Unifying the Philosophy of Truth pp 307-320

Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 36) | Cite as

Typed and Untyped Disquotational Truth

Chapter

Abstract

We present an overview of typed and untyped disquotational truth theories with the emphasis on their (non)conservativity over the base theory of syntax. Two types of conservativity are discussed: syntactic and semantic. We observe in particular that TB—one of the most basic disquotational theories—is not semantically conservative over its base; we show also that an untyped disquotational theory PTB is a syntactically conservative extension of Peano Arithmetic.

Keywords

Conservativeness Disquotation T-schema 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of WarsawWarsawPoland

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