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Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare pp 177–199Cite as

Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems

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Abstract

Autonomous systems will fundamentally alter the way wars are waged. In particular, autonomous weapon systems, capable of selecting and engaging targets without direct human operator involvement, represent a significant shift of humans away from the battlefield. As these new means and methods of warfare are introduced, many important targeting decisions will likely need to be made earlier and further away from the front lines. Fearful of these changes and coupled with other legal and moral concerns, groups opposed to autonomous weapons have formed and begun campaigning for a pre-emptive ban on their development and use. Nations intending to use these emerging technologies must grapple with how best to adjust their targeting processes and procedures to accommodate greater autonomy in weapon systems. This chapter examines these cutting-edge and controversial weapons with a particular emphasis on the legal impact on targeting during international armed conflicts. Initially, this chapter will explore the promising technological advances and operational benefits which indicate these weapon systems may become a reality in the not-so-distant future. The focus will then turn to the unique challenges the systems present to the law of armed conflict under both weapons law and targeting law principles. Next, the examination will shift to two key aspects of targeting most affected by autonomous systems: targeting doubt and subjectivity in targeting. The author ultimately concludes that autonomous weapon systems are unlikely to be deemed unlawful per se and that, while these targeting issues raise legitimate concerns, the use of autonomous weapons under many circumstances will be lawful.

The views expressed are those of the author and should not be understood as necessarily representing those of NATO, the United States Department of Defense, or any other government entity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In fact, nations such as the United States and United Kingdom have declared they are not pursuing such weapons other than human supervised ones. House of Lords Debate 26 March 2013 (The UK Ministry of Defense ‘currently has no intention of developing [weapon] systems that operate without human intervention’.); United States Department of Defense 2012a, p. 3 (The United States has no ‘plans to develop lethal autonomous weapon systems other than human-supervised systems for the purposes of local defense of manned vehicles or installations’.).

  2. 2.

    More than 40 non-governmental organizations have formed the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, an umbrella organization dedicated to seeking a comprehensive and pre-emptive ban on the development, production, and use of autonomous weapons. Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 2013. http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/. Accessed 8 January 2014.

  3. 3.

    Human Rights Watch is one of the founding organizations of the coalition. For a full description of their reservations and criticism of autonomous weapon systems, see Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 1.

  4. 4.

    United Nations A/HRC/23/47, p. 21.

  5. 5.

    Convention on Conventional Weapons CCW/MSP/2013/CRP.1, p. 4.

  6. 6.

    Not all of the legal principles discussed below may apply during conflicts not of an international character, otherwise known as non-international armed conflicts. The use of fully autonomous weapons during non-international armed conflicts is outside the scope of this chapter.

  7. 7.

    Krishnan 2009, p. 45.

  8. 8.

    United States Department of Defense 2012, pp. 13–14.

  9. 9.

    United States Department of Defense 2012, pp. 13–14.

  10. 10.

    Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 2.

  11. 11.

    Krishnan 2009, p. 43.

  12. 12.

    Krishnan 2009, p. 44.

  13. 13.

    It is conceivable that advances in artificial intelligence technology in the future may allow systems to possess human-like reasoning. However, it is far from certain that the technology will successfully develop in such a manner, and even Dr. Krishnan contends that any such advances would be unlikely to materialize until well beyond the year 2030. Krishnan 2009, p. 44.

  14. 14.

    Schmitt 2013a, p. 4.

  15. 15.

    Singer 2009, p. 128.

  16. 16.

    For example, the former chief scientist for the United States Air Force postulates that technology currently exists to facilitate ‘fully autonomous military strikes’; Dahm 2012, p. 11.

  17. 17.

    Guarino 2013.

  18. 18.

    Poitras 2012.

  19. 19.

    Guarino 2013. For a more general overview of machine learning capabilities and possibilities, see Russell and Norvig 2010, Chap. 18. For a discussion about how computer systems are learning, in approaches similar to how humans learn by examples, see Public Broadcasting Service 2011.

  20. 20.

    Heintschel von Heinegg 2011, p. 184 (asserting that such mines are ‘quite common and legally uncontested’).

  21. 21.

    United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 2013. Note, however, that at least initially the vessel is designed to require human approval before launching an attack. The United States Navy is developing similar underwater systems to conduct de-mining operations; Ackerman 2013.

  22. 22.

    Guarino 2013.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    Healey 2013.

  25. 25.

    Guarino 2013.

  26. 26.

    United States Air Force 2009, p. 16 (stating that ‘[a]s autonomy and automation merge, [systems] will be able to swarm … creating a focused, relentless, and scaled attack’). The United States Air Force’s Proliferated Autonomous Weapons may represent an early prototype of future swarming systems. See Singer 2009, p. 232; Alston 2011, p. 43.

  27. 27.

