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Armed Groups and Procedural Accountability: A Roadmap for Further Thought

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Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 19, 2016

Part of the book series: Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law ((YIHL,volume 19))

Abstract

This chapter investigates the meaning of the term “accountability”, as it is used in policy discussions surrounding armed groups. It takes a detailed look at literature from public administration on the concept of procedural accountability and applies it to the various accountability mechanisms that evaluate the conduct of armed groups against international norms. In doing so, the chapter points out some of the shortcomings of some of these accountability mechanisms. It ends by examining some of the more innovative accountability models, such as the process created by Geneva Call and the ad hoc processes created by the UNAMA field office in Afghanistan vis-à-vis the Taliban.

Katharine Fortin (k.m.a.fortin@uu.nl) is a lecturer in public international law at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Utrecht University and a member of the Utrecht Centre of Accountability and Liability Law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the lack of inter-state conflict, see Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015; and Crawford 2014.

  2. 2.

    See for example the joint statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the ICRC of 31 October 2015: ICRC (2015) World at a turning point: Heads of UN and Red Cross issue joint warning. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/conflict-disaster-crisis-UN-red-cross-issue-warning. Accessed 29 June 2017; see also UN Security Council (2016a), paras 3, 4 and 9.

  3. 3.

    See for example Zegveld 2002; Sivakumaran 2012; Murray 2016; Fortin 2017.

  4. 4.

    See for example Bangerter 2011, 2015; Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011; Bongard and Somer 2011, Heffes and Kotlik 2014; Sassòli 2010; Saul 2017; Sivakumaran 2015.

  5. 5.

    Since 2009, the United Nations Secretary-General has identified “accountability” for violations of international law as one of the “core challenges” of the international community. See UN Security Council 2009.

  6. 6.

    See a general review of the Reports of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2009–2016 which focus systematically on accountability; see Brunée 2005, p. 47.

  7. 7.

    For a rare acknowledgment of the need for measures beyond the prosecution of individual perpetrators, see UN Security Council 2009, paras 68–73.

  8. 8.

    Kleffner 2009, p. 245; and Moffett 2015, p. 325.

  9. 9.

    UN Security Council 2009, para 69.

  10. 10.

    Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) Appeals Chamber has confirmed that collective reparations are possible, it has also confirmed that a convicted person’s liability for reparations must be proportionate to the harm caused and, inter alia, his or her participation in the commission of the crimes for which he or she was found guilty, in the specific circumstances of the case. See Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations (ANNEX A) and public annexes 1, 2, 3 March 2015, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, para 118.

  11. 11.

    Moffett 2015, p. 325.

  12. 12.

    Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, United States of America, French Republic, United Kingdom and the USSR v Hess, Goring et al., Judgment, 1 October 1946, para 447.

  13. 13.

    For examples of instances in which armed groups have been held responsible in domestic jurisdictions, see Moffett 2015, pp. 335–345.

  14. 14.

    UN Security Council 2009, para 68; see also Bellal 2015, pp. 305–306 and Moffett 2015, pp. 325–330.

  15. 15.

    One of the earliest examples of a Special Rapporteur examining the acts of armed groups was in 2001. See UN General Assembly 2000, para 27; for a more recent example see UN General Assembly 2016c.

  16. 16.

    UN Security Council 2016b, c, d, e, f; UN General Assembly 2016a, b.

  17. 17.

    See for example MONUSCO and OHCHR 2014.

  18. 18.

    See the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations of 18 October 2013 which states that “although non-State actors cannot become parties to the Convention […] under certain circumstance, in particular where an armed groups with an identifiable political structure exercises significant control over territory and population, non-State actors are obliged to respect international human rights”. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 2013; on the willingness of human rights treaty bodies to monitor the acts of armed groups, see also Sassòli 2010, p. 39.

  19. 19.

    See the account by Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings, in which he explains how and why the mandate was forced to find a means to respond to extrajudicial killings by armed groups, UN General Assembly 2007, paras 40–44.

  20. 20.

    See Brunée 2005 for an evaluation of this question.

  21. 21.

    There is a growing body of literature considering the responsibility of armed groups for wrongful acts. See for example Moffett 2015; Bílková 2015; Verhoeven 2015, but the idea is still nascent.

  22. 22.

    Kamminga 1992, pp. 45.

  23. 23.

    ICJ, Corfu Channel case, Judgment, 9 April 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Reports 4, p. 4 and 18.

  24. 24.

    Bovens 2007, p. 449.

  25. 25.

    Mulgan 2000, p. 555.

  26. 26.

    Bovens 2010, p. 951.

  27. 27.

    Curtin and Nollkaemper 2005, p. 8.

  28. 28.

