Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Content of the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute International Humanitarian Law Violations—The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Transitional Justice and a State’s Response to Mass Atrocity

  • 554 Accesses

Abstract

For a better understanding of the nature and scope of the obligations to investigate and prosecute or extradite international humanitarian law violations, this chapter provides an overview of the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law . It then analyzes common Article 1 to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions which lays down the obligation to “respect and ensure respect ” for the Conventions “in all circumstances.” This clause is also enshrined in Additional Protocol I and III. The chapter then covers the doctrinal debate on the precise scope and content of common Article 1 —viz., whether an “internal compliance dimension ” or rather an “external compliance dimension ” attaches to the provision de qua—and the ensuing challenges. The spotlight shifts to how the jurisprudence of international tribunals, the ICRC Commentaries , and the soft law instruments contribute to understanding the meaning of common Article 1 . This is followed by discussion of the system of repression of grave breaches , encompassing the obligations to criminalize, search, prosecute or extradite. The chapter then examines Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II and the rationale for amnesty . Finally, the customary international law nature of the obligations to investigate and prosecute international humanitarian law violations is discussed with attention to state practice .

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force 1 July 2002, Preamble.

  2. 2.

    Ibid.

  3. 3.

    See Ambos 2009, p. 29. Nonetheless, the scholar considers the duty to prosecute a “rule or principle [that] as such permits exceptions.” Ibid., p. 32.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., p. 31.

  5. 5.

    See Ingadottir 2010, p. 78 (inferring such obligations from the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).

  6. 6.

    See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep 226 (Nuclear Weapons Case 1996), para 25.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    See ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in The Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Rep 136 (Wall Case 2004), para 106.

  9. 9.

    See Orna Ben-Naftali 2011, p. 3. On the extraterritorial application of international human rights law , see Milanovic 2011.

  10. 10.

    See Gioia 2011, p. 214. De lege ferenda, the interplay between these two different bodies of law is still an ongoing cross-fertilization process.

  11. 11.

    First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 311, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force 21 October 1950 (GC I); Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force 21 October 1950 (GC II); Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War , adopted 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force 21 October 1950 (GC III); Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War , adopted 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force 21 October 1950 (GC IV). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978 (AP I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978 (AP II); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, adopted 8 December 2005, entered into force 14 January 2007 (AP III).

  12. 12.

    GC I–IV, above n 11, Common Article 1. Common Article 1 of the 1929 Geneva Conventions provides: “The provisions of the present Convention shall be respected by the High Contracting Parties in all the circumstances.”

  13. 13.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 116; Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes 2000, p. 69; and Kessler 2001, p. 508. AP III will not be considered any further.

  14. 14.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Vol I, Rule 139, p. 495.

  15. 15.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 117.

  16. 16.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 139, p. 495.

  17. 17.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 116; Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes 2000, p. 69; and Kessler 2001, p. 508.

  18. 18.

    See Pictet 1952–1960, Common Article 1. After drafting Chap. 2, the author acknowledges that the ICRC issued a new updated version of its Commentaries to GC I and GC II in 2016 and 2017, respectively. The updated versions of Commentaries to GC III and IV, as well as to AP I and AP II will soon follow. Given that, for what it concerns the purposes of this book, the updated versions of the Commentaries are in line with the older ones, the references will still be to the older versions.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , adopted 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force 27 January 1980, Article 60(5).

  21. 21.

    ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971, ICJ Rep 16 (Namibia Case 1971), para 96; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Martic, Decision on Review of the Indictment, 8 March 1996, Case No. IT-95-11, para 15; and ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Judgment, 14 January 2000, Case No. IT-95-16-T (Kupreskic Case 2000), paras 515–518.

  22. 22.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 140, p. 498.

  23. 23.

    See Pictet 1952–1960, Common Article 1, GC I, 26; GC II, 25; GC III, 18; and GC IV, 16.

  24. 24.

    GC I, Article 47; GC II, Article 48; GC III, Article 127; GC IV, Article 144; AP I, Article 83; and AP II, Article 19, above n 11.

  25. 25.

    AP I, above n 11, Article 82.

  26. 26.

    See, e.g., Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 139, pp. 495–498. But see Focarelli 2010, p. 170 (affirming that recognizing Article 1 as a norm of customary international law does not help much where its content is not clearly determined).

  27. 27.

    See ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Rep 14 (Military Activities in Nicaragua Case 1986), para 220; Nuclear Weapons Case 1996, above n 6, para 79; Wall Case 2004, above n 8, para 158; ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda ), Provisional Measures, Order, 1 July 2000, ICJ Rep 111, para 47(3).

  28. 28.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 139, pp. 495–496, n 5.

  29. 29.

