Abstract
Computer simulations are everywhere in science today, thanks to ever increasing computer power. By discussing similarities and differences with experimentation and theorizing, the two traditional pillars of scientific activities, this paper will investigate what exactly is specific and new about them. From an ontological point of view, where do simulations lie on this traditional theory-experiment map? Do simulations also produce measurements? How are the results of a simulation deem reliable? In light of these epistemological discussions, the paper will offer a requalification of the type of knowledge produced by simulation enterprises, emphasizing its modal character: simulations do produce useful knowledge about our world to the extent that they tell us what could be or could have been the case, if not knowledge about what is or was actually the case. The paper will also investigate to what extent technological progress in computer power, by promoting the building of increasingly detailed simulations of real-world phenomena, shapes the very aims of science.
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Notes
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This section (and the following) directly draws on Ruphy (2011).
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My discussion is based on an analysis of the Millennium run, a cosmological simulation run in 2005 (Springel et al. 2005), but similar lessons could be drawn from more recent ones such as the project DEUS: full universe run (see www.deus-consortium.org). Accessed 22 June 2013.
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See for instance Epstein and Forber (2013) for an interesting analysis of the perils of using macrodata to set parameters in a microfoundational simulation.
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I borrow this quotation from Grim et al. (2013), which, in another framework, also discusses the modal character of the knowledge produced by simulation.
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As attested by the fact that the HBP project will dedicate some funds to the creation of a European Institute for Theoretical Neuroscience.
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I draw here on documents provided by the Human Brain Project at www.humanbrainproject.eu. Accessed 25 June 2013.
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Ruphy, S. (2015). Computer Simulations: A New Mode of Scientific Inquiry?. In: Hansson, S. (eds) The Role of Technology in Science: Philosophical Perspectives. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9762-7_7
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