Abstract
Whilst a large scholarly literature exists debating why states fail, little is known about the role that neighboring countries play in containing the negative effects of state failure and assisting the recovering state. This paper proposes a rather unconventional new concept assuming that state collapse might serve as an incentive or starting point for regional integration. To illustrate the concept, it takes a look on the reactions or strategies of countries surrounding Afghanistan on the latter’s collapse. Drawing on the theoretical background of international relations approaches to institutions the paper distinguishes four basic strategies countries neighbouring failed states may choose. The analysis shows that Afghanistan’s collapse prompted formal initiatives in some cases and rather informal attempts in others though with a clear bias towards bilateral strategies of cooperation and integration.
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Notes
- 1.
On identifying state failure, see Foreign Policy (2007) and Rotberg (2002). On plausible and implausible solutions to state-failure, see Autesserre (2009), Barnett (2006), Fearon and Laitin (2004), Krasner (2004), Langford (1999). On warlords and state failure, see Reno (1997) and Marten (2007). On how international organizations and norms may cause or worsen state failure, see Englebert and Tull (2008), Atzili (2007), Fazal (2007), Herbst (2000), and Ratner (1996). On security threats caused by failing states, see Piazza (2008).
- 2.
Here state failure refers to situations where central authority collapses, peripheral agents start to rule themselves, government agents lack coercive tools to police territory, and lack the capacity to extract revenues systematically. There is no commonly accepted definition on state failure. However, most scholars agree that there are multiple indicators that will vary from place to place and that these indicators should be measured on a continuum (Foreign Policy 2007, Rotberg 2002).
- 3.
- 4.
Privately international organization officials unfavorably compared Pakistan’s frosty relations with Kabul against the more amicable climate between Tehran and Kabul.
- 5.
Traders and businessmen also argued that opening the Afghan market would provide access to Central Asian markets in the former Soviet Union. Eight Pakistani banks soon applied to open branches in Afghanistan and throughout 2003 the government opened a series of consulates in Afghanistan, including those in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and later Mazar-e Sharif.
- 6.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier was created as a strategic buffer by the British in the nineteenth century and splits up ethnic Pashtun populations between the two states (Allan 2003; Neumann 2007). Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan but are a minority in Pakistan. Respectively, they total 15 and 20 million. Afghan officials at times called for Pashtun self-determination while at other times Pakistan used the porous frontier area as a means to coerce and economically dominate Afghanistan (Qureshi 1966; Cheema 1983; Barfield and Hawthorne 2007).
- 7.
India is included here for two reasons: First, its role in aiding Afghanistan is substantial. Second, prior to partition and the creation of Pakistan, India bordered Afghanistan.
- 8.
Pakistan did not, however, block Afghan goods bound for India. In 2006 Pakistan’s trade with Afghanistan was estimated at USD 1.2 billion while India’s trade stood at USD 160 million. Indeed, much of the profit gained in the private sector by Indian investors was outstripped by official aid to Afghanistan. India continues to give hundreds of millions in aid to Afghanistan.
- 9.
The ring road connects Afghanistan’s major urban areas. The international community is currently upgrading, paving, and widening existing stretches of highway, a multi-billion dollar project.
- 10.
Consider Tajikistan for instance, a post-Soviet Central Asian state sandwiched between China and Afghanistan. China is rapidly outstripping Russia as the main investor in Tajikistan. China has made massive investments in light industry and extended loans and grants for multiple road-building projects in Tajikistan. These projects include USD 600 million in loans for roads and tunnels. One notable project is a highway linking the Chinese-Tajik border with Uzbekistan. Another is the Shar-Shar tunnel which will link the Tajik capital with the south of the country. Indeed the bulk of a USD 900 million dollar export loan is slatted for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) projects in Tajikistan. The SCO’s bank syndicate was founded in 2005 for major infrastructure projects such as these. Between 2001 and 2005 trade volume of SCO member states doubled.
- 11.
In Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Chinese traders are entrenched in local operations in a number of important market towns. In Afghanistan, Chinese goods are imported via third party traders from Pakistan, especially ethnic Pashtun.
- 12.
Turkmenistan’s officials expressed the opinion that the Taliban should be reintegrated into the government to some extent, Uzbekistan’s diplomats argued for a hardline approach that would exclude and continue to decimate the Taliban, while Tajikistan’s officials signaled that they would support any US initiative that gave ethnic Tajiks a prominent role in the Afghan government.
- 13.
There are a number of recent exceptions. Uzbekistan is now being paid to supply electricity to north Afghanistan and parts of Kabul. Turkmenistan has donated some oil and gas to assist reconstruction but transporting substantial quantities to Afghanistan remains a distant prospect given the heavily restricted border and lack of a direct pipeline. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have also at different times allowed the US, UN, and NATO to use air routes, roads, and bases for lines of communication into Afghanistan. The transit fees and leases accrue their governments substantial revenue. On the issue, see Cooley (2008).
- 14.
The borders of weak states are argued to be magnets for threatening transnational activities. On this, see Fearon and Laitin (2003).
- 15.
The most notable change in regional relations is perhaps denser ties and new forms of cooperation between India and Iran, ties that are based on infrastructure, trade, and transport initiatives over Afghanistan.
- 16.
- 17.
An exception to this is the Asian Development Bank (headquartered in Manila) which funds a number of development projects throughout Afghanistan and Central Asia alongside the UN, US, and EU.
- 18.
On the activities of the SCO see also Ahmad, Chap. 6, in this volume.
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Gavrilis, G. (2018). State Failure and Regional Containment: The Case of Afghanistan. In: Loewen, H., Zorob, A. (eds) Initiatives of Regional Integration in Asia in Comparative Perspective. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1211-6_10
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