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Enforcing Nuclear Non-Proliferation—The Role of Verification

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law

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Abstract

Nuclear non-proliferation verification should be framed as a multiple negative in connection with deterring and detecting States’ nuclear activities so as to impel States to neither develop nor otherwise acquire disallowed weapons. Accordingly, international authorities must have legal authority to determine whether non-proliferation obligations are satisfied, to resolve doubts about compliance, and in the rare case to coercively enforce such obligations. Ultimately, verification necessarily entails an elevation of legal authority to judge a State’s behaviour from self-appointed State political and military elites to technical elites within the United Nations or other international organizations, thereby strengthening global governance in the cause of peace and security. The international community must know what States are doing with and about nuclear and other weapons, and this superior interest must trump the strategic interests of any particular State. This chapter first asserts that the core imperative of verification must be to enable detection of violations of non-proliferation obligations, and it frames the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) role in verifying compliance with States’ mutual commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. It then addresses two controversies associated with nuclear non-proliferation verification, respectively: the scope of States’ legal obligation to allow the IAEA to resolve doubts about compliance, and the Security Council’s authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations pursuant to recent international law decisions. The author concludes that the IAEA is fully mandated to verify not only the correctness but also the completeness of a State’s reports, and the Security Council has unreviewable authority to enforce international obligations in the maintenance of peace and security.

Professor and Director, International Weapons Control Center, DePaul University College of Law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a useful introduction on how understanding non-proliferation verification can offer useful insights for controlling other weapons, see M. Dreicer and G. Stein, Applicability of Non-Proliferation Tools and Concepts to Future Arms Control, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LLNL-CONG-636652 (May 2013) and C.R. Wuest, The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LLNL-TR-564612.

  2. 2.

    See generally, Avenhaus and Kyriakopoulos 2006.

  3. 3.

    See Verification in All Its Aspects: Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, UN Doc. A/45/372 (1990).

  4. 4.

    See generally, Schelling 1966.

  5. 5.

    At the recent Nuclear Security Summit, 2014, 35 nations agreed to implement nuclear security recommendations from the IAEA. See generally Partnership for Global Security, Nuclear Security Summit Paves Way for Future Regime, (7 April 2014), http://partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/2014/04/07/2014-nuclear-security-summit-paves-way-for-future-regime/.

  6. 6.

    See generally, Kellman 1994.

  7. 7.

    See ICJ Press Release, http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/0/18300.pdf; see also http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18332.pdf; International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, The Marshall Islands Case, Special Newsletter, July 2014, http://www.lcnp.org/RMI/IALANA-Newsletter_14_7.pdf.

  8. 8.

    See generally, S. Johnson, The Safeguards at Reprocessing Plants under a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, Research Report No. 6, International Panel on Fissile Materials.

  9. 9.

    See Van de Graaf and Lesage 2009.

  10. 10.

    G.A. Res. 2028 (XX), p. 2(a), UN Doc. A/6014 (Nov. 19, 1965), cited in DeFrancia 2012.

  11. 11.

    C. Kessler, Presentation, The International Atomic Energy Agency—The Global Guardian of Non-Proliferation, Brookhaven National Laboratory, BNL-100895-2013-CP.

  12. 12.

    Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  13. 13.

    See, G. Evans and Y. Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, recommending regular preparation of a ‘Report Card’ on the IAEA and the nuclear non-proliferation regime generally.

  14. 14.

    At the heart of failure of the Biological Weapons Convention Verification Protocol was the virtual impossibility of adapting such finely tuned measurements into the world of biological laboratories. See generally, Kellman 2007.

  15. 15.

    Wang et al. 2011.

  16. 16.

    For example, the United States provides support through the State Department International Safeguards Project; Office; National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-22, NA-24.

  17. 17.

    IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012–2023, available at http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/STR_375_--_IAEA_Department_of_Safeguards_Long-Term_R&D_Plan_2012-2023.pdf.

  18. 18.

    See, e.g. IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012–2023, available at http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/STR_375_--_IAEA_Department_of_Safeguards_Long-Term_R&D_Plan_2012-2023.pdf. Nuclear Disarmament Safeguards and Physical Protection (S98) Source/Report, February 2012; JAEA-REVIEW--2011-038, http://jolissrch-inter.tokai-sc.jaea.go.jp/pdfdata/JAEA-Review-2011-038.pdf.

  19. 19.

    See, e.g. Otuka et al. 2014.

  20. 20.

