Subjects of International Law and International Legal Personality

Droesse, Gerd

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-327-6_6

Gerd Droesse²

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1 Citations

Abstract

The chapter proposes that a wider concept of “subject of international law” is required. It recalls the concepts of sovereignty and subject of international law which were distinct and broader in the middle ages that in the time after the Peace of Westphalia, as this underlines that the notion of subject of international law may be thought about in a much wider context that its current application. International law has no intrinsic constraint against the recognition of entities other than states or intergovernmental organizations as subjects of international law. Hence, a new class of dual or hybrid organizations established under national law but with recognition of its international legal personality by its home country and other countries has emerged. These organizations may be classified as subjects of international law and as international organizations. Moreover, the concept of “subject of international law” is broader than that of “international legal personality” . Hence, organizations characterized by “institutional ambivalence by design”, such as OSCE, may qualify for recognition as subjects of international law and as international organizations, if it is established that they are acting on the international plane. Moreover, also organizations established as trust funds may qualify for recognition as subjects of international law. This is shown with regard to Global Environment Facility and the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility established as a trust fund of ADB. It is demonstrated that current theories of international law are not adequately suited to international organizations established as trust funds. As regards international legal personality, the chapter focuses on three issues: First, it shown that international legal personality is not a requirement for membership. Second, international legal personality does not need to be conferred to an organization at the time of its establishment, in the constituent agreement or otherwise. Hence, organizations may acquire international legal personality subsequently, based on bilateral or multilateral agreements which recognize their international legal personality or legal capacity, or through a variety of other means. Third, entities established as a subsidiary body or as a financial mechanism of an international convention may possess international legal personality . Whether this is the case, is not to be determined with reference to the mode of their establishment but based on their functions and the position which recognized subjects of international law have adopted in their regard. Moreover, the legal status of the European Agencies is reviewed. It is also discussed whether a conference or meeting of the parties to a multilateral convention may establish an international organization with international legal personality.

