR Third Section, Ponsetti and Chesnel v France, 14 September 1999, Application Numbers 36855/97 and 41731/98, para 5 of ‘The Law’.

  187. 187.

    ECtHR, Maria Celeste Vieira Veloso de Oliveira v Switzerland, 30 July 1998, Application No. 84/1997/868/1080, para 26.

  188. 188.

    The rule of ne bis in idem in criminal matters is also applied within EU Law, as a consequence of the incorporation of the Schengen acquis in the European Community [Schengen Acquis (1999) The Schengen Convention to Implement the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985] and EU legal order by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts (Mitsilegas 2009, p. 143).

  189. 189.

    Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, above n. 50, para 99.

  190. 190.

    Arbour and Bergsmo 1999, p. 131.

  191. 191.

    OTP 2014, para 114, cited in Weiner 2016, p. 233, n. 94.

  192. 192.

    For guidelines reflecting the notion of shielding , see El Zeidy 2008, pp. 175–180.

  193. 193.

    El Zeidy 2008, p. 168.

  194. 194.

    El Zeidy 2008, p. 170.

  195. 195.

    Shany 2007, pp. 159–163.

  196. 196.

    Bernard 2011a, b, p. 871.

  197. 197.

    Stahn 2010, p. 669.

  198. 198.

    Chalmers et al. 2006, pp. 273–301.

  199. 199.

    Olásolo 2005, p. 154.

  200. 200.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in the DRC in the case of the Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Katanga Against the Decision of the Trial Chamber II of 20 November 2009 entitled ‘Decision on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of Proceedings’, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Erkki Kourula and Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova, 12 July 2010, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 10, n. 147.

  201. 201.

    Article 14(7) of the ICCPR, above n. 154.

  202. 202.

    Daniels 2006, p. 11.

  203. 203.

    Amnesties will also be considered under Sect. 16.5.

  204. 204.

    Jurdi 2011, p. 84.

  205. 205.

    Kleffner 2006, pp. 94–95.

  206. 206.

    van den Wyngaert and Ongena 2002, p. 726.

  207. 207.

    Schabas 2001, p. 69, cited in Scobbie 2003, p. 34, n. 77.

  208. 208.

    Vladimir Tochilovsky has also proposed the merging of investigative and prosecutorial functions within international criminal justice systems (Tochilovsky 2011, pp. 599–601); see also Robinson 2006, p. 144.

  209. 209.

    For a thorough analysis of Article 53 of the ICC Statute , above n. 25, see Robinson 2003, pp. 486–498.

  210. 210.

    OTP 2007, p. 2.

  211. 211.

    OTP 2007, p. 3.

  212. 212.

    Buchan and Johnsson 2012, p. 106.

  213. 213.

    OTP 2007, p. 8.

  214. 214.

    OTP 2013, p. 4.

  215. 215.

    Akande 2009, p. 338.

  216. 216.

    Buchan and Johnsson 2012, p. 106.

  217. 217.

    OTP 2013, p. 17; see also OTP 2007, p. 3.

  218. 218.

    Holmes 2002, p. 678.

  219. 219.

    van den Wyngaert and Ongena 2002, pp. 726–727.

  220. 220.

    Holmes 2002, pp. 678–679.

  221. 221.

    El Zeidy 2008, p. 298.

  222. 222.

    Ibid.

  223. 223.

    Buchan and Johnsson 2012, p. 103.

  224. 224.

    See the deferral mechanism contemplated by Article 16 of the ICC Statute which is eloquently analysed in Knottnerus 2014.

  225. 225.

    Daniels 2006, p. 11; see also Conway 2003, pp. 217–218.

  226. 226.

    Conway 2003, pp. 219–221.

  227. 227.

    ICTY Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non Bis in Idem , 14 November 1995, Case No IT-94-1-T.

  228. 228.

    National proceedings must encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court. This means that the person must be investigated and prosecuted for the specific crimes under consideration by the ICC [Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, above n. 29, paras 38 and 40 cited in Klip and Sluiter 2010, p. 61].

  229. 229.

    For an understanding of the meaning of a ‘criminal charge’, see Gomien et al. 1996, p. 163.

  230. 230.

    The preclusion of prosecution on the same facts is also referred to as ne bis in idem in concreto, this being adopted generally within civil law countries, whereas such prohibition on the basis of the same offence, generally adopted within common law jurisdictions, is referred to as ne bis in idem in abstracto (Conway 2003, p. 227).

  231. 231.

    Bassiouni and Manikas 1996, p. 334.

  232. 232.

    Carter 2010, pp. 15–16.

  233. 233.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v Bosco Ntanganda, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58, 10 February 2006, Case No. ICC-0I/04-02/06-20-Anx2, paras 29–41.

