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A Definition of Terrorism in the Making: Balancing State Interests with Cosmopolitan Ideals

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Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 15))

Abstract

Having thus shown how State-centric and cosmopolitan concerns have influenced the process of criminalising (or creating a framework for criminalisation of) terrorism, this chapter will focus on the definitional process and principally, on how concerns that relate either to State interests or cosmopolitan purposes should shape the formulation of an international definition for terrorism. The analysis will start with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, as it contains the first example of a treaty law definition that can be tracked down at an international level after the establishment of the UN. Secondly, the UN Draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism and the Appeals Interlocutory Decision of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon, as well as some regional instruments and domestic anti-terrorist law, will be compared and contrasted, with the purpose of tracing which definitional elements are the least debated and which ones remain contentious. The comparative analysis of these instruments will reveal some common ground that already exists (and can be used as a safe basis to build upon an international definition) as well as the two major contested elements of defining terrorism: (i) the inclusion of a political/ideological motive requirement and (ii) the exemption of activities carried out by particular groups or individuals from the definition. Subsequently, both these groups of elements will be put under the light of the ‘State sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ debate, highlighting their aspects that pertain to this debate and demonstrating how these aspects should be addressed in the context of finally formulating an international definition for terrorism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Some main anti-terrorist conventions are listed below (n. 7).

  2. 2.

    Kolb 2004, p. 241.

  3. 3.

    International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 9 December 1999, 2178 UNTS 197, (entered into force 10 April 2002) (Financing of Terrorism Convention ).

  4. 4.

    Kolb 2004, p. 234.

  5. 5.

    Cassese 2004, p. 216.

  6. 6.

    Kolb 2004, p. 241.

  7. 7.

    Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 860 UNTS 105 (entered into force 14 October 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 974 UNTS 177 (entered into force 26 January 1973); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 1035 UNTS 167 (entered into force 20 February 1977); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1316 UNTS 205 (entered into force 3 June 1983) (International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1456 UNTS 246 (entered into force 8 February 1987); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1589 UNTS 474 (entered into force 6 August 1989); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678 UNTS 201 (entered into force 1 March 1992); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1 March 1992); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 2149 UNTS 256 (entered into force 23 March 2001).

  8. 8.

    Financing of Terrorism Convention, above n. 3, Article 2(1b).

  9. 9.

    Walter 2004, p. 27.

  10. 10.

    League of Arab States, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (entered into force 22 April 1998) (Arab Convention).

  11. 11.

    Ibid., Article 2.

  12. 12.

    UNGA 2002, Annex II, Article 2(1b).

  13. 13.

    UK Terrorism Act 2000, c 11, s 1(2b).

  14. 14.

    Canadian Bill C-36, Part II.1, 83.01(1b).

  15. 15.

    US Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC§1182 a3B.

  16. 16.

    Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism [2002] OJ L164/3 (EU Framework Decision).

  17. 17.

    Cassese 2004, p. 214.

  18. 18.

    Walter 2004, p. 41.

  19. 19.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (Additional Protocol II).

  20. 20.

    For a description of the existing IHL rules that pertain to terrorism see ICRC 2011.

  21. 21.

    Chadwick 2014, p. 313.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., p. 300.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., p. 301.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., p. 298.

  26. 26.

    Ibid., p. 314. See also UN Commission on Human Rights 2005, para 56(a).

  27. 27.

    UNGA 1994, Annex I, Article 1.

  28. 28.

    Financing of Terrorism Convention, above n. 3, Article 3.

  29. 29.

    Walter 2004, p. 37.

  30. 30.

    Arab Convention, above n. 10, Article 2a. An almost identical provision is included in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, Annex to Resolution No. 59/26-P (entered into force 1 July 1999) (OIC Convention), Article 2a.

  31. 31.

    UNGA 1994, Annex I, Article 3: ‘Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.’

  32. 32.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (Additional Protocol I).

  33. 33.

    Ibid., Article 1(4).

  34. 34.

    Cassese 2004, p. 217.

  35. 35.

    UNGA 1994, Annex I, Article 3.

  36. 36.

    UK Terrorism Act 2000, c 11, s 1(1c).

  37. 37.

    Canadian Bill C-36, Part II.1, 83.01(1biA).

  38. 38.

    Walter 2004, p. 35.

  39. 39.

    Financing of Terrorism Convention, above n. 3, Article 2(1b).

  40. 40.

    EU Framework Decision, above n. 16, Article 1(1).

  41. 41.

    UNGA 2002, Annex II.

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Subedi 2002, p. 163.

  44. 44.