    See, e.g., UNSC, Res. 822, 1993 and UNSC, Res. 853, 1993; UNGA, Res. 2674 (XXV), 1970; UNGA, Res. 2677 (XXV), 1970; UNGA, Res. 2852 (XXVI), 1971; UNGA, Res. 2853 (XXVI), 1971; UNGA, Res. 3032 (XXVII), 1972; UNGA, Res. 3102 (XXVIII), 1973; UNGA, Res. 3319 (XXIX), 1974; UNGA, Res. 3500 (XXX), 1975; UNGA, Res. 32/44 (XXXII), 1977; UNGA, Res. 47/37 (XLVII), 1992; UNGA, Res. 48/30 (XLVIII), 1993; UN Commission HR, Res. 1994/85, 1994; Res. 1995/72, 1995; and Res. 1996/80, 1996; Council of Europe , Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1085, 24 April 1996; and OAS, General Assembly , Res. 1408 (XXVI-O/96), 7 June 1996.

  30. 30.

    See, e.g., Israel , High Court of Justice , Jenin (Mortal Remains) Case, Ruling, 14 April 2002, para 12.

  31. 31.

    See Meron 1991, p. 190; and Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes 2000, pp. 68, 85–86. On erga omnes obligations , see Tomuschat and Thouvenin 2006. On the distinction between jus cogens and erga omnes obligations , see Picone 2011, pp. 412–424.

  32. 32.

    The ICJ referred to erga omnes obligations for the first time in its well-known obiter dictum in the Barcelona Traction case. ICJ, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain ), Judgment, 5 February 1970, ICJ Rep 3, para 33. The notion of erga omnes obligations has been then developed, inter alia, in the following ICJ decisions: Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 30 June 1995, ICJ Rep 90, para 20; Wall Case 2004, above n 8, paras 155–157; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility , Judgment, 3 February 2006, ICJ Rep 6, paras 64, 125; Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Rep 43 (Bosnia v. Serbia Case 2007), paras 147, 185; and Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 20 July 2012, ICJ Rep. 2012, p. 422 (Belgium v. Senegal 2012), paras 68–69 (dealing with erga omnes partes obligations ).

  33. 33.

    Focarelli 2010, p. 170 (arguing that, given its indeterminacy, common Article 1 “is not in itself a rule contemplating special consequences for the violation of the Geneva Conventions”). See also Kalshoven 1999, p. 3.

  34. 34.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 127. See also Geiss 2015, pp. 118–121.

  35. 35.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 127. See also Geiss 2015, pp. 121–131.

  36. 36.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 113, and ns 12, 64.

  37. 37.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 128.

  38. 38.

    See Kalshoven 1999, p. 7.

  39. 39.

    Final Record, Vol. II B, at 53 (9th meeting, 25 May 1949).

  40. 40.

    See Kalshoven 1999, p. 27.

  41. 41.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 131 (referring to the ICRC).

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., p. 133.

  44. 44.

    See Kalshoven 1999, pp. 27–28. See also Geiss 2015, p. 116.

  45. 45.

    See Pictet 1952–1960, Common Article 1, GC I, 25–26; GC II, 25–26; GC III, 18; and GC IV, 16.

  46. 46.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 134.

  47. 47.

    See Pictet 1952–1960, Common Article 1, GC I, 26; GC II, 25; and GC IV, 16.

  48. 48.

    See Pictet 1960, Article 1, GC III, p. 18.

  49. 49.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 134.

  50. 50.

    See Pictet 1960, Article 1, GC III, p. 18.

  51. 51.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 135.

  52. 52.

    See Sandoz et al. 1987, para 41.

  53. 53.

    See ibid., paras 41–42.

  54. 54.

    See ibid., paras 42–43.

  55. 55.

    See ibid., para 45. This understanding was upheld in the Nicaragua case, where the ICJ clarified that the duty to “respect and ensure respect” did not derive only from the Geneva Conventions, but “from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.” See Military Activities in Nicaragua Case 1986, above n 27, para 220. Also the ICTY stated that the norms of international humanitarian law are norms having an erga omnes character, and therefore states have a “legal interest” in the observance of international humanitarian law , and consequently a “legal entitlement” to demand they be respected. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 10 December 1998, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (Furundzija 1998), para 151; and Kupreskic Case 2000, above n 21, para 519.

  56. 56.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 136.

  57. 57.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 118.

  58. 58.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 137; Kalshoven 1999, p. 7; and Geiss 2015, p. 118.

  59. 59.

    Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its Fifty-Third Session, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, 12 December 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10.

  60. 60.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 137.

  61. 61.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 139, p. 495.

  62. 62.

    See Pictet 1952–1960, Common Article 1, GC I, p. 26; GC II, p. 25; GC III, p. 18; and GC IV, p. 16. See also Sandoz et al. 1987, paras 42–43.

  63. 63.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 111, and ns 12, 64.

  64. 64.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 137.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., p. 138.

  66. 66.

    See Geiss 2015, pp. 119–120; and Sassòli 2001, p. 412. See also Bosnia v. Serbia Case 2007, above n 32, para 430.

  67. 67.