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Notes

1.
Parlett provides the following background for the emergence of the concept of “gatekeeper”: “in the middle of the 19th century, recognition of belligerency was detached from recognition of independence. Thus belligerent (international law) rights were recognized for groups and individuals who did not necessarily have a valid claim to statehood. This occurred through a process of recognition by states: in this way, states remained gatekeepers of the international legal system; the ability of individuals to acquire international law rights was dependent on a specific intentional act by a state adopted as a matter of policy.” Parlett 2012, p. 65.
2.
Klabbers 2005, p. 38.
3.
Steinberger 2000, p. 501.
4.
“Die Vorstellung einer summa potestas, als konzentrierte und gedanklich unbeschränkte Gewalt über ein bestimmtes Gebiet und Volk zu Händen eines Herrschers, kannte das Mittelalter gerade nicht, konnte es nicht kennen.” Oeter 2002, p. 262.
5.
Vinogradoff 1939, p. 99.
6.
Vinogradoff clarifies that the “introduction of this new body of laws—the jus gentium was not brought about by legislative acts. The leges and senatus consulta applied directly to civil law and touched the intercourse between nations only in an indirect and subsidiary way. The edicts of the praetors and of the governors who wielded the administrative imperium in the province referred frequently to rules based on natural reasonableness and assisted materially in establishing them. But these edicts themselves were in no way the product of the magistrates’ personal opinion: normally, they presented the juridical results of ideas elaborated by business practice and by professional analysis. And it is in the domain of jus gentium that these sources of law conceived as authoritative opinions of jurists (responsa prudentium) found their widest application [….].” Vinogradoff 1939, p. 93.
7.
Michoud 1906, pp. 21–22. https://archive.org/stream/lathoriedelaper00michgoog#page/n6/mode/2up.
8.
Carroz and Probst 1953, p. 10.
9.
Hafner 2013, p. 289.
10.
Hafner 2013, pp. 289 and 290.
11.
Hafner 2013, p. 291, with further references.
12.
Pauwelyn et al. 2014, p. 744.
13.
Ibid., 744.
14.
Ibid., 744–745.
15.
Hafner 2013, p. 291.
16.
Carroz and Probst 1953, p. 13.
17.
Crawford 2013, p. 146.
18.
Ibid., 152.
19.
Ibid., 152.
20.
Schachter 1997, pp. 12–15.
21.
Higgins 1991, p. 81.
22.
Ben-Ari 2013, p. 5.
23.
“Les gouvernements signataires de la présente convention s’engagent (sauf la faculté, pour chacun d’eux, d’apprécier suivant ses propres lois, dans chaque cas particulier, s’il y a lieu d’autoriser l’acceptation des donations ou legs faits par ses ressortissants à des associations internationales, ou ayant pour objet des biens situés sur son territoire), à reconnaître comme personnes juridiques ayant le droit de faire des contrats, d’acquérir par donation ou testament ainsi que la faculté d’ester en justice, les sociétés internationales d’utilité publique …” See Draft Convention on the Legal Status of International Associations. von Bar, L. 2012. Reproduced in Appendix 4.1 of the International Associations Statutes Series, Vol 1. Union of International Associations (UIA) eds (1988) http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-1.
24.
Draft Convention on International Associations. Politis, N. 1923. Appendix 4.5 of the International Associations Statutes Series. Vol. 1, UIA eds (1988) http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-5.
25.
Ben-Ari 2013, p. 8.
26.
See also Charnovitz 1997, p. 189.
27.
Shaw 2003, p. 243.
28.
Walter 2007, para 7. http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL.
29.
Convention respecting the Bank of International Settlements of 20 Jan. 1930. https://www.bis.org/about/convention-en.pdf.
30.
Constituent Charter of the Bank for International Settlements of 20 Jan. 1930. https://www.bis.org/about/charter-en.pdf.
31.
Protocol regarding the immunities of the Bank for International Settlements of 30 July 1936. https://www.bis.org/about/protocol-en.pdf.
32.
Felsenfeld and Bilali 2004, p. 955, with further references.
33.
Ibid., 956.
34.
“Partial Award on the Lawfulness of the Recall of the Privately Held Shares on 8 Jan. 2001”. Dr. Reineccius, Horst, First Eagle SoGen Funds, Inc., Mathieu, Pierre and La Societé de Concours Hippique de la Châtre v. Bank for International Settlements, Reports of International Arbitral Awards. 2002. Vol. XXIII, 183–251. http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXIII/183-251.pdf
35.
Ibid., para 105.
36.
Ibid., para 106.
37.
Ibid., para 112.
38.
Certificate of Incorporation for the International Rice Research Institute signed at Manila on 8 March 1960 by the Philippines Securities and Exchange Commission. http://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/233/irri002.pdf?sequence=1.
39.
Article 1, para 1 of the By-Laws of the International Rice Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI), as amended on 17 Sept. 2017.
40.
Presidential Decree 1620 of 19 April 1979. http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1979/pd_1620_1979.html http://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/944/irri004.pdf?sequence=1.
