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Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 20, 2017 pp 199–228Cite as

Targeting the Islamic State’s Religious Personnel Under International Humanitarian Law

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Part of the book series: Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law ((YIHL,volume 20))

Abstract

Under international humanitarian law religious personnel must be protected against direct military attack. This basic principle, rooted in the humanitarian function of religious personnel on the battlefield, also applies to Islamic chaplains with the organized armed group “Islamic State”. However, the protected status depends on the exclusivity of the engagement in the work of the ministry. Against this background, the chapter assesses the (loss of) protection of the Islamic State’s religious personnel in Iraq and Syria. It distinguishes between such chaplains who are formally integrated into the organized armed group (IS-chaplains), and such civil chaplains who are not (IS-civil chaplains). By taking into consideration the Islamic State’s “holy war”-narrative and the data on their military administration, it will be argued that IS-chaplains are likely to also perform functions of religious propaganda and recruiting. Even in the light of international human rights law, such conduct can hardly be assessed as an exclusive engagement in the work of the ministry. As a result, the chapter argues that IS-chaplains, if such a non-exclusive function is sufficiently verified, can be legally subjected to direct military attack as every other ordinary member of the organized armed group. For the informally collaborating IS-civil chaplains, it will be shown that a protected status is granted quite independent of their religious function but via the general rules on the protection of the civil population. However, on the basis of assumed functions of IS-civil chaplains, the chapter concludes that (religious) recruiting by civilians, under certain circumstances, amounts to a direct participation in hostilities, again, resulting in the legal justification of direct military attack.

Till Patrik Holterhus is an Assistant Professor at the Georg-August-University, Göttingen and Professeur Invité at the Pantheon-Sorbonne University, Paris (in 2018 and 2019). He would like to thank Agata Daszko for many valuable remarks on the chapter. Any errors or omissions remain the author’s own.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    “Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve”, international coalition fighting IS in Iraq and Syria, set up in 2014, led and coordinated by the United States. Incorporated operations are e.g. “Operation Inherent Resolve” (United States), “Opération Chammal” (France), “Operation Counter Daesh” (Germany), “Operation Shader (United Kingdom). “History: On 17 October 2014, the Department of Defense formally established Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) in order to formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Our mission: In conjunction with partner forces Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) defeats ISIS in designated areas of Iraq and Syria and sets conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability”, cited from the operation’s official website (Operation Inherent Resolve, http://www.inherentresolve.mil. Accessed 5 April 2018). On the parameters of applying IHL to multinational forces, see Ferraro 2013; and Olson 2013.

  2. 2.

    Dunant 1986, p 31.

  3. 3.

    See Hassner 2016, pp 89–97.

  4. 4.

    See in detail below Sect. 6.3.1. On the basic concept of Protected Persons under IHL, see also Krieger 2010.

  5. 5.

    Lunze 2004a, pp 69–72.

  6. 6.

    Ibid., p 72.

  7. 7.

    For an overview on the shifting paradigms in modern asymmetric warfare, see Huyghe 2009; Blin 2011; or Sitaraman 2013, pp 23–84.

  8. 8.

    See Küng 2005, pp 261–264.

  9. 9.

    See Bellal 2015, pp 126–130 and 131–132; Küng 2005, pp 261–264; Gerges 2016, pp 23–41 and 273–279; Maher 2016, pp 35–68 and 157–166.

  10. 10.

    For a general perspective on the organizational structures of organized armed groups, see Sinno 2011.

  11. 11.

    See Gilliat-Ray et al. 2013, pp 44–45.

  12. 12.

    Weiss and Hassan 2015, pp 153–169; Griffin 2016, pp 107–114.

  13. 13.

    See Caris and Reynolds 2014, pp 15–20 with numerous further references.

  14. 14.

    Ibid., p 15.

  15. 15.

    Caris and Reynolds 2014, p 20; on Islamic chaplains being in charge of religious recruiting and training for IS, see also Hassan H (2015) The secret world of Isis training camps—ruled by sacred texts and the sword. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/inside-isis-training-camps. Accessed 13 March 2018.

  16. 16.

    Weiss and Hassan 2015, pp 170–178; Atwan 2015; see also Meleagrou-Hitchens et al. 2012; Bellal 2015, pp 129–130.

  17. 17.

    Sciutto J, Crawford J, Carter C (2014) ISIS can “muster” between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters, CIA says. http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/. Accessed 13 March 2018; Dodwell et al. 2016.

  18. 18.