    Singer 2009, p. 74; Kellenberger 2011, p. 27. Note, consensus does not exist as to if and when general artificial intelligence might become available. Artificial intelligence has previously failed to live up to some expectations. Computer scientist Noel Sharkey doubts that artificial intelligence advances will achieve human-like abilities in even the next 15 years; Sharkey 2011, p. 140.

  28. 28.

    Waxman and Anderson 2013, p. 2.

  29. 29.

    United States Department of Defense 2013, p. 25. Under a heading labelled ‘A Look to the Future’ it explains: ‘Currently personnel costs are the greatest single cost in (the Department of Defense), and unmanned systems must strive to reduce the number of personnel required to operate and maintain the systems. Great strides in autonomy, teaming, multi-platform control, tipping, and cueing have reduced the number of personnel required, but much more work needs to occur’.

  30. 30.

    ‘Enable humans to delegate those tasks that are more effectively done by computer … thus freeing humans to focus on more complex decision making’; United States Department of Defense 2012b, p. 1.

  31. 31.

    Sharkey 2012, p. 110.

  32. 32.

    Singer 2009, p. 128.

  33. 33.

    For example, the United States has expressed an interest in seeking an expansion of autonomous features, albeit not lethal targeting capabilities, into its systems in the future; United States Department of Defense 2012b, pp. 1–3; United States Department of Defense 2013, p. 25.

  34. 34.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226 (hereinafter Nuclear Weapons); Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 243. Schmitt 2013a, p. 8.

  35. 35.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 70; Nuclear Weapons, supra note 34, para 78; Cadwalader 2011, p. 157.

  36. 36.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (hereinafter Additional Protocol I).

  37. 37.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 71. See also Cadwalader 2011, p. 153.

  38. 38.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 71.

  39. 39.

    Some commentators even contend that autonomous systems require a new, more ‘holistic’ approach to weapons review procedures. See Liu 2012, p. 639.

  40. 40.

    See for example Schmitt 2013b, commentary accompanying r. 48.

  41. 41.

    Schmitt 2013b, commentary accompanying r. 48.

  42. 42.

    The International Court of Justice has recognized distinction as a ‘cardinal’ principle of the law of armed conflict. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 34, paras 78–79.

  43. 43.

    Additional Protocol I, Articles 49, 51–52.

  44. 44.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 1; Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 34, paras 78–79; Cadwalader 2011, p. 157.

  45. 45.

    See for example, Human Rights Watch 2012, pp. 30–32.

  46. 46.

    Additional Protocol I, Articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii).

  47. 47.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 14; Cadwalader 2011, pp. 157–158.

  48. 48.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b).

  49. 49.

    For a discussion of the collateral damage methodology used by the United States military, see Thurnher and Kelly 2012.

  50. 50.

    For example, Human Rights Watch maintains that an autonomous weapon ‘could not be programmed to duplicate the psychological processes in human judgment that are necessary to assess proportionality.’ Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 33.

  51. 51.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 15; Cadwalader, pp. 161–162.

  52. 52.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 57.

  53. 53.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(c).

  54. 54.

    Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 2010, p. 38.

  55. 55.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(a)(ii).

  56. 56.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 50(1); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 6. With regard to doubt involving the status of objects, Article 52(3) of Additional Protocol I requires Parties to presume an object is of civilian character in cases of doubt. Although it is unclear whether the rule is customary, States will nevertheless likely develop their autonomous systems to comply with such a rule. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 10.

  57. 57.

    Schmitt 2013b, commentary accompanying r. 33. See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r. 10, which describes an Israeli position that in situations of doubt as to the character of an object, the appropriate threshold is whether ‘significant’ doubt exists.

  58. 58.

    See generally, CAVV 2013, p. 19.

  59. 59.

    Arkin 2009, p. 46.

  60. 60.

    Herbach 2012, pp. 17–19; Wagner 2012, pp. 121–122. See generally Gillespie and West 2010, pp. 13–20; O’Connell, p. 7.

  61. 61.

    O’Connell 2013, p. 12 (‘[T]he ultimate decision to kill must be made, therefore, by a human being at or very near the time of the lethal impact.’).

  62. 62.

    International Committee of the Red Cross 2013.

  63. 63.

    The United States issued a policy directive in 2012 establishing a strict approval process for any AWS acquisitions or development and mandating various safety measures be incorporated into future AWS designs. United States Department of Defense 2012.

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  1. NATO Rapid Deployable Corps/1 (German-Netherlands) Corps, Muenster, Germany

    Jeffrey S. Thurnher

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  1. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

    Paul A.L. Ducheine

  2. Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA

    Michael N. Schmitt

  3. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

    Frans P.B. Osinga

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Thurnher, J.S. (2016). Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems. In: Ducheine, P., Schmitt, M., Osinga, F. (eds) Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-072-5_9

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