    UNGA 2002, 4. Similar exceptions can be found in the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, above n. 9, Article 12, where it states that, when an act of hostage-taking occurs during an armed conflict and when the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols are applicable, then the said Convention does not apply.

  45. 45.

    UNGA 2002, Annex IV, draft Articles 18(2) and 18(3).

  46. 46.

    Hmoud 2006, p. 1037.

  47. 47.

    UNGA 2002, Annex IV.

  48. 48.

    Walter 2004, p. 38.

  49. 49.

    UNGA 2002, Annex IV.

  50. 50.

    Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24 October 1945) (UN Charter), Articles 1(2) and 55; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 23 March 1976) Common Article 1 which unequivocally provides for the right to self-determination to all people; Additional Protocol I, above n. 32, Article 1(4); UNGA 1960, 1970, 2006.

  51. 51.

    Chadwick 2014, p. 301.

  52. 52.

    Additional Protocol I, above n. 32, Article 1(4).

  53. 53.

    Chadwick 2014, p. 301.

  54. 54.

    Walter 2004, p. 39.

  55. 55.

    Hmoud 2006, p. 1041.

  56. 56.

    Walter 2004, p. 41.

  57. 57.

    Chadwick 2014, p. 311.

  58. 58.

    UNGA 1970, 1st Principle.

  59. 59.

    Hmoud 2006, p. 1034; Trapp 2012, p. 283 where she argues that State obligation to refrain from terrorist conduct is a manifestation of the general prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

  60. 60.

    UNGA 2002, Annex I.

  61. 61.

    UNGA 2002, Annex IV, Article 18(3) (as proposed by the OIC States).

  62. 62.

    STL, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 16 February 2011, Case No. STL-11-01/1 (STL Decision ).

  63. 63.

    Mylonaki 2011.

  64. 64.

    UNSC 2007, Article 2.

  65. 65.

    STL Decision , above n. 62, p. 3.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., paras 43–46.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., paras 149–150.

  69. 69.

    Lebanese Criminal Code, Article 314: ‘Terrorist acts are all acts intended to cause a state of terror and committed by means liable to create a public danger such as explosive devices, inflammable materials, toxic or corrosive products and infectious or microbial agents.’

  70. 70.

    STL Decision , above n. 62, para 49.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., para 52.

  73. 73.

    Ibid., paras 51–52.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., para 52.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., para 69; para 113.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., p. 3 and paras 125–128.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., para 129.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., para 85. For a detailed analysis of the sources of customary law used by the Appeals Chamber see ibid., paras 86–113. For an opposite view on the interpretation of these sources as a sound basis for the customary status of terrorism see Saul 2011.

  79. 79.

    STL Decision , above n. 62, para 85.

  80. 80.

    Puchooa 2011, p. 43.

  81. 81.

    Mylonaki 2011, p. 338.

  82. 82.

    Puchooa 2011, p. 43.

  83. 83.

    Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Chamber of Criminal law, Decision of 18 September 2001, in the case of D D Bouterse, paras 4.4 and 4.7. The Supreme Court overturned an Appeals Chamber conviction for torture as a crime against humanity on the grounds that customary law is too vague as a source of law to base such a conviction.

  84. 84.

    STL Decision , above n. 62, para 101; paras 114–17.

  85. 85.

    See generally Saul 2006.

  86. 86.

    For the purposes of this analysis, ‘persons’ or ‘individuals’ are limited to the civilian population. While Cassese argues that victims of terrorism can be both civilians and military personnel (Cassese 2004, p. 224), this limitation only to civilians relate to the previous acknowledgment made in this chapter that international humanitarian law is the law applicable to armed conflicts where military personnel may be the target of terrorist acts .

  87. 87.

    Saul 2012, p. 91.

  88. 88.

    Cassese 2004, p. 219; Delmas-Marty 2002, p. 67.

  89. 89.

    Kolb 2004, p. 235.

  90. 90.

    This point does not argue that attacks against persons of high political, religious or other status should not be considered as terrorist under any circumstances. However, if the commission of the attack does not endanger the general public, it will probably fall into other categories of crime, e.g. political assassination or murder.

  91. 91.

    Saul 2012, p. 91.

  92. 92.

    Golder and Williams 2004, p. 288.

  93. 93.

    STL Decision , above n. 62, para 85.

  94. 94.

    Financing of Terrorism Convention, above n. 3, Article 2(1b); EU Framework Decision, above n. 16, Article 1(1); UN Draft Convention o n Terrorism, proposed Article 2(1); STL Decision , above n. 62, para 85.

  95. 95.

    Walter 2004, p. 28.

  96. 96.

