Abstract
The chapter draws on studies of the semantics of modality in the formal semantics tradition. Moving from the need of restricting the domain of quantification in a possible worlds semantics of modality , it presents a relational context -dependent semantics of modality inspired by the theory of Relative Modality . For Relative Modality modal expressions are relational and context-dependent. This approach is immediately applied to the analysis of conditionals and to the modeling of anaphora and rhetorical relations in discourse . The chapter demonstrates the potential of this approach for shedding light on the role of modal constructions as argumentative indicators . The vagueness and ad hoc-ness of modal conversational backgrounds plays an important role in the basic task of determining the propositional commitments of the arguers and for the potential for fallacy inherent in that vagueness. The contextual specification of modal conversational backgrounds is comparable to specifying the domain of quantifiers . Specifying the exact contribution of context dependent modal meanings to propositional content can impact, in turn, further aspects of the reconstruction of an argumentative discussion, notably including the semantic type of the propositions functioning as standpoints , the loci-relations supporting the inference from the premises to the standpoint , and the macrostructure of the argument .
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Notes
- 1.
It is telling that Kratzer’s doctoral thesis, published in German in 1978, was entitled Semantik der Rede: Kontexttheorie, Modalwörter, Konditionalsätze (“Discourse semantics : theory of context , modal words and conditional sentences”).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Such divergences and shifts in modal domain selection are discussed in David Lewis’ famous essay on “scorekeeping” in a language game. I will discuss the consequences of this phenomenon for argumentative confrontations in § 4.3.5.
- 5.
Just like the fact that ‘my aunt, who does not own dogs, does not speak to dogs’ does not falsify the statement Every woman that owns a dog talks to it.
- 6.
Angelika Kratzer first presented what became later known as the theory of relative modality in Kratzer (1977) and further developed it in Kratzer (1981). Substantially revised versions of these two classic papers have been recently republished in Kratzer (2012), together with other essays that expand her theory of modality and conditionals . Since I’m not interested here in reconstructing the history of the theory of relative modality I will normally cite and quote from Kratzer (2012), specifying in square brackets the date of the original article. Occasionally, I will refer to the original when I need to quote a passage that has been omitted from the revised version. Another presentation of the theory of relative modality is Kratzer (1991), not reproduced in Kratzer (2012). Despite being largely a summary of Kratzer (1981, 1991) contains some passages that are illuminating in view of our purposes and is therefore quoted in this Chapter.
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- 8.
In formal systems of modal logic the necessary status of logical theorems is captured by the necessitation rule, which establishes that if α is theorem of the system □α is also a theorem in the system (Garson 2014).
- 9.
Cf. Freeman (2005: 114): “by necessary statements […] we mean alethically or broadly logically necessary statements only. I believe we can identify five classes of necessary statements: formally true statements – statements true by virtue of their logical form, semantically true statements, conceptually true statements, mathematical statements and metaphysical statements”.
- 10.
In introducing his well-known and highly original logic textbook for linguists James McCawley states: “I hold that all elements of meaning can play a role in inference and in truth conditions and that is only by historical accident that logicians have largely confined themselves to the study of the logical properties of comparatively few elements (those expressed by and, or, not, if, all, some, may and must). I thus reject the distinction that is usually drawn between “logical” and “nonlogical” vocabulary. […] I have realized that my rejection of that distinction forces me to reject another standard distinction, namely, that between axioms and rules of inference on the one hand and meaning postulates on the other: meaning postulates […] are axioms and rules of inference for “nonlogical vocabulary”, and there is no more grounds for singling them out for special status than there is for distinguishing “logical” and “nonlogical” vocabulary” (McCawley 1993: xviii-xix).
- 11.
To be precise, there is one alternative to the deictic or anaphoric saturation of the argument with a definite contextually relevant country. The alternative consists in the binding of the covert argument variable to a quantifier . Consider the following sentence: Everywhere in the world, foreigners feel like “second-class” citizens. Here the covert “country” argument in foreigners (and in citizens!) is understood as bound to a universal quantifier . This behavior actually confirms the content dependent analysis of foreigner. It shows that the noun foreigner belongs to the sub-class of context dependent expressions that admit deictic, anaphoric as well as bound uses. Third person pronouns are the typical example of this class (cf. Recanati 2002). In the sentence Every boy a thinks that John b loves his a,b,c mother the possessive his can be interpreted as (a) bound, where every boy = his, (b) as anaphoric, where John = his and also as (c) deictic, where his = a contextually salient person. The context dependent expressions admitting the three uses can be contrasted with the strict indexicals, such as you and I, which only admit deictic uses. Interestingly, it will turn out that modals , like the noun foreigner have a covert argument and that they too admit bound, anaphoric and contextual resolutions of this variable.
