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The Reach of Free Movement. A Defence of Court Discretion

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The Reach of Free Movement

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Abstract

This chapter argues that the reach of the fundamental freedoms and the content of the notion of a “restriction” cannot and should not be expressed in a rule-like manner. To the contrary, the fundamental freedoms function as overarching constitutional principles that both demand and legitimize the execution of court discretion. Public bodies, like courts, are vested with discretion in situations where rules are to be avoided, due to the magnitude of phenomena that are subject to regulation. Because of their stiffness, rules cannot serve the purposes of a legal system that pursues numerous, shifting and colliding objectives, such as the EU legal order. Any attempt to establish tests or categorizations that aim to define and exhaust the reach of the fundamental freedoms in a rule-like manner will obstruct the nature of the principles through which free movement is established, secured and developed, and the nature of the legal order in which they operate. The chapter explores the legal basis for court discretion, whether discretion is compatible with the principle of legal certainty, how discretion can fit a conception of the right to free movement as a personal individual right and the constitutional limitations to court discretion.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Dougan 2010, p. 165.

  2. 2.

    See e.g. Bernard 1996, p. 82; Maduro 1998, pp. 58–60; Snell 2002, pp. 1–4; Oliver and Roth 2004, p. 413; Dougan 2010, p. 165; Snell 2010, p. 469; Nic Shuibhne 2013, p. 189 and the famous opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-292/92, Hünermund, EU:C:1993:863.

  3. 3.

    Established case law. See e.g. Joined Cases C-267/91, Keck and Mithouard, EU:C:1993:905, para 13; Case C-20/03, Burmanjer, EU:C:2005:307, paras 30–31; Case C-518/06, Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2009:270, paras 62–63; Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), EU:C:2005:201, para 37: Jansson and Kalimo 2014, p. 526.

  4. 4.

    See e.g. Enchelmaier 2004 and 2016 for a critical assessment of the seminal works of Snell 2002 and Nic Shuibhne 2013. For a convincing critique of Maduro 1998 and the conception of the four freedoms as fundamental political rights, see Roth 2002, p. 22 in particular.

  5. 5.

    See e.g. Snell 2010, pp. 461–467; Davies 2011, p. 9; 2012b, p. 25; Jansson and Kalimo 2014, p. 530.

  6. 6.

    See also Nic Shuibhne 2013, p. 191: “It is thus important to note that it is not (just) the Court that is pushing for an understanding of restrictions beyond discrimination it is (also) the Treaty.”

  7. 7.

    Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Dassonville, EU:C:1974:82, para 5, cf. e.g. Case C-320/03, Commission v. Austria, EU:C:2005:684, para 67.

  8. 8.

    Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, EU:C:1974:131, paras 10–11 (emphasis added).

  9. 9.

    Case C-55/94, Gebhard, EU:C:1995:411, para 37.

  10. 10.

    Cf. Case C-375/14, Laezza, EU:C:2016:60, para 25.

  11. 11.

    See e.g. Case C-76/90, Säger, EU:C:1991:331, para 12, Case C-415/93, Bosman, EU:C:1995:463, para 99; Case C-212/06, Walloon, EU:C:2008:178, para 48; Case C-442/02, Caixa Bank, EU:C:2004:586, para 11; Case C-65/05, Commission v Greece (‘Electronic games’), EU:C:2006:673, para 27; Case C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, EU:C:2009:336, para 24; Case C-110/05, Commission v. Italy (“Trailers”), EU:C:2009:66, para 37; Case C-375/14, Laezza, EU:C:2016:60, para 21.

  12. 12.

    Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou, EU:C:1991:193, para 15.

  13. 13.

    Bernard 1996, p. 84.

  14. 14.

    de Búrca 2002, p. 184.

  15. 15.

    Oliver and Roth 2004, p. 411.

  16. 16.

    Opinion of AG Maduro in Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04, Alfa Vita Vassilopoulus, EU:C:2006:212, para 46: “It seems to me that a consistent approach emerges from this case-law. These three criteria, as they have been applied by the Court, amount in substance to identifying discrimination against the exercise of freedom of movement.”