41.
Muller 1995, p. 281.
42.
Constitution of the Republic of Korea of 17 July 1948, as subsequently modified. http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/images/eng/main/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf.
43.
It transpired from a discussion of this author with Korean lawyers that, if all, privileges and immunities could only be extended to an entity incorporated under national law unilaterally by the Republic of Korea in statute adopted for that purposed. However, any such statute would be subject to the legislative discretion of the Korean Parliament and could be repealed or amended as the Parliament deems it fit.
44.
Regarding the dissolution, See Droesse , “Organizational Structures”, p. 103.
45.
Cantegreil 2011, p. 442.
46.
See with further references: Braun 2014, p. 73.
47.
Shaw 2003, p. 243.
48.
See Hafner.
49.
“Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment”, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, paras 37 and 38. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/50/5387.pd http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/50/050-19700205-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
50.
Ibid., para 50.
51.
Higgins 1970–1971, p. 333.
52.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Riphagen, W. para 4. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/50/050-19700205-JUD-01-11-EN.pdf.
53.
Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, Sir G., para 5. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/50/050-19700205-JUD-01-04-EN.pdf.
54.
See Schmalenbach 2012, p. 105.
55.
Ibid.
56.
Klabbers 2015, p. 42
57.
Broches 1959, p. 316.
58.
Ibid.
59.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports, 1949, 174, 178. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/4/004-19490411-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.
60.
Amerasinghe 2010, pp. 97–105.
61.
Klabbers 2001, p. 405.
62.
Amerasinghe 2005, pp. 68–69.
63.
Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports 1949, 174, 179. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/4/004-19490411-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.
64.
Ibid.
65.
Runavot 2015, p. 38.
66.
Frid 1995, p. 10.
67.
See Odello, citing Kooijmans 1996, p. 33.
68.
Flynn and Farrell 1999, p. 514.
69.
Sapiro 1995, p. 631.
70.
OSCE Handbook 2007, p. 1.
71.
Ibid., 8.
72.
“Es liegt daher nahe, die OSZE in toto noch als gemeinsames Forum der Teilnehmerstaaten zu begreifen. Zwar zeigt sich gerade an der der OSZE eingeräumten Möglichkeit, unabhängig von den Teilnehmerstaaten Erkundungs—und Berichterstattermissionen zu entsenden sowie friedenserhaltende Maßnahmen durchzuführen, bereits ein der OSZE zur eigenständigen Wahrnehmung übertragener Aufgabenbereich. Gleichwohl muss man angesichts der angeführten Umstände Fastenrath zustimmen, der die Umbenennung der KSZE und die Einführung einiger neuer Bezeichnungen für im Übrigen unverändert gebliebene Organe zutreffen als ‘Augenwischerei’ titulierte.” Epping and Brunner 2014, p. 1313.
73.
As regards the conclusion of a headquarters agreement with Austria, Tichy and Köhler state that “in 2007 a proposal that OSCE should simply conclude a headquarters agreement with Austria, which would implicitly grant it international legal personality, surprised the participants in the long discussions on the legal status of the OSCE. Austria quickly made it clear that it was ‘able to take a flexible position in this regard and would be ready to conclude a headquarters agreement under international law with the OSCE along the lines of existing headquarters agreements between Austria and International Organizations, if the OSCE is in a position to do so’. However, not surprisingly there was no consensus within the OSCE to such an implicit approach.” Tichy and Köhler 2008, p. 470. Hence, it took until 2017 for host country agreements to be signed with Austria and Poland. See OSCE Press Release. 14 June 2017. Austrian Deputy Foreign Minister Linhart and OSCE Secretary General Zannier sign Headquarters Agreement regulating presence of OSCE in Austria. http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/322916.
74.
OSCE Press Release. Warsaw, 28 June 2017. OSCE/ODIHR and Polish Foreign Ministry sign host country agreement. http://www.osce.org/odihr/326711.
75.
Klabbers 1998, pp. 238–239.
76.
Ibid., 231–253.
77.
See Seyersted 1964, pp. 1–74 (hereinafter, Seyersted, “International Personality”) and Seyersted, Common Law of International Organizations.
78.
Ibid., 233.
79.
Pachinger 2003, p. 135. For the evolution of the international legal personality of the EU, see, with further references, Tührer and Marro 2012.
80.
See, with further references, Klabbers 2001, pp. 403–421.
81.
See Stribis 2013, pp. 113–114.
82.
Seyersted 2008, p. 51.
83.
Ibid., 51–52.
84.
Klabbers 2001, p. 410.
85.
Stribis 2013, p. 115
86.
Berger 1996, p. 38.
87.
Odello 2006, p. 370.
88.
See para 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Adopted on 10 June 1999. http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/990610_SCR1244%281999%29.pdf. The Security Council decided in this para “on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences.”
89.