- 12.
To avoid all risk of misunderstanding, let me emphasize that Kripke’s frame semantics has absolutely nothing to do with the homonymous Frame Semantics approach introduced by Charles Fillmore in cognitive linguistics. Likewise, Kripke frames have nothing to do with the notion of argument frame or argument structure of a predicate that is common in linguistic semantics . For instance, when we say that the argument frame of a modal has two argument slots, respectively for the restrictor and for the prejacent proposition in the scope of the modal we refer to argument frame/ argument structure. Argument frames are, to some extent, connected to Fillmore’s Frame Semantics which generalizes the notion of an argument frame to provide a common format for the representation of semantic -conceptual information about types of situations or scenes that is variously indexed by linguistic expressions .
- 13.
Lycan (1994: 177) even contends that, contrary to what “one would naturally think”, in everyday discourse “some alethic modalities are not reflexive”. I am not entirely convinced by his examples: some involve desires seen as emotional compulsions, which I would not treat as alethic, others have a conditional , counterfactual, component that changes the nature of their accessibility relation, or (according to the terms that I am going to introduce in the following pages) of their conversational background .
- 14.
The basic criticism to possible worlds semantics coming from cognitive psychology is based on experimental results suggesting that “human beings show little aptitude in considering the complete set of alternatives to a given situation, even where set is small” (Johnson-Laird 1978: 17). This criticism is originally framed in a psychologically realistic interpretation of the accessibility relation in terms of conceivability: “To make sense of certain modal logics , however, one need consider only certain possible worlds, namely, those that are ‘accessible’ to a given world. This notion may be taken to mean that there are only certain possible worlds that can be conceived of in a particular world, and hence for that world a necessary proposition is one that is true in all the worlds conceivable from within it, i.e., true in all the possible worlds that are accessible to it.” (Ibid.). Clearly, such an interpretation forces upon possible worlds semantics a claim of psychological realism that was never intended by its proponents. The reading of accessibility as conceivability, in particular, appears a hasty identification. At best, conceivability can be one specific concrete interpretation of R. As for the human (in-)ability to entertain even relatively small sets of alternatives , it has been replied that in order to conceive modal concepts in terms of quantification over alternatives it is not necessary to have a discrete mental representation of each of them. This is true, in general, of our ability to conceive sets, which does not require individual representation of their members and thus applies also to ordinary quantifiers . For instance, in order to understand the sentence Every Chinese knows something about Confucius I do not need to store separate individual mental representations of 1,357,000,000 citizens of the People’s Republic of China.
- 15.
Some would say it is a very peculiar model of situation, again, counterintuitive and unwieldy in some respects. Worlds, in particular, are complete (every proposition or its negation holds in a world), while we would have the tendency to view situations as more localized, not completely determined and, perhaps, as having fuzzy margins. Semantic theories alternative to possible world semantics have proposed different views of situations and propositions . Situation Semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983), in particular, features situations that, unlike worlds, are incomplete. More recently Kratzer (2012 [2002]) proposed an approach that bridges the two, having possible situations as parts of possible worlds.
- 16.
As observed above, I refer to the original text of Kratzer’s paper for s that have been expunged or altered in the 2012 edition.
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A set such that adding any single proposition to it would result in an inconsistency.
- 19.
The set of Peircean essentially possible worlds will contain all logically consistent possible worlds where the semantic axioms of the English language also hold.
- 20.
Only roughly though. The English modal verb must, like all modal lexical units, imposes specific constraints on the make-up of its conversational background that are not imposed by the phonologically null necessity modal operator. In Chap. 6 I will examine some of these fine grained lexical constraints on conversational backgrounds in relation to a few Italian modal expressions.
- 21.
From a logical point of view these natural language conditional structures are often interpreted as bi-conditional . (see Dancygier and Sweetser 2006: 35–42). I will not discuss this point here.
- 22.
Fauconnier and Turner (2006 [1998]: 307) give the following preliminary characterization of mental spaces: “Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action. Mental spaces are very partial assemblies containing elements, and structured by frames and cognitive models. They are interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold.” On the relation of mental spaces to domains and discourse worlds see Fauconnier (1994 [1985]: xxxvi-xxxvii).
- 23.
