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Naturalism and Scientific Realism*

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Reflections on Naturalism

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Abstract

Little consensus exists in the literature about what either naturalism or scientific realism amounts to. The naturalist perspective considered in this paper takes philosophy and empirical science as continuous intellectual endeavors, united by mutual integration rather than reduction. To the extent that contemporary natural science takes all claims about the world to be synthetic, naturalism denies properly a priori knowledge.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. City University of New York, USA

    Alberto Cordero

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  1. Alberto Cordero
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of the Basque Country, Spain

    José Ignacio Galparsoro

  2. City University of New York, USA

    Alberto Cordero

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Cordero, A. (2013). Naturalism and Scientific Realism*. In: Galparsoro, J.I., Cordero, A. (eds) Reflections on Naturalism. SensePublishers, Rotterdam. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6209-296-9_5

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