Two Ways of Leaving: A Comparative Case Study on Exit Strategies of a UN and A NATO Led Mission

  • Sander Dalenberg
  • Marenne Mei Jansen
Part of the NL ARMS book series (NLARMS)


In crisis areas, military and civilian missions are often simultaneously active, but they have different mandates and are executed by different organisations. Also the way those organisations leave a country after an intervention differs. This chapter provides a comparison between the military (ISAF/NTM-A) and political (UNAMA) mission in Afghanistan. In 2009, both missions designed their exit strategy as transition-oriented. In practice, however, the military and political exit strategies were operationalised differently. Interviews with employees of both organisations reveal UNAMA being more process (Afghan led and Afghan owned) oriented and ISAF being more project-oriented


Afghanistan Transition Exit-strategy NATO UN UNAMA ISAF 


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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Netherlands Defence AcademyBredaThe Netherlands

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