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Caught in the Crossfire: The Impact of Foreign Fighters on Internally Displaced Persons, Asylum Seekers and Refugees from Syria and Iraq

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Abstract

Foreign fighters, heading to and returning from Syria and Iraq, are considered a global threat by the international community and governments worldwide (Council of the European Union 2014. UNSC Resolution 2178 2014, p. 1). Foreign fighters further exacerbate the violence and the human rights abuses perpetrated both by the regime and the non-State armed forces, hampering the precarious human security of civilians and ethnic minorities, leading to flows of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees and asylum seekers. This chapter seeks to explore the complex, multifaceted links between IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers, and foreign fighters in three main geographical areas: Syria and Iraq, their neighbouring countries and the European Union. It analyses the reasons why people in need of protection may be obliged to use the same routes as foreign fighters and the relevant implications. In particular, it focuses on the impact that the actions of foreign fighters on the one hand, and the policies to detect them on the other hand, may have on the human rights of IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers. This chapter further explores the possible pushbacks against refugees and asylum seekers due to the fear of foreign terrorist fighters in mixed migration flows. Finally the contribution considers UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) requiring States to ensure that refugee status is not abused by foreign terrorist fighters and the extent to which it follows UNSC Resolution 1373 adopted following the 9/11 attacks. This chapter concludes with some remarks, which may be instrumental in reducing the impact that both foreign fighters and State measures to counter them, may have on IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers.

Francesca Vietti is Research Fellow, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa. Previously she worked as Field Officer for the Italian Red Cross in Sicily and Lampedusa.

Mike Bisi is an Independent Expert on migration, refugee and asylum, former Deputy Coordinator Intergovernmental Consultations in Geneva and Project Coordinator Temporary Desk on Iraq in Brussels.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the definition of IDPs see the following section.

  2. 2.

    International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Syria Figures Analysis, http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/. Data are updated to July 2015. Accessed on 10 July 2015.

  3. 3.

    Ibid.

  4. 4.

    United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons 2013, para 16.

  5. 5.

    G. Charron, ‘Forsaken IDPs Adrift in a Fragmenting State’, IDMC, 21 October 2014.

  6. 6.

    IDMC, Iraq Figure Analysis, http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/. Data are updated to 15 June 2015. Accessed on 10 July 2015.

  7. 7.

    OHCHR and UNAMI 2014, p. 4.

  8. 8.

    Ibid., pp. 11–17.

  9. 9.

    T. Arango, ‘Sunnis Fleeing ISIS Find Few Doors Open Elsewhere in Iraq’, The New York Times, 27 May 2015.

  10. 10.

    S. Barbarani, ‘Displaced by ISIS Militants, Hundreds of Thousands of Iraqis Seek Shelter’, Haaretz, 22 June 2014.

  11. 11.

    United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2014c paras 11–12–16. OHCHR and UNAMI 2014, pp. 11–17. See Chap. 2 by Bakker and Singleton in this volume.

  12. 12.

    UNOCHA 2001, Principle 5 and 27. For further information regarding the Guiding Principles see the following section.

  13. 13.

    Norwegian Refugee Council and International Rescue Committee 2014.

  14. 14.

    UNHCR 2014a, p. 1. United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2015, paras 125, 126, 127, 166 and 167. United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2014b, para 63. Human Rights Watch 2014c, p. 605. OHCHR and UNAMI 2014, p. 14.

  15. 15.

    UNHCR 2014b, pp. 6–7.

  16. 16.

    For the definition of ‘refugee’ see the following section.

  17. 17.

    Data available at the UNHCR website ‘Syrian Regional Refugee Response’ updated to 9 July 2015. The UNHCR distinguishes between Egypt and North Africa. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. Accessed on 11 July May 2015.

  18. 18.

    Data refers to the first six months of 2014. UNHCR 2014a, p. 5. Data regarding Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries is available at: UNHCR 2014b; UNHCR 2015b, p. 1.

  19. 19.

    The World Bank, 17 March 2014. The World Bank 2013.

  20. 20.

    K. Shaheen, ‘Near Batroun Fear of Syrians Prompts Patrols’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 19 September 2014. Human Rights Watch 2014d. Erdoğan 2014, pp. 70 and 75.

  21. 21.

    For the definition of ‘asylum seeker’ see the following section.

  22. 22.

