Getting Away with Exit: The Role of Strategic Communication

Part of the NL ARMS book series (NLARMS)


Strategic communication includes all messages and activities across the levels of war in order to affect target audiences and to encourage certain behaviour. It can be divided into a horizontal way, the way the messages and activities are crafted and sent to touch the public, and a vertical way, the way to ensure that all levels in an organisation speak with one voice. Strategic communication is inevitably related to exit strategy. During every military operation the constituency of a western democratic nation requires to be informed about the undertaking, from beginning till the end. In the case of Operation TELIC, the British participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the strategic communication was lacking in vision and synchronisation. It was fragmented and seriously in discord. Due to the struggles of Operation TELIC, the British public lost its trust in its government.


strategic communication public support Operation TELIC Iraq Tony Blair 


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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Netherlands Defence AcademyBredaThe Netherlands

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