Jus ad bellum economicum and jus in bello economico: The Limits of Economic Sanctions Under the Paradigm of International Humanitarian Law

  • Nema MilaniniaEmail author


This chapter argues that economic sanctions—including sanctions imposed outside of the armed conflict context—should be regulated by the principles underlying international humanitarian law (IHL). It considers the challenges associated with applying other sources of law, namely international human rights law and the law on countermeasures, to economic sanctions and the benefits of viewing sanctions through IHL. The chapter then describes what limits would regulate economic sanctions when borrowing IHL principles. In doing so, the chapter constructs two general categories of rules: jus ad bellum economicum—or the principles concerning when economic sanctions can be used—and jus in bello economico—or the principles concerning limits governing sanctions programs.


Security Council Armed Conflict Appeal Chamber Trial Chamber Geneva Convention 
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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press and the author(s) 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Office of the ProsecutorInternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former YugoslaviaThe HagueThe Netherlands

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