The Comprehensive Approach and the Problem of Exiting Civil Military Cooperation: Lessons from Uruzgan

  • Peter Olsthoorn
  • Myriame Bollen
  • Ernst Lobbezoo
  • Sebastiaan Rietjens
Chapter
Part of the NL ARMS book series (NLARMS)

Abstract

The Comprehensive Approach was devised to facilitate cooperation between civilian and military actors, to tackle causes of instability and to create a more safe and secure environment in areas of conflict. Due to weak governance and with police and military not up to their job, a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was needed to bring these goods in Uruzgan. This chapter discusses, against the background of the Netherlands’ contribution to that PRT, the concept of exiting from a civil-military perspective; cooperation during the exit phase is vital in order to secure results reached. In Uruzgan, a short but intense period of cooperation with the Australian successors ensured a relatively smooth handover, with the Australians continuing to work on more or less similar lines as the Dutch had done.

Keywords

Comprehensive approach Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) civil-military relations Afghanistan military transition 

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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Olsthoorn
    • 1
  • Myriame Bollen
    • 1
  • Ernst Lobbezoo
    • 1
  • Sebastiaan Rietjens
    • 1
  1. 1.Netherlands Defence AcademyBredaThe Netherlands

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