The NPT and the IAEA Additional Protocol

  • Masahiko AsadaEmail author


The importance of having in place an effective verification system that goes beyond declaration-based verification under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and thus the importance of the Additional Protocol and of its universalization, has long been recognized and expressed within the framework of both the IAEA and the NPT. However, despite the recent increase in the number of States that have brought an Additional Protocol into force, its universalization still is a distant goal. This chapter first considers whether one can argue that the conclusion and bringing into force of an Additional Protocol is an obligation under the NPT. It then discusses the ways and means to make the Additional Protocol universal. Such ways and means may take the form of a direct call for the conclusion of an Additional Protocol. Its universalization may also be pursued indirectly by requiring a State to conclude an Additional Protocol as a condition for benefiting in nuclear cooperation. Possibilities and limitations are explored for both of these (direct and indirect) approaches.


Additional protocol Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Verification 


  1. Ahlström C (2006) Legal aspects of the Indian-US civil nuclear cooperation initiative. SIPRI yearbook, pp 669–685Google Scholar
  2. Asada M (2004) Arms control law in crisis?: a study of the North Korean nuclear issue. J Conflict Secur Law 9:331–355CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Aust A (2013) Modern treaty law and practice, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  4. Boese W (2004) U.S. nuclear trade restriction initiatives still on hold. Arms Control Today 34:19Google Scholar
  5. Brownlie I (2008) Principles of public international law, 7th edn. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  6. Carnahan BM (1987) Treaty review conferences. AJIL 81:226–230CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Choubey D (2010) Future prospects for the NPT. Arms Control Today 40:25–29Google Scholar
  8. Crail P (2009) IAEA approves India additional protocol. Arms Control Today 39:39–40Google Scholar
  9. Doherty B (2013) Australia and India to Start Uranium Sale Talks, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 March 2013Google Scholar
  10. Firmage EB (1969) The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. AJIL 63:711–746CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Fischer D (1997) History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first forty years. IAEA, ViennaGoogle Scholar
  12. Ford CA (2007) Interpreting article vi of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation Rev 14:401–428CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Ford CA (2010) Nuclear technology rights and wrongs: the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, article iv, and nonproliferation. In: Sokolski H (ed) Reviewing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, pp 237–383Google Scholar
  14. Goldschmidt B (1977) A historical survey of nonproliferation policies. Int Secur 2:69–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. von Heinegg WH (2014) Treaties, fundamental change of circumstances, Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law.
  16. Hirsch T (2004) The IAEA additional protocol: what it is and why it matters. Nonproliferation Rev 11:140–166CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Horner D (2010) NSG makes little headway at meeting. Arms Control Today 40:45Google Scholar
  18. Huntington W (2005) Brazilian regulator denies uranium claims. Arms Control Today 35:37Google Scholar
  19. Jennings R, Watts A (eds) (1992) Oppenheim’s international law, vol I, 9th edn. Longman, HarlowGoogle Scholar
  20. Jonas DS (2006) The new U.S. approach to the fissile material cutoff treaty: will deletion of a verification regime provide a way out of the wilderness? Florida J Int Law 18:597–677Google Scholar
  21. Michel Q (2007) Critical reflections on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nucl Law Bull 80:21–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Müller H (2005) Farewell to arms: what’s blocking nuclear disarmament? IAEA Bull 46:12–15Google Scholar
  23. Ntoubandi FZ (2008) Reflections on the USA-India atomic energy cooperation. J Conflict Secur Law 13:273–287CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Pomper MA (2008) Nuclear suppliers make progress on new rules. Arms Control Today 38:52–53Google Scholar
  25. Shaker MI (1980) The nuclear non-proliferation treaty: origin and implementation 1959–1979, vol I. Oceana Publications, LondonGoogle Scholar
  26. Simma B, Tams CJ (2011) Article 60: termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach. In: Corten O, Klein P (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the law of treaties: a commentary, vol. II. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1351–1378Google Scholar
  27. Sinclair I (1984) The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, 2nd edn. Manchester University Press, ManchesterGoogle Scholar
  28. Yasseen MK (1976) L’interprétation des traités d’après la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités. Recueil des Cours 151:1–114Google Scholar
  29. Zhang X (2006) The Riddle of “inalienable right” in article iv of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: intentional ambiguity. Chin J Int Law 5:647–662CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of GovernmentKyoto UniversitySayo-KuJapan

Personalised recommendations