    European Commission 2015a. UNHCR 2014a, pp. 3–4.

  23. 23.

    Frontex 2014a, FRAN Quarterly July September 2014, pp. 13–17, pp. 20–21.

  24. 24.

    United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 2014, p. 1. Amnesty International 2014b, p. 7.

  25. 25.

    Resettlement refers to ‘the selection and transfer of refugees from a state in which they have sought protection to a third country that admits them—as refugees—with a permanent residence status’. Humanitarian admission refers to the process by which countries admit groups from vulnerable refugee populations in third countries so as to provide temporary protection on humanitarian grounds. Source www.resettlement.eu. Humanitarian visas fall into the domain of protected entry procedures which ‘(…) from the platform of diplomatic representations, (allow) a non-national to approach the potential host state outside its territory with a claim for asylum or other form of international protection, and to be granted an entry permit in case of a positive response to that claim, be it preliminary or final’. Noll et al. 2002, p. 3. It should be noted that with regard to the Syrian humanitarian crisis, pledges by European Union Member States for resettlement, humanitarian admissions and private sponsorships amount to approximately 1 % of the number of Syrian refugees currently hosted in neighbouring countries. Joint Agency Briefing Paper 2014, Resettlement of Refugees from Syria: http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-syria-refugee-resettlement-geneva-en.pdf, p. 3 Accessed on 15 April 2015; European Commission 2015a. See also UNHCR 2015d. In this regard, it should be underlined that the European Agenda on Migration launched on 13 May 2015 foresees that the European Commission will make a Recommendation proposing an EU-wide resettlement scheme to offer an additional 20,000 places. See European Commission 2015c, pp. 5 and p. 22 (Annex).

  26. 26.

    Human Rights Watch 2014b, pp. 14–21; Amnesty International 2014c, pp. 12–15. Fundamental Rights Agency 2014, pp. 20 and 43.

  27. 27.

    Frontex 2014b, p. 18; Krasimirov and Tsolova 2015, ‘Bulgaria to Extend Fence at Turkish Border to Bar Refugees Influx’, Reuters, 14 January 2015.

  28. 28.

    UNHCR, 10 December 2014.

  29. 29.

    This data refers to the period 1 January–11 May 2015 and it represents a 20-fold increase if compared to the same period in 2014. ‘EU Seeks UN Support to Tackle Migrants Smuggling’, BBC, 11 May 2015.

  30. 30.

    UNOCHA 2001, p. 7.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., p. 4.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., Principle No. 2, p. 8. See also Principle No. 13, p. 12.

  33. 33.

    Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, Article 1 A (2). United Nations http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.htm Accessed 11 November 2015.

  34. 34.

    UNHCR 2015a, p. 5.

  35. 35.

    UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html. Accessed on 26 April 2015. In this regard, ‘group determination on a prima facie basis means in essence the recognition by a State of refugee status on the basis of the readily apparent, objective circumstances in the country of origin giving rise to the exodus. Its purpose is to ensure admission to safety, protection from refoulement and basic humanitarian treatment to those patently in need of it’. UNHCR 2001, para 6.

  36. 36.

    With regard to the 1951 Geneva Convention, Egypt made the following reservations: Article 12.1 (personal status); Article 20 (rationing), Article 21 (housing), Article 22.1 (public education), Article 23 (public relief) and Article 24 (labour legislation and social security). Upon ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention, Turkey stated that ‘No provision of this Convention may be interpreted as granting to refugees greater rights than those accorded to Turkish citizens in Turkey’. In addition, the Turkish government made a reservation according to which it applies the Convention only to persons who have become refugees as a results of events occurring in Europe. Source: UNHCR, Reservations and Declarations to the 1951 Refugee Convention and UNHCR, Reservations and Declarations to the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

  37. 37.

    Norwegian Refugee Council International Rescue Committee 2014, pp. 13–14.

  38. 38.

    UNOCHA 2001, Principle 3.1.

  39. 39.

    IOM 2011, p. 21.

  40. 40.

    The terrorist attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels on 24 May 2014 was allegedly perpetrated by the French citizen Mehdi Nemmouche, who had returned from Syria after fighting with jihadist opposition groups. The terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 in Paris, was perpetrated by Charid and Said Kouachi. At least one of the two brothers reportedly underwent weapons training by Al Qaeda. E. Schmitt, M. Mazzetti, R. Callimachi, ‘Disputed Claims Over Qaeda Role in Paris Attacks’, The New York Times, 14 January 2015.