Cf. Rocci (2006: 421) on this distinction: “Since these argumentative inferences represent the inferential path that is conveyed through the argumentative discourse , they are communicated inferences. […] Not surprisingly, the inferential paths communicated by argumentative discourse are not decoded, but are conveyed by the speaker relying on the pragmatic inferences of the hearer. The latter inferences closely interact with argumentative inferences, and yet are distinct from them; they are communicative inferences rather than communicated since they are instrumental to recovering the communicated inferential path.”
- 24.
For some reason there is little trace of a discussion of cataphoric phenomena in the discourse semantic literature at large.
- 25.
Note that the grammatical manifestations of the two “notional moods” are left admittedly vague and it is clear that they are intended as a mere signpost for a not-yet-existent Stalnakerian theory of speech acts in discourse . The interest of Robert’s theory lies elsewhere and I will leave the matter at that. For those interested, subsequent works of Craige Roberts develop her Stalnakerian view of discourse pragmatics (Roberts 2012).
- 26.
By con-possible, I mean, in Kratzerian terms, compatible with each other as well as with the common ground . Note that two possibilities may be compatible with the same common ground without being compatible with each other, as in Maybe a thief will break in. Maybe not.
- 27.
Multiple argumentation consists of independent arguments , each deemed sufficient to support the standpoint , while coordinative argumentation puts forward compound arguments jointly necessary to support the standpoint . Here I assume a full equivalence the coordinative argumentation of Pragma-Dialectics and compound argumentation in AMT , disregarding certain subtle differences in the approach (cf. Chap. 2, § 2.2.2).
- 28.
On the notions of direct and indirect argumentative indicators see the Introduction at § 1.3.
- 29.
Actually, Snoeck Henkemans (1992: 106) talks about quantifier scope rather than strength but she uses the term scope in a very peculiar, idiosyncratic, way, which does not correspond to the well settled meaning of scope in logic. What Snoeck Henkemans (1992) means by scope, i.e. the meaning dimension varying along scales such as all > almost all > most > some, is more unequivocally captured by the term quantifier strength.
- 30.
Snoeck Henkemans’ careful analysis covers three levels of context : the physical setting, the communicative situation, including the overall joint goal of the interaction , and the institution where the exchange takes place, which notably includes the social rules and regulations that apply in the communicative situation (Snoeck Henkemans 1992: 104). This three pronged analysis anticipates some aspects of later, and more developed, models of the context of an argumentative exchange, including, in particular Rigotti and Rocci (2006) and van Eemeren (2010). Referring to the former, which is adopted by the present study, the situation roughly corresponds to the activity type, while the institution closely matches the notion of interaction field (cf. Chap. 2, § 2.4).
- 31.
On the parallelism between quantifiers and modals see the discussion of tripartite structures in § 4.2.2.
- 32.
Here I have slightly adapted, I dare say updated, Snoeck Henkemans’ (1992) analysis to the analytical categories employed in this book. The original analysis refers to the situation rather than to the activity type and does not mention the issue. In particular, the present research highlights the notion of issue as vital for understanding how argumentative discussions are rooted in the social and interactional context . See Chap. 2, § 2.4.
- 33.
I have already used this kind of test in Chap. 3, § Section 3.2.3, examples (10), (11) and (12) discussing Toulmin’s pragmatic -argumentative analysis of the modals . The test that can be used to verify whether a modal is epistemic/ doxastic or not and consists in putting it into the scope of an epistemic modal expression. Non-epistemic modals, such as can in (35.a, b) are embedded without problems, while truly epistemic or doxastic modals produce three possible results: (a) polyphonic shifts in point-of-view as in Mary believes that Max must be lonely, (b) opaque, hardly interpretable results, as in Maybe Max must be lonely, or (c) harmonic interpretations, which do not amount to an embedding of one modal in the scope of the other: Perhaps, Max may be lonely.
- 34.
Example (36) corresponds to (9.c) in Chap. 3.
- 35.
On presumptive argumentation see the Introduction, § 1.6.2.
- 36.
This is known as the Samaritan’s Paradox, see Portner (2009: 58–63). Portner discusses different version of the paradox, all concerning obligations that only arise in imperfect situations.
- 37.
“In the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, it becomes clear that there is a standpoint that is not accepted because it runs up against doubt or contradiction, thereby establishing a [...] difference of opinion” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 60).
- 38.
In Pragma-Dialectics this corresponds to the violation of the standpoint rule: “Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 191).
- 39.