    That is to say whether contracting states, including states that are not party to an armed conflict , are obliged to adopt all measures in their power to induce non-compliant contracting states to abide by the instruments under analysis.

  68. 68.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 118.

  69. 69.

    See Pictet 1952–1960, Common Article 1, GC I, pp. 25–26; GC II, pp. 25–26; GC III, p. 18; and GC IV, pp. 15–16.

  70. 70.

    See Kessler 2001, p. 516; Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes 2000, p. 76; and Azzam 1997, p. 68.

  71. 71.

    Wall Case 2004, above n 8, para 159; but for two contrasting views, see Judge Kooijmans and Judge Higgins opinions.

  72. 72.

    See Focarelli 2010, pp. 129, 138–142 (referring, inter alia, to ICCPR, Article 2(1); Genocide Convention, Article 1; ECHR, Article 1; and ACHR, Article 1(1)).

  73. 73.

    See ibid., pp. 142–143.

  74. 74.

    See ibid., pp. 143–144.

  75. 75.

    See Geiss 2015, pp. 122, 124. See also Namibia Case 1971, above n 21, para 53.

  76. 76.

    See, e.g., UNSC, Res. 681, 20 December 1990, para 5, UN Doc. S/RES/681; and UNGA, Res. 59/122, 10 December 2004, para 3, UN Doc. A/RES/59/122; Human Rights Council, 25 September 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48; and International Conference on Human Rights, Resolution XXIII: Human Rights in Armed Conflict , 12 May 1968, Preamble, para 9, UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41. For other practice, see Condorelli and Boisson 2000, p. 69; Kessler 2001, p. 504; Focarelli 2010, p. 128; and Geiss 2015, pp. 122–123.

  77. 77.

    See Military Activities in Nicaragua Case 1986, above n 27, para 220; Wall Case 2004, above n 8, para 158.

  78. 78.

    Bosnia v. Serbia Case 2007, above n 32, para 430.

  79. 79.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 119. In any case, if we were briefly to consider the measures that states parties can employ against non-compliant states parties within a “state-compliance ” scenario, in the absence of clarification in common Article 1 , it would be possible to distinguish between diplomatic measures, including, inter alia, protest, denunciation , diplomatic pressure, monitoring activities, appeal to an international fact-finding commission pursuant to AP I, Article 90, complaint to human rights treaty bodies , measures taken by UN bodies, coercive measures, such as acts of retaliation, and countermeasures, such as asset freeze and travel restrictions. Such measures can be taken individually or by a group of states. Current developments on the law of state responsibility and international humanitarian law , do seem to suggest that states other than the injured state are not entitled to respond to Geneva Convention violation with countermeasures in the collective interest. In addition, in the absence of a Security Council mandate, use of force and unilateral humanitarian intervention contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter are not possible means to guarantee compliance with the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols . Ibid., pp. 129–130.

  80. 80.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 151.

  81. 81.

    See Pictet 1960, Article 1, GC III, p. 18.

  82. 82.

    See, e.g., UNGA, Res. 59/122, 10 December 2004, para 3, UN Doc. A/RES/59/122. It should be mentioned that references to the “state-compliance ” meaning of common Article 1 , where contained in resolutions of the UNSC adopted under Chapter VII, are binding per se, and not because of the reference to common Article 1 .

  83. 83.

    See Focarelli 2010, pp. 147–151. The writer makes it clear that the term “per se” is necessary “to indicate measures which are ‘normally’ lawful or unlawful, regardless of the fact that those which are per se unlawful may ‘become’ lawful as reactions to an unlawful act by the targeted state.”

  84. 84.

    See Kessler 2001, p. 499.

  85. 85.

    See ibid., p. 506.

  86. 86.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 126 (positing that this understanding of the obligation to “ensure respect” as a due diligence obligation is also in line with the similar due diligence obligation to prevent found in human rights treaties ).

  87. 87.

    See ibid., p. 127.

  88. 88.

    See Focarelli 2010, p. 153.

  89. 89.

    Cf. GC I, Articles 3(1), 7, 12(1), 19(1), 24, 27(3), 40(4), and 49(4); GC II, Articles 3(1), 7, 12(1), 22(1), 42(4), and 50(4); GC III, Articles 3(1), 7, 14, 49(3), 84(2), 103(1), 118(5)(b), and 129(4); GC IV, Articles 3(1), 8, 18(1), 24(1), 27(1), 45(4), 100(1), and 146(4); and AP I, Articles 10(2), 12(4), 16(1), 51(1), 63(1), 64(1), 71(4), 73, and 75(1), above n 11.

  90. 90.

    Cf. Kalshoven 1999, p. 7.

  91. 91.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 133. See also Focarelli 2010, pp. 157–158.

  92. 92.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 133. See also Focarelli 2010, pp. 157–164.

  93. 93.

    See Geiss 2015, p. 134. See also Focarelli 2010, pp. 163–164.

