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Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions: Promoting Respect for International Humanitarian Law by the Security Council

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Book cover Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 19, 2016

Part of the book series: Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law ((YIHL,volume 19))

Abstract

The UN Security Council (Security Council) has the task to maintain and restore the international peace and security. As a part of this task, it has the competence to impose targeted sanctions against individuals and entities that commit violations of international humanitarian law, when this poses a threat to the international peace. In recent years—since 2004—the Security Council expressly created the possibility to actually make use of this competence by adopting listing criteria towards that end in eight different sanctions regimes. Indeed, many individuals and substantially less entities have been listed by the Security Council or a sanctions committee (partly) because they committed violations of international humanitarian law. This tool has also been used against armed groups and their leaders in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that violated international humanitarian law (IHL), e.g. by recruiting and using children. The studies into the two cases showed that these measures have not been implemented effectively and that it is not clear what exactly armed groups should do in order to have the measures against them lifted. More generally, it is questionable whether the Security Council is the best organ to deal with violations of IHL and whether targeted sanctions are useful in ensuring respect for IHL. Because the practice of imposing sanctions in response to violations of IHL is quite new, it is possible that relevant concerns, especially practical problems, can and will be addressed in the future. However, even then, it is problematic to leave the enforcement of IHL to the Security Council.

Hilde Roskam is a Ph.D.-candidate at the Grotius Centre for Public International Law of the Leiden University. She would like to thank Prof. Dr. N.J. Schrijver and Dr. D.A. Dam for commenting on a previous version of this chapter.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    UN Security Council 2009b, preamble.

  2. 2.

    UN Security Council 2014d, preamble.

  3. 3.

    Moiseienko and Hufnagel 2015, pp. 357–358.

  4. 4.

    UN Security Council 1999, para 35.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., Recommendation 22.

  6. 6.

    UN Security Council 2004, preamble.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., para 5.

  8. 8.

    Ibid., para 5(c).

  9. 9.

    UN Security Council 2005c, para 8.

  10. 10.

    UN Security Council 2008b, para 5.

  11. 11.

    UN Security Council 2009a, para 10; and UN Security Council 2010, para 7.

  12. 12.

    Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24 October 1945) (UN Charter), Article 24.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., Article 25 and Chapter VII.

  14. 14.

    Ibid., Article 39. This consecutive order cannot solely be based on the wording of Articles 41 or 42, but follows from the entirety of Chapter VII. See Farral 2007, pp. 64–65.

  15. 15.

    Lamb 1999, pp. 361–388.

  16. 16.

    See e.g. United Nations Conference on International Organization 1945; Brichambaut 2001, pp. 269–276; López-Jacoiste 2010, p. 279; Orakhelashvili 2011, p. 156.

  17. 17.

    See e.g. Orakhelashvili 2006, pp. 68–70; Schweigman 2001, p. 163 and following; Krisch 2012, p. 1258; De Wet 2004, p. 193; Vradenburgh 1991. See also UN Charter, above n 12, Articles 27–32.

  18. 18.

    Kelsen 1950, p. 294.

  19. 19.

    Schweigman 2001, p. 156; Gowlland-Debbas 2011, p. 42; Gowlland-Debbas 2001, p. 288; Shraga 2011, p. 12–13.

  20. 20.

    Orakhelashvili 2011, p. 172.

  21. 21.

    Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951), Article VIII.

  22. 22.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Contentions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1979) (Additional Protocol I), Article 89; Bourloyannis 1991–1992, p. 339 and 342.

  23. 23.

    UN General Assembly 2005, para 139.

  24. 24.

    See e.g. Lopez 2013, p. 781; Roscini 2010.

  25. 25.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002), e.g. Articles 13(b) and 16.

  26. 26.

    López-Jacoiste 2010, p. 284; Al-Anbari 2001, p. 372; Schrijver 1994, p. 155; Krisch 2012, p. 1260.

  27. 27.

    Martenczuk 1999, p. 545.

  28. 28.

    UN Security Council 2014a, para 37(b) and (c).

  29. 29.

    UN Security Council 2005a, para 3(c).

  30. 30.

    UN Security Council 2015c, para 8.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., para 6.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., para 7(c), (d) and (e).

  33. 33.

    UN Security Council 2014b, paras 17 and 18 (Yemen); UN Security Council 2014c, para 4 (Libya); UN Security Council 2015b, para 5.

  34. 34.

    Schotten and Biehler 2008, p. 323.

  35. 35.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2009, para 310.

  36. 36.

    Kandiah Thompson 2014, p. 116.

  37. 37.

    The only other sanctions regime of the eight mentioned in this Chapter that imposed sanctions against an armed group is the regime concerning Somalia. However, Al-Shabaab in Somalia has been excluded here, as it can be argued that this organization mostly would qualify as a terrorist organization. Al-Shabaab has publicly announced that it is cooperating with Al-Qaeda. It is mainly listed for engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia and obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The narrative summary refers to the actions of Al-Shabaab as coercing and intimidating the Somali population. A campaign of bombings and targeted killings was intended to disrupt the elections. No specific mention is made to the violation of international humanitarian law generally, whereas this clearly is the case in relation to the other four groups elaborated on in this section.

