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International Legal Limits on the Ability of States to Lawfully Impose International Economic/Financial Sanctions

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Economic Sanctions under International Law

Abstract

This chapter addresses the subject of the legal limitations which international law places on the imposition of international economic/financial sanctions, with particular reference to sanctions with counter-proliferation aims. It argues that there are at least three sources of international legal obligations which impose limits on the application of coercive international economic/financial sanctions: (1) the general international principle of noncoercion; (2) the law of countermeasures; and (3) human rights law. The totality of these obligations limiting the lawfulness of both unilateral and multilateral coercive sanctions purposed in counter-proliferation leaves a vanishingly small window for the lawful application of such sanctions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hufbauer et al. 2007, p. 162.

  2. 2.

    See Yousaf Butt, By Not Lifting Sanctions, West and Obama are Helping Iran Enrich Uranium, Christian Science Monitor, 25 May 2012.

  3. 3.

    For a listing of UNSC Resolutions on Iran see Arms Control Association, UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran (accessed 5 July 2014).

  4. 4.

    See e.g., Daniel Joyner, EJIL:Talk!, The New Deal between the P5+1 and Iran, 26 November 2013 http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-new-deal-between-the-p51-and-iran/.

  5. 5.

    This principle provides that “restrictions upon the independence of States cannot … be presumed” and that international law recognizes that States possess “a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.” Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10.

  6. 6.

    See Dupont 2012, p. 311; Lowe and Tzanakopoulos 2012, p. 8 (“It is generally accepted that the prohibition of the use of force under [UN Charter] Article 2(4) and under customary law does not preclude the use of economic force.”) The ICJ in the Nicaragua case found that “[a] State is not bound to continue particular trade relations longer than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment or other specific legal obligation.” Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment. 1986 I.C.J. 14, 138.

  7. 7.

    See Lowe and Tzanakopoulos 2012, p. 8.

  8. 8.

    See e.g., Zarate 2013.

  9. 9.

    Lowe and Tzanakopoulos 2012, p. 8.

  10. 10.

    Statement by H.E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the Sixty-eight Session of the United Nations General Assembly [sic], New York, 24 September 2013, available at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/157530/iran.pdf (accessed 5 July 2014).

  11. 11.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, pp. 86–141.

  12. 12.

    Lowe and Tzanakopoulos 2012, pp. 11, 13.

  13. 13.

    See Shaw 2008, p. 1147.

  14. 14.

    Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Article 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (12 December 1974); see also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, Principle 3, U.N. Doc A/RES/25/2625 (24 October 1970); G.A. Res. 44/215, U.N. Doc A/RES/44/215 (22 December 1989); G.A. Res 66/186, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/186 (22 December 2011).

  15. 15.

    See Dupont 2012, p. 316.

  16. 16.

    See generally Joyner 2012; Schweigman 2001; de Wet 2004; Tzanakopoulos 2011.

  17. 17.

    See generally Dupont 2012.

  18. 18.

    Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83/Annex (12 December 2001).

  19. 19.

    Dupont 2012, p. 325.

  20. 20.

    Lowe and Tzanakopoulos 2012, p. 12.

  21. 21.

    See Milanovic 2013.

  22. 22.

    See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Articles 54, 69, 70, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Additional Protocol I”).

  23. 23.

    See UDHR, Articles 3, 25, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); ICCPR, Article 6.1, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 6.1, 27.1, 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; ICESCR, Articles 11.1, 11.2, 12, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.

  24. 24.

    Maya Lester, European Sanctions Law and Practice, ECJ Signals its Approach to Iran Sanctions Cases in 2 Appeals, 2 December 2013, http://europeansanctions.com/2013/12/02/ecj-signals-its-approach-to-iran-sanctions-cases-in-2-appeals/ (accessed 5 July 2014).

  25. 25.

    See Daniel H. Joyner, Arms Control Law, EU Courts and Iran Sanctions, 25 July 2013, http://armscontrollaw.com/2013/07/25/eu-courts-and-iran-sanctions/ (accessed 5 July 2014).

  26. 26.

    See Joyner 2007.

  27. 27.

    See Schweigman 2001.

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Joyner, D.H. (2015). International Legal Limits on the Ability of States to Lawfully Impose International Economic/Financial Sanctions. In: Marossi, A., Bassett, M. (eds) Economic Sanctions under International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-051-0_5

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