  234. 234.

    Nouwen 2011, p. 212.

  235. 235.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the CAR , Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process Challenges, 24 June 2010, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, para 261.

  236. 236.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Initial Appearance of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 11 February 2008, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07.

  237. 237.

    Swart 2002b, p. 1694.

  238. 238.

    Akande 2012a, p. 322.

  239. 239.

    Article 93(1)(j) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  240. 240.

    See Sects. 11.1.1 and 11.1.2.

  241. 241.

    Akande 2012a, p. 322.

  242. 242.

    Article 19(7) of the ICC Statute .

  243. 243.

    See n. 260 here below.

  244. 244.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 35, para 28.

  245. 245.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 36.

  246. 246.

    For a detailed and comprehensive examination of this phrase in the context of the ICC Statute , see Ciampi 2002a, pp. 1705–1747.

  247. 247.

    Akande 2012a, pp. 317–321.

  248. 248.

    Knoops 2002, p. 327.

  249. 249.

    See Sects. 11.1, 11.1.1, 11.1.2 and 11.1.3.

  250. 250.

    Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 96, para 73, cited in Stahn 2015, p. 239, n. 68.

  251. 251.

    Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo , above n. 52, paras 33–34 and 75–78; see also ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Libya , Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi , 11 October 2013, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, para 66, cited in Stahn 2015, p. 238, n. 67.

  252. 252.

    See Article 89(3) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  253. 253.

    Caligiuri 2018, p. 254.

  254. 254.

    Ambos and Stegmiller 2012, p. 403.

  255. 255.

    Ciampi 2002b, p. 1632.

  256. 256.

    Swart 2002b, p. 1681.

  257. 257.

    Article 97 of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  258. 258.

    Swart 2002b, p. 1681.

  259. 259.

    Bishop 2013, p. 405.

  260. 260.

    It must be noted, however, that Libya ’s admissibility challenge was only directed at the Saif Al-Islam case. Libya argued that both cases should be considered separately. On 11 October 2013 the ICC [Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi , above n. 251], in the first successful admissibility challenge (see Stahn 2015, p. 232) held that the Al-Senussi case was inadmissible and was hence to proceed in Libya . The different outcomes of the Saif Al-Islam and Al-Senussi cases (wherein the former, unlike the latter, was considered admissible) has quelled fears that the ICC would interpret the admissibility threshold overly restrictively in order to keep any case once received in its docket in an effort of self-preservation (Bernard 2011a, b, p. 203, cited in Ambach 2015, p. 1281, n. 27).

  261. 261.

    Bekou 2009, pp. 468 and 470.

  262. 262.

    Stegmiller 2013, p. 483.

  263. 263.

    Swart and Sluiter 1999, p. 109.

  264. 264.

    Knoops 2002, pp. 291–292.

  265. 265.

    Article 90(2) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  266. 266.

    Schabas 2010, p. 1005.

  267. 267.

    OTP 2003, p. 19.

  268. 268.

    OTP 2003, p. 24.

  269. 269.

    Ibid.

  270. 270.

    Swart 2002b, p. 1696.

  271. 271.

    Ibid.

  272. 272.

    Ibid.

  273. 273.

    Ciampi 2008, pp. 103–111.

  274. 274.

    Another jurist considers the ‘misuse of the criminal process’ on the basis of mala fides (bad faith) as sufficient for proceedings to be stayed (Naqvi 2010, p. 361).

  275. 275.

    Wherever there is a right, there is a remedy (Fellmeth and Horwitz 2009, p. 281).

  276. 276.

    Such remedy , which should be proportionate to the violation and the harm endured, can range from the reduction of a sentence, in case of a conviction , to pecuniary compensation in the case of an acquittal .

  277. 277.

    This legal provision unequivocally stipulates that ‘the application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights…’.

  278. 278.

    Deprez 2012, p. 729.

  279. 279.

    Currie 2007, p. 362.

  280. 280.

    Knoops 2002, pp. 236–238.

  281. 281.

    Spencer 2014, p. 14.

  282. 282.

    HoL, Regina v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court ex parte Bennett, 24 June 1993 [1993] 3 WLR 90.

  283. 283.

    McAuliffe de Guzman 1999, p. 445, cited in Usacka 2016, p. 287, n. 26.

  284. 284.

    Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  285. 285.

    Viebig 2016, pp. 141–142.

  286. 286.

    Gradoni et al. 2013, p. 83.

  287. 287.

    Jorda 2004, p. 574.

  288. 288.

    Carnero Rojo 2005, pp. 829–869.

  289. 289.

    See, for example, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda, Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal in Part Pre-Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s Applications for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58, 19 August 2005, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, para 24–51.

