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Body Scanners: A Strip Search by Other Means?

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Privacy-Invading Technologies and Privacy by Design

Part of the book series: Information Technology and Law Series ((ITLS,volume 25))

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Abstract

This chapter describes the privacy intrusiveness of (backscatter) body scanners, comparing the use of the devices to a strip search; highlights both their security benefits and drawbacks for airport security; outlines the possible alternatives to (backscatter) body scanners in airport security screening; sums up the scope of deployment of body scanners in the US; outlines the statutory law and case law of special relevance in the US; evaluates the deficiencies and dilemmas of the US legal framework in terms of fulfilling the principles of privacy and upholding the integrity of the Fourth Amendment with regard to the use of body scanners; and provides some policy-relevant recommendations, including proposals on how to enhance the US legal framework and address the issues identified.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This chapter will only discuss the security screening of passengers themselves and not their luggage or carry-on bags.

  2. 2.

    Sharkey 2005.

  3. 3.

    Interpol, available at: http://www.interpol.int/Public/TechnologyCrime/CrimePrev/VirtualMoney.asp. Accessed 17 February 2014.

  4. 4.

    Saletan 2007b.

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    Frank 2007a.

  7. 7.

    On the other hand, this result was recently confirmed by a more appropriately conducted poll by Gallup. In the midst of the so-called Christmas day attack, 78 % of US air travellers surveyed approved of the use of body scanners at US airports. see “In U.S., Air Travelers Take Body Scans in Stride”, 11 January 2010, available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/125018/air-travelers-body-scans-stride.aspx. Accessed 17 February 2014. And even more recently, a survey study conducted by the IT firm Unisys in April 2010, as part of the Unisys Security Index, found that nearly 65 % of Americans are willing to undergo full body scans for greater aviation security. See Unisys Press Release, available at: http://www.unisys.com/unisys/news/detail.jsp?id=1120000970001910179. Accessed 17 February 2014. But, these results still leave an average of 30 % of Americans unwilling to undergo full body scans, which should not be discounted. Moreover, the willingness of US travellers will likely continue to drop as time elapses further away from the so-called “Christmas day attack”.

  8. 8.

    Privacy International, US Big Brother Awards, April 2000.

  9. 9.

    Further information is available at: http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/. Accessed 17 February 2014.

  10. 10.

    See World Intellectual Property Organization, International Application No.: PCT/US1991/005558, Publication No.: WO/1992/002937, Publication Date: 20 February 1992, Applicant: IRT CORPORATION; U.S. Patent No. 7,110,493, titled “X-ray detector system having low Z material panel”, Issued to Rapiscan Security Products, Inc. on September 19, 2006.

  11. 11.

    See Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA’s Passenger Screening Process, Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, and John W. Cooney, Assistant Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations of the United States Government Accountability Office, during the testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, 15 November 2007.

  12. 12.

    Frank 2007b.

  13. 13.

    See “Loaded gun slips through airport security” (CNN, 23 January 2008), available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/01/23/airport.gun/index.html. Accessed 17 February 2014.

  14. 14.

    See “TSA tester slips mock bomb past airport security” (CNN, 28 January 2008), available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/01/28/tsa.bombtest/index.html. Accessed 17 February 2014.

  15. 15.

    “'Human factors' refers to the demands a job places on the capabilities of, and the constraints it imposes on, the people doing it. For screeners, the human factors issues cited in past studies include the repetitive tasks screeners perform, the close and constant monitoring required to spot the rare appearances of dangerous objects, and the stress involved in dealing with the public, who may dislike being screened or demand faster action to avoid missing their flights”. U.S. General Accounting Office (2000) Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance, GAO/RCED-00-75, p. 26.

  16. 16.