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 of 18 Aug. 2000 (“on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and their Personnel in Kosovo”). http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg47-00.htm.
90.
Section 9 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 provides: “Applicability of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The provisions of the present regulation are without prejudice to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by UNMIK under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.”
91.
Tichy and Köhler 2008, p. 463.
92.
The text of the MoU in Ukrainian is available at http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/975_026/paran2#n2; and a summary of the MoU is available at http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/anot/1282-18 http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/anot/1282-18.
93.
The law of ratification is available on the website of the Parliament http://www.zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1282-18 and the chronology of law under http://www.w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=50947, both in the Ukrainian language.
94.
Sands and Klein 2009, p. 203.
95.
Stribis 2013, pp. 115–116.
96.
Amerasinghe 2005, pp. 68–69.
97.
Martha 2010, p. 145.
98.
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §44.
99.
Ibid.
100.
Kelsen 2007, p. 93.
101.
Gold 1978, p. 863.
102.
Ibid., 863.
103.
Ibid., 864.
104.
Ibid., 864.
105.
Ibid., 864.
106.
Ibid., 865.
107.
Bantekas 2009, p. 34.
108.
“The GEF’s structure has given rise to significant conflict between the Secretariat and the World Bank as the GEF has grown in size and stature. The desire of the GEF Secretariat for more independence than allowed by the GEF’s structure (under which the GEF lacks independent legal personality or capacity, and the World Bank, as Trustee, is the only entity with legal capacity to act in respect of the GEF Trust Fund assets, surfaced as a key issue in the third replenishment. The issue was resolved at that time by a number of band-aid arrangements. Subsequent developments in the early stages of the fifth replenishment suggest that the shelf life of those band-aids has now expired” (Smyth 2011, p. 524).
109.
Article 10.3.2 of the CGIF Articles of Agreement (as amended on 27 November 2013 and 31 May 2016), provides for a delegation of all powers of the trustee, except those “expressly reserved by Article 10.1,” “to the Meeting of Contributors which, in turn, may delegate such powers to the Board of Directors.” http://www.cgif-abmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CGIF-Articles-of-Agreement-as-of-May-2016_Clean.pdf.
110.
On “Institutional Veil and International Responsibility”, see Brölmann 2007, pp. 262–267.
111.
Ibid., 262–263.
112.
Ibid., 263.
113.
Amerasinghe 2005, p. 412.
114.
“Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment”, ICJ Reports, 1992, 240, para 47. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/80/080-19920626-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
115.
Ibid., para 48.
116.
See as one of many examples the “Amended and Restated Agreement on the Terms and Conditions for the Administration of the Green Climate Fund Trust Fund between Green Climate Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, serving as the Interim Trustee of the Green Climate Fund Trust Fund”. Paragraph 2.2 of that Agreement provides: “The Fund agrees that the Trustee shall be fully indemnified, out of the assets of the Fund, including the Trust Fund resources, for any liabilities, claims, losses, costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees and expenses, incurred by the Trustee in connection with or in any way arising out of its activities as Trustee under this Agreement. Such indemnity shall not include any liabilities, claims, losses, costs or expenses incurred by the Trustee as a direct result of its own gross negligence or willful misconduct.” http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24868/Trust_Fund_Agreement_between_GCF_and_IBRD__Amended_.pdf/7ca07ac8-7a83-4f18-847e-e260b32b3e9a.
117.
Droesse , “Modalities of Multilateral Concessional Financing”, 259, ss.
118.
Smyth 2005, pp. 28–34 and 80–81, ss.
119.
Silard 1995, p. 622.
120.
Streck 2000.
121.
Ragazzi 2011, p. 487.
122.
See Ragazzi 2011, pp. 486–487.
123.
Ibid., 486.
124.
Smyth 2011, pp. 525, 547–548.
125.
Ragazzi 2011, pp. 493–495.
126.
See Decision 12/CP.2 Memorandum of Understanding between the Conference of the Parties and the Council of the Global Environment Facility, http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/15a01.pdf#page=55 and Decision 12/CP.3 Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding on the determination of funding necessary and available for the implementation of the Convention, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf#page=43. Council of the Global Environment Facility. Memorandum of Understanding between the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Council of the Global Environment Facility. http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/cop3/cop30008.htm.
127.