  290. 290.

    Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch was one of the main suspects for the atrocities committed by the regime of Democratic Kampuchea in the 1970s (Ryngaert 2008, p. 719). The case [ECCC, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, 3 February 2012, 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC] is eloquently explained by Eckelmans 2016, pp. 159–179.

  291. 291.

    Adolf Eichmann complained of the illegality of his capture in Argentina by Israeli agents, arguing it affected the legality of his detention and trial (Ryngaert 2008, p. 728).

  292. 292.

    Alvarez-Machain [USA Supreme Court, USA v Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 15 June 1992, 504 U.S. 655 (112 S.Ct. 2188, 119 L.Ed.2d 441) 91/712] argued that the illegality of his capture in Mexico by USA drug enforcement agents affected the legality of his detention and trial (Ryngaert 2008, p. 728; see also Reisman et al. 2004, pp. 1504–1512).

  293. 293.

    Ebrahim was abducted from Swaziland to South Africa [Supreme Court of Appeal, South Africa , State v Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, 26 February 1991, 279/89, cited in Nsereko 2009, p. 991, n. 65].

  294. 294.

    ICTR Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v Joseph Kanyabashi, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction , 18 June 1997, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, para B7 (v).

  295. 295.

    Tochilovsky 2014, p. 1326.

  296. 296.

    Ibid.

  297. 297.

    ICC Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(E) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, 13 June 2008, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para 90, cited in Tochilovsky 2014, p. 1326, n. 30.

  298. 298.

    Pitcher 2018, p. 305.

  299. 299.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court Pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December 2006, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06(OA4), para 44, cited in Paulussen 2010, p. 970.

  300. 300.

    In Latin America the contrary has occurred when changes of government brought a change of policy and prosecutions for past official conduct (Akande and Shah 2011, p. 816).

  301. 301.

    Tochilovsky 2014, p. 1327.

  302. 302.

    See also Zappalà 2002, p. 1577.

  303. 303.

    Schabas 2006, p. 379.

  304. 304.

    Barayagwiza was released before trial when the Appeals Chamber dismissed the charges against him by means of its decision [ICTR Appeals Chamber, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v Prosecutor, Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration, 31 March 2000, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72]. The Appeals Chamber declared that the length of time (over three years) which Barayagwiza spent in detention in Cameroon at the behest of the ICTR without being indicted violated the 90-day rule as set forth by Rule 40bis and established human rights jurisprudence. The Appeals Chamber reached the conclusion that ‘to proceed with the trial of the Appellant would amount to an act of injustice […] forcing him to undergo a lengthy and costly trial, only to have him raise, once again the very issues currently pending before this Chamber. Moreover, in the event the Appellant was to be acquitted after trial we can foresee no effective remedy for the violation of his rights. Therefore, on the basis of these findings, the Appeals Chamber will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the Appellant, on the basis of the abuse of process doctrine…’ [para 72 of the above mentioned judgment, cited in http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp9-e/barayagwiza.htm. Accessed 22 March 2011].

  305. 305.

    ICTY Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić, Decision on the Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, 9 October 2002, Case No. IT-94-2, para 114].

  306. 306.

    ICTR Appeals Chamber, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v Prosecutor, Decision, 3 November 1999, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 74.

  307. 307.

    Smeulers 2007, p. 110.

  308. 308.

    See Sect. 16.7.1.

  309. 309.

    This is suggested by Göran Sluiter (Sluiter 2016).

  310. 310.

    ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest , 5 June 2003, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, para 30.

  311. 311.

    In the Duch case before the ECCC, it was held that the ICC Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo would also refuse jurisdiction , under the abuse of process doctrine, in the case of grave violations of the suspect’s rights (thereby focusing on the more ‘physical’ serious mistreatment and torture ) as such, hence irrespective of the entity responsible (Paulussen 2010, p. 968).

  312. 312.

    This term is used in Articles 36(2)(a), 59(2), 67(1)(a) and 93(3), 93(6), 103(1)(c), 121(1), 122(1) of the ICC Statute , above n. 25. Article 93(3) is particularly important since this legal provision uses such a term in a very similar context to the one prevailing within Article 97, id est where consultations to resolve a matter are involved. The substitution of the word ‘promptly’ with the words ‘without delay ’ within Article 97, as opposed to Article 93(3) [both of which are stipulated within Part 9 of the ICC Statute ], connotes that the drafters of the ICC Statute , above n. 25, did not want to impose strict time requirements on the requested State in the catch-all provision, id est in Article 97.

  313. 313.