  94. 94.

    Cf. GC I, above n 11, Article 49, which reads: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article. Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches , and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case . Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article. In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defense, which shall not be less favorable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.”

    This article is reproduced in GC II, Article 50; GC III, Article 129; GC IV, Article 146; and AP I, Articles 85 and 86(1), above n 11.

  95. 95.

    See Gaeta 2015, p. 616. See also Pictet 1952, GC I, pp. 357–60.

  96. 96.

    See Gaeta 2015, p. 617.

  97. 97.

    See ibid.

  98. 98.

    See Gaeta 2015, p. 619.

  99. 99.

    As defined by the Geneva Conventions, “grave breaches ” include the following acts: willful killing, torture , or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health. GC I, Article 50; GC II, Article 51; GC III, Article 130; and GC IV, Article 147, above n 11. To this common list, each Convention adds other acts: Geneva Conventions I, II, and IV also list extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity , while Geneva Conventions III and IV also include compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of the hostile power, and willfully depriving a civilian of the right to a fair and regular trial; lastly Geneva Convention IV lists also unlawful deportation, transfer or confinement of a protected person, and the taking of hostages.

  100. 100.

    According to AP I, above n 11, Article 85, “[t]he provisions of the Conventions relating to the repression of breaches and grave breaches […] shall apply to the repression of breaches and greave breaches of this Protocol.” It also includes an extended list of “grave breaches .”

  101. 101.

    GC I, Article 49; GC II, Article 50; GC III, Article 129; and GC IV, Article 146, above n 11. On the aut dedere aut judicare principle, see ILC 2016, pp. 76–84, paras 150–165, UN Doc. A/CN.4/690. See also van Steenberghe 2011.

  102. 102.

    See Provost 2002, p. 110.

  103. 103.

    GC I, Article 49(3); GC II, Article 50(3); GC III, Article 129(3); and GC IV, Article 146(3), above n 11. It is interesting to observe that while the word “suppression” was used in the English text, the expression “faire cesser” was preferred in the French text. Despite that slight difference, there are no doubts that the primary purpose of the paragraph is the repression of acts other than “grave breaches .”

  104. 104.

    See also Pictet 1952–1960, GC I, pp. 365–366; GC III, p. 623; and GC IV, pp. 592–593.

  105. 105.

    See Kress 2009, p. 795.

  106. 106.

    See van Elst 2000, p. 828.

  107. 107.

    See ibid. But see Gaeta 2015, pp. 623–624 (arguing that to “contend that ICL also imposes on states the duty to adopt at the national level an ad hoc set of identical criminal offences with the same nomen juris and legal ingredients as those found in the treaty, in the absence of an express treaty obligation in this regard, seems, at present, unwarranted,” and referring instead to Article 5 of the Genocide Convention as an example of a clear provision imposing the obligation to criminalize and punish).

  108. 108.

    See Gaeta 2015, p. 625. This understanding has a bearing on the question of the legality of amnesties.

  109. 109.

    See Schmitt 2011, pp. 36–40. See also Gioia 2011, pp. 235, 237.

  110. 110.

    See Cohen and Shany 2012, pp. 8, 11–12, 14, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201 [Accessed 20 August 2018] (noting however with regard to the latter two points that practice is virtually non-existent).

  111. 111.

    See Pictet 1952, GC I, p. 365.

  112. 112.

    See Schmitt 2011, p. 38.

  113. 113.

    See Schmitt 2011, p. 39 (referring to certain conclusions derived from AP I at pp. 43–44, and other conclusions derived from state practice at pp. 78–82).

  114. 114.

    See ibid., p. 79.

  115. 115.

    See Cohen and Shany 2012, p. 6, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201 [Accessed 20 August 2018].

  116. 116.

    AP I, above n 11, Articles 85, 87–90.

  117. 117.

    AP I, above n 11, Article 87.

  118. 118.

    See Sandoz et al. 1987, AP I, p. 3550.

  119. 119.

    See Schmitt 2011, p. 41.

  120. 120.

    See Cohen and Shany 2012, p. 10, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201 [Accessed 20 August 2018].

  121. 121.

    See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ljube Boskoski and Johan Tarculovski, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, Case IT-04-83-T, para 418.

  122. 122.

    The ICC clarified that the measures taken by commanders have to be “necessary and reasonable.” See ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Pre-Trial Chamber II), 15 June 2009, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, para 440. On the ICC and Article 17 of the ICC Statute , see Chap. 4 below.

  123. 123.

    See Cohen and Shany 2012, p. 20, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201 [Accessed 20 August 2018].

  124. 124.

    See Sandoz et al. 1987, AP I, p. 3552.

  125. 125.

    See Cohen and Shany 2012, pp. 5, 18, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201 [Accessed 20 August 2018].

  126. 126.

    See Human Rights Council, 25 September 2009, para 1611, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48.

  127. 127.