  41. 41.

    J. Stone, ‘Firebombs and Pigs Heads Thrown into Mosques as Anti-Muslim Attacks Increase after Paris Shootings’, The Independent, 14 January 2015. C. Milmo, ‘British Muslim School Children Suffering a Backlash of Abuse following Paris Attacks’, The Independent, 23 January 2015. ‘#Notinmyname: German Muslims Fear Backlash after Paris Attacks’, Spiegel Online, 21 January 2015. R. Mulholland, ‘Paris Shootings: the Backlash Begins against French Muslims’, The Telegraph, 10 January 2015. European Network Against Racism, 7 January 2015.

  42. 42.

    Ranstorp et al. Foreign Policy, 22 May 2015.

  43. 43.

    Focus Information Agency, 9 January 2015. K. Connoly, A. Chrisafis, S. Kirchgaessner, ‘Muslims in Europe fear anti-Islamic mood will intensify after Paris attacks’, The Guardian, 9 January 2015.

  44. 44.

    A. Philipson, ‘Leave Immigrants on Boats, says Italy’s Far-Right Party Leader’, The Telegraph, 16 February 2015. S. Rame, ‘La Proposta della Meloni: Basta Accogliere Profughi’, Il Giornale, 16 February 2015.

  45. 45.

    M. Pizzi, ‘House GOP: Syria Refugee Resettlement Could Be ‘Backdoor for Jihadists’’, Aljazeera America, 30 January 2015. Joint Agency Briefing Paper, 2014, pp. 6–7. M. Hosenball, ‘US Congress Questions Plan to Admit Syrian Refugees’, Reuters, 29 January 2015. On this issue see Committee on Homeland Security, 11 February 2015. McCaul et al. 2015.

  46. 46.

    In the United States, the refugee resettlement programme was closed for several months after 9/11 even if none of the hijackers had entered the country through that programme. In addition, the number of refugees resettled following the attacks was far below the pre-September 11th levels. Acer 2004, p. 1362, pp. 1368–1370. UNHCR 2011b, p. 69.

  47. 47.

    UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) para 16. See, on this topic, Chap. 14 by de Guttry in this volume.

  48. 48.

    With regard to Italy the meeting between the Minister of Interior and representatives of Muslim communities and associations: Ministero dell’Interno, 23 February 2015 http://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/alfano-incontra-i-rappresentanti-comunita-e-associazioni-islamiche-italia. Accessed on 4 March 2015.

  49. 49.

    See, e.g. Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) website http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm. Accessed on 15 March 2015.

  50. 50.

    See, on this topic, Chap. 14 by de Guttry in this volume.

  51. 51.

    UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) para 2.

  52. 52.

    Hegghammer 2013, p. 1.

  53. 53.

    Young et al. 2014. See for an analysis covering also Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Sinkkonnen 2015, p. 7.

  54. 54.

    Europol, 2014, pp. 23–25. In August 2014, rebel armed groups in Syria, including foreign terrorist fighters, crossed into Lebanon and raided Arsal, killing and capturing security force members. Associated Press, ‘Syrian Rebels Kill 10, Capture Others in Lebanon, Mail Online, 3 August 2014. See also UNSC, Implementation of UNSC Resolution 2139 (2014) and UNSC Resolution 2165 (2014), para 13.

  55. 55.

    European Commission 2015b, pp. 2 and 10.

  56. 56.

    Turkey is considered a ‘two-way jihadist highway’, foreign fighters from Europe mainly transit through Turkey in order to reach Syria and Iraq as well as to return to Europe. Rand and Vassalo 2014, p. 5.

  57. 57.

    European Commission 2015b, p. 10.

  58. 58.

    For instance, the United States counter-ISIL budget amendment for the fiscal year 2015, foresees additional foreign military financing to Jordan (100$ million) and Lebanon (150$ million) in order to provide urgent and immediate security assistance in countering the threat from ISIL and other extremists in the region. United States of America Department of State 2015, Budget Amendment Justification pp 8–9 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234238.pdf. Accessed on 17 May 2015.

  59. 59.