  17. 17.

    See in particular the elegant analysis of Enchelmaier 2003.

  18. 18.

    The dynamic development of the free movement of capital is illumining in this regard, see Flynn 2001.

  19. 19.

    Kelsen 1998, p. 63.

  20. 20.

    See e.g. Lianos 2010; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, EU:C:2003:333, paras 53–54.

  21. 21.

    Mancini 1989, p. 595.

  22. 22.

    Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1; Case 6/64 Costa v. Enel, EU:C:1964:66; Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom, EU:C:1981:93.

  23. 23.

    Rasmussen 1986, p. 12.

  24. 24.

    Case 4/73, Nold, EU:C:1974:51, para 13.

  25. 25.

    Mancini 1989, p. 610.

  26. 26.

    For another example, see the judgment in Case C-159/90 Grogan, [1991] I-4685, ingeniously analyzed by Lindahl 2008, pp. 303–313.

  27. 27.

    Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, EU:C:1979:42, para 8 (emphasis added).

  28. 28.

    Gormley 2005, p. 22.

  29. 29.

    Case 41/74, van Duyn, EU:C:1974:133, para 18.

  30. 30.

    E.g. Case 113/80, Commission v. Ireland, EU:C:1981:139, Case 177/83 KOHL v. Ringelhan, EU:C:1984:334; Case 207/83, Commission v. United Kingdom, EU:C:1985:161. According to Weiler 1999, p. 366 this approach was “no more than formalist sophistry”, and as pointed to by Hatzopoulus in another chapter in this volume, we have witnessed a change. The Court frequently applies the term “overriding requirements of general public importance”, see e.g. Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 de Agostini, EU:C:1997:344, para 45 or similar expressions, see e.g. Joined Cases C-340/14 and C-341/14 Trijber ECLI:EU:C:2015:641.

  31. 31.

    Halberstam 2005, pp. 781–782.

  32. 32.

    Dworkin 1963, p. 624.

  33. 33.

    Snell 2010, p. 469; Jansson and Kalimo 2014, p. 540.

  34. 34.

    Schauer 1995, pp. 636–637.

  35. 35.

    See e.g. case C-34/79 Henn and Darby, EU:C:1979:295, para 12: “a prohibition on imports […] is the most extreme form of restriction”.

  36. 36.

    Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos, EU:C:2009:336, para 26; Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (“Trailers”), EU:C:2009:66, para 56, Opinion of AG Léger in Trailers, C:2006:646, para 40; opinion of AG Bot in Trailers, EU:C:2006:646, paras 103–105 and paras 157–159.

  37. 37.

    See Enchelmaier in Chap. 4 in this volume.

  38. 38.

    Opinion of AG Kokott in Mickelsson and Roos, EU:C:2006:782, paras 47–56.

  39. 39.

    In the same manner AG Bot in Trailers, para 102 of the opinion.

  40. 40.

    See in particular Oliver 1999, pp. 793–799.

  41. 41.

    Selznick 1969, p. 11.

  42. 42.

    See e.g. Enchelmaier in Chap. 4 in this volume.

  43. 43.

    See e.g. Snell 2010, p. 459.

  44. 44.

    AG Bot in Trailers, para 81 of the opinion.

  45. 45.

    I.e. Case 166/73, Rheinmühlen, EU:C:1974:3; Case C-224/01, Köbler, EU:C:2003:513.

  46. 46.

    As Maduro 1998 rhetorically asks at pp. 163–164: “if the court is the more appropriate and legitimate institution, in the second stage, to balance all the interests and values involved, why is this not always the case?”

  47. 47.

    E.g. Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95, de Agostini, EU:C:1997:344, para 45; Case C-438/05, Viking, EU:C:2007:772, para 80; Case C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, EU:C:2009:336, para 26; Joined Cases C-340/14 and C-341/14, Trijber EU:C:2015:641, para 75; Davies 2012b.

  48. 48.