    See Human Rights Council, 23 September 2010, para 32, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/50.

  128. 128.

    See Cohen and Shany 2012, p. 14, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201 [Accessed 20 August 2018].

  129. 129.

    See Kress 2009, pp. 802–803. Article 7(1) of the Torture Convention is an example of the Hague formula .

  130. 130.

    See Gaeta 2015, p. 632.

  131. 131.

    See Pictet 1952, GC I, pp. 366–367.

  132. 132.

    See Gaeta 2015, p. 632.

  133. 133.

    See ILC 2017, pp. 131–132, paras 286–287, UN Doc. A/CN.4/704. Cf. Michel and Del Mar 2014, pp. 860–871.

  134. 134.

    See Pictet 1952, GC I, p. 373. See also Scharf 1996, p. 44. Cf. Bassiouni 2002, pp. 26, 33, and 41 (defining war crimes as jus cogens crimes, but conceding that not every culprit must be prosecuted to assure accountability ). But see Naqvi 2003, pp. 616–624 (arguing that “restricted amnesties for war crimes , which nonetheless enable societies to acknowledge and condemn offences committed during conflict or repressive rule,” should be accorded international validity).

  135. 135.

    Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity , adopted 26 November 1968 by U.N.G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), 754 U.N.T.S. 73, entered into force 11 November 1970. For an analysis of the Convention, see Miller 1971. Cf. European Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes , opened for signature 25 January 1974, E.T.S. No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540, entered into force 27 June 2003. Juliane Kokott and Fania Domb have interpreted the reference to “other limitations” as excluding not only time bars to prosecution , but also other limitations in the form of amnesty laws. But given the drafters impossibility to reach an agreement on the permissibility of amnesties, and the absence of an explicit obligation to punish in the Convention, Seibert-Fohr rules out that the prohibition of amnesties is automatically included in the prohibition of statutory limitations. Seibert-Fohr 2009, pp. 170–172.

  136. 136.

    See Scharf 2006, pp. 352–353.

  137. 137.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 159, pp. 611–614.

  138. 138.

    See ibid., Rule 158, p. 610.

  139. 139.

    See Roht-Arriaza and Gibson 1998, pp. 862–866; and Naqvi 2003, pp. 603–605. Cf. ILC 2017, p. 132, para 287, UN Doc. A/CN.4/704.

  140. 140.

    Acuerdo Final para la Terminaciòn del Conflicto y la Construcciòn de una Paz Estable y Duradera [Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace ], 24 November 2016 (the Colombian Final Peace Agreement ), http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Prensa/Documentos%20compartidos/Colombian-Peace-Agreement-English-Translation.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2018].

  141. 141.

    Ibid., Chap. 5, Agreement regarding the Victims of the Conflict , 5.1.2 Justice , Items 10, 23, 37, 38, and 40.

  142. 142.

    See McDonald 1999, p. 155.

  143. 143.

    See ILC 2017, p. 133, para 290, UN Doc. A/CN.4/704. For instance, the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, between the countries of Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Uganda , Rwanda and Zimbabwe, included a provision on amnesty also for those responsible for international crimes but with the exclusion of genocidaires. UNSC, Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 1999, Annex, para 22. For the most comprehensive study of amnesties, see Mallinder 2008. For other practice, see also Naqvi 2003, p. 587, and ns 16–18.

  144. 144.

    See, e.g., UNSC, Res. 1055, 1996; UNSC, Res. 1064, 1996; and UNSC, Res. 1120 (1997); UNGA, Res. 47/141 (XLVII), 1992; UNGA, Res. 48/152 (XLVIII), 1993; and UNGA, Res. 49/207 (XLIX), 1994; and UN Commission HR, Res. 1996/73, 1996.

  145. 145.

    See, e.g., Furundzija 1998, above n 55, para 155 (on torture ); HRC, General Comment No. 20: Article 7 of the ICCPR (Prohibition of Torture , or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ), 10 March 1992, para 15; IACHR, Lucio Parada Cea et al. v. El Salvador , Report No.1/99, 27 January 1999, Case 10.480, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 doc. 7 rev., paras 123, 129, 142, 147, 158; and IACtHR, Barrios Altos Case (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru ), Judgment (Merits), 14 March 2001, paras 41–44, 51. I refer to Chap. 4 for an analysis of the most recent jurisprudence on amnesty .

  146. 146.

    See Jacobs 2012, p. 310 (admitting that there might be a duty to prosecute those war crimes that have acquired the status of customary international law ). See generally ILC 2010, UN Doc. A/CN.4/630.

  147. 147.

    See Belgium v. Senegal 2012, above n 32, para 95.

  148. 148.

    See Pictet 1952, GC I, p. 366.

  149. 149.

    See Provost 2002, p. 110.

  150. 150.

    See Pictet 1960, GC III, p. 623.

  151. 151.