See Annex C to the GEF Instrument, paras 1(a) and (b). Contributors deposit their instrument of contribution with the World Bank as trustee in accordance with para 2(a) of the said Annex.
128.
Financial procedures agreements are executed between the agency concerned and the IBRD, acting as the trustee of the GEF. See as one of many examples the Financial Procedures Agreement between the Asian Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as Trustee of the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund of 23 October 2008: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/ADB_FPA_-_Oct_2008_-_Fully_Executed_Original_0.pdf.
129.
The “Accreditation Master Agreements” are bilateral agreements between the Green Climate Fund and the accredited entity. See “Accreditation Master Agreements” Library. https://www.greenclimate.fund/library/-/docs/list/383065.
130.
Contribution Agreement are concluded as tripartite agreement involving the Green Climate Fund, the IBRD (as interim trustee) and the donor country concerned. See “Contribution Agreements” Library. https://www.greenclimate.fund/library/-/docs/list/574026.
131.
See Smyth 2011, pp. 527–528.
132.
http://www.cgif-abmi.org/about.
133.
ADB. 2010. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors. Proposed Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility: Establishment of Trust Fund and Capital Contribution. http://www.adb.org/projects/documents/proposed-credit-guarantee-and-investment-facility-rrp.
134.
http://www.cgif-abmi.org/datas/pdf/CGIF%20Articles%20of%20Agreement%20(as%20of%20December%202013).pdf.
135.
ADB. 2010. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors. Proposed Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility: Establishment of Trust Fund and Capital Contribution. http://www.adb.org/projects/documents/proposed-credit-guarantee-and-investment-facility-rrp.
136.
ADB. 2010. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors. Proposed Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility, para 34.
137.
CGIF Articles of Agreement, Article 3.1.2(a).
138.
CGIF Articles of Agreement, Article 10.3.2.
139.
CGIF Articles of Agreement, Article 3.1.1.
140.
ADB. 2010. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors. Proposed Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility.
141.
Tomuschat 1999, p. 142.
142.
Ibid., 142.
143.
Portmann 2010, p. 242.
144.
Cited according to Eagleton 1950, p. 326.
145.
Seyersted 1964, and Seyersted 2008.
146.
G. Gaja, First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations (Document A/CN.4/532, 26 March 2003), 105–116, 111. http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_532.pdf.
147.
Sandurska and Chinkin 1989–1990, pp. 845–890; Warbrick and Cheyne 1987, pp. 931–935; Lowe et al. 1990, pp. 945–952. https://doi.org/10.1093/iclqaj/39.4.945; Seidl-Hohenveldern 1994, pp. 255–274.
148.
Shaw 2003, pp. 1190–1191.
149.
See the approach adopted in “House of Lords Judgment of 21.2.91: Arab Monetary Fund (Appellants) Hashim, V. and others (Respondents)”. http://www.unife.it/giurisprudenza/giurisprudenza/studiare/international-institutional-law/allegati-pubblici/6ArabLQ90.pdf/at_download/file.
150.
d’Aspremont 2011, p. 3.
151.
Rensmann 2009.
152.
Arangio Ruiz 1972, pp. 679–680.
153.
See for example, Article 43 of the ADB Charter regarding settlement of accounts.
154.
Miller 2007, p. 13.
155.
Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: International Court of Justice Reports 1949, pp. 174–220.
156.
Martha 2010, p. 144.
157.
Ibid., 145.
158.
Ibid., 146.
159.
The Adaptation Fund is an example where the first approach was followed, as in that case legal capacity under German law was conferred to the Adaptation Fund Board. Similarly, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC only has legal capacity under German law under the agreement between the United Nations, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Droesse 2011, pp. 21–22.
160.
Paragraph 7 of the Governing Instrument provides, “In order to operate effectively internationally, the Fund will possess juridical personality and will have such legal capacity as is necessary for the exercise of its functions and the protection of its interests.”
161.
Paragraph 21 of Decision 7/CP.20. http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/repository/entri/docs/cop/FCCC_COP20_dec07.pdf.
162.
Decisions of the Board—Tenth Meeting of the Board. 6–9 July 2015 (GCF/B.10/17, 21 July 2015). Annex XXV: Draft provisions for privileges and immunities, 125–127. http://www.greenclimate.fund/boardroom/on-record?p_p_id=122_INSTANCE_8e72dTqCP5qa&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=_118_INSTANCE_jUGwSITWV8c5__column-2&p_p_col_pos=1&p_p_col_count=2&p_r_p_564233524_resetCur=true&p_r_p_564233524_categoryId=23988#nav-category.
163.
GCF. 2017. Report on the activities of the Secretariat (GCF/B.18/Inf.04, 21 September), para 102 http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/820027/GCF_B.18_Inf.04_-_Report_on_the_activities_of_the_Secretariat.pdf/09454489-7819-4d80-ac92-8c788b588040.
164.
Article 1 of the Headquarters Agreements between the Global Fund and the Swiss Federal Council contains the following provision:
Article 1: Personality and capacity