    E. Schmitt and M. S. Schmidt, ‘West Struggles to Halt Flow of Citizens to War Zones’, The New York Times, 13 January 2015. “Turkish Defense Minister says foreign fighters ‘common enemy’”, Turkish Weekly, 19 February 2015.

  60. 60.

    Achilli 2015, p. 4.

  61. 61.

    Saudi Arabia is foreign fighter source country, ‘Saudis most likely to join ISIS, 10 % of group's fighters are women’. Middle East Monitor, 20 October 2014. Saudi Arabians who join foreign conflicts can face between three and 20 years in prison. Source http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php#SaudiArabia. Accessed 6 June 2015. Kuwaitis who join military organisations or participate in military operations abroad could face a term of imprisonment of up to twenty-five years and more if the organisation is terrorist. http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php#Kuwait. Accessed 8 June 2015. Iran is going to share intelligence with Australia to counteract foreign fighters. ‘Iran and Australia Agree to Share Intelligence on Daesh Foreign Fighters’, Albawaba, 21 April 2015. For a comprehensive analysis of the policies undertaken by Syria and Iraq’s neighbouring countries see Chap. 23 by Gartenstein-Ross and Moreng in this volume.

  62. 62.

    See, on this topic, Chap. 14 by de Guttry in this volume.

  63. 63.

    Council of the European Union 2014.

  64. 64.

    Ibid.

  65. 65.

    See Chap. 20 by Paulussen and Entenmann in this volume.

  66. 66.

    European Parliament Resolution of 11 February 2015 on anti-terrorism measures, indicates the EU PNR Directive will be finalised by the end of 2015.

  67. 67.

    See Chap. 20 by Paulussen and Entenmann in this volume.

  68. 68.

    Euractive, 16 January 2015.

  69. 69.

    Byman and Shapiro 2014, p. 8.

  70. 70.

    For instance, ‘the Spanish, with French and German support, are also pushing for curbs on passport-free travel within the Schengen area that covers most of the EU, though not Britain and Ireland, by reintroducing national border ID checks—moves previously rejected on the grounds that they would generate huge airport queues’. I. Traynor, ‘EU Officials Consider Pooling Air Passenger Data after Paris Attacks’, The Guardian, 12 January 2015.

  71. 71.

    In this regard, API is collected from travel documents while PNR is collected through travel reservations. The EU will introduce PNR once the European Parliament agrees. ‘Advance Passenger Information (API) refers to a passenger’s identity such as full name, date of birth and nationality. API is typically obtained from travel documents such as passports. Passenger Name Records (PNR) are collected by airlines solely for their business purposes. PNRs contain information about bookings made, which can include as little as a name, an itinerary and a ticket indicator. Accuracy is not guaranteed and PNRs can contain sensitive personal data’. Source https://www.iata.org/publications/Pages/api-pnr-toolkit.aspx. Accessed on 26 June 2015.

  72. 72.

    See Chap. 20 by Paulussen and Entenmann in this volume.

  73. 73.

    UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014), p. 2.

  74. 74.

    United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2015, paras 125–126.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., para 16.

  76. 76.

    United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2015 paras 24, 125, 126 and 127. United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2014c paras 11–12–16; OHCHR and UNAMI 2014, pp. 11–17. See Chap. 2 by Bakker and Singleton in this volume.

  77. 77.

    OHCHR UNAMI 2014, pp. 11–17.

  78. 78.

    T. Arango, ‘Sunnis Fleeing ISIS Find Few Doors Open Elsewhere in Iraq, The New York Times, 27 May 2015.

  79. 79.

    S. Barbarani, ‘Displaced by ISIS Militants, Hundreds of Thousands of Iraqis Seek Shelter’, Haaretz, 22 June 2014. ‘Divided: Displaced Iraqis Get Different Levels of Aid’, Associated Press, 3 December 2014.

  80. 80.

    Available at UNOCHA website http://www.unocha.org/syria/third-pledging-conference. Accessed on 8 April 2015.

  81. 81.

    UNSC Resolution 2139 (2014), para 5.

  82. 82.

    United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2015, para 53. United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2014a, p. 5. In areas controlled by ISIL, aid delivery is not possible due to the level of deliberate violence. As a result, 600,000 people in ISIL controlled areas in Syria could not be reached since May 2014.

  83. 83.

    See, on this topic, Chap. 9 by Sommario in this volume.

  84. 84.

    United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 2014a, p. 5.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., p. 8. See, on this topic, Chap. 12 by Amoroso in this volume.

  86. 86.

    UNOCHA 2001, pp. 9–17, principles 5–27. On this issue, refer to Section 24.2.

  87. 87.

    UNRWA, Statement on the situation in Yarmouk from UNRWA Spokesperson Chris Gunnes, 2 April 2015, http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-situation-yarmouk-unrwa-spokesperson-chris-gunness. Accessed on 8 June 2015. F. Makdesi, ‘U.N. Calls for Safe Passage from Damascus Refugee Camp under Islamic State Attack’, Reuters, 12 April 2015. ‘Clashes Rage on between ISIL, Palestinians in Yarmouk’, Iran Daily, 5 April 2015. White and Tabler 2015.

  88. 88.

    Including ex Iraqi Palestinian refugees most of whom came to Syria after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. Erakat 2014, p. 593. UNHCR 2006a, p. 4.

  89. 89.

    A. Shubert, B. Naik, N. Thompson, “‘The Deepest Circle of Hell:’ Terrified Yarmouk Residents Describe ISIS Raid”, CNN, 15 April 2015.

  90. 90.

    With regard to other neighbouring countries, besides those discussed in para 24.1, it should be noted that Israel, ‘officially denies entry to Syrian asylum-seekers; however, some Syrians have received medical care in the country’. Norwegian Refugee Council and International Rescue Committee 2014, p. 8. Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait do not generally admit Iraqi or Syrian refugees and generally do not recognise those who manage to enter their territories. A. Lund, ‘The Betrayal of Syria’s Refugees’, Canergie Endowment, 12 December 2014. N. Webster, ‘Former British Foreign Minister Says Gulf Countries Must Do more over Syria’, The National, 19 February 2015.

  91. 91.

    UNHCR 2015b, pp. 6–7.

  92. 92.

    The World Bank, 17 March 2014. The World Bank 2013. Human Rights Watch, 30 September 2014.

  93. 93.

    See Chap. 2 by Bakker and Singleton in this volume. Rand and Vassalo 2014, p. 5. European foreign fighters may return to Europe for multiple reasons, according to Europol: ‘They may seek to set up logistical, financial or recruitment cells, and may act as role models to individuals within extremist communities—further enhancing their capacity to encourage others to travel. In addition, their resolve is likely to have strengthened in the conflict zones, and they may have gained the skills and contacts to carry out attacks in the EU.’ Europol 2014, p. 9.

  94. 94.

    Norwegian Refugee Council and International Rescue Committee 2014, p. 12. The Report refers specifically to Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., p. 5. Amnesty International, 6 January 2015. UNHCR 2015b. Lebanon Protection Update December 2014. UNHCR 2015c.

  96. 96.

    UNHCR 2014c, p. 10.‘The Loss of a Nation’, The Economist, 23 October 2014. Amnesty International 2014a, pp. 11–12.

  97. 97.

    Ibid.

  98. 98.

    ‘Lebanon Announces Unprecedented Entry Restrictions for Syrians’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 2 January 2015. ‘Syrian Refugees Become Less Welcome in Lebanon, as New Entry Rules Take Effect’, The Washington Post, 5 January 2015. I. Hunter, D. Chudacoff, ‘Turkey Introduces Tough New Border Policies for Syrians’, IRIN, 14 January 2015. Norwegian Refugee Council and International Rescue Committee 2014, pp. 9–10. Exceptions are urgent medical care or extreme humanitarian cases, applying, according to the Ministry of Social Affairs spokesperson, to severe medical cases, people with severe disabilities and children at risk who have family in Lebanon. S. Kullab, ‘Regulations Unclear regarding Humanitarian Cases’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 5 January 2015. In this regard, partners working in the framework of the Syria Regional Response Plan advocated for transparent application of humanitarian criteria to allow the entry of refugees from Syria at risk of immediate harm or with acute vulnerabilities likely to seriously deteriorate. RRP6, 2014, p. 46.

  99. 99.

    For instance, in Lebanon, residence renewal applies to people whose status became irregular after 21 August 2014, either as a result of entering through unofficial border crossings or of the expiry of their residency. The residence renewal fee amounts to $200. UNHCR 2015b, p. 2.

  100. 100.