    See Gaeta 2015, p. 637 (referring at n 99 to an obiter dictum of the ICTY in Furundzija in which the court affirmed that torture cannot be considered as a political offence for the purposes of extradition given the jus cogens status of the prohibition of torture ).

  152. 152.

    Naqvi 2003, pp. 595–596.

  153. 153.

    See ICJ, Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of April 11, 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Dissenting Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, 14 February 2002, ICJ Rep 3 (Arrest Warrant Case 2002), para 54.

  154. 154.

    See Pictet 1952, GC I, pp. 366–367. See also Arrest Warrant Case 2002, Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, above n 153, para 9.

  155. 155.

    See Gaeta 2015, p. 640.

  156. 156.

    See ibid.

  157. 157.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 157, pp. 604–605.

  158. 158.

    See Torture Convention, Article 5; and Enforced Disappearance Convention, Article 9. See also Convention on the Safety of UN Personnel, Article 4; and Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property Article 16(1).

  159. 159.

    AP I, above n 11, Article 88(1)(2).

  160. 160.

    See, e.g., UNSC, Statement by the President, 13 July 1998, pp. 1–2, UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/20; and UNGA, Res. 2712 (XXV), 1970; UNGA, Res. 2840 (XXVI), 1971; UNGA, Res. 3020 (XXVII), 1972; and UNGA, Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 1973. The UN Commission on Human Rights likewise urged states to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution . See, e.g., UN Commission HR, Res. 3 (XXI), and Res. 1988/47, 1988.

  161. 161.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 161, p. 619.

  162. 162.

    GC I, Article 49; GC II, Article 50; GC III, Article 129; GC IV, Article 146; and AP I, Articles 85 and 86(1), above n 11.

  163. 163.

    See Pictet 1960, GC III, p. 624. See also Cohen and Shany 2012, p. 12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201 [Accessed 20 August 2018] (analyzing the options available to military commanders ); and Meron 1998, p. 23.

  164. 164.

    See Pictet 1952–1958, GC I, p. 367, and GC IV, p. 594; see also Schmitt 2011, pp. 47–48.

  165. 165.

    See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-I (Tadic Case 1995), paras 111–127.

  166. 166.

    See Cohen and Shany 2012, pp. 7–11, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201 [Accessed 20 August 2018]; with regard to the third principle see, e.g., AP I, above n 11, Article 57(1), which prescribes that “[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”

  167. 167.

    See Provost 2002, pp. 110–111 (stressing nonetheless that customary law or other conventional instruments do not fully support the extension of the aut dedere aut judicare obligation to “other” war crimes ).

  168. 168.

    See ibid., p. 111.

  169. 169.

    GC I, Article 8; GC II, Article 8; GC III, Article 8; GC IV, Article 9; and AP I, Article 5, above n 11.

  170. 170.

    This mechanism was used in relation to the Suez Conflict of 1956, the Goa Conflict of 1961, and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Cassese 1998, p. 4, n 5.

  171. 171.

    GC I, Article 11; GC II, Article 11; GC III, Article 11; and GC IV, Article 12, above n 11.

  172. 172.

    See Cassese 1998, p. 4.

  173. 173.

    See Boutruche 2011, p. 108.

  174. 174.

    See Seibert-Fohr 2009, p. 265; and Naqvi 2003, p. 597. See also Provost 2002, p. 115 (affirming that the “existence of an obligation aut dedere aut judicare with respect to the most egregious violations of the Conventions and Protocol stands in stark contrast to the lack of any equivalent in either treaty or customary human rights law (with genocide , crimes against humanity and torture as distinct exceptions.”). States parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions are 196. ICRC 2016, p. 591.

  175. 175.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 158, p. 607; and Schmitt 2011, p. 48. See also Meron 1991, p. 215 (stressing that the Geneva Conventions are not subject to derogation ). But see Tadic Case 1995, above n 165, para 68. See also Scharf 1996, p. 44; and Karavias 2009, p. 305.

  176. 176.

    See Cassese 1998, p. 6.

  177. 177.

    See, e.g., Genocide Convention, Article 4; and Torture Convention, Article 7; and ICC Statute , Preamble. See also Chemical Weapons Convention, Article 7(1); Amended Landmines Protocol, Amended Protocol II, Article 14; Ottawa Convention on Landmines, Article 9; and Dublin Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 9.

  178. 178.

    See, e.g., UNGA, Res. 3 (I), 1946, UN Doc. A/RES/3(I).

  179. 179.

    See, e.g., UNSC, Res. 978, 1995; UNSC, Res. 1193, 1998; and UNSC, Res. 1199, 1998; and UNGA, Res. 3 (I), 1946; UNGA, Res. 2583 (XXIV), 1969; UNGA, Res. 2712 (XXV), 1970; UNGA, Res. 2840 (XXVI), 1971; and UNGA, Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 1973.

  180. 180.

    UNGA, Res. 60/147, 16 December 2005, Annex, para 3, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147.

  181. 181.