    Mulgan 2000, p. 555.

  29. 29.

    Bovens 2007, p. 450.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.; see also Grant and Keohane 2005, p. 29.

  31. 31.

    Bovens 2007, p. 450 and 460. It is noteworthy that Bovens calls this a ‘horizontal accountability’ relationship. See also Curtin and Nollkaemper 2005, p. 10 for a discussion of different persons or institutions to which account can be rendered.

  32. 32.

    Bovens 2007, p. 460; and Bovens 2010, p. 951.

  33. 33.

    Mulgan 2000, p. 565; and Bovens 2007, p. 455.

  34. 34.

    Brunée 2005, p. 24.

  35. 35.

    Mulgan 2000, p. 555.

  36. 36.

    Bovens 2010, p. 952.

  37. 37.

    Curtin and Nollkaemper 2005, p. 8.

  38. 38.

    Mulgan 2000, p. 555.

  39. 39.

    Rached 2016, p. 4.

  40. 40.

    Kamminga 1992, p. 5.

  41. 41.

    It is noteworthy in this respect that the right to defend oneself and thereby render an “account” of one’s behaviour is enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953); Article 14 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR); and Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978); It is also found in Article 21 and 20 of the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively, UN Security Council 1993 and UN Security Council 1994; and Article 67 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002).

  42. 42.

    Bovens 2007, p. 451; and Mulgan 2000, p. 556.

  43. 43.

    Mulgan 2000, p. 556. See also Rached 2016, p. 9.

  44. 44.

    Bovens 2007, p. 452.

  45. 45.

    Rached 2016, p. 9.

  46. 46.

    Bovens 2007, p. 452.

  47. 47.

    See Oxford English Dictionary, Online edition, http://www.oed.com. Accessed 10 July 2017.

  48. 48.

    See for example Article 40 ICCPR, above n 41, which invites States parties to submit reports on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights in the Covenant and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights.

  49. 49.

    Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council allows any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the United Nations Security Council to be invited, as a result of the decision of the Security Council, to participate without a vote in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when inter alia the Security Council considers that the interests of the member are specially affected. UN Security Council 1983.

  50. 50.

    For the Universal Periodic Review, see the UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251, which created the Human Rights Council and described how the new universal periodic review process would be a “cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country concerned”. UN General Assembly 2006, para 5(e); see the special sessions of the Human Rights Council, for example UN General Assembly 2017a; and UN General Assembly 2017b.

  51. 51.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2013, p. 5.

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2014, p. 73.

  54. 54.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, p. 76.

  55. 55.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2016a, p. 73.

  56. 56.

    See for example UNAMA and OHCHR 2012a, p. 17; and UNAMA and OHCHR 2013, p. 36.

  57. 57.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2011b, p. 4; UNAMA and OHCHR 2012b, p. 5; and UNAMA and OHCHR 2015b, p. 56; UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, p. 78.

  58. 58.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2015b, p. 55; UNAMA and OHCHR 2016a, p. 73; and UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, p. 78.

  59. 59.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2016a, p. 73.

  60. 60.

    See ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v UK, Grand Chamber Judgment, 7 July 2011, Application No. 55721/07, paras 167 and 172–175 for judicial guidance on the requirement of externality or independence.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    Curtin and Nollkaemper 2005, p. 8.

  63. 63.

    Saul 2017, p. 3; for recent studies of the obligations of armed groups under human rights law, see Fortin 2017; Murray 2016.

  64. 64.

    This idea is explored in more detail in Fortin 2017, pp. 4–5 and 15–18.

  65. 65.

    For the role of State consent in the creation of obligations for armed groups, see Murray 2016; Sivakumaran 2006; Kleffner 2011; Fortin 2017. For the view that consent of an armed group is relevant in the context of human rights obligations, see Ryngaert 2008, p. 308.

  66. 66.

    There is scope for further research on the ‘authority’ of international law as applied by armed groups, but this is left for further studies.

  67. 67.

    Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011, p. 191; see also Sassòli 2010, p. 6 and 25–26.

  68. 68.

    Sassòli 2010, pp. 15–20 and 22; Rondeau 2011, p. 658.

  69. 69.

    Rondeau 2011, p. 659.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., p. 658.

  71. 71.

    Heffes and Kotlik 2014.

  72. 72.

    Sassòli 2010, p. 25; Sivakumaran 2015, p. 130; Ryngaert and Van de Meulebroucke 2011.

  73. 73.

    See Bongard and Somer 2011 for an overview of Geneva Call’s work.

  74. 74.

    Saul 2017, p. 13; Bangerter 2015, pp. 123–124; Schneckener and Hofmann 2015, pp. 96–97. See also ICRC 2008, p. 22.