    Through linking the fight for IS to a howsoever religiously derived Islamic duty to a violent Jihad (in the sense of a religious duty of Muslims to maintain and spread Islam).

  19. 19.

    See Gilliat-Ray et al. 2013, pp 44–45.

  20. 20.

    See generally Price 2016, pp 261–284; Chesney 2010.

  21. 21.

    Zamir 2015, pp 95–102; Bellal 2015, pp 133–135.

  22. 22.

    Multiple overlapping IACs and NIACs are taking place in Iraq and Syria, involving the Syrian government, the Foreign Coalition (CJTF-OIR), Russia, Turkey, Syrian rebel groups (including the Free Syrian Army), the Islamic State and Kurdish militias. For a detailed analysis of the various ongoing IACs and NIACs in Iraq and Syria, see the online portal of the RULAC Project (Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts) of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights and their specific country overviews (Rulac, Countries. http://www.rulac.org/browse/countries. Accessed 13 March 2018); for further scholarly discussion, see Gill 2016, p 353, pp 366–367 and 375–376; Arimatsu and Choudhury 2014, pp 2–19; in general, see also Moir 2015, pp 391–414; Wilmshurst 2012; Paulus and Vashakmadze 2009.

  23. 23.

    For a detailed analysis of this conflict to be categorized as a NIAC, see Zamir 2015, pp 102–116; Gill 2016, p 353, pp 366–367 and 375–376; see also Chesney 2010, pp 29–30; Bellal 2015, pp 127–129.

  24. 24.

    See generally Melzer 2014, pp 328–331.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., pp 307–328; on the general rules of targeting in NIACs, see Boothby 2012, pp 429–454; see also in detail below Membership (of IS-Chaplains) in the Organized Armed Group IS and Sect. 6.3.4.1.

  26. 26.

    For an overview, see Kumar 2013, pp 413–424; Lunze 2004b, pp 102–106.

  27. 27.

    Additionally, numerous national military war manuals applicable in NIACs lay down specific protection for religious personnel. See, for instance, the military war manuals of the members of the Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), e.g. United Kingdom Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) Manual (United Kingdom 2004, p 134), France LOAC Manual (France 2001, pp 95–96), Germany Military Manual (Germany 1992, paras 811–820), and United States Manual for Military Commissions (United States 2010, Part IV 1(a)(2)).

  28. 28.

    See Bond 1973, pp 348–349; Boothby 2012, pp 433–434; Rogers 2012, p 301; for the opposing view, see Cameron et al. 2016, Article 3 GC I para 540 et seq.

  29. 29.

    Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 3(1).

  30. 30.

    Casey-Maslen 2015, p 819.

  31. 31.

    Cameron et al. 2016, Article 3 GC I para 522 et seq.

  32. 32.

    This would not include a functional change from one protected group of personnel to the other, e.g. from a religious to a medical function.

  33. 33.

    Ipsen 2013, pp 95–101; Henderson 2009.

  34. 34.

    Cameron et al. 2016, Article 3 GC I para 529 et seq.; see also Melzer 2014, p 310. On the complex question under what conditions IS-chaplains can be considered members of the organized armed group IS, see below Sect. 6.3.3.1.

  35. 35.

    “The concept of respect implies a duty not to attack, so that it is not necessary from a legal point of view to mention attacks”, cited from Sandoz et al. 1987, Article 9 AP II, para 4674.

  36. 36.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1979), Article 9(1).

  37. 37.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, Article 9 AP II, para 4663. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1979).

  38. 38.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, Article 9 AP II, para 4672.

  39. 39.

    See Lunze 2004b, p 100.

  40. 40.

    On this question of the non-applicability of AP II in NIACs taking place in territories of states not being members to the AP II (“extraterritorial application of AP II”), see Crawford and Pert 2015, p 69; Akande 2012, pp 55–56 and 70–79.

  41. 41.

    Extensively assessed in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009; see also Meron 2014, pp 37–49; Kolb and Del Mar 2014, pp 53–60.

  42. 42.

    See rule 1 of the ICRC’s customary IHL study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, pp 3–8.

  43. 43.

    See rule 6 of the ICRC’s customary IHL study, ibid., pp 19–24.

  44. 44.

    See rule 27 of the ICRC’s customary IHL study, ibid., pp 88–91.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., pp 90–91.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., pp 5–8, 21–23 and 89–90.

  47. 47.

