Skip to main content
Book cover

Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 19, 2016 pp 63–88Cite as

Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: How Can It Be Improved?

Part of the Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law book series (YIHL,volume 19)

Abstract

How can compliance of non-state armed groups with international humanitarian law (IHL) be improved? In answering this question, this chapter presents a political science perspective and approach to achieve three goals. First, the author discusses the current state of our understanding about the compliant behavior of non-state armed groups in contemporary security. Second, existing legal tools and policy instruments are outlined, with an eye toward enhancing IHL compliance by armed groups. Third and finally, the author provides conjectures regarding the conditions under which some policies might work better than others. This examination of rebel groups and IHL non-compliance calls for more systematic policy evaluation in future research for the improvements of compliance mechanisms to better attain the goals of IHL.

Keywords

  • International humanitarian law
  • Political science approach
  • Non-state armed groups
  • Compliance
  • Non-compliance
  • Compliance mechanisms
  • Armed conflicts

The author is an associate professor of political science at Texas A&M University in the United States of America. Her research fields are international relations and international law and her work has appeared in journals such as International Organization, British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Management and Peace Science. She is the author of Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Her book won the Chadwick Alger Book Prize, the best book in the field of international organization annually awarded by the International Studies Association.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Fig. 3.1

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Dunoff and Pollack 2013 for interdisciplinary effort between political science and law.

  2. 2.

    This definition is consistent with other definitions of compliance: See for example the definition of compliance given by Raustiala and Slaughter 2002, p. 539: “a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule.”

  3. 3.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005.

  4. 4.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978).

  5. 5.

    Krieger 2013, p. 10; also see Sivakumaran 2012a.

  6. 6.

    Clapham 2015; Alston and Goodman 2012; Clapham 2006.

  7. 7.

    Scheffer 2012 specifically notes the connection among three bodies of law.

  8. 8.

    Armed opposition groups are commonly called rebel groups. See Sivakumaran 2012a for the definitional issues of non-international armed conflicts, where hostilities occur between state and non-state actors or between two or more non-state actors.

  9. 9.

    According to the global terrorism database (GTD) administered by the University of Maryland, about half of the terrorist groups are armed opposition groups. But the present chapter will not include terrorist groups that have global aims (e.g. al-Qaeda) because the wars they wage are not non-international armed conflicts. See Duffy 2005 on the overlap between international law on terror and IHL. I also want to note the difference/similarity between rebel groups and terrorist groups. Rebel groups in civil conflicts are defined based on their goals of opposing existing national governments, while terrorist organizations are identified by their tactics to create fear and intimidation, but there are overlapping in the boundaries of rebel groups and terrorist organizations. See Fortna 2015 for instance. According to this definition, ISIS is a rebel group against the Syrian government but also a terrorist group that employs terror tactics. So, this group will be applicable within the definition given in this chapter.

  10. 10.

    In fact, some vigilantes or paramilitaries exercise violence on the side of government or work with the government (e.g. “Rangers” within Pakistani army; Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in Colombia).

  11. 11.

    See Tyler 2006 for the blend of sociology, psychology and political science.

  12. 12.

    Narang 2015.

  13. 13.

    Martinovic 2016.

  14. 14.

    Drumbl 2012; Jo 2015 for the spatial and temporal patterns of IHL violations by armed groups in the issues of child soldiering, civilian killing, as well as in the issue of detention.

  15. 15.

    Eck and Hultman 2007.

  16. 16.

    Jo 2015, pp. 156–158.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    Jo and Thomson 2014.

  19. 19.

    For the reasons as to why armed groups violate IHL, see Bangerter 2011.

  20. 20.

    Humphreys and Weinstein 2006.

  21. 21.

    Cunningham et al. 2012.

  22. 22.

    Crawford 2015.

  23. 23.

    Jo 2015, pp. 59–60.

  24. 24.

    IRIN news (2011) Moves to end use child soldiers, but problem persists. http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2011/04/08/moves-end-use-child-soldiers-problem-persists. Accessed 28 March 2017.

  25. 25.

    Salehyan et al. 2014.

  26. 26.

    IRIN news (2011) Moves to end use child soldiers, but problem persists. http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2011/04/08/moves-end-use-child-soldiers-problem-persists. Accessed 28 March 2017.

  27. 27.

    Jo 2015.

  28. 28.

    For extant literature, see Gillard 2016; Krieger 2015; Hofmann and Schneckener 2011; Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011; Ryngaert and Van de Meulebroucke 2011; Sassòli 2010 and Sassòli 2007.

  29. 29.

    The consultative process initiated by the ICRC and the Swiss Government since 2011 is one such effort, to consider the fact-finding commission, periodic reporting, inter alia. See International Committee of the Red Cross and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2015.

  30. 30.

    Particularly, the area of environmental governance and trade governance as well as disarmament treaties. See Dorn and Scott 2000.

  31. 31.

    Bellal 2015.

  32. 32.

    Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012.

  33. 33.

    Sivakumaran 2012b.

  34. 34.

    Recalling Franck’s thesis on the connection between legitimacy of law and compliance, see Franck 1990.

  35. 35.

    MacLeod et al. 2016.

  36. 36.

    Ratner 2011, p. 459; Bangerter 2015.

  37. 37.

    Supreme Court of the United States, Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, 21 June 2010, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), 130 S.Ct. 2705.

  38. 38.

    International Council on Human Rights Policy 2000. Organizational discipline is one of the key components for preventing civilian victimization; see Weinstein 2007.

  39. 39.

    The General Order No. 1 is titled “An order promulgating a code of conduct regulating the affairs of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces prescribing its powers, duties, and functions, and other related purposes” and the General Order No. 2 was titled “An order amending Articles 34 and 36 of the Code of conduct of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces and for other purposes.” See more in Bangerter 2011.

  40. 40.

    Risse and Sikkink 1999, p. 5.

  41. 41.

    Cohen 2016.

  42. 42.

    Sivakumaran 2009.

  43. 43.

    Blair and Kalamanovitz 2016.

  44. 44.

    At least among states, these naming and shaming strategies have been shown to be effective. See Krain 2012.

  45. 45.

    See more in Klostermann 2015.

  46. 46.

    See the work of 1267 Committee for example in sanctioning non-state armed groups.

  47. 47.

    See Charron 2011.

  48. 48.

    Hultman and Peksen 2015.

  49. 49.

    For general systematic evidence related to ICC deterrence, see Jo and Simmons 2016; Jo et al. 2017. For a skeptical view, see Cronin-Furman 2013.

  50. 50.

    It is well known that the foremost aims of military interventions are geo-political. See Regan 2010.

  51. 51.

    Lake 2016.

  52. 52.

    Aslam 2010 finds this pattern in the post-cold war U.S. interventions.

  53. 53.

    See Morrow 2007 for evidence.

  54. 54.

    Gleditsch et al. 2016. On the civilian killing issue, see Fazal 2013.

  55. 55.

    Its public awareness campaign is “Fighter Not Killer” (www.fighternotkiller.org).

  56. 56.

    Kaplan 2013.

  57. 57.

    One exception is Mills 2015.

  58. 58.

    Consider the work of mobile gender courts in DRC as explained by Lake 2014. Also, innovations by peacekeeping operations in DRC as described in Tull 2015.

  59. 59.

    Mampilly 2015 records the Naxalites in India who viewed international organizations as competitors to local governance.

  60. 60.

    Middle East Research Institute (MERI) 2016; Jo 2015, pp. 160–164.

  61. 61.

    International Crisis Group 2010.

  62. 62.

    See Sechser and Fuhrman 2013, p. 173.

  63. 63.

    Lake 2014.

References

Articles, Books and Other Documents

  • Alston P, Goodman R (2012) International human rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Aslam R (2010) U.S. military interventions and the risk of civil conflict. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33(3):246–267

    Google Scholar 

  • Bangerter O (2011) Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law or not. International Review of the Red Cross 93(882):353–384

    Google Scholar 

  • Bangerter O (2015) Comment. Persuading armed groups to better respect international humanitarian law. In: Krieger H (ed) Inducing compliance with international humanitarian law: lessons from the Great Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–124

    Google Scholar 

  • Bellal A (2015) Challenges of compliance by non-state armed groups. Proceedings on the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts: Challenges for IHL? XXXVIII Roundtable on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, 3–5 September 2015. http://www.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BELLAL.pdf. Accessed 18 April 2017

  • Bellal A, Casey-Maslen S (2011) Enhancing compliance with international law by armed non-state actors. Gottingen Journal of International Law 1:175–197

    Google Scholar 

  • Blair R, Kalamanovitz P (2016) On the rights of the warlords: Legitimate Authority and Basic Protection in Warn-Torn Societies. American Political Science Review 110(3):428–440

    Google Scholar 

  • Charron A (2011) UN sanctions and conflict: responding to peace and security threats. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Clapham A (2006) Human rights obligations of non-state actors. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Clapham A (ed) (2015) Human rights and non-state actors. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen D (2016) Rape during civil war. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford E (2015) Identifying the enemy: civilian participation in armed conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Cronin-Furman K (2013) Managing expectations: international criminal trials and the prospects for deterrence of mass atrocity. International Journal of Transitional Justice 7:434–454

    Google Scholar 

  • Cunningham K, Bakke K, Seymour L (2012) Shirts today, skins tomorrow: Dual contests and the effects of fragmentation in self-determination disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(1):67–93

    Google Scholar 

  • Dorn W, Scott D (2000) Compliance mechanisms for disarmament treaties. In: Findlay T, Meier O (eds) Verification Yearbook 2000. Vertic, London, pp 229–247

    Google Scholar 

  • Drumbl M (2012) Reimagining child soldiers in international law and policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Duffy H (2005) The “War on Terror” and the framework of international law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunoff J‚ Pollack M (eds) (2013) Interdisciplinary perspectives on international law and international relations: The state of the art. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Eck K, Hultman L (2007) One-sided violence against civilians in war: Insights from new fatality data. Journal of Peace Research 44(2):233–246

    Google Scholar 

  • Fazal T (2013) Secessionism and civilian targeting. APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper, American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2300126. Accessed 10 March 2017

  • Fortna P (2015) Do terrorists win? Rebels’ use of terrorism and civil war outcomes. International Organization 69(3):519–556

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck T (1990) The power of legitimacy among nations. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillard EC (2016) Promoting compliance with international humanitarian law. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-10-05-promoting-compliance-ihl-gillard.pdf. Accessed 20 January 2017

  • Gleditsch K, Hug S, Schubiger LI, Wucherpfennig J (2016) International conventions and nonstate actors: Selection, signaling, and reputation effects. Journal of Conflict Resolution DOI:10.1177/0022002716650924

    Google Scholar 

  • Henckaerts JM, Doswald-Beck L (2005) Customary international humanitarian law. International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofmann C, Schneckener U (2011) Engaging non-state armed actors in state- and peace-building: options and strategies. International Review of the Red Cross 93(883):603–622

    Google Scholar 

  • Hultman L, Peksen D (2015) Successful or counterproductive coercion? The effect of international sanctions on conflict intensity. Journal of Conflict Resolution DOI:10.1177/0022002715603453

  • Humphreys M, Weinstein J (2006) Handling and manhandling civilians in civil war. American Political Science Review 100(3):429-447

    Google Scholar 

  • International Committee of the Red Cross and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (2015) Strengthening compliance with international humanitarian law, Concluding Report. http://rcrcconference.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/04/32IC-Concluding-report-on-Strengthening-Compliance-with-IHL_EN.pdf. Accessed 28 March 2017

  • International Council on Human Rights Policy (2000) Ends and means: human rights approaches to armed groups. http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/6/105_report_en.pdf. Accessed 3 October 2016

  • International Crisis Group (2010) The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora after the LTTE, Crisis Group Asia Report N°186. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-ltte. Accessed 20 October 2016

  • Jo H (2015) Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Jo H, Simmons B (2016) Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? International Organization 70(3):443–475

    Google Scholar 

  • Jo H, Simmons B, Radtke M (2017) Assessing the ICC. In: Squatrito T, Young O, Føllesdal A, Ulfstein G (eds) Performance of International Courts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (forthcoming)

    Google Scholar 

  • Jo H, Thomson C (2014) Legitimacy and compliance with international law: Access to detainees in civil conflict, 1991–2006. British Journal of Political Science 44(2):323–355

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan O (2013) Nudging armed groups: how civilians transmit norms of protection. International Journal of Security and Development 2(3):62

    Google Scholar 

  • Klostermann R (2015) The UN Security Council’s special compliance systems – the regime of children and armed conflict. In: Krieger H (ed) Inducing compliance with international humanitarian law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 313–350

    Google Scholar 

  • Krain M (2012) J’accuse! Does naming and shaming perpetrators reduce the severity of genocides or politicides? International Studies Quarterly 56(3):574–589

    Google Scholar 

  • Krieger H (2013) A turn to non-state actors: Inducing compliance with international humanitarian law in war-torn areas of limited statehood. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series No. 62. http://www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen/working_papers/wp62/SFB-Governance-Working-Paper-62.pdf. Accessed 20 October 2016

  • Krieger H (ed) (2015) Inducing compliance with international humanitarian law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Lake D (2016) The Statebuilder’s Dilemma. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Lake M (2014) Organizing hypocrisy: Providing legal accountability for human rights violations in areas of limited statehood. International Studies Quarterly 58(3):515–526

    Google Scholar 

  • MacLeod A, Hoffman C, Saul B, Webb J, Hogg CL (2016) Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed groups. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-04-29-NSAG-macleod-hofmann-saul-webb-hogg.pdf. Accessed 1 November 2016

  • Mampilly Z (2015) Insurgent governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In: Krieger H (ed) Inducing compliance with international humanitarian law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 44–78

    Google Scholar 

  • Martinovic M (2016) The challenges of asymmetric warfare: Enhancing compliance with international humanitarian law by organized armed groups. Anchor Academic Publishing, Hamburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Middle East Research Institute (MERI) (2016) Compliance of armed forces with international humanitarian law, Policy Note. http://www.meri-k.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Compliance-of-Armed-Forces-with-IHL-MERI-Policy-Note-May-2016.pdf. Accessed 10 October 2016

  • Mills K (2015) International responses to mass atrocities in Africa: Responsibility to protect, prosecute and palliate. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Morrow J (2007) Why do states follow the laws of war? American Political Science Review 101(3):559–572

    Google Scholar 

  • Narang N (2015) Assisting uncertainty: How humanitarian aid can inadvertently prolong civil war. International Studies Quarterly 59(1):184–195

    Google Scholar 

  • Ratner S (2011) Law promotion beyond law talk: The Red Cross, persuasion, and the laws of war. European Journal of International Law 22(2):459–506

    Google Scholar 

  • Raustiala K, Slaughter A (2002) International law, international relations and compliance. In: Carlsnaes W, Risse T, Simmons B (eds) Handbook of international relations. Sage, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Regan P (2010) Interventions into civil wars: A retrospective survey with prospective ideas. Civil Wars 12(4):456–476

    Google Scholar 

  • Risse T, Sikkink K (1999) The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: Introduction. In: Risse T, Ropp S, Sikkink K (eds) The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–38

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberts A, Sivakumaran S (2012) Lawmaking by non-state actors: Engaging armed groups in the creation of international humanitarian law. Yale Journal of International Law 37(1):107–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryngaert C, Van de Meulebroucke A (2011) Enhancing and enforcing compliance with international humanitarian law by non-state armed groups: An inquiry into some mechanisms. Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16(3):443–272

    Google Scholar 

  • Salehyan I, Wood R, Siroky D (2014) External rebel sponsorship and civilian abuse: A principal-agent analysis of wartime atrocities. International Organization 98(3):633–661

    Google Scholar 

  • Sassòli M (2007) The implementation of international humanitarian law: Current and inherent challenges. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 10:45–73

    Google Scholar 

  • Sassòli M (2010) Taking armed groups seriously: Ways to improve their compliance with international humanitarian law. International Humanitarian Legal Studies 1:5–51

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheffer D (2012) All the missing souls: A personal history of the war crimes tribunals. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Sechser T, Fuhrman M (2013) Crisis bargaining and nuclear blackmail. International Organization 67(1):173–95

    Google Scholar 

  • Sivakumaran S (2009) Courts of armed opposition groups: Fair trials or summary justice? Journal of International Criminal Justice 7(3):489–513

    Google Scholar 

  • Sivakumaran S (2012) The law of non-international armed conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Sivakumaran S (2012) The ownership of international humanitarian law: Non-state armed groups and the formation of enforcement of IHL rules. In: Perrin B (ed) Modern warfare: Armed groups, private militaries, humanitarian organizations, and the law. UBC Press, Vancouver

    Google Scholar 

  • Tull D (2015) UN peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The travails of civilian protection. In: Krieger H (ed) Inducing compliance with international humanitarian law: Lessons from the Great Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 399–416

    Google Scholar 

  • Tyler T (2006) Why people obey the law. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Weinstein J (2007) Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

Case Law

  • Supreme Court of the United States, Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, 21 June 2010, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), 130 S.Ct. 2705

    Google Scholar 

Treaties

  • Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Heike Krieger for motivating this study and Professor Christophe Paulussen for helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank Yvette Isidori, Margaret McIntyre, and John Niehaus for research assistance. Part of this research effort was supported by the National Science Foundation (SES #1260218). The findings and recommendations in this chapter are those of the author and do not represent the views of the funding agency.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, 2010 Allen Building 4348 TAMU, College Station, TX, 77843, USA

    Hyeran Jo

Authors
  1. Hyeran Jo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hyeran Jo .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Criminal Law Section, Section Military Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Prof. Terry D. Gill

  2. Melbourne Law School, Carlton, Victoria, Australia

    Prof. Tim McCormack

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

    Prof. Robin Geiß

  4. Department of Law/Public Law, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Prof. Heike Krieger

  5. Research Department, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Dr. Christophe Paulussen

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Jo, H. (2018). Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: How Can It Be Improved?. In: Gill, T., McCormack, T., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 19, 2016. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 19. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-213-2_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-213-2_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-212-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-213-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)