    See, e.g., UN Commission HR, Res. 1994/77, 1994; Res. 1995/77, 1995; Res. 1995/91, 1995; Res. 1996/71, 1996; Res. 1996/76, 1996; Res. 1999/1, 1999; Res. 1999/10, 1999; and Res. 2000/58, 2000.

  182. 182.

    See, e.g., U.K. Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (JSP 383), 2004, last amended in May 2014, p. 438.

  183. 183.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, Rule 158, p. 608.

  184. 184.

    Gaeta 2015, p. 646.

  185. 185.

    See Cassese 1998, p. 5.

  186. 186.

    See Benvenisti 2006, p. 89. See generally Teitel 2008.

References

  • Ambos K (2009) The legal framework of transitional justice. In: Ambos K, Large J, Wierda M (eds) Building a future on peace and justice: Studies on transitional justice, peace and development. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, pp 19–103

    Google Scholar 

  • Azzam F (1997) The duty of third states to implement and enforce international humanitarian law. Nordic Journal of International Law 66:55–75

    Google Scholar 

  • Bassiouni C M (2002) Accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and other serious violations of human rights. In: Bassiouni C M (ed) Post-conflict justice. Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, pp 3–54

    Google Scholar 

  • Ben-Naftali O (ed) (2011) International humanitarian and international human rights law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Benvenisti E (2006) Human dignity in combat: The duty to spare enemy civilians. Israel Law Review 39:81–109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boutruche T (2011) Credible fact-finding and allegations of international humanitarian law violations: Challenges in theory and practice. Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16:105–140

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cassese A (1998) On the current trends towards criminal prosecution and punishment of breaches of international humanitarian law. European Journal of International Law 9:2–17

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen A, Shany Y (2012) Beyond the grave breaches regime: The duty to investigate alleged violations of international law governing armed conflicts. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, International Law Forum, Research Paper No. 02-12. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982201. Accessed 20 August 2018

  • Condorelli L, Boisson de Chazournes L (2000) Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests. International Review of the Red Cross 82:67–87

    Google Scholar 

  • Focarelli C (2010) Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A soap bubble? European Journal of International Law 21:125–171

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gaeta P (2015) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P, Sassòli M (eds) The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 615–646

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiss R (2015) The obligation to respect and to ensure respect for the Conventions. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P, Sassòli M (eds) The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 111–134

    Google Scholar 

  • Gioia A (2011) The role of the European Court of Human Rights in monitoring compliance with humanitarian law in armed conflict. In: Ben-Naftali O (ed) International humanitarian law and international human rights law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 201–249

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Henckaerts J-M, Doswald-Beck L (2009) Customary International Humanitarian Law. International Committee of the Red Cross/Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Ingadottir T (2010) The ICJ Armed Activity Case – Reflections on states’ obligation to investigate and prosecute individuals for serious human rights violations and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Nordic Journal of International Law 78:581–598

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jacobs D (2012) Puzzling over amnesties: Defragmenting the debate for international criminal tribunals. In: van den Herik L, Stahn C (eds) The diversification and fragmentation of international criminal law. Brill|Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 305–345

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalshoven F (1999) The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: From tiny seed to ripening fruit. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2:3–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karavias M (2009) Duty to punish. In: Cassese A (ed) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 305–306

    Google Scholar 

  • Kessler B (2001) The duty to “ensure respect” under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions: Its implications on international and non-international armed conflicts. German Yearbook of International Law 44:498–516

    Google Scholar 

  • Kress C (2009) Reflections on the iudicare limb of the grave breaches regime. Journal of International Criminal Justice 7:789–809

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mallinder L (2008) Amnesty, human rights and political transitions: Bridging the peace and justice divide. Hart Publishing, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • McDonald A (1999) A right to truth, justice and a remedy for African victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law. Law, Democracy and Development 3:139–180

    Google Scholar 

  • Meron T (1991) Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Meron T (1998) Is international law moving towards criminalization? European Journal of International Law 9:18–31

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Michel N, Del Mar K (2014) Transitional justice. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P (eds) The Oxford handbook of international law in armed conflict. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 840–884

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanovic M (2011) Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties: Law, principles, and policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Miller R H (1971) The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. American Journal of International Law 65:476–501

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Naqvi Y (2003) Amnesty for War Crimes: Defining the limits of international recognition. International Review of the Red Cross 85:583–626

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Picone P (2011) The distinction between jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. In: Cannizzaro E (ed) The Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 412–424

    Google Scholar 

  • Pictet J (ed) (1952–1960) The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  • Provost R (2002) International human rights and humanitarian law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Roht-Arriaza N, Gibson L (1998) The developing jurisprudence on amnesty. Human Rights Quarterly 20:843–885

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sandoz Y, Swinarski C, Zimmermann B (eds) (1987) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. International Committee of the Red Cross/ Nijhoff, Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  • Sassòli M (2001) State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross 84:401–434