  38. 38.

    UN Security Council 2003, preamble.

  39. 39.

    See e.g. UN Security Council 2008a, preamble.

  40. 40.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDe.001, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/entity/allied-democratic-forces-%28adf%29. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  41. 41.

    Ibid.

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2015) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDi.015, Jamil Mukulu. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/jamil-mukulu. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  44. 44.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDe.001, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/entity/allied-democratic-forces-%28adf%29. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  45. 45.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDe.005, Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR). https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/entity/forces-democratiques-de-liberation-du-rwanda-%28fdlr%29. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    The following persons have been listed in relation to the FDLR: Gaston Iyamuremye, CDi.003, FDLR President and FDLR-FOCA 2nd Vice-President (1 December 2010); Callixte Mbarushimana, CDi.010, Executive Secretary of the FDLR and Vice-President of the FDLR military high command (3 March 2009); Sylvestre Mudacumura, CDi.012, Military Commander of FDLR-FOCA (1 November 2005); Leodomir Mugaragu, CDi.013, Chief of Staff of the FDLR-FOCA (1 December 2010); Leopold Mujyambere, CDi.014, Commander of the Second Division of FDLR-FOCA (3 March 2009); Ignace Murwanashyaka, CDi.016, President of the FDLR and supreme commander of the FDLR-FOCA (1 November 2005); Straton Musoni, CDi.017, 1st Vice-President of the FDLR (29 March 2007); Felicien Nsanzubukire, CDi.023, 1st battalion leader of the FDLR-FOCA (1 December 2010); Pacifique Ntawunguka, CDi.024, Commander of the First Division of FDLR-FOCA (3 March 2009); Stanislas Nzeyimana, CDi.026, Deputy Commander of the FDLR-FOCA (3 March 2009).

  49. 49.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDe.006, M23. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/entity/m23. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    The following persons have been listed in relation to M23: Eric Badege, CDi.001, “a military commander of the M23” (31 December 2012); Innocent Kaina, CDi.004, Sector Commander in the M23 (30 November 2012); Sultani Makenga, CDi.008, “a military leader” of the M23 (13 November 2012); Boudoin Ngaruye Wa Myamuro, CDi.019, Third highest ranking military commander within the M23 (30 November 2012); Jean-Marie Lugerero, CDi.028, Coordinator of the political wing of M23 (31 December 2012). In addition, Taganda (or Ntaganda) has been referred to as leader of the M23 by the Group of Experts (UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2013). He is being subjected to sanctions, but his narrative summary only refers to leadership of UPC/L, an armed group preceding M23.

  52. 52.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDi.001, Eric Badege. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/eric-badege. Accessed 4 July 2017; and Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDi.008, Sultani Makenga. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/sultani-makenga. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  53. 53.

    UN Security Council 2005b, para 17.

  54. 54.

    UN Security Council 2016b, para 37.

  55. 55.

    See e.g. UN Security Council 2005d, paras 15 and 16 which demand of those governments to take measures to prevent the use of their territories in support of violations of the arms embargo and impede support to the illegal exploitation of natural resources; See also UN Security Council 2003, para 18.

  56. 56.

    UN Security Council 2003, paras 15 and 19; UN Security Council 2005b, para 19.

  57. 57.

    UN Security Council 2005b, para 5.

  58. 58.

    UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2005a, para 241.

  59. 59.

    UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2006, para 56.

  60. 60.

    UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2005b, para 19.

  61. 61.

    UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2007, paras 139 and 23.

  62. 62.

    UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2008, paras 195–196.

  63. 63.

    UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2009, para 378(28).

  64. 64.

    UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2013, para 205.

  65. 65.

    UN Security Council 2013a, preamble.

  66. 66.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2127 (2013) Concerning the Central African Republic (2016) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CFe.002, Lord’s Resistance Army. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/entity/lord’s-resistance-army. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Ibid.

  69. 69.

    UN Security Council 2016a, para 13(g).

  70. 70.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2127 (2013) Concerning the Central African Republic (2016) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CFi.009, Joseph Kony. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/individual/joseph-kony. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  71. 71.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2127 (2013) Concerning the Central African Republic (2016) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CFi.010, Ali Kony. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/individual/ali-kony. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  72. 72.

    Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2127 (2013) Concerning the Central African Republic (2016) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CFi.011, Salim Kony. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/individual/salim-kony. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  73. 73.

    Ibid.

  74. 74.

    UN Security Council 2013b, para 61; See also subsequent Resolutions, e.g. UN Security Council 2015a, para 25; UN security Council 2016a, para 32.

  75. 75.

    E.g. UN Security Council 2015a, preamble.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., para 6; UN Security Council 2016a, para 7.

  77. 77.

    Although these press releases indicate that they are “for information media. Not an official record”, they often prove to be a valuable source of information.

  78. 78.

    UN Security Council (2014) Security Council Sanctions Committee Concerning Central African Republic Meets with Special Representatives of Secretary-General, Press Release SC/1138. https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11388.doc.htm. Accessed 15 June 2017.

  79. 79.

    UN Security Council (2015) Security Council Sanctions Committee on Central African Republic Meets with CAR Government, MINUSCA and Panel of Experts to Discuss Arms Embargo, Press Release SC/11999. https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11999.doc.htm. Accessed 15 June 2017.

  80. 80.

    UN Security Council (2015) Security Council Sanctions Committee Concerning Central African Republic Convenes Meeting with Regional States on Arms Embargo, Press Release SC/12024. https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12024.doc.htm. Accessed 15 June 2017.

  81. 81.

    UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic 2015, Annex 14, paras 14–15.

  82. 82.

    These are: Joseph Kony of the LRA, who is listed as involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that violate international human rights law, or international humanitarian law (Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2127 (2013) Concerning the Central African Republic (2016) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CFi.009, Joseph Kony. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/individual/joseph-kony. Accessed 4 July 2017); Eric Badege and Sultani Makenga, who as leaders of M23 are “responsible for serious violations involving the targeting of children or women” (Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDi.001, Eric Badege. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/eric-badege. Accessed 4 July 2017; and Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDi.008, Sultani Makenga. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/sultani-makenga. Accessed 4 July 2017); and Innocent Kaina and Baudoin Ngaruye Wa Myamuro (both leaders of M23) who are responsible for and have committed severe violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law, according to their narrative summaries (Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDi.004, Innocent Kaina. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/innocent-kaina. Accessed 4 July 2017; and Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, CDi.019, Baudoin Ngaruye Wa Myamuro. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/baudoin-ngaruye-wa-myamuro. Accessed 4 July 2017).

  83. 83.

    See the list of implementation reports submitted so far: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/implementation-reports (for the DRC) and https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/implementation-reports (for the CAR). Accessed 31 October 2016.

  84. 84.

    Cryer 2006, p. 248.

  85. 85.

    See e.g. Roscini 2010, pp. 352–354.

  86. 86.

    Koller and Eckenfels-Garcia 2015, p. 9.

  87. 87.

    Van Baarda 1994, p. 147.

  88. 88.

    International Committee of the Red Cross 1993, p. 428; see also Van Baarda 1994, p. 145.

  89. 89.

    International Committee of the Red Cross 1993, p. 429.

  90. 90.

    Krisch 2012, p. 1270; Bolani 2003, p. 430; Sassòli 2001, pp. 247–248.

  91. 91.

    Fassbender 2012, p. 60 and 61.

  92. 92.

    Hufbauer et al. 2007, p. 141; See also Ward 2005, p. 167.

  93. 93.

    Biersteker et al. 2016, p. 21.

  94. 94.

    Ibid., p. 14; Giumelli 2015, p. 1356.

  95. 95.

    UN Charter, above n 12, Article 25.

  96. 96.

    See the list of implementation reports submitted so far: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/implementation-reports (for the DRC) and https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/implementation-reports (for the CAR). Accessed 31 October 2016.

  97. 97.

    Alting von Geusau 1999, p. 10.

  98. 98.

    See e.g. Elliot 2005, p. 12; see also UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2006, where the Group of Experts for the DRC refers to the absence of border control and ever-porous borders, and consequently of the failure to implement the sanctions, paras 32, 185 and 216.

  99. 99.

    Forsythe 2014, p. 133.

  100. 100.

    See e.g. UN Security Council (2014) Security Council Sanctions Committee Concerning Democratic Republic of Congo Meets with Special Representatives of Secretary-General, Press Release SC/11577. http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11577.doc.htm. Accessed 15 June 2017; UN Security Council (2015) Security Council Sanctions Committee Concerning Democratic Republic of Congo Meets with Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Press Release SC/12140. https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12140.doc.htm. Accessed 15 June 2017; UN Security Council (2015) Secretary-General's Special Representative Briefs Security Council Committees on Plight of Children in Central African Republic, Press Release SC/12157. https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12157.doc.htm. Accessed 15 June 2017.

  101. 101.

    Koller and Eckenfels-Garcia 2015, pp. 30–32.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Department of Public International Law, Leiden University, Postbus 9520, 2300 LA, Leiden, The Netherlands

    Hilde D. Roskam

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  1. Hilde D. Roskam
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Correspondence to Hilde D. Roskam .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Criminal Law Section, Section Military Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Terry D. Gill

  2. Melbourne Law School, Carlton, Victoria, Australia

    Tim McCormack

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

    Robin Geiß

  4. Department of Law/Public Law, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Heike Krieger

  5. Research Department, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Christophe Paulussen

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Roskam, H.D. (2018). Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions: Promoting Respect for International Humanitarian Law by the Security Council. In: Gill, T., McCormack, T., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 19, 2016. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 19. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-213-2_4

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