    For instance, in Lebanon, renewal of residency has become more difficult due to additional requirements, such as a housing pledge. Besides, according to recent circulars issued by the Directorate General of General Security, Syrians registered as refugees by UNHCR must sign a pledge not to work, while Syrians who are not registered as refugees by UNHCR need a Lebanese sponsor signing a pledge of responsibility for the Syrian person/family. Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon 2015.

  101. 101.

    Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum 2014, p. 9. UNHCR 2015b, p. 2.

  102. 102.

    Amnesty International 2014a, pp. 12–13; Human Rights Watch 2014a; Amnesty International 2014d; Human Rights Watch 2014e; Amnesty International 2014c, pp. 11–12. Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum 15 July 2014, p. 10.

  103. 103.

    Amnesty International 2014a, pp. 13–17.

  104. 104.

    UNHCR 2014d p 11. UNHCR 2014e, p. 16. Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq received fewer Syrian refugees than expected; Turkey received far more Syrian refugees than projected.

  105. 105.

    Human Rights Watch 2014a, p. 1. Herbert 2014, p. 78.

  106. 106.

    UNHCR 2014d, p. 12.

  107. 107.

    Norwegian Refugee Council and International Rescue Committee 2014, p. 8.

  108. 108.

    UNHCR 2014f, p. 10. UNHCR 2014e, pp. 65, 316 and 406.

  109. 109.

    UNHCR 2014e, p. 65.

  110. 110.

    Andreychuk 2014, para 7. Y. Narushima, “You Never Know Who You Are Going to Meet on Turkey’s ‘Jihadi Highway’”, Reuters, 23 September 2014. M. Srivastava and S. Hacaoglu, ‘A mere $25 Buys Illegal Crossing on Turkish Border with Syria’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 8 September 2014. This is not a new phenomenon, see, R. Spencer, ‘Terrorists Posing as Refugees in Yemen’, The Telegraph, 21 November 2010.

  111. 111.

    UNHCR 2006b.

  112. 112.

    Human Rights Watch 2009. UNHCR, 16 May 2006.

  113. 113.

    This is the case for instance of Shiite Afghan refugees mainly belonging to the Persian-speaking Hazara ethnic group who sought refuge in Syria before the war started in 2011 and are fighting to support the Assad regime. Smyth 2015, p. 41.

  114. 114.

    Shiite Afghan refugees in Iran were allegedly recruited and paid to support the Assad regime in Syria. F. Fassihi, ‘Iran Pays Afghans to Fight for Assad’, The Wall Street Journal, 22 May 2014. Smyth 2015, pp. 41–42. Other sources refer that Chechen refugees living in Europe have been recruited to support the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra. ‘The Chechen Foreign Fighter Threat’, The Soufan Group Intelligent Brief, 21 November 2014.

  115. 115.

    UNHCR 2015b, p. 2.

  116. 116.

    For instance, Syrian refugees in Lebanon, mostly Sunnis, are considered by the government a threat to national security as they could destabilise and alter the confessional composition of the population. The Daily Star Lebanon, 19 November 2014.

  117. 117.

    Barrett 2014, p. 26; Skidmore 2014, p. 53; Lewitt, June 2014, pp. 17–18. Abi-Habib, The Wall Street Journal 20 November 2013; A. Lund, ‘Lebanon’s Dangerous Downward Spiral’, Canergie Endowment, 24 November 2014.

  118. 118.

    Human Rights Watch 2014d, p. 13–14. UNHCR 2013, p. 4. Sommerfelt and Taylor 2015, p. 3.

  119. 119.

    ‘Syrian Refugees Could Pose Terrorist Threat: Lebanon Minister’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 25 November 2014. Coughlan, BBC, 22 January 2015.

  120. 120.

    They may be radicalised by some Sunni extremist groups against Hezbollah or against the Syrian regime. R. Lefèvre, ‘Tackling Sunni Radicalization in Lebanon’, Canergie Middle East Center, 24 December 2014. J. Halaby, ‘AP Exclusive: Syria Rebels Recruit at Refugee Camp’, Associated Press, 11 November 2013.

  121. 121.

    Milton et al. 2013, p. 626.

  122. 122.

    Koser 2015, 20 February 2015.

  123. 123.

    ‘Lebanese Army Raids Syrian Refugee Camps in Arsal’, BBC, 25 September 2014. S. Kullab, ‘Lebanon Refugee-Camp Raids Fuel Resentment’, Al Jazeera, 28 September 2014.