The Swiss Federal Council recognizes for the purposes of this Agreement the international juridical personality and legal capacity in Switzerland of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (hereinafter referred to as the Global Fund).” https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/3375/bm07_07gpcreportannex92_annex_en.pdf.
165.
Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in view of determining the legal status of the Global Fund in Switzerland.
166.
Headquarters Agreement between the Gavi Alliance (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization) and the Swiss Federal Council to determine the legal status of the Gavi Alliance in Switzerland done in Berne on 23 June 2009, in the French language.
167.
See https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/4138/bm32_19-pandis_report_en.pdf.
168.
“11. The Ministers have taken note with appreciation of the report of the ad hoc Group of Legal and Other Experts. The Ministers adopted a decision on legal capacity and privileges and immunities that recommends implementation of the following three basic elements (CSCE/4-C/Dec.2):
- The CSCE participating States will, subject to their constitutional, legislative and related requirements, confer legal capacity on CSCE institutions in accordance with the provisions adopted by the Ministers;
- The CSCE participating States will, subject to their constitutional, legislative and related requirements, confer privileges and immunities on CSCE institutions, permanent missions of the participating States, representatives of participating States, CSCE officials and members of CSCE missions in accordance with the provisions adopted by the Ministers;
- The CSCE may issue CSCE Identity Cards in accordance with the form adopted by the Ministers.”
See OSCE. 1993. Fourth Meeting of the Council. CSCE and the New Europe. Our Security in indivisible. Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting. VII. CSCE Structures and Operations, 16–17, para 11. http://www.osce.org/mc/40401?download=true.
169.
Cited according to OSCE. 2000. Decision No. 383. Report on OSCE Legal Capacity and on Privileges and Immunities to the Ministerial Council. (PC.DEC/383, 26 Nov.), para 1. http://www.osce.org/pc/24379?download=true.
170.
Decision No. 383. 2000. Report on OSCE Legal Capacity and on Privileges and Immunities to the Ministerial Council. (PC. DEC/383, 26 November), 1, para 1 http://www.osce.org/pc/24379?download=true.
171.
Common Purpose. Towards a More Effective OSCE. Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE. 27 June 2005. 19–20. http://www.osce.org/cio/15805?download=true.
172.
A copy of the draft Convention is reproduced in OSCE. 2007. Fifteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council 29–30 Nov. 2007, 65, ss. http://www.osce.org/mc/33180?download=true.
173.
Tichy and Köhler 2008, pp. 455–478.
174.
Tichy and Köhler 2008, p. 466.
175.
Tichy and Köhler 2008, pp. 466–467.
176.
See Schermers and Blokker 2011, §209, with further references.
177.
See Draft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between international organizations with commentaries. Commentary (3) to Article 29 “Territorial Scope of Treaties”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1982. Vol. II, Part Two, 17–77, 40. http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_2_1982.pdf.
178.
European Union. Decentralized Agencies. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/decentralised-agencies_en.
179.
European Union. External Action. CSDP structure, instruments, and agencies. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en.
180.
European Union. About the EU. Agencies and other EU bodies. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies#type_of_agencies.
181.
Ibid.
182.
Ibid. See, with further references: http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm.
183.
European Union. Analytical Fiche Nr° 2. Creation of agencies. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/fiche_2_sent_to_ep_cons_2010-12-15_en.pdf.
184.
Ott et al. 2013, pp. 20–34. http://www.asser.nl/media/1642/cleer_13-7_web.pdf.
185.
Ott et al. 2013, p. 8.
186.
Coman-Kund 2012, pp. 335–367.
187.
Meroni v High Authority. Judgement of 13.6. 1958—Case 9/56. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61956CJ0009&from=EN.
188.
In the aforementioned Decision, the Court reviewed the limits of delegation to agencies involved in a scrap metal equalization scheme. Core parts of the decision read as follows:
[….] Decision No 14/55 brings about a true delegation of powers, and the question whether such delegation accords with the requirements of the Treaty must be examined. (p. 149)