    During the second meeting of the Task Force on Security Scanners in 2010, first set up by the European Commission, representatives present from Schiphol Airport, Manchester Airport and the UK Department of Transport, for instance, explained that after their trial phases of body scanners, they are convinced that the evidence proves that body scanners offer immense security benefits and enhancements (i.e. improved detection of both metallic and non-metallic threats on a person). The European Commission has equally recognized and acknowledged the security benefits of body scanners, which must be seriously taken into consideration. See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at EU airports (COM(2010) 311 final), 15.6.2010.

  17. 17.

    MacVica 2009.

  18. 18.

    Reportedly, terrorists are known to have implanted PETN in the breasts of women. See “Terrorists Could Use Explosives in Breast Implants to Crash Planes, Experts Warn” (The Sun, 24 March 2010).

  19. 19.

    Jonathan Corbett, an engineer and blogger, has published a video showing how he managed to go through a backscatter body scanner without the system detecting a small metal case that was stitched into a special side pocket of the shirt he was wearing. YouTube is understandably restricting access to the video, and should remove the video. As the UK Daily Mail reports, Jonathan Corbett suggests that this flaw results because the body scanners “blend metallic areas into the dark background—so if an object is not directly placed on the body, it will not show up on the scan”. See Moran L. “How to get ANYTHING through TSA nude body scanners: Blogger exposes loophole in $1billion fleet” (7 March 2012), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2111417/TSA-nude-body-scanners-Jonathan-Corbett-video-exposes-loophole.html#ixzz1oRILtdLo. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  20. 20.

    See U.S. General Accounting Office (2009) Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges, GAO-10-128.

  21. 21.

    See U.S. General Accounting Office (2010) Homeland Security: Better Use of Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of Passenger Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen Security, GAO-10-401T.

  22. 22.

    Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at EU airports (COM (2010) 311 final), 15 June 2010.

  23. 23.

    Wilber 2008.

  24. 24.

    An Act to reauthorize the ban on undetectable firearms (Public Law 108-174), which reauthorized for a further 10 years the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-649).

  25. 25.

    See Ibid.

  26. 26.

    Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-71), SEC. 104.

  27. 27.

    Ibid., SEC. 105.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., SEC. 128.

  29. 29.

    Griffin et al. 2008.

  30. 30.

    See Laville et al. 2006.

  31. 31.

    See Dubnikova et al. 2005.

  32. 32.

    See Greene 2006, Perks and Sanderson 2006.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    See Dubnikova et al. 2005.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    However, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recently raised serious questions regarding the reliability and worth of these behaviour profiling techniques.

  37. 37.

    See Title 49 U.S.C, Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Chapter 449, Subchapter I, Section 44925(a).

  38. 38.

    See US Government Accountability Office (2004) Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management, GAO No. 04-890.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., p. 4 and p. 22. However, this funding is not only for checkpoint security or passenger/luggage screening, and includes the CAPPS II program and technical countermeasures for defending against shoulder-fired missiles.

  40. 40.

    Millivision, available at: http://www.millivision.com/technology.html. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  41. 41.

    The technology, however, may still require further advancement in order to be a trustworthy replacement of well-trained screeners, as pointed out by Eckard Seebohm, Head of the Aviation Security Unit of the European Commission during the first Body Scanners Task Force public consultation meeting held on 12 December 2008 at the Centre Albert Borschette in Brussels.

  42. 42.

    ThruVision, available at: http://www.digitalbarriers.com/products/thruvision/thruvision-ts5/. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  43. 43.

    QinetiQ, “US Transportation Security Administration Deploys QinetiQ New Airport Security Technology”, 4 September 2008.

  44. 44.

    Representatives from Schiphol Airport pointed this out during the first Body Scanners Task Force public consultation meeting held on 12 December 2008 at the Centre Albert Borschette in Brussels. The meeting was chaired by Eckard Seebohm, Head of the Aviation Security Unit of the European Commission.

  45. 45.

    See Tessler and Max 2009a.

  46. 46.

    Meserve and Ahlers 2010.

  47. 47.