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scharf M P (1996) The letter of the law: The scope of the international legal obligation to prosecute human rights crimes. Law and Contemporary Problems 59:41–62

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scharf M P (2006) From the exile files: An essay on trading justice for peace. Washington and Lee Law Review 63:339–378

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt M N (2011) Investigating violations of international law in armed conflict. Harvard National Security Journal 2:31–84

    Google Scholar 

  • Seibert-Fohr A (2009) Prosecuting serious human rights violations. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Teitel R (2008) Humanity law: A new interpretative lens on the international sphere. Fordham Law Review 77:667–702

    Google Scholar 

  • Tomuschat C, Thouvenin J-M (eds) (2006) The fundamental rules of the international legal order: Jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. Brill | Nijhoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • van Elst R (2000) Implementing universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Leiden Journal of International Law 13:815–854

    Google Scholar 

  • van Steenberghe R (2011) The obligation to extradite or prosecute: Clarifying its nature. Journal of International Criminal Justice 9:1089–1116

    Article  Google Scholar 

UN Documents

  • Commission on Human Rights

    Google Scholar 

  • – Resolution 3 (XXI)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1988) Resolution 1988/47

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1994) Resolution 1994/85

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1994) Resolution 1994/77

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1995) Resolution 1995/72

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1995) Resolution 1995/77

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1995) Resolution 1995/91

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1996) Resolution 1996/71

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1996) Resolution 1996/73

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1996) Resolution 1996/76

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1996) Resolution 1996/80

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1999) Resolution 1999/1

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1999) Resolution 1999/10

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2000) Resolution 2000/58

    Google Scholar 

  • General Assembly

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1946) Resolution 3 (I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3(I)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1969) Resolution 2583 (XXIV)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1970) Resolution 2674 (XXV)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1970) Resolution 2677 (XXV)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1970) Resolution 2712 (XXV)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1971) Resolution 2840 (XXVI)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1971) Resolution 2852 (XXVI)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1971) Resolution 2853 (XXVI)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1972) Resolution 3020 (XXVII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1972) Resolution 3032 (XXVII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1973) Resolution 3074 (XXVIII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1973) Resolution 3102 (XXVIII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1974) Resolution 3319 (XXIX)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1975) Resolution 3500 (XXX)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1977) Resolution 32/44 (XXXII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1992) Resolution 47/37 (XLVII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1992) Resolution 47/141 (XLVII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1993) Resolution 48/30 (XLVIII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1993) Resolution 48/152 (XLVIII)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1994) Resolution 49/207 (XLIX)

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2004) Resolution 59/122 (2004), U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/122

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2005) Resolution 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147, Annex

    Google Scholar 

  • Human Rights Committee

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1992) General Comment No. 20: Article 7 of the ICCPR (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)

    Google Scholar 

  • Human Rights Council

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2009) Human Rights in Palestine and other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (The Goldstone Report), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2010) Report of the Committee of Independent Experts in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Laws to Monitor and Assess any Domestic, Legal or other Proceedings Undertaken by Both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Side, in the Light of General Assembly Resolution 64/254, Including the Independence, Effectiveness, Genuineness of these Investigations and their Conformity with International Standards, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/50

    Google Scholar 

  • International Law Commission

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2001) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its Fifty-Third Session, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2010) Survey of Multilateral Conventions which may be of Relevance for the Work of the International Law Commission on the Topic “The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)”: Study of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/630

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2016) Second Report on Crimes Against Humanity By Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/690

    Google Scholar 

  • – (2017) Third Report on Crimes Against Humanity By Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/704

    Google Scholar 

  • Other UN Materials

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1968) International Conference on Human Rights, Resolution XXIII: Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 25th Plen. Mtg., 12 May 1968, in Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41

    Google Scholar 

  • Security Council

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1990) Resolution 681, U.N. Doc. S/RES/681

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1993) Resolution 822

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1993) Resolution 853

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1995) Resolution 978

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1996) Resolution 1055

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1996) Resolution 1064

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1997) Resolution 1120

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1998) Resolution 1193

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1998) Resolution 1199

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1998) Statement by the President, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/20

    Google Scholar 

  • – (1999) Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Annex, Letter dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/815

    Google Scholar 

Council of Europe

International Committee of the Red Cross

Organization of American States

  • – (1996) General Assembly, Resolution 1408 (XXVI-O/96), 7 June 1996

    Google Scholar 

United Kingdom

  • – (2004) Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (JSP 383), 2004, last amended in May 2014

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, Alma Mater Studiorum - University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Jacopo Roberti di Sarsina

Authors
  1. Jacopo Roberti di Sarsina
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jacopo Roberti di Sarsina .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 T.M.C. Asser Press and the author

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Roberti di Sarsina, J. (2019). The Content of the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute International Humanitarian Law Violations—The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. In: Transitional Justice and a State’s Response to Mass Atrocity. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-276-7_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-276-7_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-275-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-276-7

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation