Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: How Can It Be Improved?

Chapter
Part of the Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law book series (YIHL, volume 19)

Abstract

How can compliance of non-state armed groups with international humanitarian law (IHL) be improved? In answering this question, this chapter presents a political science perspective and approach to achieve three goals. First, the author discusses the current state of our understanding about the compliant behavior of non-state armed groups in contemporary security. Second, existing legal tools and policy instruments are outlined, with an eye toward enhancing IHL compliance by armed groups. Third and finally, the author provides conjectures regarding the conditions under which some policies might work better than others. This examination of rebel groups and IHL non-compliance calls for more systematic policy evaluation in future research for the improvements of compliance mechanisms to better attain the goals of IHL.

Keywords

International humanitarian law Political science approach Non-state armed groups Compliance Non-compliance Compliance mechanisms Armed conflicts 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Heike Krieger for motivating this study and Professor Christophe Paulussen for helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank Yvette Isidori, Margaret McIntyre, and John Niehaus for research assistance. Part of this research effort was supported by the National Science Foundation (SES #1260218). The findings and recommendations in this chapter are those of the author and do not represent the views of the funding agency.

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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceTexas A&M UniversityCollege StationUSA

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