    See, J.E. Doyle, Towards an INSEN Strategy for Engaging International Centers for Nuclear Security. International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts. Proceedings of the International Conference.

  21. 21.

    DeFrancia 2012, p. 721.

  22. 22.

    (International Atom Energy Agency Information Circular) INFCIRC/153. The IAEA’s statute contemplates the possibility of broad safeguards authorities, including facility design approval authority and anytime/anywhere inspections access.

  23. 23.

    See generally, Scheinman 1992.

  24. 24.

    United States Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978, Section 4(a)(6). See generally IAEA Safeguards System, para 12.

  25. 25.

    DeFrancia 2012, p. 729.

  26. 26.

    Cooley 2006, p. 67.

  27. 27.

    See Kellman 1996.

  28. 28.

    Cooley 2006.

  29. 29.

    UN General Assembly, The future we want, Resolution 66 (2012): 288, para 75.

  30. 30.

    INFCIRC/153, para 5 requires that the IAEA take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Agreement. See generally Gualtieri and Kellman 1995.

  31. 31.

    See generally, Kellman et al. 1995.

  32. 32.

    Staasz 1973.

  33. 33.

    Kellman 2000.

  34. 34.

    If CWC inspectors request access to areas not covered by the facility agreement in order to clarify an ambiguity, the inspected State must provide information and grant access to the inspection team. CWC Verification Annex, Part VII, Section 25.

  35. 35.

    J. Carlson, IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 20 January 2009.

  36. 36.

    See Dupont, Chap. 3 in this volume and Johnson and Rockwood, Chap. 4 in this volume. See also L. Rockwood, The IAEA’s State-Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences, Arms Control Today, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/Features/The-IAEAs-State-Level-Concept-and-the-Law-of-Unintended-Consequences and D. Joyner, A Response to Laura Rockwood, Arms Control Law, http://armscontrollaw.com/page/2/.

  37. 37.

    Asada 2011.

  38. 38.

    SC Res 1887 (2009), para 15(b).

  39. 39.

    Ibid., at p. 7.

  40. 40.

    Asada 2011; see also Asada, Chap. 5 in this volume.

  41. 41.

    Ibid.

  42. 42.

    See generally, Groome 2011.

  43. 43.

    Al Nashiri v. Poland, European Court of Human Rights, para 481 (24 July 2014).

  44. 44.

    Ibid., para 482.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., paras 490–491.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., para 492.

  47. 47.

    Kelsen 1944.

  48. 48.

    Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening), Judgment (31 March 2014).

  49. 49.

    Ibid., para 102.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., para 65.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., para 245.

  52. 52.

    INFCIRC/153, para 18.

  53. 53.

    IAEA Statute, Article XII(c).

  54. 54.

    Statute of the IAEA, Article XII(c). Whether the IAEA must so report to the Security Council or may so report has been the subject of active debate.

  55. 55.

    Idem.

  56. 56.

    Idem.

  57. 57.

    The Statute provides that: ‘… if in connexion with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.

  58. 58.

    See generally Gualtieri and Kellman 1995.

  59. 59.

    See Gualtieri and Kellman 1995, p. 1051.

  60. 60.

    CWC, Aricles XII, VIII paras 2, 36; Krutzsch and Trapp 1994, pp. 218–228.

  61. 61.

    DiFrancia 2012, p. 710.

  62. 62.

    See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (southwest Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970).

  63. 63.

    Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 [2008] ECR I-6351.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., para 287.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., para 298. See Kokott and Sobotta 2012.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., para 294.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., para 363.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., paras 336–337. By not communicating to the appellants the evidence against them, the appellants’ rights of defense were not respected, ruled the Appellate Panel. Ibid., para 348.

  69. 69.

    Ibid., paras 140–142.

  70. 70.

    Kokott and Sobotta 2012, p. 1020.

  71. 71.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America); Merits, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 27 June 1986, Merits.

  72. 72.

    See generally B. Flowe and R. Gold, The Legality of US Sanctions. 2 Global Dialogue, http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=98; Meyer 2009.

  73. 73.

    DiFrancia 2012.

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  1. International Weapons Control Center, DePaul University College of Law, Loop Campus, E. Jackson Blvd, 25, Chicago, IL, 60604, USA

    Barry Kellman

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  1. School of Management - Law, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, United Kingdom

    Jonathan L. Black-Branch

  2. Cologne, Germany

    Dieter Fleck

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Kellman, B. (2016). Enforcing Nuclear Non-Proliferation—The Role of Verification. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-075-6_11

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