Abstract
For empiricists claiming that all knowledge of the existence of objects and their properties has to be derived from ideas of sensation and reflection it may appear as a challenge to account for potentialities and potentials. For potentialities and potentials are not perceivable. In attributing powers etc. to objects we attribute properties typically only actualized in the future. Regarding our knowledge of objects, Locke, Berkeley and Hume claim that we take a number of perceived qualities to be united in, or to constitute, one thing. Locke believed that experience permits us to infer the existence of material and spiritual substances as unknown bearers of perceived qualities, which, in their turn, count as powers—dispositional properties. Thus, on a Lockean account, experience will license the attribution of second-order dispositional properties to objects. Berkeley, however, denied the existence of material substances and claimed that sensible objects are mere bundles of qualities. But to the extent Berkeley can account for the difference between appearance and reality and the transpersonal, cross-temporal perceptibility of objects he may well be able to account for dispositional qualities as well. Hume for his part denies that anything can be known about supposedly necessary aspects of existence or occurrence. Moreover, his account of causality reveals him to be a sceptic concerning powers. Hence, within a Humean ontology, it would be difficult to make sense of dispositional qualities or potentialities.
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- 1.
I will refer to this work as the Essay. To refer to sections of the Essay I will use the abbreviation “E” followed by number of book, chapter and section. For example, „E II. viii. 4” refers to Book II, Chap. viii, Sect. 15.
- 2.
W IV. 18 & 445f. (“W” is used to refer to The Works of John Locke, followed by number of volume and page.)
- 3.
In a letter to Stillingfleet (of 1697) Locke writes: “[…] the general Idea of Substance being the same every where, the Modification of Thinking, or the Power of Thinking joined to it, makes it a Spirit […]. As on the other side Substance, that has the Modification of Solidity, is Matter […]” (W IV: 33); cf. Ayers (1977, 91) and McCann (2007, 182), where the passage is read in the same way as is suggested here.
- 4.
E IV. iii. 6. For a helpful discussion of this idea of super-addition of thinking to matter see Downing (2007).
- 5.
E II. xxiii. 29. One of the reasons why experience convinces us this way is the passivity of the mind in perceiving simple ideas of sensation and reflection. For the mind cannot, according to Locke, produce or destroy any simple idea it receives from one of these sources (E II. ii. 2). Locke calls the kind of knowledge we have of the existence of things other than God and ourselves sensitive knowledge (E IV. iii. 21).
- 6.
As regards the properties of immaterial substances, souls or spirits, Locke prefers to speak of „modifications” and „affections”. For an exception see E II. xxiii. 30, where Locke refers to thinking and the power of action as qualities or properties of spirits.
- 7.
- 8.
Cf. the end of the section in which Locke introduces the expression “primary qualities”: “These I call original or primary Qualities of Body, which I think we may observe to produce simple Ideas in us, viz. Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and Number” (E II. viii. 9).
- 9.
See Campbell (1980) for an attempt to spell out what this extra could be which justifies the distinction.
- 10.
Alexander (1985, 6–7), Mandelbaum (1964, 1–3) and Yolton (1970, 11) are among the great number of scholars who suggest that Locke assumes Boylean corpuscularianism to be true and rests his philosophy on what he takes to be the best scientific theory of his day. Some passages in the Essay look as if Locke tried to give arguments for corpuscularianism (e.g. E II. viii. 9 or E II. iii. 20). But, on the other hand, there is strong evidence for the view that Locke diagnosed several explanatory gaps and shortcomings of corpuscularianism, cf. Wilson (1979). For a recent attempt to develop a coherent account of Locke’s position see Downing (2007).
- 11.
E IV. iii. 16, see also E IV. iii 11.
- 12.
E II. viii. 22, see also E IV. iii. 16. Right at the beginning of the Essay Locke declared: „I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Considerations oft he Mind; or trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consist, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any Ideas in our Understandings; and whether those Ideas do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no. These are Speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my Way, in the Design I am now upon” (E I. i. 2).
- 13.
E IV. iii. 11. Explanatory gaps of the hypothesis seem to be recognized e.g. in E II. xxiii. 23–29 and E IV. iii. 29, see also W IV, 467–8.
- 14.
Locke points out that, if we were able to perceive the sub-microscopic parts of material substances, our sensations would differ dramatically from the ones we actually have when perceiving such substances (E II. xxiii. 11).
- 15.
E IV. iii. 13. As Locke takes the real essences of things to be that from which all their qualities spring necessarily, this means that we cannot know the real essences of substances (E IV. iii. 12–14). Locke defines real essences of things as “the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend, may be called their Essence” (E III. iii. 15). Real essences are relative to what Locke calls nominal essences (E III. vi. 6). For nominal essences are the abstract ideas (formed by the mind from simple ideas of sensation and reflection) by which we classify and sort all things. “But it being evident, that Things are ranked under Names into sorts or Species, only as they agree to certain abstract Ideas, to which we have annexed those Names, the Essence of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract Idea, which the General, or Sortal […] Name stands for” (E III. iii. 15). For an illuminating discussion of nominal and real essences in Locke see Atherton (2007).
- 16.
If something is possible, this implies the actuality of a possibility. But not vice versa. If a substance can cause a certain sensation (e.g. if a snowball can—has the power to—cause a sensation of white) this does not imply that it is possible that the substance causes the sensation. For some of the conditions that make an actualization of the actual possibility possible may not be fulfilled (cf. White 1975, Chap. 1, for a discussion of the actuality of possibilities and the possibility of actualities).
- 17.
Our knowledge of the existence of God and our knowledge of our own existence are exceptions, see E IV. ix.–xi. “The Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing [but God and ourselves] we can have only by Sensation: […] no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when by actual operating upon him, it makes it self perceived by him” (E IV. xi. 1).
- 18.
Cf. the passage just quoted, and, e.g., E II. xxiii. 37.
- 19.
E II. xxiv. 37. “For the power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or consistency in Wax or Clay […] is as much a quality in Fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new Idea or Sensation of warmth or burning” (E II. viii. 10), cf. E II. xxiii 10.
- 20.
“I confess Power includes in it some kind of relation, (a relation to Action or Change,) as indeed which of our Ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively considered does not?” (E II. xxi. 3) Locke goes on to point out relational aspects in our ideas of extension, duration, number, figure, motion, colours, smells, etc. and concludes: “Our Idea therefore of Power, I think, may well have a place amongst other simple Ideas, and be considered as one of them, being one of those, that make a principal Ingredient in our complex Ideas of Substances […]” (ibid.).
- 21.
Locke acknowledges the complexity oft the idea of power in several places in the Essay. Two passages have already been quoted: E II. xxi. 3 and E II. xxiii. 7.
- 22.
For a thorough discussion of Locke’s notion of general ideas see Specht (2011), especially Chap. E4.
- 23.
Cf. Chappell (2007, 135). Chappell holds that Locke claims all qualities to be powers. However, he also believes that Locke at the same time took the primary qualities of the imperceptible parts of bodies exhibiting secondary qualities to us to be always and unconditionally present in these bodies. This seems to be right, but it does not imply that primary qualities fail to be dispositional properties.
- 24.
It has to be admitted, though, that Locke is not always careful enough to distinguish between the qualities of substances and the qualities of their minute particles (see e.g. E II. viii. 10). He seems to assume that this lack of precision is not likely to confuse his reader, just as he thinks that no harm will be done by talking of ideas (of sensible qualities) as existing in (material) substances when he is actually referring, not to our ideas of these qualities, but to the qualities themselves (as he does in E II. xxiii. 7; cf. E II. viii. 8; both sections have been quoted above).
- 25.
See Berkeley’s (1710), hereafter referred to as Principles, Sect. 2. From now on I will use “P”, followed by number of section, to refer to sections of the Principles.
- 26.
In the first section of the Principles he calls sensible qualities like smells or colours, etc. ideas; in the fourth section he calls sensible objects like houses, mountains and rivers, ideas. (A sensible quality is a quality which can be perceived by the senses. A sensible object is an object which can be perceived by the senses.)
- 27.
In his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), hereafter referred to as Three Dialogues, Berkeley writes “And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived, no one can deny” (3D III: 237). And: “Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them, but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived; when therefore they are actually perceived, there can be no doubt of their existence.” (3D III: 230) („3D” is used as an abbreviation for “Three Dialogues”, followed by number of Dialogue and page number in Volume II of the Luce-Jessop edition of Berkeley’s Works.)
- 28.
One of his motives for identifying ideas and things, instead of regarding ideas as representations of the things we perceive, lies in his conviction that what we have immediate and complete knowledge of are our own ideas. Cf. e.g. P 87.
- 29.
In fact, Berkeley’s theory may be regarded as a kind of direct realism (cf. Saporiti 2006).
- 30.
See also P 102, 105, 107 and 3D II: 215ff., 3D III: 236.
- 31.
Berkeley takes Newton’s principle of gravity to be such a hypothesis (DM 17). (“DM” is short for Berkeley’s De Motu, followed by number of section.) He regards Leibniz’s use of the terms “sollicitatio”, “nisus”, or “conatus” as metaphorical and often inappropriate.
- 32.
See also DM 8, 11.
- 33.
See e.g. DM 3, 30–31.
- 34.
See e.g. DM 34.
- 35.
See Saporiti (2006, Chap. VI), for a discussion of Berkeley’s account of perceptual error and the difference between appearance and reality.
- 36.
Hume declares these terms to be “nearly synonimous” and holds that “therefore ‘tis an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest” (T 1.3.14.4, SB 157). “T” is used as an abbreviation for Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), followed by number of book, part, section, and paragraph, as numbered in the Clarendon edition. In addition, page numbers of the Selby-Bigge edition (SB) are given.
- 37.
Hume uses the term “perceptions” to denote objects of the understanding (much like Locke used “idea”). Perceptions comprise both impressions and ideas. Ideas, at least all simple ideas, are copies (resemblances) of impressions which enter the mind through sensation or reflection and which are represented by these ideas: “all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (T 1.1.1.7, SB 4).
- 38.
“EHU” is used as an abbreviation for Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), followed by number of section and paragraph as given in the Clarendon edition. In addition, page numbers of the Selby-Bigge edition, revised and with Notes by P. H. Nidditch (SBN) are given.
- 39.
For a lucid account of Hume’s notion of causation and remarks on some of the problems of interpretation that it gives rise to, see Bell (2009).
- 40.
“The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature; such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose, that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation” (EHU 7.21, SBN 69).
- 41.
Cf. T 1.3.14.2, SB 156; T 1.3.14.4, SB 171; EHU 7.3, SBN 62.
- 42.
EHU 7.29, SBN 76–77; see also T 1.3.14.31, SB 170. There is an ongoing debate about how these two definitions relate to each other, cf. Bell (2009). I will here assume without further argument that Hume did not offer two different accounts but tried to capture different aspects of his complex account of causation. For an object to qualify as a cause in Hume’s sense it will presumably have to meet both conditions.
- 43.
“[…] we must reject the distinction between cause and occasion, when suppos’d to signify any thing essentially different from each other” (T 1.3.14.32, SB 171). “The distinction, which we often make betwixt power and the exercise of it, is equally without foundation” (T 1.3.14.34, SB 171).
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Saporiti, K. (2018). Potentiality in British Empiricism. In: Engelhard, K., Quante, M. (eds) Handbook of Potentiality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1287-1_8
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