    Partial exception to this may arise from ordinary law, such as for example, Section 5(8) of the UK International Criminal Court Act of 2001 [UK ICC Act (2001) International Criminal Court Act, United Kingdom], whereby the ICC is ultimately the court to stipulate whether and what remedy should be provided in the case of abuse of process [HoL, Stockdale v Hansard, 15 June 1839, vol. 48 cc301/6, cited in Cryer and Bekou 2007, pp. 454–455, n. 83].

  314. 314.

    Paulussen 2010, p. 974.

  315. 315.

    Ryngaert 2008, p. 719.

  316. 316.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v Mrkšić et al., Transcript, 9 December 1998, Case No. IT-95-13/1, paras 22–23, cited in Carnero Rojo 2005, p. 857.

  317. 317.

    ICTY, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Deferral and Motion for Order to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 4 October 2002, Case No. IT-02-55-MISC.6, paras 13 and 18; see also ICTR Trial Chamber designated under Rule 11bis, Prosecutor v Fulgence Kayishema, Decision on the Request by Human Rights Watch for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae in the Proceedings for Referral of the Indictment Against Fulgence Kayishema to Rwanda: Rule 11bis and 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 November 2007, Case No. ICTR-2001-67-I, cited in Klip A, Sluiter G (2010) (eds) Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals : The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2006–2007, Vol. 25. Intersentia, Cambridge, pp. 281–285.

  318. 318.

    Al Jazeera (2018) News: CAR . https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/car-war-crimes-suspect-yekatom-appears-icc-alleges-torture-181123111318110.html. Accessed 23 December 2018.

  319. 319.

    Mutyaba 2012, p. 949.

  320. 320.

    Article 18 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities [Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities (1967) Official Journal, No. 167, 13 July 1967] caters for such waivers when these are compatible with the ultimate interests of the EU.

  321. 321.

    Gillet 2012, p. 93.

  322. 322.

    This deals with conflicting international obligations, outside of competing requests (Prost 2005, p. 76).

  323. 323.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Cooperation of the DRC Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, 9 April 2014, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, para 27.

  324. 324.

    Voetelink 2013, p. 241.

  325. 325.

    Prouveze 2011, p. 361.

  326. 326.

    This requirement differentiates indictees from ICC staff and officials. The latter are protected by means of their status [see Article 48 of the ICC Statute , the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC [Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC (2002) Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, ICC/ASP/1/3], and the Resolution of the ASP on Cooperation , adopted at the 8th Plenary Meeting, held on 21 November 2012, by consensus [ASP (2012) Resolution ICC-ASP/11/Res.5, Doc. ICC/ASP/11/20], paras 7–9. http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-Res5-ENG.pdf. Accessed 22 July 2014. An important point must be raised in relation to the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC. This offers a possibility to States not parties to the ICC Statute to become parties to such agreement irrespective of their ratification of the ICC Statute or otherwise. By virtue of this States are allowed to foster cooperation with the ICC without being subject to its jurisdiction (Nilsson 2004, p. 577).

  327. 327.

    See Article 27 of the ICC Statute , above n. 25.

  328. 328.

    Cassese 2008, p. 304.

  329. 329.

    Akande 2004, p. 412.

  330. 330.

    Bantekas 2010, p. 133.

  331. 331.

    Drumbl 2008, pp. 236–237.

  332. 332.

    SCSL Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor , Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction , 31 May 2004, Case No. SCSL -2003-01-I, paras 52–53. The SCSL held that the principle of sovereign equality of States, which underlies Head of State immunity before national courts , is irrelevant in respect of international tribunals (Kreẞ 2009, p. 951).

  333. 333.

    Werle 2009, p. 61.

  334. 334.

    Simbeye 2004, p. 90.

  335. 335.

    ICTY Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v Slobodan Milošević , Decision on Preliminary Motions, 8 November 2001, Case No. IT-02-54, paras 26–34.

  336. 336.

    ‘A number of States, including the United Kingdom, have interpreted such immunities as having been waived by States party to the Rome Statute’ (Cryer 2002, p. 738).

  337. 337.

    Bantekas 2010, p. 133.

  338. 338.

    Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 323, para 25.

  339. 339.

    Frulli 2009a, p. 368.

  340. 340.

    These characteristics have been dealt with in Chap. 5.

  341. 341.

    Similarly, since it derived from an agreement between all UN Member States and Sierra Leone, the Statute of the SCSL was binding also on Liberia, which ‘could then be said to have indirectly waived any non-peremptory customary immunity right’. Admittedly, however, Claus Kreẞ sheds doubts on the Taylor dictum in so far as it unsuccessfully tried to combine the customary law argument and the indirect waiver argument (Kreẞ 2005, p. 204).

  342. 342.

    Nouwen 2005, p. 648.

  343. 343.

    Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor , above n. 332, para 53, duly analysed in Heller 2013, pp. 835–855.

  344. 344.