    On the relation of IHL and IHRL, see Clapham 2015; Bantekas and Oette 2016, pp 649–681; Kleffner 2013, pp 71–78; Krieger 2006.

  48. 48.

    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). On the specific relation of the ECHR and IHL, see Landais and Bass 2015.

  49. 49.

    See Bantekas and Oette 2016, pp 82–83 and 304–306; Milanovic 2011.

  50. 50.

    See, with numerous further references, Grabenwarter 2014, Article 1 paras 13–17; De Schutter 2014, pp 163–187; Kälin and Künzli 2009, pp 132–142.

  51. 51.

    See with a convincing critical assessment and further references Kälin and Künzli 2009, pp 138–140.

  52. 52.

    “As of August 9, 2017, the Coalition has conducted 13,331 strikes in Iraq, and 11,235 strikes in Syria, for a total of 24,566 strikes in support of Operation Inherent Resolve”, cited from the operation’s official website (U.S. Department of Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve. https://www.defense.gov/OIR/. Accessed 5 April 2018).

  53. 53.

    For a general overview on certain shifts in the acknowledgement of extraterritorial jurisdiction, see Milanovic 2011, pp 118–228; Kleffner 2013, pp 75–77 with many further references.

  54. 54.

    Kälin and Künzli 2009, pp 134–135.

  55. 55.

    ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, paras 106–112; ICJ, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, [2005] ICJ Rep 168, paras 206–216; ECtHR, Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Grand Chamber Judgment, 23 March 1995, Application No. 15318/89, paras 62–63; ECtHR, Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, Grand Chamber Judgement, 24 February 2005, Application Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, para 166; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment, 7 July 2011, Application No. 55721/07, paras 142–150; ECtHR, Hassan v the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment, 16 September 2014, Application No. 29750/09, para 77; see also Jinks 2014, pp 656–674.

  56. 56.

    See Schabas 2014, pp 365–386; Gaggioli 2013; Melzer 2014, pp 328–331.

  57. 57.

    See Walter 2010, para 8.

  58. 58.

    See Walter 2010, paras 14–23; Green and Witte 2013, pp 26–31.

  59. 59.

    See Lunze 2004b, pp 49 and 71.

  60. 60.

    UN Human Rights Committee (1993) General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 1.

  61. 61.

    See Kumar 2013, p 414.

  62. 62.

    To recall, two types of chaplains inside IS were set out above (see Sect. 6.2.3). On the one hand, Islamic chaplains that are formally integrated into IS (IS-chaplains) and, on the other hand, Islamic chaplains that are not formally integrated (IS-civil chaplains).

  63. 63.

    See above Sect. 6.3.1.

  64. 64.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj, Judgement, 3 April 2008, Case No. IT-04-84-T, para 60; see Melzer 2009, p 32; Sandoz et al. 1987, Article 1 AP II, paras 4460–4470.

  65. 65.

    UN Human Rights Council (2014) Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rule of Terror, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/CRP.3, paras 13–16; Bellal 2015, pp 132–135; Zamir 2015, p 105; Gill 2016, pp 353 and 359.

  66. 66.

    Melzer 2014, pp 309–314; Melzer 2010b, pp 833 and 837; Melzer 2009, p 36; Watkin 2010, p 663; Chesney 2010, pp 40–43; for a skeptical view, see Boothby 2012, pp 153–156; or Droege 2008, pp 527–537.

  67. 67.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, Article 13 AP II, para 4789.

  68. 68.

    For a very useful overview, see McBride 2012; see also Chesney 2010, pp 43–45; see also Sassòli and Olson 2008, pp 606–610.

  69. 69.

    Melzer 2009, pp 32–35.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., pp 32–33; see also Melzer 2014, pp 315–316. Ambiguous and to some extent inconsistent with its own definition of continuous combat function in this regard is the ICRC’s remark “A continuous combat function may be openly expressed through the carrying of uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons.” Melzer 2009, p 35.

  71. 71.

    On DPH in the context of (religious) recruiting, see below Sect. 6.3.4.

  72. 72.

    Melzer 2014, p 323; differing Chesney 2010, pp 47–49.

  73. 73.

    See e.g. Parks 2010; Schmitt 2010a.

  74. 74.

    See Watkin 2010, pp 662–690 and 690–693; Schmitt and Widmar 2016, pp 125–127; see also Sassòli and Olson 2008, pp 606–610.

  75. 75.

    On these interesting approaches, see McBride 2012.

  76. 76.

    Melzer 2009, pp 32–33; see also Schmitt 2010b, pp 21–22.