    Ahura Scientific, available at: http://www.ahurascientific.com/chemical-explosives-id/products/firstdefender/index.php#. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  48. 48.

    See Hambling 2009.

  49. 49.

    ICX Technologies, available at: http://www.icxt.com/products/icx-detection/explosives/fido-paxpoint/. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  50. 50.

    Nemesysco, available at: http://security.nemesysco.com/gk1.html. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  51. 51.

    See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458), SEC. 4013.

  52. 52.

    See HR 1271, “FAA Research, Engineering, and Development Authorization Act of 1997” (Public Law No: 105–155).

  53. 53.

    US Customs TODAY, March 2000, available at: http://www.cbp.gov/custoday/mar2000/bodyscan.htm; Frank T. “TSA looks into using more airport body scans” (USA TODAY, 7 October 2007), available at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-10-07-backscatter_N.htm. Accessed 18 February 2014; Frank T. “Air travelers stripped bare with X-ray machine” (USA Today, 15 May 2005), available at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-15-airport-xray-bottomstrip_x.htm. Accessed 18 February 2014. Other airports in the US where body scanners have been or were reportedly deployed include: Albuquerque International Sunport Airport; Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport; Bob Hope Airport; Cleveland Hopkins International Airport; Denver International Airport; Detroit Metro Airport; Indianapolis International Airport; Jacksonville International Airport; McCarran International Airport; Raleigh-Durham International Airport; Richmond International Airport; Rochester International Airport; Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; San Francisco International Airport; Salt Lake City International Airport; Tampa International Airport; Tulsa International Airport. For more information, see http://www.tsa.gov.

  54. 54.

    National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 2003, p. 16, Section 3.1.1, available at: http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/3987b1pres-report.pdf. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  55. 55.

    Note: the latest developments concerning the development, deployment and use of body scanners is not reported in this book.

  56. 56.

    See http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/imaging_technology.shtm

  57. 57.

    Frank 2009a.

  58. 58.

    In acknowledging that the deployment of body scanners will likely increase, the stock market shares for the manufacturers of body scanners surged during the aftermath of the Christmas Day attack (particularly more so for backscatter body scanners). By January 11 2010, the shares of OSI Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ:OSIS) (parent company of Rapiscan), for example, jumped nearly 50 %, from around $22 to around $32 a share.

  59. 59.

    Weisman and Gorman 2010.

  60. 60.

    See the written statement of (former) Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano for a hearing titled “The State of Aviation Security—Is Our Current System Capable of Meeting the Threat?” before the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 20 January 2010.

  61. 61.

    See Cafferty 2010.

  62. 62.

    UPDATE: The TSA/DHS has now back-pedalled somewhat on the deployment of body scanners. The latest developments concerning the deployment and use of body scanners are not reported in this book.

  63. 63.

    Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).

  64. 64.

    See, e.g. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

  65. 65.

    See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

  66. 66.

    Ibid., at 361. Concurring opinion of Justice Harlan.

  67. 67.

    Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 191 (11th Circuit, 1992).

  68. 68.

    See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    Minert 2006.

  71. 71.

    Terry v. Ohio, 392, U.S. 1, 26 (1968).

  72. 72.

    United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Circuit, 1972).

  73. 73.

    Vina 2001, Mock 2009.

  74. 74.

    For further discussion, see Vina 2001, Mock 2009.

  75. 75.

    See, e.g., Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Circuit, 1965); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Circuit, 1973) at 1276.

  76. 76.

    United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Circuit, 1973).

  77. 77.

    Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).

  78. 78.

    United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Circuit, 1973); see Minert 2006, p. 1657.

  79. 79.

    United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).

  80. 80.

    See Title 19 U.S.C. Chap. 4, Subtitle III, Part V, Section 1582 of the Tariff Act of 1930; Title 19 U.S.C. Chap. 3, Subtitle IV, Part 5, Section 482.

  81. 81.

    See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); for further discussion, see Vina 2001, p. 423.