    See e.g. Roth 2002, p. 8: “Control of Member State measures by the ECJ involves a replacement of a decision reached in the national political process through the Community judiciary.”

  49. 49.

    Case C-380/03 Germany v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:772, para 37.

  50. 50.

    Weatherill 2009, pp. 900–991.

  51. 51.

    On the introduction of a fiction, see Oliver 1999, p. 798.

  52. 52.

    On the intimate relationship between the notion of a restriction and the legislative competences of the Union, see e.g. Dougan 2010, pp. 171–179.

  53. 53.

    Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), EU:C:2005:201, para 37.

  54. 54.

    On proportionality as a “bridge between courts and legislatures”, see in particular Jackson 2015, pp. 3144–3147.

  55. 55.

    See also Kumm 2010.

  56. 56.

    Joined Cases C-267/91 Keck and Mithouard, EU:C:1993:905, para 14.

  57. 57.

    Bernard 1996, p. 95.

  58. 58.

    Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-222/07, Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) v Administración General del Estado, EU:C:2008:468, para 77 referring to, on free movement for workers: Case C-415/93, Bosman, EU:C:1995:463, paras 92, 103 and 104; Case C-190/98, Graf, EU:C:2000:49, paras 21–23 and Case C-464/02, Commission v Denmark, EU:C:2005:546, para 45; on freedom of establishment: Case C-55/94, Gebhard, EU:C:1995:411, para 37, and Case C-442/02, CaixaBank France, EU:C:2004:586, para 11; on freedom to provide services: Case C-76/90, Säger, EU:C:1991:331, para 12 and Case C-490/04, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2007:430, para 63; on the free movement of capital: the golden shares judgments Case C-367/98, Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2002:326, para 44, Case C-483/99, Commission v France, EU:C:2002:327, para 40 and Joined Cases C-463/04 and C-464/04, Federconsumatori and Others, EU:C:2007:752, para 19.

  59. 59.

    Hart 1961.

  60. 60.

    Braithwaite 2002, p. 54.

  61. 61.

    E.g. Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR I-1795.

  62. 62.

    See also Ortino 2002, pp. 161–183.

  63. 63.

    Case 136/78 Auer [1979] ECR 437, para 21.

  64. 64.

    The expression used in Cassis de Dijon Cited supra note 27, para 8. For a similar link to “the single market and […] the achievement of its objectives” in the field of services, see e.g. Case C-522/04 Commission v. Belgium [2007] ECR I-5701, para 37.

  65. 65.

    Enchelmaier 2016 p. 14.

  66. 66.

    While on the other hand the right to free movement is construed too narrowly, see Sect. 2.4.

  67. 67.

    Dworkin 1977, p. 192.

  68. 68.

    E.g. Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, [1979] ECR 649; Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165; Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I-2941, para 36; Case C-546/07 Commission v. Germany [2010] ECR I-439, paras 39–53; Joined Cases C-344/13 and C-367/13 Blanco & Fabretti ECLI:EU:C:2014:2311, para 37; Case C-375/14 Laezza EU:C:2016:60, para 25.

  69. 69.

    Oliver 1999, p. 796.

  70. 70.

    To paraphrase the Court in the “posted workers” judgment, it may be argued that every national rule “involves an additional administrative and financial burden for undertakings established in another Member State, so that the latter are not on an equal footing”. Undertakings established in another Member State must adjust to the peculiarities of the regulation in the host state, to which national undertakings have already adapted. Cf. Case C-319/06, Commission v. Luxembourg, EU:C:2008:350, para 85.

  71. 71.

    Hilson 1999, pp. 448–451.

  72. 72.

    According to Davies 2003, p. 58, even though the Court has eliminated the concept of indirect discrimination from its language, it is still relevant and at the core of the restriction criterion. “It is just that the discussion of it is avoided.” However, one has to wonder: Can a court announce that it will no longer discuss the only thing that matters?

  73. 73.

    Snell 2010, pp. 449, 468.

  74. 74.

    Davies 2011, p. 22.

  75. 75.

    Bernard 1996, pp. 86–87 (emphasis added).