  77. 77.

    However, on the various existing levels of sophistication of the organizational structures of organized armed groups, see Sinno 2011.

  78. 78.

    On the unjustified disequilibrium between armed forces and organized armed groups induced by the ICRC’s approach, see Watkin 2010, pp 672–674; Boothby 2012, p 150.

  79. 79.

    Johnston et al. 2016, pp 162–169 and 71–102; Thompson N, Shubert A (2015) The anatomy of ISIS: How the “Islamic State” is run, from oil to beheadings. http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/. Accessed 13 March 2018; Minder R (2016) Europe; Spain: Uniforms for ISIS Seized. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/world/europe/spain-seizes-20000-military-uniforms-bound-for-isis.html. Accessed 13 March 2018; Pagliery J (2016) ISIS cuts its fighters’ salaries by 50%. http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/19/news/world/isis-salary-cuts/. Accessed 13 March 2018.

  80. 80.

    For the question of DPH of IS-civil chaplains, see below Sect. 6.3.4.

  81. 81.

    Doerr 2012, pp 521–570. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980).

  82. 82.

    Demeyere 2016, Article 24 GC I, para 1978; Lunze 2004a, pp 74–75.

  83. 83.

    See Lunze 2004b, pp 165–169; Kumar 2013, pp 413–416.

  84. 84.

    Hassner 2016, pp 87–97; Venzke 1977, p 37; Lunze 2004a, pp 81–82.

  85. 85.

    Lunze 2004b, pp 165–169; Kumar 2013, pp 413–416.

  86. 86.

    See above Sect. 6.3.1.4.

  87. 87.

    UN Human Rights Committee, above n 60, para 7; Green and Witte 2013, pp 26–27; Joseph and Castan 2014, p 567; Nowak 2005, Article 18 para 2; Grabenwarter 2014, Article 9 para 11; Bielefeldt et al. 2016, pp 495–499, 502–504 and 558–570; see also Guiora 2009, pp 9–57.

  88. 88.

    Nowak 2005, Article 5 paras 1 and 7–10, Article 20 para 17; Joseph and Castan 2014, pp 626–638; Schabas 2015, pp 614–622.

  89. 89.

    “Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives”, rule 16 of the ICRC’s customary IHL study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, pp 55–56.

  90. 90.

    Henderson 2009, pp 161–167; Boothby 2012, pp 121–123.

  91. 91.

    Lunze 2004b, p 100.

  92. 92.

    Melzer 2014, pp 323–328; Melzer 2010a, paras 7–16; Melzer 2009, pp 46–64; Boothby 2012, pp 153–156.

  93. 93.

    See Chesney 2010, pp 47–49; Jensen 2011, pp 101–103.

  94. 94.

    See above Sect. 6.3.3.2.

  95. 95.

    Walter 2010, para 17; Nowak 2005, Article 18 para 24.

  96. 96.

    UN Human Rights Committee, above n 60, para 7; see Bielefeldt et al. 2016, pp 196–198; Lerner 2006, pp 119–165.

  97. 97.

    Melzer 2009, p 51.

  98. 98.

    Nevertheless, such civilians might be at greater risk of being killed lawfully as “collateral causalities” when targeting e.g. ordnance factories themselves (within the limits of the IHL’s principles of necessity, proportionality, humane treatment and so on).

  99. 99.

    See Melzer 2009, p 53; differing with respect to recruiting Jensen 2011, pp 101–103.

  100. 100.

    Melzer 2009, p 53.

  101. 101.

    Henderson 2009, pp 161–167; Boothby 2012, pp 95–98.

  102. 102.

    Chesney 2010, p 48.

  103. 103.

    Melzer 2009, pp 66 and 68.

  104. 104.

    See also Chesney 2010, p 48.

  105. 105.

    Boothby 2010, pp 752 and 764–767.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of International Law and European Law, Georg-August-University Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5, 37073, Göttingen, Germany

    Till Patrik Holterhus (Assistant Professor)

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Criminal Law Section, Section Military Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Terry D. Gill

  2. Melbourne Law School, Carlton, VIC, Australia

    Tim McCormack

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Robin Geiß

  4. Department of Law/Public Law, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Heike Krieger

  5. Research Department, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Christophe Paulussen

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Holterhus, T.P. (2019). Targeting the Islamic State’s Religious Personnel Under International Humanitarian Law. In: Gill, T., McCormack, T., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 20, 2017. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 20. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-264-4_6

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