  124. 124.

    V. Rainey, ‘17,000 Refugees Risk Eviction From Homes’, Daily Star Lebanon, 7 February 2015. UNHCR 2015a Syrian Refugees: Inter-agency Regional Update 18 February, p. 3.

  125. 125.

    Frontex FRAN Quarterly July September 2014, p. 49.

  126. 126.

    UNHCR 2015a.

  127. 127.

    Data available in EASO Quarterly Report Q3.

  128. 128.

    The recast Dublin Regulation is one of the pillars of the Common European Asylum System and establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum application lodged by a third country national or a Stateless person. Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, Official Journal of the European Union 29 June 2013.

  129. 129.

    Relocation is the transfer of persons having an international protection status within the meaning of Directive 2011/95/EU from the Member State which granted them international protection to another Member State where they will be granted similar protection and of persons having applied for international protection from the Member State which is responsible for examining their application to another Member State where their applications for international protection will be examined. European Commission 2015d, p. 7.

  130. 130.

    In general terms referring to all asylum applications from all nationalities (not only Syrians and Iraqis), it should be noted that in 2014, five EU Member States (Germany, Sweden, Italy, France and Hungary) dealt with 72 % of asylum application. European Commission 2015c, p. 13; European Commission 2015d, pp. 6–7. In this regard, the European Agenda on Migration presented by the European Commission on 13 May 2015 foresees relocation among EU Member States on the basis of some criteria such as GDP, size of population, unemployment rate, past number of asylum seekers and of resettled refugees. European Commission 2015c, pp. 4 and p. 21 (Annex).

  131. 131.

    With regard to Greece see: T. Lister and I. Mantzikos, ‘Add This to Greece’s List of Problems: It’s an Emerging Hub for Terrorists’, CNN, 26 January 2015. R. Sherlock and C. Freeman, “Islamic State ‘Planning to Use Libya as Gateway to Europe’”, The Telegraph, 17 February 2015. As to Bulgaria, the Bulgarian government expressed concern that terrorists could enter the country under the cover of asylum seekers and is adding 130 km of fence to its border. Euractive 2014. On Italy see: S. Tomlinson, “Britain Warned to Expect ‘Boats Full of Terrorists’ as ISIS Tightens Grip on Libya and 2,000 migrants are rescued from the Mediterranean” Mail Online, 18 February 2015. Roberts, Daily Mail, 19 February 2015. N. Squires, ‘Italy Fears Refugee Exodus from Libya Will Cross Mediterranean’, The Telegraph, 17 February 2015. Sarzanini, ‘Isis, Libia e Allerta in Italia. Strategia dei Miliziani: più Sbarchi per Creare Caos. Si Temono 200.000 Arrivi’, Corriere della Sera, 17 February 2015. In this regard, it should be noted the eventual use of the Central Mediterranean route by foreign terrorist fighters and jihadists could be considered as risky and perilous as most wooden fishing vessels and inflatable boats depart from the Libyan coasts. On the other hand, using the Eastern Mediterranean route implies embarking in far larger and safer vessel ships, Frontex, 24 December 2014. According to other researchers it is highly debatable that terrorists would use boats to head to Europe: A. Armellini, ‘Immigration Debate in Italy Heats Up after Paris Attacks’, Dpa International,16 January 2015.

  132. 132.

    Italian Parliament 2015, p. 22. Italian Parliament 2014a, pp. 6, 10 and 19; Italian Parliament 2014b, p. 8. Italian Parliament 2014c.

  133. 133.

    In the case of foreign terrorist fighters from third countries.

  134. 134.

    J. Crone, ‘ISIS Plotting Trojan Horse Campaign by Smuggling Militants into Western Europe Disguised as Refugees’, Daily Mail, 6 October 2014. P. Messina, ‘Terrorismo, Chi Sono gli 800 Jihadisti Pronti a Colpire l’Italia L’Espresso, 15 January 2015. ‘Isis in Italia sui Barconi dei Migranti?’, Corriere di Ragusa, 17 February 2015.

  135. 135.

    See n. 40 above.

  136. 136.

    Europol 2014, 29 May 2014; Council of the European Union 2014.

  137. 137.

    Acer 2004, p. 1362.

  138. 138.

    UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), para 3 (f).