  76. 76.

    As in Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments, [1995] ECR I-1141, paras 37–38.

  77. 77.

    In the opposite direction, Snell 2010, p. 449.

  78. 78.

    Lianos 2010, pp. 705–706.

  79. 79.

    See De Cecco 2014.

  80. 80.

    Opinion of AG Maduro in Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04, Alfa Vita Vassilopoulus, EU:C:2006:212, para 40.

  81. 81.

    Case C-50/96, Deutsche Telekom AG v Lilli Schröder, EU:C2000:72, para 54.

  82. 82.

    Lilli Schröder, para 55.

  83. 83.

    Lilli Schröder, para 57.

  84. 84.

    See the contributions of Tryfonidou, Eriksen and Stubberud, and De Cecco in Chaps. 3, 10 and 12 in this volume.

  85. 85.

    Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para 31.

  86. 86.

    Petersman 2012, p. 307.

  87. 87.

    Petersman 2005.

  88. 88.

    On the integration, see Bekkedal 2011.

  89. 89.

    Opinion of Trstenjak AG in Case C–271/08 European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, EU:C:2010:183, para 187 (emphasis added).

  90. 90.

    See Chap. 5 in this volume, Sect. 5.4.2.

  91. 91.

    As noted by Snell 2010, p. 455 the recent developments in the case law of the ECJ may indicate that the Court has finally embraced the approach suggested by AG Jacobs.

  92. 92.

    Opinion of Jacobs AG in Case C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec, EU:C:1994:393, para 41.

  93. 93.

    Para 39 of the opinion, cf. para 48.

  94. 94.

    Para 38 of the opinion.

  95. 95.

    Schauer 1991, p. 152.

  96. 96.

    Schauer 1991, p. 158.

  97. 97.

    Schauer 1991, p. 157.

  98. 98.

    Para 42 of the opinion.

  99. 99.

    Snell 2010.

  100. 100.

    Thus, as noted by Snell 2010, p. 468 “the notion of market access has in practice had several different usages”—but that in itself is not a valid criticism of the use of the concept.

  101. 101.

    As noted by Enchelmaier in Chap. 4 in this volume, Sect. 4.4.2: “Market access is not a test but an objective”.

  102. 102.

    See Sect. 2.3.4.2.

  103. 103.

    Case C-405/98, Gourmet, EU:C:2001:135, para 25.

  104. 104.

    Case C-442/02, CaixaBank France, EU:C:2004:586, para 11 provides a similar example.

  105. 105.

    E.g. Case C-473/98 Toolex, EU:C:2000:379, para 35; Case C-205/99 Analir, EU:C:2001:107, para 22; Case C-483/99 Commission v. France, EU:C:2002:327, para 41; Case C-372/04 Watts, EU:C:2006:325, paras 95–98; Case C-400/08 Commission v. Spain, EU:C:2011:172, paras 66–70; Case C-472/14, Canadian Oil Company Sweden and Rantén, EU:C:2016:171, para 44.

  106. 106.

    Nic Shuibhne 2013, p. 206; Meulman and de Waele 2006, p. 218.

  107. 107.

    Case 34/79 Henn and Darby, EU:C:1979:295; Case C-275/92 Schindler, EU:C:1994:119; Case C-42/07 Liga Portoguesa, EU:C:2009:519; Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos, EU:C:2009:336; Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (“Trailers”), EU:C:2009:66; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, EU:C:2003:333; Case C-320/03 Commission v. Austria, EU:C:2005:684.

  108. 108.

    Opinion of Jacobs AG in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec, EU:C:1994:393, para 39; Case C-415/93 Bosman, EU:C:1995:463.

  109. 109.

    Case C-515/14 Commission v. Cyprus, EU:C:2016:30, para 46. Cf. e.g. Case C-370/05 Festersen, EU:C:2007:59, para 25.

  110. 110.

    Mickelsson & Roos, para 28; Trailers para 58.

  111. 111.

    Oliver and Roth 2004, p. 441; De Cecco 2014, pp. 384, 390.

