Abstract
In the Poetics Aristotle connects the experience of mimetic works with learning (Poet. 4.1448b5-18). This essay offers an interpretation of the kind of understanding that spectators/readers gain from the experience of tragedy and of its relation to other forms of knowledge. It suggests that, although it is different from, and inferior to, practical and theoretical wisdom, “narrative intelligence” is connected to both. It is directed to the kinds of objects that are the focus of practical intelligence in use, but understands them in a way that is analogous to philosophical learning.
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Notes
- 1.
This essay focuses on what we learn from literature rather than on the cognitive powers that make this form of understanding possible. It is generally agreed that imagination (phantasia) is primarily involved in the experience of art. For a recent treatment of this topic see M. Heath, “Cognition in Aristotle’s Poetics” Mnemosyne 62 no. 1 (2009): 51–75.
- 2.
See also NE 2.2.1104a1-9; NE 6. Unless otherwise noted, translations from the Greek are my own.
- 3.
Aristotle does not explicitly thematizes the nature of “narrative intelligence,” although, as Ricoeur notes, he “makes clear that it really is a question of a kind of intelligence, beginning in Chapter 4, where he establishes his leading concepts by way of their genesis.” See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 40.
- 4.
Following Aristotle’s approach in the treatise on poetry, this article focuses primarily on tragedy.
- 5.
Poet. 7.1451a11-15. See also 9.1452a22ff; 1452a31ff; 18.1455b28.
- 6.
On the mimetic relation between art and the world see, e.g., John Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 21–29; Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector, expanded ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 55–67; Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 151–76, 186–93; Silvia Carli, “Poetry is more Philosophical than History: Aristotle on Mimêsis and Form,” The Review of Metaphysics 64, no. 2 (2010): 303–36.
- 7.
See also Poet. 4.1448b24-28; 5.1449a33; 5.1449b10-11.
- 8.
Aristotle holds that conformity to type is the major source of the “universality” of plots. He writes that “‘universal’ means the kinds of things it fits a certain sort of person to say or do according to probability or necessity” (Poet. 9. 1451b8-9).
- 9.
I am referring here to the characters’ individual ethical deeds, rather than to the poetic action as a whole.
- 10.
Poet. 6.1450b5-12; 19.1456a33-b8
- 11.
Poet. 6.1450a6; 1450a19; 4.1448b24-28.
- 12.
Poet. 6.1450b8-9; 15.1454a18-19.
- 13.
“It [tragedy] is mimesis of an action, and the action is conducted by some agents (upo tinōn prattontōn), who necessarily are of a certain quality of character and thought (and because of these factors we also say that their actions are of a certain quality). There are, by nature, two causes of actions, namely, thought (dianoia) and character (ēthos)” (Poet. 6.1449b36-1450a2; emphasis added). Here Aristotle brings character and thought together as the determinants of the nature of ethical deeds, as he does in the Ethics. See NE 3.2.1112a15ff; 6.2.1139a33ff; 6.13. Both in chapter 6 and 19, however, he defines dianoia in a way that virtually assimilates it to rhetorical argument, i.e., to verbal demonstration, refutation etc. See Poet. 6.1450b5-12; 19.1456a33-b8. On the relation between these two characterizations of dianoia in the Poetics, see Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, with a New Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, 1998), 154–158.
- 14.
Poet. 6.1450a14-15; 1450a24-25; 1450a36-1450b5.
- 15.
Poet. 6. 1450a37.
- 16.
Poet. 6.1450a24-25; DA 2.1.412b19-22.
- 17.
Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, 157.
- 18.
It should be noted, however, that in the Poetics external goods have a more prominent role in determining the quality of a person’s life than they do in the Ethics. Indeed Aristotle uses the term eudaimonia only once in this treatise (Poet. 6.1450a17); typically he uses eutuchia (good fortune, prosperity). See Poet. 7.1451a.11–15; 11.1452a32; 1452b2; 13.1452b35-1453a17; 13.1453a26; 18.1455b28.
- 19.
See below for the explanation of this point.
- 20.
Poet. 13.1453a6; Rhet. 2.8. On the legitimacy of using the discussion of the emotions in the Rhetoric to illuminate Aristotle’s brief remarks in the Poetics, without disregarding the difference between the two treatises, see Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, 168–184.
- 21.
On the similarity between the subject and the object of this emotion in the Rhetoric see Rhet. 2.8; for the Poetics see below.
- 22.
Rhet. 2.5.1382a28-30; Poet. 13. 1452b31-1453a13.
- 23.
Poet. 7.1450b26-34; 7.1451a13; 11.1452a23ff; 8.1451a27; 9.1451a37-8; 9.1451b33-1452a1; 10.1452a18-21; 15.1454a35-b2; 23.1459a17-30. There are, however, significant exceptions to this rule. On this point see n. 67 below.
- 24.
On the nature of the relation among historical events see Silvia Carli, “Aristotle on the Philosophical Elements of Historia” Review of Metaphysics 65 (2), 2011: 321–349.
- 25.
In limit cases, however, events in the real world can display “flawless” patterns of probability or necessity that are indistinguishable from fictional happenings. See Poet. 9.1451b30–33.
- 26.
On the difference between real and poetic world see below.
- 27.
James Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad, 59.
- 28.
See NE 3.1.1111a3-6, as well as the definitions of the various virtues NE 3.6-5; Poet. 25.1461a4-9. On this point see Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 54–55.
- 29.
G. F. W. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Vol. 1 trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 40.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
NE 6.7.1141b15.
- 32.
NE 6.11.1143b13.
- 33.
NE 2.2.1104a8; emphasis added.