  75. 75.

    Bongard and Somer 2011, p. 696.

  76. 76.

    Bangerter 2012. See in particular p. 12 on the definition of codes of conduct.

  77. 77.

    Sivakamaran calls this “translation”. Sivakumaran 2015, p. 133.

  78. 78.

    See Saul 2017, p. 14.

  79. 79.

    Sivakumaran 2015, p. 137.

  80. 80.

    Bellal 2015.

  81. 81.

    See n 49 and n 50 of this chapter.

  82. 82.

    Ibid.

  83. 83.

    Mulgan 2000, p. 355.

  84. 84.

    UN Security Council 2014.

  85. 85.

    UN General Assembly 2012b, paras 18–46 and 66–70.

  86. 86.

    See for example, UN General Assembly 2011, para 113; UN General Assembly 2012a, para 133. See also UN Human Rights Council 2009, p. 427.

  87. 87.

    Mulgan 2000, p. 555.

  88. 88.

    Curtin and Nollkaemper 2005, p. 8.

  89. 89.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2011a, p. 11.

  90. 90.

    See UNAMA and OHCHR 2012a, p. 17; see also UNAMA and OHCHR 2014, p. 76; and UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, p. 78 where it indicates that it monitors “public reporting” by all parties to the conflict.

  91. 91.

    See for example UNAMA and OHCHR 2011b, p. 15; UNAMA and OHCHR 2012b, pp. 5–6, 14, 17 and 28–29; UNAMA and OHCHR 2013, p. 33; UNAMA and OHCHR 2014, p. 74; UNAMA and OHCHR 2015b, p. 54.

  92. 92.

    See the analysis of the special unit above. See also for example UNAMA and OHCHR 2014, p. 76; and UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, p. 77, detailing the Taliban refutation of the UNAMA and OHCHR Midyear Report 2016 (UNAMA and OHCHR 2016a).

  93. 93.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2014, p. 75.

  94. 94.

    See the full Taliban response to the UNAMA and OHCHR Final Report 2016 in UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, Annex 6, pp. 122–123.

  95. 95.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, p. 78.

  96. 96.

    UNAMA has often expressed frustration that the Taliban’s statements that it plans to take measures to protect civilians do not translate into better protection for civilians on the ground. See UNAMA and OHCHR 2011b, p. 15; UNAMA and OHCHR 2014, p. 77; UNAMA and OHCHR 2015b, p. 54; and UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, p. 78.

  97. 97.

    For the Taliban’s unlawful targeting of government officials and workers, see UNAMA and OHCHR 2012b, p. 17. For the Taliban’s evolving attitude to the definition of “civilian”, see UNAMA and OHCHR 2013, p. 32. Here UNAMA expressed concern about the Taliban’s definition of “civilian” as “those who are in no way involved in fighting: the white bearded people, women, children and common people who live an ordinary life”. In January 2015, the Taliban broadened this definition to “any person who is not engaged in activities against the Taliban: “those people who do not stand shoulder to shoulder with the enemy forces and are not considered to be carrying out actions against Jihad”. UNAMA and OHCHR 2014, p. 74. In April 2015, the Taliban issued a statement that seemed to recognise that government workers have civilian status. See UNAMA and OHCHR 2015a, p. 66.

  98. 98.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2012b, p. 17; UNAMA and OHCHR 2013, p. 14 and 33; UNAMA and OHCHR 2015b, pp. 44–45; and UNAMA and OHCHR 2016b, p. 61.

  99. 99.

    UNAMA and OHCHR 2013, pp. 32–33.

  100. 100.

    See Bangerter 2011, p. 355; see also Bangerter 2015 on the importance of dialogue with armed groups to promote the acceptance of humanitarian norms.

  101. 101.

    Rached 2016, p. 11; Dubnick questions whether there is a correlation between accountability and future performance in Dubnick 2005.

  102. 102.

    Curtin and Nollkaemper 2005, p. 8.

  103. 103.

    Sassòli 2010, p. 36.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Utrecht Centre of Accountability and Liability Law, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Katharine Fortin

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  1. Katharine Fortin
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Correspondence to Katharine Fortin .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Criminal Law Section, Section Military Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Terry D. Gill

  2. Melbourne Law School, Carlton, Victoria, Australia

    Tim McCormack

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

    Robin Geiß

  4. Department of Law/Public Law, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Heike Krieger

  5. Research Department, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Christophe Paulussen

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Fortin, K. (2018). Armed Groups and Procedural Accountability: A Roadmap for Further Thought. In: Gill, T., McCormack, T., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 19, 2016. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 19. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-213-2_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-213-2_6

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