  112. 112.

    Case C-362/88 GB-INNO, EU:C:1990:102, para 8. Cf. opinion of AG Trstenjak in case C-445/07, Danske Slagterier, EU:C:2008:464, para 83.

  113. 113.

    Mickelsson & Roos, para 26; Trailers para 56.

  114. 114.

    Case C-41/90 Höfner, EU:C:1991:161, paras 25 and 31. For a presentation of the doctrine on demand limitation, see Buendia Sierra 1999, pp. 163 et seq.

  115. 115.

    Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, EU:C:2001:577; Case C-157/99 Smits & Peerbooms, C:2001:404, para 103; Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré, EU:C:2003:270, para 91; Case C-372/04 Watts, EU:C:2006:325, paras 73–74.

  116. 116.

    Cf. opinion of AG Alber in case C-176/96 Lehtonen, EU:C:1999:321, para 48.

  117. 117.

    Case C-518/06, Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2009:270, paras 69–70.

  118. 118.

    Case 15/81, Gaston Schul, EU:C:1982:135, para 33 (emphasis added).

  119. 119.

    Oliver 1999, p. 785; Davies 2012a, b, p. 27 (emphasis added).

  120. 120.

    Similarly Weiler 1999, p. 353: “the prohibition in the Treaty on (…) measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions seems (…) opaque and (…) open-textured. [T]he text seems to invite a teleological interpretation conditioned by an overarching vision of the Community as a single market place (…)”.

  121. 121.

    Bernard 1996, p. 103.

  122. 122.

    Nic Shuibhne 2013, p. 243.

  123. 123.

    Davies 2012b, p. 29.

  124. 124.

    Opinion of AG Lenz in Case C-415/93 Hünermund, EU:C:1995:293.

  125. 125.

    Case C-464/02, Commission v. Denmark, EU:C:2005:546, para 37.

  126. 126.

    Snell 2010, p. 438.

  127. 127.

    Case C-190/98, Graf, EU:C:2000:49, paras 24–25.

  128. 128.

    Oliver and Roth 2004, p. 413.

  129. 129.

    Enchelmaier 2016, p. 17.

  130. 130.

    Enchelmaier 2016, p. 23.

  131. 131.

    Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-292/92, Hünermund, EU:C:1993:863, para 1.

  132. 132.

    See in particular Maduro 1998, pp. 58–60; Snell 2002, pp. 1–4; 2010, p. 471.

  133. 133.

    Spaventa 2004, p. 765. According to Spaventa, this would not amount to a neo-liberal reading of the Treaty, as long as the proportionality test is flexible and not hostile to regulation as such, just measures that are unnecessary. However, there is a thin wall between the two, and one could very well argue that the hallmark of the neo-liberal approach would be that the necessity of every piece of legislation is questioned (in this regard, see also paras 62–63 of the opinion of AG Tizzano in CaixaBank).

  134. 134.

    E.g. Case 124/81 Commission v. United Kingdom, EU:C:1983:30; Joined Cases C-358/93 and C-416/93 Bordessa, EU:C:1995:54; Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms, EU:C:2001:404; Case C-250/06 UPC, EU:C:2007:783. Cf. Eriksen 2011.

  135. 135.

    Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-2/91 Meng, EU:C:1993:308, para 29 of the opinion.

  136. 136.

    See Reich 1994.

  137. 137.

    Neergaard 1998, pp. 225–226.

  138. 138.

    Snell 2010, p. 471 insists that a choice has to be made.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Oslo, St. Olavs plass, PO Box 6706, 0130, Oslo, Norway

    Tarjei Bekkedal

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  1. Tarjei Bekkedal
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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Mads Andenas

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Tarjei Bekkedal

  3. Faculty of Public Management, Law and Safety, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Luca Pantaleo

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Bekkedal, T. (2017). The Reach of Free Movement. A Defence of Court Discretion. In: Andenas, M., Bekkedal, T., Pantaleo, L. (eds) The Reach of Free Movement. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-195-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-195-1_2

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