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Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume III pp 525–551Cite as

The Right to Develop Research, Production and Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes : Shortcomings and Loopholes in Legal Regulation

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Abstract

The right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination is addressed in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in but general terms (preambular paras 6–7, Articles IV–V NPT). It is characterized as an inalienable right of all Parties, to be used in conformity with the nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. The author examines the character and contents of this right in context with corresponding obligations of States Parties. The relevant rights and obligations are assessed in view of their development over time, considering changes in global security, safety and environmental protection during the last decades. Some shortcomings and loopholes in legal regulation are identified that need to be solved in international cooperation. The tension between the interest of States in keeping civilian nuclear options open as much as possible on the one side, and the interest in preventing acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons and ensuring nuclear safety and security on the other is not fully balanced out by the provisions of the NPT; it rather requires cooperative and sustainable implementation efforts. What is needed is a joint effort in identifying common interests and evolving new potentials for nuclear cooperation. To be successful, such efforts must go beyond the divide between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States and the even more challenging divide between Parties and Non-Parties to the NPT. At the same time, the role of the IAEA in peer-reviewing and monitoring compliance with safety standards needs to be strengthened.

The security and economic benefits of adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty need to be greatly enhanced. Among other measures, there deserve to be provided unconditional positive and negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and against military aggression in general. Also, the promise of peaceful nuclear cooperation contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be fulfilled.

Maleeha Lodhi (2001)

Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Honorary President, International Society for Military Law and the Law of War; Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—NPT—(1 July 1968), 729 UNTS 161.

  2. 2.

    As noted by Shaker 1980, Vol. I, 76, this was apparent from the beginning of negotiations in the conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) when the US and Soviet Co-Chairmen presented their identical treaty drafts of 27 August 1967: trying to convince other members of the validity of their draft proposals they were ‘at one point going to insinuating in a vehement tone the unfavourable implications in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for those who refuse to become parties to the treaty’.

  3. 3.

    See Final Document 2010, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), para 31.

  4. 4.

    As recorded by the 1995 NPT Review Conference, such benefits had not been demonstrated and serious concerns had been expressed as to the environmental consequences that could result from the release of radioactivity from such applications and on the risk of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1, http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/nptconf/21d6.htm, V 2. The 2010 Review Conference affirmed that the provisions of Article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I), para 78.

  5. 5.

    See Anastassov 2014, at 164–172; Nanda 2008, at 49–64; and above, Chap. 10 (Bothe).

  6. 6.

    See Anastassov 2014, at 160.

  7. 7.

    Zhang 2009, at 65.

  8. 8.

    See above, Chap. 1, Part 1.1.

  9. 9.

    See above, Chap. 8 (Drobysz).

  10. 10.

    GAOR, 8th Session, 470th Plenary Meeting, 8 December 1953, paras 79–126, http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/eisenhower-atoms-for-peace-speech-text/.

  11. 11.

    ENDC/PV.325, para 17; ENDC/PV.331, para 7. See Shaker 1980 Vol. I, 276–277; Joyner 2009, at 44.

  12. 12.

    Shaker 1980 Vol. I at 294, quoting the Romanian statement in A/CONF. 35/C.2/SR.9 (17 September 1968), p. 98.

  13. 13.

    Zhang 2006, at 647, 655–657, 662.

  14. 14.

    ENDC/PV.325, para 17; ENDC/PV.331, para 7.

  15. 15.

    American Declaration of Independence (4 July 1776): ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’

  16. 16.

    See ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion (21 June 1971), ICJ Reports 16; Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, id. at 80, quoting Jacques Maritain, Autour de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, Unesco, 1948, p. 16, on the binding character of human rights: ‘… à l’origine de l’incitation secrète qui pousse sans cesse à la transformation des sociétés, il y a le fait que l’homme possède des droits inaliénables, et que cependant la possibilité de revendiquer justement l’exercice de tels ou tels d’entre eux lui est ôtée par ce qui subsiste d’inhumain à chaque époque dans les structures sociales’ [‘… underlying the stealthy, perpetual urge to transform societies is the fact that man possesses inalienable rights while the possibility of claiming actually to exercise now this one, now that, is yet denied him by those vestiges of inhumanity which remain embedded in the social structures of every era’].

  17. 17.

    Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA Statute—(26 October 1956), 276 UNTS 4, amended 1963, 1973, 1989, and 1999), http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/treaties/atomic-energy-act/trty_atomic-energy-statute.htm.

  18. 18.

    See Lodhi 2001, para 17.

  19. 19.

    ‘The inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’ Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT (24 April 2012), NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, para 3.

  20. 20.

    Spector 1995, 23–24.

  21. 21.

    Zhang 2009, at 48.

  22. 22.

    See above, Footnote 3.

  23. 23.

    Zhang 2009, passim.

  24. 24.

    Zhang 2009, at 65.

  25. 25.

    Zarate 2010, at 222.

  26. 26.

    Wulf 2011.

  27. 27.

    See Black-Branch and Fleck 2015, Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law, Vol II, in particular Chapter 3 (Dupont), contra: Chapters 4 (Rockwood and Johnson), 5 (Asada) and 11 (Kellman).

  28. 28.

    See Legal Aspects of Nuclear Disarmament, Report of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law (Washington DC, 2014, http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1025), paras 3–5.

  29. 29.

    Fedchenko 2009, MN 17.

  30. 30.

    Convention on Nuclear Safety (20 September 1994), INFCIRC/449, 1963 UNTS 293; Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, INFCIRC/546 (29 September 1997); Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (26 September 1986), 1439 UNTS 275, INFCIRC/335; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (26 September 1986), 1457 UNTS 133, INFCIRC/336.

  31. 31.

    For similar proposals see Findlay 2011; Gioia 2012; and Anastassov, above (Chap. 7). On a strengthened role of the IAEA in the field of nuclear security see also Vassalli di Dachenhausen 2015, Drobysz and Persbo 2015.

  32. 32.

    See above, Chap. 6 (Grunwald).

  33. 33.

    See e.g. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1 November 1979—CPPNM), 1456 UNTS 125, entered into force on 8 February 1987, amended on 8 July 2005, INFCIRC/274/Rev 1 (amendment not yet in force); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention (13 April 2005—ICSANT—), 2445 UNTS 89; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (15 December 1997, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-9&chapter=18&lang=en); Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (14 October 2005, 1678 UNTS 2014); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (14 October 2005, 1678 UNTS 304); Beijing Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (10 September 2010, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Pages/TreatyCollection.aspx).

  34. 34.

    See Herbach 2016, at 65.

  35. 35.

    See the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/237002.pdf, paras 21 and 22.

  36. 36.

    See Findlay 2011, at 124.

  37. 37.

    See Gioia 2012, at 99–100; see also above, Chap. 12 (Pelzer).

  38. 38.

    Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (29 July 196), 956 UNTS 251, amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, 956 UNTS 335, the Protocol of 16 November 1982, 1650 UNTS 444, and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004.

  39. 39.

    Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (21 May 1963), 1063 UNTS 293, amended by the Protocol of 12 September 1997, 36 ILM 1454, 1462 (1997), INFCIRC/556.

  40. 40.

    As of 27 January 2014, https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf.

  41. 41.

    This important gap is closed in principle by the Vienna Protocol of 12 September 1997, but only 13 States have become Parties to the Protocol so far, see https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamend_status.pdf. They may exclude damage suffered in non-contracting States that do not provide reciprocal benefits.

  42. 42.

    Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention (21 September 1988), 1672 UNTS 302; 28 State Parties (as of 30 April 2014), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointprot_status.pdf.

  43. 43.

    Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage —CSC—(12 September 1997), 36 ILM 1454 (1997), INFCIRC/567; 7 State Parties (as of 17 April 2015), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp_status.pdf.

  44. 44.

    See International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), www.irena.org.

  45. 45.

    This opinion was expressed by Slater 2008, at 62.

  46. 46.

    See Findlay 2011, at 213.

  47. 47.

    See Scheinman 1987, 246–256; Fischer 1997, in particular at 146, 189, 196, 210, 226, 343.

  48. 48.

    For an Indian plea for a comprehensive legal framework see Hariharan 2012, at 120 (‘The only requirement is to abandon all the domestic legislations and have a single nuclear law framework so that the whole process is streamlined.’).

  49. 49.

    World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), http://www.wano.info/en-gb.

  50. 50.