xxx xxx xxx

The consequences resulting from a delegation of powers are very different depending on whether it involves clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore, be subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority, or whether it involves a discretionary power, implying a wide margin of discretion which may, according to the use which is made of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy. A delegation of the first kind cannot appreciably alter the consequences involved in the exercise of the powers concerned, whereas a delegation of the second kind, since it replaces the choices of the delegator by the choices of the delegate, brings about an actual transfer of responsibility. (p. 152)

xxx xxx xxx

The objectives set out in Article 3 are binding not only on the High Authority, but on the ‘institutions of the Community [….] within the limits of their respective powers, in the common interest’. From that provision there can be seen in the balance of powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure of the Community a fundamental guarantee granted by the Treaty in particular to the undertakings and associations of undertakings to which it applies. To delegate a discretionary power, by entrusting it to bodies other than those which the Treaty has established to effect and supervise the exercise of such power each within the limits of its own authority, would render that guarantee ineffective. (p. 152)

xxx xxx xxx

In reserving to itself the power to refuse its approval, the High Authority has not retained sufficient powers for the delegation resulting from Decision No 14/55 to be contained within the limits defined above.

In the paragraph of the statement of defence set out above the High Authority has made it clear that it ‘adopts the data furnished by the Brussels agencies without being able to add anything thereto’. In those circumstances the delegation of powers granted to the Brussels agencies by Decision No 14/55 gives those agencies a degree of latitude which implies a wide margin of discretion and cannot be considered as compatible with the requirements of the Treaty. (p. 154)
189.
Judgement of 14 May 1981—Case 98/80, Romana, Guiseppe and Institut National D’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité. http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61980CJ0098&from=EN.
190.
Paragraph 20 of the said Judgment states:
As regards that question, as framed by the Tribunal du Travail, it follows both from Article 155 of the Treaty and the judicial system created by the Treaty, and in particular by Articles 173 and 177 thereof, that a body such as the Administrative Commission may not be empowered by the Council to adopt acts having the force of law. Whilst a decision of the Administrative Commission may provide an aid to social security institutions responsible for applying Community law in this field, it is not of such a nature as to require those institutions to use certain methods or adopt certain interpretations when they come to apply the Community rules. Decision No. 101 of the Administrative Commission does not therefore bind the Tribunal du Travail.
191.
European Court of Justice, Judgment of 22 Jan. 2014, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Judgment of 22 Jan. 2014. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=146621&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1824444.
192.
See para 8 of Judgment of 22 Jan. 2014, Case C-270/12. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=146621&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1824444.
193.
The Court “observed that the bodies in question in Meroni v High Authority were entities governed by private law, whereas ESMA is a European Union entity, created by the EU legislature.” (para 43). It noted that “unlike the case of the powers delegated to the bodies concerned in Meroni v High Authority, the exercise of the powers under Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012 is circumscribed by various conditions and criteria which limit ESMA’s discretion.” (para 45) and that “the powers available to ESMA under Article 28 of Regulation No. 236/2012 are precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority. Accordingly, those powers comply with the requirements laid down in Meroni v High Authority.” (para 53) In addition, the Court held:
It is clear from Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012 that ESMA is required, in strictly circumscribed circumstances, to adopt measures of general application under that provision. Such measures may also include rules affecting any natural or legal person who has a specific financial instrument or specific class of financial instruments or who enter into certain financial transactions. (para 64)