This leaves the door open to some modals having more than two arguments . This seems reasonable for at least some flavors of modality , as it will be shown in Chaps. 5 and 6. For epistemic modals, it makes sense to recognize an epistemic subject slot even if it has no regular syntactic mapping. For many epistemic modals, the epistemic subject by default maps deictically on the speaker of the utterance. These additional arguments I call subsidiary arguments , they are, in fact, subsidiary to the conversational background , in the sense that their main job is precisely to determine the conversational background: a set of goals, for instance, makes sense only relative to an agent or group of co-agents. They must be someone’s goals (cf. Portner 2009: 187).
For instance, deontic-practical modals should include an argument place for the agent whose goals and actions are being considered. Similarly, among the alethic modalities , dynamic modals concerning what an agent can and cannot do should include an agent slot. Deontic modals corresponding to positive law should include two additional arguments : the deontic subject, i.e. the person – physical or juridical – who is under the obligation, and the deontic source, i.e. the juridical or physical person whose authority originates the positive obligation. Similarly, deontic modals corresponding to interpersonal commitments reasonably have slots for the person who is committed and the person with whom the commitment has been taken. For epistemic modals, it makes sense to recognize an epistemic subject slot even if it has no regular syntactic mapping. For many epistemic modals, the epistemic subject by default maps deictically on the speaker of the utterance. These arguments are subsidiary to the conversational background ; in the sense that their main job is precisely to determine the conversational background: a set of goals, for instance, makes sense only relative to an agent or group of co-agents. They must be someone’s goals (cf. Portner 2009: 187). When there is an overt syntactic manifestation of these arguments , it functions like the in view of phrase in providing a restriction of the conversational background. A relative common view among linguists is that for modal verbs expressing deontic and dynamic modality the agent/ deontic subject argument is systematically mapped onto the syntactic subject of the modal. In generative syntactic parlance, they are seen as control predicates (cf. Portner 2009: 187), while epistemic modals, in which the syntactic subject is devoid of semantic function, are raising predicates. This is a mistaken view, at least for deontic and deontic-practical modals. One can easily find many examples where the agent or subject of obligation is not the syntactic subject. One of the first scholars to notice it was St. Anselm of Canterbury in the XI century (cf. Rocci 2005a, b: 141). Wurmbrand (1999) and Rocci (2005a), on the basis of examples of this kind, argue that for all flavors modal verbs should be regarded as raising predicates. Portner (2009: 188) proposes a nuanced position according to which “some deontic modals are control predicates and some are raising predicates”. For the purposes of the present investigation it is not necessary to enter this debate. In the perspective of Congruity Theory arguments can be recognized on semantic grounds irrespectively of the systematicity of their syntactic manifestation (cf. the analysis of foreigner above in § 4.2.5), and subsidiary arguments remain semantically interesting even if they are only sporadically mapped on complements. Even for epistemic modals, which are, by general consensus, raising predicates it makes sense to recognize an epistemic subject slot even if it has no regular syntactic mapping. For many epistemic modals, the epistemic subject by default maps deictically on the speaker of the utterance. Yet, when the modal proposition is embedded in reported speech or in an attitude report (e.g. Mary thinks John must be sick) the epistemic subject is shifted to the subject of the attitude or speech verb (cf. Hacquard 2010: 80). Similar shifts can be obtained through free indirect speech or merely by clues of a shift in point-of-view. It is finally possible to have epistemic modals lacking a proper subject and referring back to a mere information base.
- 40.
Kieran O’Halloran (2003) bridges insights from Critical Discourse Analysis and from psycholinguistics to build an interesting model of the inferences drawn by a “non-critical reader” of news texts. By “non-critical reader” O’Halloran means “a reader who (1) is largely unfamiliar with the events being referred to; (2) in reading for gist and so something akin to minimum effort, does not invest the effort to notice absences from a news text” (O’Halloran 2003: 169–170).
- 41.
As an alethic example of otherwise consider the following: If the light is red, stop. Otherwise you’ll get a ticket. Here the scope of otherwise is a causal consequence In view of the circumstances, if you don’t stop at the red light, you will get a ticket.
- 42.
The broader interactions between (relative) modality and issues of discourse -structural compositionality and discourse interpretation remain largely unexplored. For one, Webber et al. (2003: 567) actually admit that when they encounter issues of modality in their account of discourse structure they deal with them “fast and loose” in order not overburden their analysis.
- 43.
See Karttunen (1972) for an early statement of the problem and von Fintel and Gillies (2010) for a comprehensive discussion arguing that, despite prima facie intuitions, the epistemic modal manifests the force of necessity .
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Rocci, A. (2017). Relative Modality and Argumentation. In: Modality in Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 29. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1063-1_4
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