    For example, indiscriminate violence between Shiite and Sunni groups in Iraq based on ethnicity cannot be qualified as terrorist even if the means of violence used resemble to the means commonly used by terrorists (e.g. suicide bombers or car bombs). See Llobet 2012, p. 106.

  97. 97.

    Arguably, since it is still possible to compel a government or organization for private, non-political reasons (in Saul 2012, p. 89).

  98. 98.

    Walter 2004, p. 29.

  99. 99.

    Filippo 2008, p. 547.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., pp. 541–42.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., p. 547.

  102. 102.

    Saul 2012, p. 88.

  103. 103.

    Ibid.

  104. 104.

    Ibid.

  105. 105.

    Saul 2012, p. 89.

  106. 106.

    Saul 2012, p. 90.

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

  108. 108.

    Saul 2012, p. 89.

  109. 109.

    Habermas 2003, p. 34.

  110. 110.

    Wilson 2009, p. 6.

  111. 111.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Preamble, para 3.

  112. 112.

    Arab Convention, above n. 10, Article 2a.

  113. 113.

    OIC Convention, above n. 30, Article 2a.

  114. 114.

    UNGA 1994, Annex I, Article 1.

  115. 115.

    Financing of Terrorism Convention, above n. 3, Preamble.

  116. 116.

    UNGA 2002, p. 4.

  117. 117.

    Saul 2012, p. 95.

  118. 118.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v Galić, Trial Judgment, 5 December 2003, ICTY-98-29-T, paras 65–66; affirmed in ICTY, Prosecutor v Galić, Appeals Judgment, 30 November 2006, IT-98-29-A, paras 87–90.

  119. 119.

    Text to above n. 50.

  120. 120.

    See Värk 2011, p. 79 arguing that ‘the inclusion or exclusion of the activities of armed forces is mostly emotional and symbolic.’

  121. 121.

    Saul 2012, p. 95.

  122. 122.

    Ibid.

  123. 123.

    UNGA 2002, Annex I.

  124. 124.

    Ibid., Annex IV, draft Article 18(3).

  125. 125.

    UNGA 2010, Annex III, p. 20.

  126. 126.

    Perera 2014, p. 161.

  127. 127.

    Additional Protocol II, above n. 19, Article 2.

  128. 128.

    Trapp 2012, p. 280. Even in the Lockerbie case, Libya accepted civil responsibility only, for the conduct of its officials (ibid) and paid compensation to the victims in order to have Security Council measures lifted (See BBC 2008).

  129. 129.

    Saul 2012, p. 96.

  130. 130.

    STL Decision , above n. 62, para 90.

  131. 131.

    Ibid.

  132. 132.

    Mueller 2001, p. 13 as found in Boister 2003, p. 954.

  133. 133.

    Ibid., p. 955.

  134. 134.

    Ibid., p. 962.

  135. 135.

    Norberg 2010, p. 17.

  136. 136.

    Bassiouni 1974, p. 429 in Boister 2002, p. 200.

  137. 137.

    See Norberg 2010, p. 18, arguing that the adjudication of the crimes that are under the ICC’s jurisdiction today was initiated at the international level, whereas this ‘is not the case with respect to terrorism’. For an opposite view see Boister 2003, p. 955 arguing that ‘[t]he offences established by the suppression conventions are, in contrast, classed by international lawyers as “crimes of international concern” or “common crimes against internationally protected interests” because although the origin of the norm is international, penal proscription is national.’

  138. 138.

    Nadelmann 1990, p. 481 in Boister 2003, pp. 957–58.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., p. 958.

  140. 140.

    Boister 2002, p. 220.

  141. 141.

    Boister 2003, p. 958.

  142. 142.

    Ibid., p. 960.

  143. 143.

    Ibid.

  144. 144.

    Cassese 2004, p. 223.

  145. 145.

    Ibid.

  146. 146.

    Kolb 2004, p. 243.

  147. 147.

    Ibid.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., p. 244.

  149. 149.

    Ibid.

  150. 150.

    Ibid., p. 246.

  151. 151.

    Ibid., p. 245.

  152. 152.

    STL Decision , above n. 62, para 90.

  153. 153.

    Cassese 2004, p. 223.

  154. 154.

    Saul 2012, p. 93.

  155. 155.

    STL Decision , above n. 62, para 90.

  156. 156.

    Cassese 2004, p. 223.

  157. 157.

    Saul 2012, p. 93.

  158. 158.

    Ibid.

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Margariti, S. (2017). A Definition of Terrorism in the Making: Balancing State Interests with Cosmopolitan Ideals. In: Defining International Terrorism. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 15. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-204-0_6

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