Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Philosophy of Chemistry pp 39–55Cite as

A Novel Approach to Emergence in Chemistry

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 306))

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel account of emergence in chemistry. The account, which I call “functional emergence”, is based on the idea that many chemical properties are defined not by shared microphysical constituents, but by their functional role in chemical reactions. Although weaker than other emergentist accounts, functional emergence still counts as ontological emergence, and it can justify the ontological autonomy of chemistry. However, what is emergent according to the account I’m proposing is not chemical objects, but rather chemical properties, laws, and explanations. Also, unlike other accounts of emergence, functional emergence is compatible with physicalism and the causal closure of physics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Throughout this paper I am using the word “entity” to mean “concrete individual” or “object”.

  2. 2.

    The metaphor of the layer cake is due to Putnam and Oppenheim (1958), who adopted it to argue for a certain kind of reductionism.

  3. 3.

    A set of properties H supervenes on a set of properties L if and only if (i) any two objects x and y that have the same L properties will necessarily have the same H properties (though not necessarily viceversa), and (ii) any two objects z and w that differ in their H properties will also differ in their L properties (though not necessarily viceversa).

  4. 4.

    Hendry (2012) is an exception, but he does not give many details. He writes: “A science is autonomous if its laws and explanations make no appeal to the laws or categories of other sciences.” (Hendry 2012, p. 382).

  5. 5.

    An ontology includes objects, phenomena, as well as relations between them. If one includes explanations, then they could be regarded as objective relations between laws and phenomena. The idea that explanations could be seen ontically does not sound as implausible if one thinks that it makes sense to say that for a certain phenomenon an explanation exists but it may never be found.

  6. 6.

    For a comprehensive review see Manafu (2013a).

  7. 7.

    Although Broad does not use this term, McLaughlin (2008) interprets Broad in this way. According to McLaughlin, “it is clear that he [i.e., Broad] maintains that certain structures of chemical compounds can influence motion in fundamental ways” (McLaughlin 2008, p. 47).

  8. 8.

    For a different view, see Gibb (2010).

  9. 9.

    In this context, by “chemical laws” I do not mean exceptionless and timeless universal truths, of the kind that occur in fundamental physics (or maybe not even there). Rather, I mean the kind of regularities chemists use on a daily basis, and which chemistry students find circled in chemistry textbooks. For example, the statement that “Acids in reaction with metals generate hydrogen gas” would count as a chemical law. If one does not accept this charitable reading of what a law should mean, then the Nagelian reduction of chemistry to physics cannot even begin to be discussed.

  10. 10.

    I am assuming a strong connection between kinds and properties.

  11. 11.

    Of course, one may reply by saying that bridge laws need not be biconditionals. But there are many problems with this move, and this is not the place to discuss them. I will just mention Fodor who writes that if the relation in the bridge law “is interpreted as any relation other than identity, the truth of reductivism will only guaranty the truth of a weak version of physicalism” (1974, p. 99).

  12. 12.

    For the distinction between a property and its instances see Swoyer and Orilia (2011).

References

  • Adler SL (2003) Why decoherence has not solved the measurement problem: a response to P. W. Anderson. Stud Hist Philos Mod Phys 34B:135–142

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Batterman RW (2000) Multiple realizability and universality. Br J Philos Sci 51:115–145

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Batterman RW (2002) The devil in the details: asymptotic reasoning in explanation, reduction, and emergence. Oxford studies in philosophy of science. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Broad CD (1925) The mind and its place in nature. Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor JA (1974) Special sciences (Or: the disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese 28(2):97–115

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gibb S (2010) Closure principles and the laws of conservation of energy and momentum. Dialectica 64(3):363–384

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hendry RF (2003) Chemistry and the completeness of physics. In: Rojszczak A, Cachro J, Kurczewski G (eds) Philosophical dimensions of logic and science. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 165–178

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hendry RF (2006) Is there downward causation in chemistry? In: Baird D, Scerri E, McIntyre L (eds) Philosophy of chemistry. Synthesis of a new discipline. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 173–189

    Google Scholar 

  • Hendry RF (2010a) Chemistry: emergence vs. reduction. In: Macdonald C, Macdonald G (eds) Emergence in mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 205–221

