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Some Weak Theories of Truth

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Unifying the Philosophy of Truth

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 36))

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Abstract

In this article we present a number of axiomatic theories of truth which are conservative extensions of arithmetic. We isolate a set of ten natural principles of truth and prove that every consistent permutation of them forms a theory conservative over Peano arithmetic.

This research was supported by an Arts and Humanities research council grant number AH/H039791/1. The author would like to thank Kentaro Fujimoto for his helpful comments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    If formulated with a type-free truth predicate.

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Correspondence to Graham E. Leigh .

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Leigh, G. (2015). Some Weak Theories of Truth. In: Achourioti, T., Galinon, H., Martínez Fernández, J., Fujimoto, K. (eds) Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9673-6_13

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