However, that does not mean that Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012 is at odds with the principle established in Romano. It should be recalled that the institutional framework established by the FEU Treaty, in particular the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 277 TFEU, expressly permits Union bodies, offices and agencies to adopt acts of general application. (para 65)

Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from Romano that the delegation of powers to a body such as ESMA is governed by conditions other than those set out in Meroni v High Authority, as referred to at paras 41 to 42 above. (para 66)

In addition, the other pleas of the United Kingdom were rejected.
194.
Schusterschitz 2004, p. 175.
195.
Puccio 2013, p. 226.
196.
The first paragraph of Article 308 of TFEU states: “The European Investment Bank shall have legal personality.”
197.
European Court of Justice. Judgment of 10. 7. 2003—CASE C-11/00, para 92. See http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=48494&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=161058.
198.
Lastra 2012, p. 1278.
199.
European Parliament. Directorate for Research. Institutional Status of the European Investment Bank. Economic Affairs Series. ECON 132 EN, 16. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2003/332624/DG-4-ECON_ET(2003)332624_EN.pdf.
200.
Ibid.
201.
See detailed references to background documents, European Union. Decentralized Agencies: 2012 Overhaul. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/overhaul_en. See also EU Agencies Network. Agencies activities in 2013 relating to the Common Approach. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201401/20140116ATT77602/20140116ATT77602EN.pdf.
202.
“Guidelines with standard provisions for headquarters agreements of EU decentralised agencies. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/2013-12-10_guidelines_hq_agreements_en.pdf.
203.
Ibid., 2.
204.
See with further details on the seat agreements of European Agencies, “European Union. Agencies Seat and the role of the host country”. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/fiche_3_sent_to_ep_cons_2010-12-15_en.pdf.
205.
Constantinecso 1977, §374.
206.
See Schusterschitz 2004, p. 175, with further references.
207.
Ibid., 175.
208.
Ibid., 175.
209.
Ruiter 2001, p. 102.
210.
Wessel 2000, p. 512, footnote 19 with detailed references.
211.
Ibid., 514.
212.
Szasz 1999, pp. 3, 5.
213.
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §40.
214.
Plasil-Wenger 1971, p. 190.
215.
Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Article 59, Supplement No. 6 (1979–1984), Vol. 4, para 3. http://legal.un.org/repertory/art59/english/rep_supp6_vol4-art59_e.pdf.
216.
Plasil-Wenger 1971, p. 190.
217.
UN General Assembly Resolution 2152 (XXI). https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/004/55/IMG/NR000455.pdf?OpenElement.
218.
General Assembly Resolution 3362 (S-VII). Development and international economic co-operation, IV, para 9: “The General Assembly endorses the recommendation of the Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization to convert that organization into a specialized agency and decides to establish a Committee on the Drafting of a Constitution for the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, which shall be an intergovernmental committee of the whole, including States which participated in the Second General Conference, to meet in Vienna to draw up a constitution for the United Nations Industrial Development Organization as a specialized agency, to be submitted to a conference of plenipotentiaries to be convened by the Secretary-General in the last quarter of 1976.”
219.
Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. Extracts relating to Article 59 of the Charter of the United Nations: Supplement No. 6 (1979–1984), Vol. 4. para 3. http://legal.un.org/repertory/art59/english/rep_supp6_vol4-art59_e.pdf http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../repertory/art59/english/rep_supp6_vol4_art59.pdf&lang=EF.
220.
See Rau-Mentzen and Koppenfels 1995, p. 1329, with further references.
221.
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §1695.
222.
Szasz 1999, p. 7. Szasz lists a number of UN Bodies in addition to those referred to above which may qualify as QABs.
223.
E.g. Question whether the United Nations Development Programme could become a founding member of a corporate body under the national law of a Member State—Character of United Nations activities in the territories of Member States—Submission of. UNDP to the national law of the corporate body could be construed to constitute a waiver of the privileges and immunities to which UNDP is entitled. Memorandum to the Director, Policy Division, Bureau for Programme Policy and Evaluation, United Nations Development Programme. United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1990, Part Two, 259–260. http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/english/volumes/1990.pdf&lang=E.
224.
Legal Capacity of International Intergovernmental Organizations to Establish Other International Organizations—Legal Capacity of the United Nations Development Programme to Participate in the Establishment of Other International Organizations or to Establish Its Own Subsidiary Organs. United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1991, 296–301, 297. The Office of Legal Affairs recalled in para 6 of the cited decision: “The United Nations Development Programme was created by the General Assembly in its resolution 2029 (XX) of 22 November 1965, as a combined organ of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, to be administered under the authority of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. It is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, and as such it has only those powers which are vested in it in its founding resolution, and in General Assembly resolution 2688 (XXV) of 11 Dec. 1970 (‘the Consensus Resolution’).” http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/english/by_chapter/chpVI/1991/chpVI.pdf&lang=E.
225.
Ibid., 300.
226.
Berthoud 1970, p. 155.
227.
Ibid.
228.
Ruiter 2001, p. 106.
229.
Ibid.
230.
Ibid., 106.
231.
See representative for many: UN Treaty Series. 2007. Vol. 2474, No. 44415, 83–86.
232.
UN Administrative Tribunal Judgment No. 380, Case No. 400: ALAM http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/188272/AT_DEC_380-EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
233.
Reinisch 2010, p. 81.
234.
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §41.
235.
Ibid.
236.
Memorandum from The Legal Counsel of the UN Carl-August Fleischhauer to Mr. Michael Zammit Cutajar, Executive secretary, Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change of 4 Nov. 1993 titled: “Arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of Article 11 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change concerning the financial mechanism. United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1993, 427–433, 428, para 4. http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/english/volumes/1993.pdf&lang=E.
237.
Ibid., 429, para 7.
238.
See Droesse , “Introductory Remarks”, 21, with further references.
239.
Ozone Secretariat. The London Amendment (1990): The Amendment to the Montreal Protocol Agreed by the Second Meeting of the Parties (London, 27–29 June 1990) http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer/27609.
240.
“Decision VI/16: Juridical personality, privileges and immunities of the Multilateral Fund”. In Ozone Secretariat, UNEP 2016, p. 436.
241.
See Jacur 2013, p. 171.
242.
See Agreement between the Government of Canada and the United Nations Concerning the Privileges, Immunities and other Facilities of United Nations Officials Servicing the Secretariat of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. http://treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=103122.
243.
The Agreement was signed by Marco A. Gonzalez-Salazar on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund.
244.
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Regulating Matters Resulting from the Establishment in Canada of the Multilateral Fund and its Organs. The Agreement was signed in Cairo on 23 Nov 1998. See http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=103123. http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=103123.
245.
See also UNEP. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol. Policies, Procedures, Guidelines and Criteria (as of Nov. 2010), 515–565.
246.
Transitional Committee. Workstream II: Governance and Institutional Arrangements. 2011. Background note: Review of the legal status of select international funds and financial institutions. Second meeting. TC-2/WSII/2, 29 June 2011, 9.
https://unfccc.int/files/cancun_agreements/green_climate_fund/application/pdf/tc2_ws2_2_290611.pdf, 9.
247.
Decision 1/CP. 16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, para 102.
248.
While Decision 3/CP.17 decided in para 11 “that the Green Climate Fund be conferred juridical personality and legal capacity”, para 12 (a) of the said Decision invited the countries offering to host the Fund to submit expressions of interest for the evaluation of expressions of interest of countries offering to host the Fund to submit expressions of interest based, inter alia, on the following criterion: “The ability to confer and/or recognize juridical personality and legal capacity to the Fund for the protection of its interests and the exercise of its functions, to give effect to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the governing instrument, including but not limited to the ability to contract, acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property, and institute legal proceedings.”
249.
Wiersema 2009, pp. 231–287.
250.
Resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission of the Nuclear Test Ban Organization. Adopted on 19 Nov. 1996 (CTBT/MSS/RES/1, 27 Nov. 1997. https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/CTBT-MSS-RES-1-e_01.pdf.
251.
See detailed references: CTBT Legal Resources. https://www.ctbto.org/member-states/legal-resources/.

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Gerd Droesse

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Droesse, G. (2020). Subjects of International Law and International Legal Personality. In: Membership in International Organizations. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-327-6_6

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-327-6_6
Published: 20 December 2019
Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-326-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-327-6
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