  82. 82.

    See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).

  83. 83.

    United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).

  84. 84.

    United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520 (5th Circuit, 1982).

  85. 85.

    For further discussion, see Vina 2001, Mock 2009.

  86. 86.

    United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22 (1st Circuit, 1999).

  87. 87.

    United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Circuit, 1984).

  88. 88.

    Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356 (4th Circuit, 2001).

  89. 89.

    Ibid., citing Va. Code Ann. S 19.2-59.1(F).

  90. 90.

    Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294 (11th Circuit, 2001).

  91. 91.

    See United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22 (1st Circuit, 1999).

  92. 92.

    Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (1996).

  93. 93.

    U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008) , p. 4.

  94. 94.

    See Transportation Security Administration, System Engineering Branch, Operational Requirements Document, Whole Body Imager Aviation Applications, July 2006, Version 1.9, Final Report, pp. 10–11; Transportation Security Administration, Office of Security Technology System Planning and Evaluation, Procurement Specification for Whole Body Imager Devices for Checkpoint Operations, September 2008, FINAL, Version 1.02, pp. 4–7.

  95. 95.

    Digital evidence may include, for example: the content of computer hard drives, computer printouts, GPS data, e-mails and digital video.

  96. 96.

    See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

  97. 97.

    US Federal courts have held, for example, that a videotape is a “record” for the purposes of the Privacy Act 1974, if the videotape contains the means of identifying the individual concerned (see: Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).Thus, if the images generated by body scanners are stored in a “system of records”, in which the concerned individual’s image is identifiable, it is also possible that these images may constitute a “record” for the purposes of the Privacy Act 1974 and are, therefore, in this sense, subject to the Act. However, as argued in the next section, body scanner images may not necessarily constitute information in personally identifiable form.

  98. 98.

    E-Government Act of 2002, Section 208.

  99. 99.

    The precautionary principle was originally developed in the context of environmental protection and refers to the need to anticipate the plausible or potential environmental harm of an act, policy or technology, and to take preventive measures against the potential harm, even if there is uncertain scientific evidence proving the harm is real. The principle is found in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Principle 15) and is also a core element of the EU’s environmental policy.

  100. 100.

    Friedewald et al. 2006. SWAMI (Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence) was an EU project aimed to provide an overview of the key social, legal and ethical implications of ambient intelligence and highlight the main privacy threats.

  101. 101.

    Former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff argued against a potential “endless debate”. See Testimony by Secretary Michael Chertoff Before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_0035.shtm. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  102. 102.

    For further discussion, see Vina 2001, Mock 2009.

  103. 103.

    Leib 2008.

  104. 104.

    Vina 2001, p. 436.

  105. 105.

    In the Netherlands, the NRC Handelsblad reported that it has learned that the Rotterdam police department seeks to develop within 3 years a portable device that can see through people’s clothing to check for concealed weapons. According to NRC Handelsblad, Rotterdam’s police have received from the government a 500,000-euro grant to develop the device and are now approaching companies, universities and research institutes to develop it. While there are already devices, such as ThruVision’s T5000, that can see through people’s clothes metres away in the outdoors, portability for the police is also important. See Heck W. “Dutch police try to develop X-ray vision” (NRC Handelsblad, 8 January 2010), available at: http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2454112.ece/Dutch_police_try_to_develop_x-ray_vision. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  106. 106.

    ThruVision’s terahertz ray technology already integrates CCTV technology allowing for enhanced public or urban surveillance.

  107. 107.

    For example, the New York Police Department is already testing terahertz imaging scanners (to be placed on police vehicles) for detecting concealed weapons. See Wagstaff K. “Police Developing Tech to Virtually Frisk People from 82 Feet Away” (Time Magazine, 20 January 2012), available at: http://techland.time.com/2012/01/20/police-developing-tech-to-virtually-frisk-people-from-82-feet-away/. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  108. 108.

    See United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Circuit, 1973).

  109. 109.

    See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP187, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, Adopted on 13 July 2011, p. 15.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., p. 12.

  111. 111.

    On the other hand, Senators Klobuchar (D-MN) and Bennett (R-UT) introduced a bill that mandates the deployment of body scanners at US airports and mandates their use for primary screening.

  112. 112.

    The full body patdown could be similar to the enhanced patdown.

  113. 113.

    See Goo 2004.

  114. 114.

    Elliott 2010.

  115. 115.

    The Screening Management SOP (Implementation Date: June 30, 2008), which was leaked on the web and is Sensitive Security Information for only the “Need to Know”, distinguishes between the different types of patdowns: full body patdowns; bulk-item patdowns; limited patdowns of the stomach area, the back and both legs; and finally patdowns that may include the patting of sensitive areas. The Screening Management SOP is different from the Screening Checkpoint SOP.

  116. 116.

    See Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294 (11th Circuit, 2001).

  117. 117.

    Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); reiterating the US Supreme Court’s judgment in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).

  118. 118.

    Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

  119. 119.

    U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008.

  120. 120.

    U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General 2005, p. 40.

  121. 121.

    Ibid., pp. 42–48.

  122. 122.

    Bruce Schneier interview with (former) TSA Head Kip Hawley (30 July 2007), available at: http://www.schneier.com/interview-hawley.html. Accessed 18 February 2014.

  123. 123.

    Frank 2009b.

  124. 124.

    http://www.tsa.gov

  125. 125.

    See U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008, p. 2.

  126. 126.

    Sharkey 2009.

  127. 127.

    The Privacy Act 1974 is codified at Title 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

  128. 128.

    Wood 2006, p. 89.

  129. 129.

    See Goo 2014.

  130. 130.

    Kearns 1998, p. 1005, Paton-Simpson 2000, p. 306.

  131. 131.

    Minert 2006, pp. 1653–54.

  132. 132.

    Wood 2006, p. 80.

  133. 133.

    See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).

  134. 134.

    This approach is, for example, prominently advocated by US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. See, e.g., Scalia 1997.

  135. 135.

    The software upgrade is being tested by the TSA. See Hughes 2010.

  136. 136.

    Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of EPIC, made this valid point during a brief discussion at the third annual international conference Computers, Privacy and Data Protection (29–30 January 2010, Brussels).

  137. 137.

    As pointed out by Eckard Seebohm, Head of the Aviation Security Unit of the European Commission during the first Body Scanners Task Force public consultation meeting held on 12 December 2008 at the Centre Albert Borschette in Brussels.

  138. 138.

    During the second meeting (which I also attended) of the Task Force on Security Scanners, established by the European Commission, representatives from the Netherlands (the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism—NCTb) explained the success of the ATR software. The representatives also noted that the Data Protection Authority in the Netherlands has referred to the body scanners currently in use at Schiphol Airport as a “perfect example” of privacy by design.

  139. 139.

    See Tessler and Max 2009b.

  140. 140.

    Mock 2009, p. 238.

  141. 141.

    See the Screening Management SOP (Implementation Date: June 30, 2008).

  142. 142.

    See Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-71), SEC. 109.

  143. 143.

    The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was established after recommended by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the 9/11 Commission). The PCLOB is as an independent agency within the executive branch.

  144. 144.

    DHS TRIP serves as a means for individuals who believe they have been improperly denied entry or identified for additional screening by a DHS component at a transportation hub to file a request for redress.

  145. 145.

    The legal fact that the Privacy Act of 1974 limits judicial remedy to US citizens or US legal permanent residents has been criticized by the EU in the negotiations with the US over a transatlantic binding agreement on the exchange of data for law enforcement purposes and the protection of privacy thereof. See the Final Report by EU-US High Level Contact Group on information sharing and privacy and personal data protection, May 2008.

  146. 146.

    Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-71), SEC. 108.

  147. 147.

    See Section 12001.1 of the California Penal Code.

  148. 148.

    Webster B. “Body scan machines to be used on Tube passengers” (Times Online, 8 July 2005).

  149. 149.

    “Tube to reject passenger scanners” (Kable, 16 March 2006).

  150. 150.

    “Shah Rukh signs off sexy body-scan printouts at Heathrow” (Yahoo India News, 6 February 2010).

  151. 151.

    Brijot, Press Release (14 December 2007).

  152. 152.

    Schiphol International Airport, http://www.schiphol.nl.

  153. 153.

    Ibid.

  154. 154.

    European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2008 on the impact of aviation security measures and body scanners on human rights, privacy, personal dignity and data protection.

  155. 155.

    Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at EU airports (COM (2010) 311 final), 15 June 2010.

  156. 156.

    The first meeting/public consultation of the Task Force on Security Scanners was held on 12 December 2008 at the Centre Albert Borschette in Brussels, of which I was an active participant. The meeting was chaired by Eckard Seebohm, Head of the Aviation Security Unit of the European Commission (at the time). Present at the meeting were numerous relevant stakeholders, including representatives of the manufacturers of the different body scanners on the market (L3, Brijot, Rapiscan, Millivision and others), the International Air Transportation Association (IATA), ACI Europe, Schiphol Airport, the Dutch Ministry of Justice, the CEBRN programme of the UK Home Office, the Article 29 Working Party, European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the European Cockpit Association (ECA), and the assistant to MEP Philip Bradbourn, an outspoken critic of body scanners. There was essentially a consensus among the stakeholders that body scanners are significant for enhancing aviation security, but certain privacy safeguards are required. Indeed, the EDPS and FRA are not completely against body scanners, but are instead hesitant. I pointed out the need to incorporate ‘privacy by design’ solutions, which representatives from the Article 29 Working Party, FRA and EDPS equally advocated. Representatives of L3 and Rapiscan confirmed that design solutions are feasible and already available and may include anything from blurring the face to converting the body scanner images into animations or even holograms. The representative from L3 further expressed the concern that manufacturers of body scanners have not been given any clear standards to follow during the design and development of the body scanners. I raised the notion that passive millimetre wave imaging is a privacy-friendly alternative to backscatter body scanners or active millimetre wave portals, which of course delighted the representative of Brijot. However, the representatives from Schiphol Airport objected to this point and noted that Brijot’s systems do not provide images that are clear or detailed enough to offer the same degree of security benefits of active millimetre wave portals or backscatter body scanners. In a follow-up email to a Policy Officer at the Aviation Security Unit, nearly a year after the task force meeting and closing of the public consultation, I learned on 26/11/09 that no summary for that consultation was published, no further meeting was scheduled and a legal initiative was yet to be foreseen. In other words, the EC was taking their time to develop the report/communication requested by the European Parliament. However, as a consequence of the “Christmas day attack”, the EC accelerated the adoption of this communication on body scanners, which was finally published in June 2010.

  157. 157.

    See Hsu 2010.

  158. 158.

    Upon invitation, I also attended the second meeting of the Task Force on Security Scanners, held 14 September 2010 in Brussels. The meeting served to further debate some of the key privacy and health issues/impacts surrounding body scanners, and to discuss the detection performance of body scanners. In addition to representatives from various stakeholders, representatives from EU Member States were also present at the meeting.

  159. 159.

    Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at EU airports (COM (2010) 311 final), 15 June 2010.

  160. 160.

    See Shears 2008.

  161. 161.

    The survey results are available at: http://www.unisyssecurityindex.com/. Accessed 18 February 2014.

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Correspondence to Demetrius Klitou .

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Klitou, D. (2014). Body Scanners: A Strip Search by Other Means?. In: Privacy-Invading Technologies and Privacy by Design. Information Technology and Law Series, vol 25. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-026-8_5

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