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hendry RF (2010b) Ontological reduction and molecular structure. Stud Hist Philos Mod Phys 41:183–191

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hendry RF (2012) Reduction, emergence and physicalism. In: Hendry RF, Needham P, Woody A (eds) Handbook of the philosophy of science. Volume 6: philosophy of chemistry. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 367–386

    Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys P (1996) Aspects of emergence. Philos Top 24:53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys P (1997a) Emergence, not supervenience. Philos Sci 64:S337–S345

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys P (1997b) How properties emerge. Philos Sci 64(1):1–17

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Janich P, Psarros N (1998) The autonomy of chemistry: 3rd Erlenmeyer-Colloquy for the Philosophy of Chemistry. Konigshausen & Neumann, Würzburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim J (2006) Emergence: core ideas and issues. Synthese 151(3):547–559

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kincaid H (1990) Molecular biology and the unity of science. Philos Sci 57(4):575–593

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher P (1984) 1953 and all that. A tale of two sciences. Philos Rev 93(3):335–373

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher P (1999) The hegemony of molecular biology. Biol Philos 14:195–210

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Llored J-P (2012) Emergence and quantum chemistry. Found Chem 14:245–274

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Lombardi O, Labarca M (2005) The ontological autonomy of the chemical world. Found Chem 7(2):125–148

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Luisi PL (2002) Emergence in chemistry: chemistry as the embodiment of emergence. Found Chem 4:183–200

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Manafu A (2013a) Concepts of emergence in chemistry. In: Llored J (ed) Philosophy of chemistry: practices, methodologies and concepts. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, pp 659–674

    Google Scholar 

  • Manafu A (2013b) Internal realism and the problem of ontological autonomy: a critical note on Lombardi and Labarca. Found Chem 15(2):225–228

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McIntyre L (2007) Emergence and reduction in chemistry: ontological or epistemological concepts? Synthese 155:337–343

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McLaughlin B (2008) The rise and fall of British emergentism. In: Bedau A, Humphreys P (eds) Emergence. Contemporary readings in philosophy and science. MIT Press, Cambdridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Mill JS (1882) A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. Harper and Brothers, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel E (1961) The structure of science: problems in the logic of scientific explanation. Harcourt, Brace & World, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Papineau D (1990) Why supervenience? Analysis 50:66–71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Papineau D (2002) Thinking about consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H (1975a) Minds and machines. In: Putnam H (ed) Mind, language, and reality, vol 2, Philosophical papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H (1975b) The nature of mental states. In: Putnam H (ed) Mind, language, and reality, vol 2, Philosophical papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H, Oppenheim P (1958) The unity of science as a working hypothesis. Minn Stud Philos Sci 2:3–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Scerri E (2000) The failure of reduction and how to resist disunity of the science in the context of chemical education. Sci & Educ 9:405–425

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scerri E (2012) Top-down causation regarding the chemistry-physics interface: a sceptical view. Interface Focus 2:20–25

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scerri E, McIntyre L (1997) The case for the philosophy of chemistry. Synthese 111:213–232

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swoyer C, Orilia F (2011) Properties. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Winter 2011 edition

    Google Scholar 

  • Turing AM (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 59(236):433–460

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vicente A (2006) On the causal completeness of physics. Int Stud Philos Sci 20(2):149–171

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woolley R, Sutcliffe B (1977) Molecular structure and the Born-Oppenheimer approximation. Chem Phys Lett 45:393–398

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Zeh H (2003) Basic concepts and their interpretation. In: Giulini D, Joos E, Kiefer C, Kupsch J, Stamatescu I-O, Zeh HD (eds) Decoherence and the appearance of a classical world in quantum theory. Springer, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Paris 1 Panthéon – Sorbonne, 13, rue du Four, 75006, Paris, France

    Alexandru Manafu

Authors
  1. Alexandru Manafu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alexandru Manafu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, University of California, Los Angeles, California, USA

    Eric Scerri

  2. Center for Philosophy and History of Science, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

    Lee McIntyre

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Manafu, A. (2015). A Novel Approach to Emergence in Chemistry. In: Scerri, E., McIntyre, L. (eds) Philosophy of Chemistry. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 306. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9364-3_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation