Abstract
The distinction between potentiality and actuality in Aristotle has its origin in Platonic ethics . In his psychological and ethical works Aristotle’s notion of potentiality is embedded in a causal framework that is characteristic of life in general. A key theme is the distinction of various meanings of ‘to know’. In his early work the possession of knowledge is distinguished from its use. In De anima Aristotle adds the potentiality for acquiring knowledge as characteristic of the genus human being. He argues that the stages of actualization of knowledge are instances of a more comprehensive biological and ethical development. Life is the fulfillment of soul as formal, efficient and final cause , with the potentiality of body as material cause. The unity of body and soul is derived from the causal nexus of potentiality and actuality, like a power and the instrument in which it resides. In such cases potentiality is complex and depends on numerous conditions. Failure of full realization may occur when any of the necessary conditions of the development and realization of the fulfillment of human life are lacking, whether in the environment (e.g. climate), the body (illness, drunkenness), or the soul (natural virtue, firm character, attention).
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. EE 1218b38–1219a1: “Let this then be assumed, and also that virtue is the best state (diathesis) or condition (hexis) or faculty (dunamis) of all things that have a certain use or work (khrêsis ê ergon).”
- 2.
See Menn (1994, 78ff) for the claim that in his Protrepticus (ed. Düring 1961) Aristotle does not go beyond Plato’s use of dunamis, but differs in his growing preference for ἐνέργεια for Plato’s χρῆσις. Cf. Plato Euth. 277e–278a, 280b5–282a6. This section is indebted to Menn’s study, although I do not share all of his conclusions about Aristotle’s development.
- 3.
Cf. Protr. B80 Düring, MM 1185a10, EE 1095b32, 1216a3, 1219b16–20, Metaph. Λ 1072b14–17. Cf. Top. V.2 129b33–34: ‘To perceive’ means several things, one to possess perception, the other the use of perception (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πλείω σημαίνει, ἓν μὲν τὸ αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ τὸ αἰσθήσει χρῆσθαι).
- 4.
Here both infinitives mark the exercise (pace Düring’s translation ad loc.).
- 5.
See also Protr. B67, B91 Düring; cf. EN 1177a19–27, 1100b18–1101a8. Of course the exercise of a naturally good disposition need not be beneficial, see e.g. EE 1248b29–37, and below p. 87.
- 6.
- 7.
Plato in Theaetetus represents pieces of knowledge as birds in an aviary; he denies that knowing is a ἔξις ἐπιστήμης, but admits that this κεκτῆσθαι is in a sense ἔχειν (to have caught the birds and keep them in the aviary) and in a sense not (i.e. in the sense in which true mastery consists in catching the right bird when needed).
- 8.
Cf. Cat. 8b27–9a13 which emphasizes that ἔξις is a more permanent quality that a διάθεσις. See further below pp. 85–86.
- 9.
Protr. B79–87 Düring develops this distinction at some length. See Düring o.c. 245–249 for parallels in the corpus. For the homonymy of ‘to live’ see Shields (1999, Chap. 7).
- 10.
See p. 85 below for further applications in the context of Aristotle’s ethics.
- 11.
Within the confines of this handbook I cannot begin to do justice to the wealth of secondary literature on these topics. My main sources of inspiration, and sparring partners, in this section are Ackrill (1972–1973), Bowin (2011), Burnyeat (2002), Caston (2002, 2004, 2005, 2006), Everson (1997), Heinaman (2007), Johansen (1997, 2012a, b), Menn (2002), Polansky (2007), Sorabji (1992, 2001), Sisko (1996, 1998, 2004).
- 12.
It is helpful that Aristotle can write about a natural body possessing life, thus invoking the earlier associations of ἔχειν and ἔξις.
- 13.
Cf. Phys. VIII.4 quoted above.
- 14.
- 15.
See Bowin (2011) for a careful distinction and partial overlap of kinds of potentiality and actuality.
- 16.
See e.g. Meteor. 389b31–390a2, DA 412b11–22, GA 734b24–27, 735a6–11 (see also p. 85), Pol. 1253a20–25.
- 17.
The priority of actuality over potentiality itself implies that a potentiality can only be conceived with reference to the corresponding actuality.
- 18.
The last sentence is one of the notorious references to the possibility that the mind (νοῦς) might not be tied to the body because the brain was not known to be the organ of the mind as the senses were of sensation; cf. Caston (2000).
- 19.
See p. 84 for a similar role of appropriate conditions in the context of ethics.
- 20.
For the use of way of life (βίος) as a unifying principle of method in Aristotle’s biology see Lennox (2010).
- 21.
For more details see Makin’s contribution in this volume.
- 22.
The distinctions are subtle and hotly debated in the secondary literature. The survey provided here states my current understanding of the chapter, which is indebted esp. to the discussion between Burnyeat and Sorabji with corrections by Heinaman, Sisko, and Bowin. My interpretation coincides with neither in every respect—The need for further refinements is clear from e.g. EE 1218b35–6: Of things in the soul some are dispositions or powers, others actualities and motions (τῶν δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἕξεις ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐνέργειαι καὶ κινήσεις).
- 23.
See DA II.5, 417b29–418a6. Here the same points are repeated with the example of the (still nameless) difference between the way a boy is capable of leading an army (τὸν παῑδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν), and the way the same boy is when he has grown into a young man. The latter stage is the stage that compares to the power of perception (τὸ αἰσθητικόν).
- 24.
- 25.
DA 429a27–29: “It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place of forms’, though this description holds only of the rational soul, and even this is the forms only potentially, not actually.”
- 26.
Cf EN 1103b26–31, 1105b12–18.
- 27.
The literature on the topic is extensive. For a useful entry into akrasia in ancient philosophy at large see Bobonich-Destrée (2007), esp. the contributions by Destrée (who has inspired much of my discussion here), Zingano and Charles on Aristotle; see also Gosling (1993), Moss (2009), Charles (2009a, 2011a, b)
- 28.
See Destrée and Zingano oo.cc. for an analysis of Aristotle’s dialectical method here.
- 29.
EN VII.5, 1147b6–9, cf. Phys. VII.3, 247b13–248a6: people who recover from drunkenness, sleep, or disease do not change to the opposite state, and we do not say they have become knowing all over again—even though the person concerned was previously unable to use her knowledge (b13-16 ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μεθύειν ἢ καθεύδειν ἢ νοσεῖν εἰς τἀναντία μεταστῇ τις, οὔ φαμεν ἐπιστήμονα γεγονέναι πάλιν (καίτοι ἀδύνατος ἦν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ χρῆσθαι πρότερον); MM 2.6.17.3-11: drunk people have not lost their knowledge but their knowledge was overpowered by the drunkenness; in the same way the overruling passion has brought the akratic’s reasoning to a standstill. When she recovers she will be herself again. (ἐπικρατῆσαν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἠρεμεῖν ἐποίησε τὸν λογισμόν ὅταν δ᾽ ἀπαλλαγῇ τὸ πάθος ὥσπερ ἡ μέθη, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστίν).
- 30.
- 31.
In EN VI Aristotle carefully relates these two to three further candidates for intellectual virtues: insight (nous), understanding (epistêmê), and art (tekhnê).
- 32.
EN II.1, 1103a14–18. Aristotle emphasizes that all of these states are acquired to avoid association with innate knowledge of the Platonic kind. Hence the need to investigate how this acquisition takes place.
- 33.
In EN II.5, 1105b16–1106a2 Aristotle argues that virtues of character are neither passions (pathê) like anger, fear, and joy; nor capacities (dunameis), viz. ‘things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these (pathêtikoi)’; but rather states (hexeis), ‘the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions’.
- 34.
It remains unclear how exactly Aristotle believes virtuous states determine action. Here I cannot go into the notorious problem that a ‘firm and unchangeable character’ seems to rule out voluntary choice if one necessarily acts in accordance with it. Against this position, Aristotle holds firmly that we remain responsible for the formation (or correction) of our character, even if at a particular point in time we cannot act but badly on account of it, see esp. EN III.1, III.5 and III.
- 35.
EN II.2, 1104a27–b24; II.4. The desires that prohibit the akratic to exercize her knowledge may well derive from bad habits that make it all too easy for her to give into the wrong representations (φαντασία αἰσθητική instead of φαντασία λογιστική, cf. DA III.11, 433b27–30); cf. Destrée o.c., and Kosman (1999), Leighton (2011).
- 36.
- 37.
- 38.
Rational capacities are open to opposite results, cf. Metaph. 1046b1ff, 1048a8–12.
- 39.
HA VIII.1, 588a18–29. For discussion where comparison as to degree stops and analogy starts see Leunissen (2012).
- 40.
Pol. VII.7, 1325b39–1326a5, 1327b18–38, pp. 37–38. Cf. PA II.2, 648a2–11 on the relation between different qualities of blood and profitable conditions for courage and practical wisdom. See further Leunissen (2012).
- 41.
Cf. DA II.3; PA II.10, 656a1–13; IV.5, 681a10–15; the scala also pertains to their character traits, see HA VIII.1, 588b4–12.
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de Haas, F.A.J. (2018). Potentiality in Aristotle’s Psychology and Ethics. In: Engelhard, K., Quante, M. (eds) Handbook of Potentiality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1287-1_4
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