  139. 139.

    Ibid. para 3 (g).

  140. 140.

    Acer 2004, p. 1362.

  141. 141.

    In this regard it should be noted that a recent study carried out by the Fundamental Rights Agency in several land border areas (including Kapitan Andreevo/Kapikule at the Bulgarian–Turkish border and Kipi/Ipsala at the Greek–Turkish border) found that more training is needed in the domain of identification of asylum seekers among travellers. Fundamental Rights Agency 2014, pp. 21 and 43.

  142. 142.

    See Section 24.2.

  143. 143.

    Eurojust 2014, p. 1.

  144. 144.

    UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014), p. 3.

  145. 145.

    Ibid. paras 2, 11, 14.

  146. 146.

    See Chap. 23 by Van Waas in this volume.

  147. 147.

    UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014), p 3. Goodwin-Gill 2014, p. 17. See Chap. 23 by Van Waas in this volume.

  148. 148.

    Goodwin Gill 2014, p. 18.

  149. 149.

    Although most EU Member States can detain asylum applicants who enter irregularly on several grounds, (European Commission 2014, pp. 15–16), Italy does not systematically detain asylum applicants (Global Detention Project 2015, p. 7). In Bulgaria the detention of this group is prohibited (European Commission 2014, pp. 15) Greece no longer detains asylum seekers, ‘More than 300 migrants released’, Ekathimerini, 26 February 2015.

  150. 150.

    UNHCR 2011a, para 147.

  151. 151.

    The Geneva Convention 1951 Article 1 F.

  152. 152.

    A crime against peace involves the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. Given the nature of this crime, it can only be committed by those in a high position of authority representing a State or a State-like entity’. UNHCR 2011a, para 11, p. 118.

  153. 153.

    War crimes cover such acts as ‘willful killing and torture of civilians, launching indiscriminate attacks on civilians and willfully depriving a civilian or a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial’. UNHCR 2011a, para 12, p. 118.

  154. 154.

    Crimes against humanity ‘cover acts such as genocide, murder, rape and torture, (…) they must be carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population. An isolated act can, however, constitute a crime against humanity if it is part of a coherent system or a series of systematic and repeated acts’. UNHCR 2011a, para 13, p. 118.

  155. 155.

    According to the UNHCR Handbook, in determining the seriousness of a crime the following factors need to be considered: ‘the nature of the act, the actual harm inflicted, the form of procedure used to prosecute the crime, the nature of the penalty and whether most jurisdiction would consider it a serious crime’. UNHCR 2011a para 14, p. 118. In addition, ‘a serious crime should be considered non-political when other motives (such as personal reasons or gain) are the predominant feature of the specific crime committed. (…) The motivation, context, methods and proportionality of a crime to its objectives are important factors in evaluating its political nature’.

  156. 156.

    See, on this topic, Section 25.3.

  157. 157.

    See on this issue Zard 2002, pp. 33–34.

  158. 158.

    UNSC Resolution 1377 2001, p. 2. In this realm, the UNHCR clarified the lack of a universal definition of terrorism and the need to go beyond the focus on ‘terrorist label’ as ‘a more reliable guide to the correct application of Article 1F (c) in cases involving a terrorist act is the extent to which the act impinges on the international plane in terms of its gravity, international impact and implications for peace and security’ UNHCR 2003, para 49.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    In this regard, the prohibition of torture set forth in the United Nations Convention against Torture, Article 3, and in the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3, applies without exception.

  161. 161.

    UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) p. 3

  162. 162.

    For instance, with regard to the Netherlands which has one of the most developed exclusion systems in Europe, while there is evidence of persons associated with the Assad regime being excluded under Article 1F, no opposition fighters have been excluded in this framework. This could be also due to the fact that ‘immigration authorities have difficulties recognising opposition members or getting enough information to support the conclusion that Article 1F applies’. Bolhuis 2015.

  163. 163.

    UNHCR 2011a para 26, pp. 120–121.

  164. 164.

    UNHCR 2011a para 149 and Annex 5, p. 120, para 25.

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Vietti, F., Bisi, M. (2016). Caught in the Crossfire: The Impact of Foreign Fighters on Internally Displaced Persons, Asylum Seekers and Refugees from Syria and Iraq. In: de Guttry, A., Capone, F., Paulussen, C. (eds) Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-099-2_24

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