Abstract
Targeting is used in military doctrine to describe a military operational way, using (military) means to influence a target (or addressee) in order to achieve designated political and/or military goals. The four factors italicized are used to analyse non-kinetic targeting, thereby complementing our knowledge and understanding of the prevalent kinetic targeting. Paradoxically, non-kinetic targeting is not recognized as a separate concept; kinetic and non-kinetic are intertwined facets of targeting. Kinetic targeting refers to the targeted application of military force based on the release or concentration of kinetic energy against opposing forces or objects with (primarily) lethal effects in the physical domain, whereas non-kinetic targeting describes the targeted application of (other military and non-military) capabilities against addressees to generate (additional) non-kinetic effects in the non-physical and physical domain . This chapter attempts to provide a better demarcation between kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, first by reviewing recent developments in military operations and targeting and introducing a ‘full spectrum approach ’. It then enumerates and analyses a number of typical non-kinetic capabilities : information activities, key leader engagement, lawfare, criminal legal action, security detention, assets freezes, and cyber operations. The chapter concludes that although non-kinetic targeting does not exist as a stand-alone concept, it is vitally important in contemporary military operations. It provides opportunities to engage and affect additional target audiences (including supporters) with less devastating effects (including constructive effects) by offering additional means to conduct operations, stressing the crucial role of non-kinetic elements like information, perception, cohesion, understanding, and will.
The author would like to thank Colonel (RNLAF) dr. Joop Voetelink, Lieutenant-Colonels (RNLA) Edwin de Ronde and Peter Pijpers LL.M. MA, Major dr. Eric Pouw LL.M. and Captain (RNLMC) Mark Roorda LL.M. for their suggestions.
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Notes
- 1.
Kilcullen 2009, p. 300.
- 2.
See Chap. 4, Pratzner, in this volume.
- 3.
Sun Tzu 1994, p. 177.
- 4.
US Army 2010a, p. B-1.
- 5.
- 6.
In its Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, NATO defines joint targeting as ‘the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritizing targets, and the synchronization of fires with other military capabilities and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary.’ NATO 2008, p. 1. See also US Air Force 2014, p. 3: ‘Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.’
- 7.
Canada 2008, pp. 5–33.
- 8.
This element involves inter alia ‘weaponeering’, defined in the US Army Field Manual as ‘the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapons characteristics and effects, and delivery parameters (JP 3-60).’ US Army 2010a, pp. 2–17.
- 9.
- 10.
See e.g. NATO (2005) Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.9.2 Land targeting.
- 11.
Operational process is used to refer to the application of this process in operations. This should not be mixed up with the command levels (strategic, operational and tactical).
- 12.
See the Canadian Land Operations breakdown which distinguishes between allied, supportive, friendly, neutral, unsupportive, inactive hostile and enemy audiences:
‘This approach requires a cultural understanding and stems in part from the need to engender support from local populations and to engage other elements of an environment. In order to support this approach the knowledge base must gain insight into the psychological plane and the intent, motivations, and relationships of elements in the battlespace in order to out manoeuvre them or to move them, through an effect of influence to a position of acceptance, cooperation, or even support. The assessment and analysis that leads to this categorization supports the targeting process, for each of the audiences on the spectrum of relative interest is assessed with respect to how they may be influenced and moved to a position of support or acceptance.’
Canada 2008, p. 43 [Emphasis added]
.
- 13.
Canada 2008, p. 43, footnote 99.
- 14.
US Army 2010a, pp. 1–2.
- 15.
US Army 2010a, pp. 2-8. [Emphasis added].
- 16.
US Army 2010a, pp. 2-1.
- 17.
See Kruif, in his Foreword to this volume.
- 18.
Not to be confused with ‘effect based operations’, see: US Department of Defence, US Joint Forces Command, ‘Assessment of Effects Based Operations’ (14 August 2008, Gen Mattis).
- 19.
See Chap. 4, Pratzner, in this volume.
- 20.
See the Strategic notion of DIME on the strategic level, and the Comprehensive Approach at the operational level, e.g. NATO, Lisbon Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, 20 November 2010. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm. Accessed 2 April 2014.
- 21.
As defined in the law of armed conflict.
- 22.
- 23.
Ducheine and Haaster 2014.
- 24.
See NATO 2008, pp. 1–5, Targeting Principles: ‘b. Effects. Targeting is concerned with supporting the creation of effects to achieve the JFC’s objectives’; and NATO 2008, pp. 1–9, para 0119: ‘The effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) is an evolving philosophy that is defined as ‘the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create the effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end state.’
- 25.
NATO 2008, pp. 1–9, para 0119: ‘At the operational level, an effects based approach involves the selective combination of actions, coordinated with the activities of other organizations to create lethal and non-lethal effects in order to achieve operational objectives in support of this end state.’
- 26.
See Chaps. 2, Coker, and 4, Pratzner in this volume.
- 27.
Ducheine and Pouw 2012, p. 33.
- 28.
See Sun Tzu 1994.
- 29.
NATO 2008, p. 1 [Emphasis added].
- 30.
NATO 2008 throughout.
- 31.
NATO 2008, pp. 3–6, A-10.
- 32.
- 33.
UK Ministry of Defence 2009, p. iv [Emphasis added].
- 34.
UK Ministry of Defence 2009, pp. 3–5.
- 35.
UK Ministry of Defence 2009, pp. 3–6, para 317 [Emphasis added].
- 36.
- 37.
Ministerie van Defensie 2013, p. 104.
- 38.
Canada 2008, pp. 4–24.
- 39.
Cheng Hang 2010.
- 40.
Note the US reservation made to the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations: ‘Kinetic and non-kinetic activities have no defined meaning in NATO doctrine. Kinetic is a scientific idea commonly applied to motion and energy related descriptions. Kinetic and non-kinetic (non-motion or non-energy activities) do not fit the context of the publication.’ NATO 2009, p. xi.
- 41.
It remains to be seen whether this dichotomy should be complemented with ‘neutral’ effects for the target/addressee.
- 42.
- 43.
See Canada 2008, p. 43 and also note 12 supra.
- 44.
Murphy 2009, p. 2.
- 45.
US Department of Defense 2013, p. II-16.
- 46.
US Army 2010a, p. 2-1.
- 47.
US Army 2010a, pp. 3–7.
- 48.
UK Ministry of Defence 2009, p. 3B-7.
- 49.
US Army 2010a, p. B-1.
- 50.
Matthijssen 2010, p. 521.
- 51.
Murphy 2009, p. 2.
- 52.
Kilcullen 2009, p. 300.
- 53.
Caldwell et al. 2009.
- 54.
See e.g. NATO 2008, pp. 1-2–1-3: ‘From the strategic to the tactical level and across the range of military operations, information plays a vital role in the manner in which decisions are made. In military operations the ability to defeat adversaries or potential adversaries may rest on the perception of all actors involved, particularly the local population. There is therefore considerable benefit to be gained by affecting the flow of information through a decision-maker and his understanding of that information.’. See also US Department of Defense 2012, p. II-1 (stating, ‘[i]nfluence is at the heart of diplomacy and military operations’); UK Ministry of Defence 2009, pp. 3–5, 3A-2; Canada 2008, p. 2-2; Koninklijke Landmacht 2014, pp. 2–9 (in Dutch). For the ramifications and complications of effectively countering insurgents’ information campaigns, see Pijpers 2014.
- 55.
Taking a slightly different (enemy centric) approach, the US defines it as: ‘the integrated employment, during military operations, of [information-related capabilities] in concert with other lines of operation, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.’ US Department of Defense 2012, p. iii.
- 56.
NATO 2009, p. 1-5.
- 57.
NATO 2009, pp. 1–7.
- 58.
Andres 2009, p. 74.
- 59.
NATO 2009, pp. 1–8 (maintaining that the enumeration also contains doctrine as a constraint for information activities). The present author rejects this reading, as doctrine is meant to provide guidance for commanders and staff officers/planners, not be a constraint.
- 60.
NATO 2009, p. 1-8.
- 61.
NATO 2009, pp. 1-8–1-9.
- 62.
NATO 2009, pp. II-3 to II-4.
- 63.
Wilner 2011, p. 26.
- 64.
Wilner 2011, p. 30.
- 65.
- 66.
NATO 2009, p. II-5.
- 67.
US Joint Forces Command 2010, p. III-7.
- 68.
US Joint Forces Command 2010, p. III-7.
- 69.
NATO 2009, p. II-13.
- 70.
In general, Key Leader Engagement, entails generating constructive effects, although theoreticaly one could also aim at disruptive effects vis-avis selected stakeholders.
- 71.
- 72.
US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned 2009, p. i. See also the role of CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) at p. 13 ff, arguably signalling particular advantages for this capability in counterinsurgencies, as it ‘is defeating COIN targets without creating collateral damage’.
- 73.
Kitzen 2012a, p. 716.
- 74.
- 75.
US Army 2010a, pp. 3–7.
- 76.
- 77.
Dunlap 2008, p. 146.
- 78.
- 79.
Dunlap 2001.
- 80.
See NATO’s response to questions from the UN’s Human Rights Council related to Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011) in UN Human Rights Council 2012.
- 81.
Banks 2011.
- 82.
Wright 2011.
- 83.
- 84.
- 85.
Haaretz 2014.
- 86.
Wright 2011.
- 87.
Operational or tactical goals are used in contrast to strategic goals (i.e. goals at strategic command levels in operations).
- 88.
Govern 2012.
- 89.
Berlin 2010.
- 90.
- 91.
- 92.
Govern 2012, p. 477.
- 93.
Based on the consent by the sovereign Host Nation, as expressed in i.a. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).
- 94.
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, Article 42 [hereinafter Hague IV Regulations].
- 95.
- 96.
Chesney 2011, p. 477.
- 97.
Herrera 2013.
- 98.
Evidence-based operations ‘are operations where Afghan law enforcement authorities, supported by ISAF, effectively investigate, apprehend, search and seize criminal suspects and affiliated property in accordance with Afghan law’. Voetelink 2013, p. 198.
- 99.
And vice versa.
- 100.
European arrest warrant: European Union 2002.
- 101.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, Article 58 Rome Statute (Statute of the International Criminal Court).
- 102.
Voetelink 2013, p. 195.
- 103.
Govern 2012, p. 484.
- 104.
- 105.
Neuteboom 2014.
- 106.
Govern 2012, p. 484.
- 107.
- 108.
Herrera 2013, p. 94.
- 109.
These are often referred to as ‘detention’ operations. This term however, will be reserved for ‘security detention’ (see infra).
- 110.
Berlin 2010, pp. 2, 8 (referring to ‘prosecution support teams’ that should be established).
- 111.
Pouw 2013, p. 18.
- 112.
The term ‘operational detention’ is also used.
- 113.
See Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva, 12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 135.
- 114.
- 115.
- 116.
Or when s/he fulfils a ‘continuous combat function’, resulting in a loss of protection from attack throughout that period.
- 117.
Kleffner 2010, pp. 469–470, mentioning a Security Council Resolution, LOAC, self-defence, the prevention of breaches of international (criminal) law; and Agreements with the Host Nation.
- 118.
Noorda 2014.
- 119.
- 120.
See the activities of the UK based NGO Global Witness, www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/corruption/oil-gas-and-mining/Afghanistan. Accessed 25 May 2014.
- 121.
See UK Government, Current List of Designated Persons, Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (update 11 April 2014). www.gov.uk/government/publications/current-list-of-designated-persons-terrorism-and-terrorist-financing. Accessed on 25 May 2014.
- 122.
- 123.
- 124.
Ducheine and Haaster 2014, pp. 309–310.
- 125.
- 126.
Ducheine and Haaster 2014, pp. 313–314.
- 127.
Ducheine and Haaster 2014, pp. 320–323.
- 128.
Dauber 2009, pp. v–x.
- 129.
Dauber 2009, pp. v–x.
- 130.
Dauber 2009, pp. v–x.
- 131.
Dauber 2009, pp. v-x.
- 132.
US Department of Defense 2013, p. II-16.
- 133.
It goes beyond the focus of the chapter to elaborate on the notion of strategic communication. See e.g., NATO Military Concept for Strategic Communications 2010, p. 1, defining strategic communication as ‘the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities—Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Info Ops and PsyOps—in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims’.
- 134.
Cyber operations, however, are partially different.
- 135.
US Department of Defense 2013, p. II-15.
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Ducheine, P.A.L. (2016). Non-kinetic Capabilities: Complementing the Kinetic Prevalence to Targeting. In: Ducheine, P., Schmitt, M., Osinga, F. (eds) Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-072-5_10
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