    See 2010 Nuclear Power Plant and Reactor Exporters’ Principles of Conduct (NuPoC), http://nuclearprinciples.org/about/history/.

  51. 51.

    See revised text of the document entitled ‘The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its origins, role and activities’, INFCIRC/539/Rev.6 (2015), http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc539r6.pdf; revised Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, INFCIRC 254, Part 1, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/Files/Updated_control_lists/Prague_2013/NSG_Part_1_Rev.12_clean.pdf (June 2013); revised Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology, INFCIRC 254, Part 2, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/Files/Updated_control_lists/Prague_2013/NSG_Part_2_Rev._9_clean.pdf.

  52. 52.

    2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), para 41. It seems, however, debatable, to what extent this support effect applies to cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. The funds allocated for civilian projects are relatively modest and more than half of this money goes to health, food, water, and industrial applications.

  53. 53.

    See Quevenco (2012).

  54. 54.

    Anastassov (2014), at 192, 195.

  55. 55.

    See above, Chap. 12 (Pelzer).

  56. 56.

    See above (Footnote 8).

  57. 57.

    Preamble, para 6.

  58. 58.

    Article IV.2 NPT.

  59. 59.

    As to the latter, see above, Sect. 16.2.2.

  60. 60.

    Shaker 1980, Vol. I, 300 ff.

  61. 61.

    Joyner 2009, 46–50; and again Joyner 2011, 94–95, stipulates a broad interpretation of obligations under Article IV.2 NPT which is, however, neither in line with the Treaty text nor supported by subsequent State practice.

  62. 62.

    Article I NPT.

  63. 63.

    Article II NPT.

  64. 64.

    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/; Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254, Part 1), and Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology (INFCIRC/254, Part 2), reprinted in Elbaradei et al. 1993, 1517 et seq; Good practices for corporate standards to support the efforts of the international community in the non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/Files/National_Practices/NSG_Measures_for_industry_update_revised_v3.0.pdf. See the IAEA website where the NSG guidelines, which have changed many times since 1993, are published in the most up-to-date versions as INFCIRC’s.

  65. 65.

    Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy (8 August1963), reproduced in Chellaney 1993, at 318–327; see http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/india/nuclear/.

  66. 66.

    Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. With Agreed Minute (8 October 2008), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122068.pdf; see Di Lieto 2015, at 168–172.

  67. 67.

    Lowrance 1976, at 154; Krause 2005, at 3.

  68. 68.

    Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares/Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC).

  69. 69.

    Created as a specialized regional body for articulating common positions and joint actions on nuclear disarmament to implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

  70. 70.

    Kroenig 2010, 198; Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/brazil/.

  71. 71.

    Zhang 2009, at 40.

  72. 72.

    See above (Footnote 64).

  73. 73.

    See Report from the Commission of European Communities COM(80) 316 (11 June 1980), http://aei.pitt.edu/34085/1/COM_(80)_316_final.pdf, para 14.

  74. 74.

    NPT Review Conference 2010, Final Document 2010, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), para 33.

  75. 75.

    Greig 1975, at 82.

  76. 76.

    Id, at 118.

  77. 77.

    Zhang 2009, at 65.

  78. 78.

    Scheinman 2004, at 5.

  79. 79.

    Ibid, at 6–7.

  80. 80.

    Host State Agreement (HSA) governing the establishment and operation of a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel bank in Oskemen, Kazakhstan (27 August 2015), https://www.iaea.org/ourwork/leubank; Rauf 2015.

  81. 81.

    The Chernobyl Forum 2005.

  82. 82.

    IAEA, Fukushima Daiichi Report 2015.

  83. 83.

    See Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (9 February 2015), published as INFCIRC/872 of 18 February 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/cns_viennadeclaration090215.pdf, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/vienna-declaration-nuclear-safety-adopted-diplomatic-conference.

  84. 84.

    See European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), http://www.ensreg.eu.

  85. 85.

    See above, Chap. 9 (Odendahl).

  86. 86.

    Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011).

  87. 87.

    Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), UN DOC A/56/10 (2001).

  88. 88.

    Black-Branch 2015, 370–382, 385; Singh 2012, 204–219, 248–249.

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Fleck, D. (2016). The Right to Develop Research, Production and Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes : Shortcomings and Loopholes in Legal Regulation. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume III. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-138-8_16

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