    As per Article 24(1) of the UNC itself, the UNSC acts on behalf of the members of the UN. Consequently, the Agreement between Sierra Leone and the UN is an agreement between Sierra Leone and all the members of the UN [Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor , above n. 332, para 38, n. 31].

  345. 345.

    ICJ, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium), 14 February 2002, ICJ Rep. 2002, p. 3, para 61. The mark it would have left on contemporary international law could have largely depended upon its confirmation or revocation when the judgment in the case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (DRC v France), further to an application before the ICJ dated 9 December 2002, would be delivered [see the ICJ order {Order No. 129} of 16 November 2009, authorising the submission of written pleadings by not later than 17 May 2010]. Succinctly, in this case, the DRC claimed that the exercise of jurisdiction by French courts over some Congolese nationals, including the Head of State, for alleged torture , infringed international law. However, the case was dropped by the plaintiff by means of a note filed before the ICJ on the 5 November 2010 [see ICJ, Case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (DRC v France), Order of Removal of the Case from the List, 16 November 2010].

  346. 346.

    van Alebeek 2008, pp. 103–157.

  347. 347.

    Skander Galand 2014, p. 626.

  348. 348.

    Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor , above n. 332.

  349. 349.

    Nouwen 2005, p. 656.

  350. 350.

    Cassese 2008, p. 311.

  351. 351.

    Mettraux et al. 2018, p. 591.

  352. 352.

    Dapo Akande has vociferously criticised this decision (Akande 2011).

  353. 353.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Malawi case), 12 December 2011, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, para 43.

  354. 354.

    Cassese 2008, p. 312, cited in the Malawi case, above n. 353, para 34.

  355. 355.

    Gaeta 2002, p. 991.

  356. 356.

    Akande 2011.

  357. 357.

    Ramsden and Yeung 2016, p. 709.

  358. 358.

    The UK, Ireland, Malta and Samoa are cases in point (Akande 2009, p. 339, n. 23).

  359. 359.

    Akande 2011.

  360. 360.

    Akande 2012b, p. 10.

  361. 361.

    Akande 2009, p. 339.

  362. 362.

    ‘Customary international law abrogates immunity in the case of core crimes’ (Day 2004, p. 510).

  363. 363.

    Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 323, paras 26–34.

  364. 364.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, in the Case of the Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Non-Compliance by South Africa with the Request by the Court for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir (Decision on South Africa’s non-compliance ), 6 July 2017, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, para 94.

  365. 365.

    Akande and de Souza Dias 2018.

  366. 366.

    Tladi 2013, p. 203.

  367. 367.

    Prost 2018, p. 366.

  368. 368.

    du Plessis and Tladi 2017.

  369. 369.

    Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 323, para 27.

  370. 370.

    Jacobs 2015, p. 292.

  371. 371.

    ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, cited in Jacobs 2015, p. 292.

  372. 372.

    Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, above n. 371, paras 43–44, cited in Jacobs 2015, pp. 292–293.

  373. 373.

    Jacobs 2015, p. 292.

  374. 374.

    Article 34 of the VCLT (1969) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

  375. 375.

    Akande 2004, pp. 420–433.

  376. 376.

    Cryer et al. 2011, p. 555.

  377. 377.

    Nouwen 2005, p. 656.

  378. 378.

    Dembowski 2003, p. 150.

  379. 379.

    Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, above n. 371, para 43.

  380. 380.

    Knoops 2008, p. 128.

  381. 381.

    For a comprehensive examination of the practice of self-referrals , see van der Wilt 2015, pp. 210–227, and El Zeidy 2008, pp. 228–235 and 274–283. For a critique of self-referrals and an opinion about the extent to which they signal a departure from the purposive rationale of the principle of complementarity which, in turn, could be detrimental to the credibility and impartiality of the ICC, see Hassanein 2017, pp. 107–134.

  382. 382.

    Swart and Sluiter 1999, p. 121.

  383. 383.

    See Sect. 11.4.2.

  384. 384.

    Jia 2012, p. 1315.

  385. 385.

    Frulli 2009b.

  386. 386.

    Abass 2005, p. 281.

  387. 387.

    Frulli 2009a, p. 369.

  388. 388.

    Article 27 takes into account national rules on immunities of certain State officials. Considered in the light of other ICC Statute provisions, particularly the crucial Articles 17 and 88, it could make it incumbent upon the State Parties to change their national legislation on immunities belonging to some State officials in order to enable national courts to institute proceedings against those State officials and to enable domestic competent authorities to execute an order to arrest and surrender by the ICC (Gaeta 2002, p. 997).

  389. 389.

    Schabas 2010, p. 1041.

  390. 390.

    Lee 2005, p. 18.

  391. 391.

    Malawi case, above n. 353, para 36, cited in Mutyaba 2012, n. 85 at p. 949.

  392. 392.

    Stahn 2012, n. 47 at p. 331.

  393. 393.

    Bantekas 2010, p. 134.

  394. 394.

    Sluiter 2011.

  395. 395.

    ‘At the heart of this notion lies the issue of a hierarchy of norms’ (Simbeye 2004, p. 136) which has been dealt with in Part II, and shall also referred to under Part IV.

  396. 396.

    van Schaack and Slye 2010, p. 978.

  397. 397.

    Prost 2011, p. 314.

  398. 398.

    King 2006, p. 270.

  399. 399.

    Cryer 2009a, p. 202.

  400. 400.

    King 2006, pp. 277–280.

  401. 401.

    King 2006, p. 284.

  402. 402.

    Swart and Sluiter 1999, p. 121.

  403. 403.

    Jalloh 2009, p. 485.

  404. 404.

    Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, above n. 371, para 45.

  405. 405.

    Kiyani 2013, pp. 471–472.

  406. 406.

    Drumbl 2008, p. 238.

  407. 407.

    Domestic implementing legislation has been promulgated in Canada, New Zealand, UK, Switzerland, Malta, South Africa , Croatia, Trinidad and Tobago, Ireland, Samoa and Estonia. (Akande 2009, pp. 338–339, n. 19).

  408. 408.

    See, inter alia, Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 323; see also Malawi case, above n. 353; see also Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, above n. 371. For a thorough analysis of the ICC’s approach to immunities, see Jacobs 2015, pp. 281–302.

  409. 409.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in the CAR , Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Corrigendum to Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo Against the Decision of Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 entitled ‘Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process Challenges’, 19 October 2010, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 3, paras 34 et seq.

  410. 410.

    Malawi case, above n. 353, para 18.

  411. 411.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision following the Prosecutor’s request for an order further clarifying that the Republic of South Africa is under the obligation to immediately arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir, 13 June 2015, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, para 9.

  412. 412.

    Papillon 2010, p. 288.

  413. 413.

    Supreme Court of Appeal, South Africa , The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre, 15 March 2016, 867/15 [2016] ZASCA 17, para 82.

  414. 414.

    Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 371.

  415. 415.

    Schabas 2010, p. 1042.

  416. 416.

    Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 323, para 31.

  417. 417.

    Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 323, para 29.

  418. 418.

    Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 323, para 30.

  419. 419.

    Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, above n. 323, paras 30–31.

  420. 420.

    See para 2 of UNSC Resolution 1593 {UNSC (2005) Resolution 1593 (2005) UN Doc. S/RES/1593}. For an analysis relating to the extent to which UNSC Resolutions must be explicit, see de Souza Dias 2018.

  421. 421.

    Akande 2009, p. 344.

  422. 422.

    Ibid.

  423. 423.

    Gillet 2012, p. 92.

  424. 424.

    A contrary view, equating recommendations to authorizations to take specific action under Chapter VII of the UNC, has been adopted by the English HoL in HoL, Regina (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent), 12 December 2007, 2007 UKHL 58, paras 30–34, cited in Akande 2009, pp. 344–345, n. 38.

  425. 425.

    Akande 2009, abstract, p. 333.

  426. 426.

    See, for example, paras 4–8, entitled ‘ICC Referral’, of UNSC Resolution 1970 {UNSC (2011) Resolution 1970 (2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1970}.

  427. 427.

    Akande 2009, p. 340.

  428. 428.

    Akande 2009, p. 341.

  429. 429.

    Akande 2009, p. 347.

  430. 430.

    Orakhelashvili 2011, pp. 849–855.

  431. 431.

    Akande 2009, p. 351.

  432. 432.

    For a detailed analysis thereof, see Maunganidze and du Plessis 2015, pp. 65–83.

  433. 433.

    Barnes 20102011, pp. 1615–1616; see also Odero 2011, pp. 150–154.

  434. 434.

    Kiyani 2013, p. 484.

  435. 435.

    Kreẞ 2005, p. 208.

  436. 436.

    Drumbl 2008, p. 235.

  437. 437.

    Article 7(2).

  438. 438.

    See its Article 6(2).

  439. 439.

    See its Article 6(2).

  440. 440.

    See its Article 29.

  441. 441.

    In its second paragraph, this legal provision explicitly eliminates immunity rationae personae by means of an express waiver of State Parties.

  442. 442.

    Drumbl 2008, pp. 235–236.

  443. 443.

    Abass 2005, p. 279.

  444. 444.

    Cryer et al. 2011, p. 459.

  445. 445.

    Cryer et al. 2011, p. 559.

  446. 446.

    Cryer et al. 2011, p. 558.

  447. 447.

    Cryer et al. 2011, p. 551.

  448. 448.

    Cryer et al. 2011, p. 552.

  449. 449.

    Claus Kreẞ , whose commentary postulates the so-called ‘indirect waiver argument ’ and the ‘customary law argument ’ [see n. 341], considers it to be tantamount to a ‘noteworthy piece of international case law on the question of immunity rationae personae before an international criminal court’ (Kreẞ 2005, p. 204).

  450. 450.

    Kiyani 2013, p. 474.

  451. 451.

    One must here reiterate that Article 27 of the ICC Statute departs from customary international law with detrimental effects since it does not even distinguish between immunities rationae materiae and immunities rationae personae (Abass 2005, p. 281).

  452. 452.

    Kiyani 2013, pp. 487–489.

  453. 453.

    Skander Galand 2014, p. 627.

  454. 454.

    Kreẞ 2012, p. 254.

  455. 455.

    Dapo Akande being cited by Tladi 2013, p. 210.

  456. 456.

    See Sect. 10.2.

  457. 457.

    Sluiter 2011.

  458. 458.

    Tladi 2013, pp. 217–218.

  459. 459.

    Knottnerus 2017.

  460. 460.

    Ibid.

  461. 461.

    Ibid.

  462. 462.

    Decision on South Africa’s non-compliance , above n. 364, para 93.

  463. 463.

    ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir (Decision on Jordan’s non-compliance ), 11 December 2017, ICC-02/05-01/09, para 38.

  464. 464.

    Akande 2009.

  465. 465.

    du Plessis 2010, pp. 78–79.

  466. 466.

    The territorially-based paradigm is still the prevalent theory of jurisdiction in general international law (Paliouras 2014, p. 37).

  467. 467.

    Such decision conflicts with the Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58 in relation to the situation in Uganda [ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58 in Relation to the Situation in Uganda, 8 July 2005, Case No. ICC-02/04].

  468. 468.

    Critics of this resolution argue that ‘it discriminates on the basis of nationality’ since it ensures that nationals of other States are excluded from the ICC’s jurisdiction (Ssenyonjo 2009, p. 399 and p. 403). William Schabas speaks of a ‘defective Security Council resolution’ (Schabas 2007, p. 51).

  469. 469.

    Akande 2008, p. 2.

  470. 470.

    van Schaack and Slye 2010, p. 978.

  471. 471.

    Akande 2008, p. 3.

  472. 472.

    For a detailed examination of the case against Omar Al Bashir, see Kreẞ 2015, pp. 669–704.

  473. 473.

    Grono and de Courcy Wheeler 2015, pp. 1243–1244.

  474. 474.

    Papillon 2010, p. 276.

  475. 475.

    Weatherall 2015, p. 293.

  476. 476.

    Webb 2013, p. 79.

  477. 477.

    Webb 2013, p. 76.

  478. 478.

    Papillon 2010, p. 283.

  479. 479.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s Appeal Against the ‘Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Non-Compliance by Jordan with the Request by the Court for the Arrest and Surrender [of] Omar Al-Bashir , 12 March 2018, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09.

  480. 480.

    van der Wilt 2005, p. 110.

  481. 481.

    Webb 2012, p. 121; see also HoL, Regina v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet (Spanish request for extradition case), 24 March 1999, (No.3) [1999], 2 WLR 827.

  482. 482.

    Prouveze 2011, p. 362.

  483. 483.

    Marek 2002, p. 351.

  484. 484.

    Belsky et al. 1989, p. 394, cited in Akande and Shah 2011, pp. 828–829, n. 59.

  485. 485.

    Spanish request for extradition case, above n. 481, paras 113 and 166.

  486. 486.

    Brody 2000, p. 15.

  487. 487.

    Cryer 2009b, p. 875.

  488. 488.

    Brody 2000, p. 15.

  489. 489.

    Cryer 2009b, p. 875.

  490. 490.

    Frulli 2009a, p. 369.

  491. 491.

    A waiver has been defined as ‘the permission given by the State of the individual concerned, authorizing the State with custodial enforcement jurisdiction to proceed with investigation , arrest and trial of the individual concerned’ (Simbeye 2004, p. 136).

  492. 492.

    USA Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, Susan Siderman de Blake et al. v Argentina, 22 May 1992, 85-5773, 1992, 965 F. 2d 699.

  493. 493.

    ICJ, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert , 14 February 2002, ICJ Rep. 2002, p. 3, para 28, cited in Tladi 2013, p. 220.

  494. 494.

    See Chap. 1, n. 2.

  495. 495.

    Haffke 1994, cited in Simbeye 2004, p. 140.

  496. 496.

    Brownlie, van Hoof, Rozakis, Ruiz, Robledo, Ronzitti and Barberis, cited in Ragazzi 1997, p. 67, n. 96.

  497. 497.

    Akande and Shah 2011, p. 817.

  498. 498.

    Opinions of Lords Browne-Wilkinson , Saville, Millet and Phillips, in Spanish request for extradition case, above n. 481, paras 114, 169–170, 178–179 and 190.

  499. 499.

    Akande and Shah 2011, p. 849.

  500. 500.

    Akande and Shah 2011, p. 840.

  501. 501.

    King 2006, p. 302.

  502. 502.

    Prost and Schlunck 1999, p. 1132, cited in Sluiter 2003, n. 95 at p. 633.

  503. 503.

    Iverson 2012, p. 137.

  504. 504.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan , Public Redacted Version of ‘Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15’, 20 November 2017, Case No. ICC-02/17, para 376.

  505. 505.

    Cobain 2018.

  506. 506.

    Lederer EM (2018) US Boycotts Informal UN Meeting on ICC’s 20th Anniversary. Associated Press. https://www.apnews.com/f1ca6338ccc34a00982036d41d46aaaa. Accessed 7 October 2018.

  507. 507.

    For a better understanding of the impact of such agreements, see Scheffer 2005; see also Deen-Racsmany 2004; see also Fleck 2003.

  508. 508.

    Triffterer 1999, p. 513.

  509. 509.

    This important legal provision stipulates that:

    ‘The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender’.

  510. 510.

    Cryer 2005, p. 154.

  511. 511.

    The purpose and effect of Status of Forces Agreements is to limit, and not extend, the functional immunity of foreign armed forces as the result of a balance between the law of the sending State and the law of the receiving State (Fleck 2003, p. 656).

  512. 512.

    Fleck 2003, p. 651.

  513. 513.

    It is undisputed that ‘consent plays a pivotal role in determining the authority and legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’ (Brighton 2012, p. 632).

  514. 514.

    Fleck 2003, p. 656.

  515. 515.

    van der Wilt 2005, p. 102.

  516. 516.

    van der Wilt 2005, p. 105.

  517. 517.

    King 2006, pp. 298–299.

  518. 518.

    Schabas, 2010, p. 1040.

  519. 519.

    The negotiating history , however, does not reveal such intention at all (van der Wilt 2005, p. 101).

  520. 520.

    King 2006, p. 300.

  521. 521.

    Schabas 2010, p. 1045.

  522. 522.

    Council of the EU 2002; see also Mutyaba 2012, p. 950.

  523. 523.

    For an analysis of some of the political consequences of this piece of legislation, see Magliveras and Bourantonis 2003, pp. 32–42; see also Everett 2000, pp. 137–151.

  524. 524.

    Benzig 2009, p. 253.

  525. 525.

    Zahar and Sluiter 2008, p. 471.

  526. 526.

    Chet 2003, p. 1122.

  527. 527.

    Besides the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (2002) Title II of Public Law 107-206, the USA concluded agreements with other States prohibiting the transfer of USA nationals to the ICC, and adopted UNSC Resolutions preventing the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over those nationals of non-State Parties that are involved in UN-authorized operations {UNSC (2002) Resolution 1422 (2002), UN Doc. S/RES/1422, and UNSC (2003) Resolution 1487 (2003), UN Doc. S/RES/1487}.

  528. 528.

    Kochler 2003, p. 241.

  529. 529.

    Ku and Yoo 2013, p. 225.

  530. 530.

    Jia 2009, p. 166.

  531. 531.

    Ibid.

  532. 532.

    Malawi case, above n. 353, cited in Mistry and Ruiz Verduzco 2012, p. 11.

  533. 533.

    Wilkitzki 1999.

  534. 534.

    Knoops 2002, p. 173.

  535. 535.

    Ibid.

  536. 536.

    Arsanjani 1999, p. 73.

  537. 537.

    Ibid.

  538. 538.

    This derives its ‘right of existence’ from the principle of legality (Sluiter 2003, p. 639).

  539. 539.

    Schabas 2010, p. 1055.

  540. 540.

    Swart 2002b, p. 1700.

  541. 541.

    Swart 2002b, p. 1702.

  542. 542.

    Cryer 2005, p. 150.

  543. 543.

    Cryer et al. 2011, p. 511.

  544. 544.

    Sluiter 2003, p. 643.

  545. 545.

    Swart 2002b, p. 1700.

  546. 546.

    Ibid.

  547. 547.

    Swart 2002b, p. 1701.

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Soler, C. (2019). Inherent Limitations of the Vertical System of Enforcement. In: The Global Prosecution of Core Crimes under International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-335-1_11

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