- 34.
See, e.g., NE 6.7.1141b14-22; 6.11.1143b11-14; 1.3.1095a2-3; 2.2.1104a1-9.
- 35.
See Poet. 4.1448b18-20.
- 36.
NE. 6.1.1139a8
- 37.
NE 10.7.1177b26-1178a7; 1178b8-23.
- 38.
NE 3.3; 6.1.1139a8.
- 39.
NE 10.8.1178a15-21.
- 40.
See, e.g., NE 2.3.1104b13-15; 2.6.1106b15-27.
- 41.
NE 6.13.1144b1-16; 10.8.1178a17-19. The two kinds of aretai are so intertwined, according to Aristotle, that it is not sufficient to claim that one is in accordance with (kata) the other; rather, it should be said one is conjoined with (meta) the other (esti gar ou monon ē kata ton orthon logon, all’ ē meta tou orthou logou hexis aretē estin) (NE 6.13.1144b25-27).
- 42.
See NE 2.7; 4.
- 43.
Experiencing the proper emotions, and thus harmony between the rational and the appetitive parts of the soul, is also a manifestation of the excellence of one’s nature. See NE 1.13.1102b14-1103a3.
- 44.
See, e.g., Rhet. 2.1.1378a220-28.
- 45.
Rhet. 2.2.1378a31-33.
- 46.
On this point see Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 44–50, 165–171.
- 47.
This is also the intended audience of the lectures on Ethics (NE 1.4.1095b4-6).
- 48.
If we assume that the heroes cannot be blamed for the error (hamartia) that leads to their downfall (Poet. 13.1453a10). For this reading of hamartia, see, e.g., Nancy Sherman, “Hamartia and Virtue,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 177–196, esp. 186–90; P. Donini, La tragedia e la vita (Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 2004) 87–106, esp. 101–3; M. Heath, “The Universality of Poetry in Aristotle’s Poetics,” The Classical Quarterly (New Series) 41 No. 2 (1991), 391–398, esp. 393, 395; Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Chance and Blame, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), 295–8; Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, 215–237, esp. 220, 229.
- 49.
If we understand hamartia as culpable error. For this interpretation of hamartia, see, e.g., Dorothea Frede “Necessity, Chance and ‘What Happens for the Most Part’ in Aristotle’s Poetics,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. A. O. Rorty, 212–13, 219 n. 39; Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982), 168ff.
- 50.
On the integration of discernment and passions see, e.g., Stephen Halliwell “Pleasure, Understanding, and Emotion in Aristotle’s Poetics,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. A. O. Rorty, 241–260; Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 42–45.
- 51.
Indeed “Those who imitate, imitate men who act (mimountai oi mimoumenoi prattontas)” (Poet. 2.1448a1).
- 52.
Aristotle confirms that many tragedies were based on traditional stories (Poet. 13.53a8-12; 1453a17-22; 14.1454a9-13), and even recommends that poets do not deviate significantly from them (Poet. 14.1453b23-26). At the same time, he notes that the plots could also be based on historical events (Poet. 9.1451b30–33), or they could be invented (Poet. 9.1451b19-23).
- 53.
See e.g. Poet. 7.1451a13-16; 18.1456a24-29.
- 54.
Poet. 9.1452a3-5.
- 55.
On this point see Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 240 n. 26.
- 56.
Anagnōrisis (Poet. 11.1452a31-32).
- 57.
On this point see Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 240 n. 27.
- 58.
In the ordinary sense of theorein as “to look at,” “to observe.”
- 59.
This is a general principle of Aristotle’s theory of cognition. See Post. An. 1.1.
- 60.
See, for instance, Historia Animalium, 1.6.491a7–14; Post. An. 2.1.89b21–3; Met. 1.1.981a1-981b9.
- 61.
The example that Aristotle presents in Poet. 4 concerns the recognition of a previously known particular individual from the observation of his image or portrait. For a careful analysis of this passage see Stavros Tsitsiridis, “Mimesis and understanding: an interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics 4.1448B4-19,” Classical Quarterly 55 No. 2 (2005): 435–446. As several commentators have argued, however, Aristotle’s thesis can be extended to other forms of mimesis, including poetry. See, e.g., Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, 70–81; Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 157–171; P. Donini, “Introduzione” in Aristotle, Poetica: traduzione e cura di Pierluigi Donini (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 2008), LXIII-LXVII.
- 62.
On this point see Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 40.
- 63.
Aristotle, however, recognizes that there can be limit-cases in which a chain of historical events display the same organization as mimetic pragmata (and can for this reason be the proper object of artistic plots). See Poet. 9.1451b30–33.
- 64.
“Legō … muthon . . tēn sunthesin tōn pragmatōn”(Poet. 6.1450a5); “ē tōn pragmatōn sustasis” (Poet. 1450a14-15).
- 65.
Poet. 23.1459a22-29.
- 66.
Poet. 8.1451a17-19.
- 67.
Poet. 8.1451a32-34. It must be noted, however, that Aristotle is quite flexible in the application of his principle of the organization of the events according to probability or necessity, and admits connections that are simply plausible or believable. See Poet. 24.1460a26-7; 25.1461b11–12; 1460a35-b5, 1460b23-6, 1461b11ff. For the explanation of the inclusion of the plausible in the construction of the plot see Frede, “Necessity, Chance and ‘What Happens for the Most Part’ in Aristotle’s Poetics,” esp. 208–12; Donini, “Introduzione,” XLVIII-LVI.
- 68.
Poet. 7.1450b24-31.
- 69.
In the case of scientific hypothesis, allegedly relevant.
- 70.
For Aristotle’s rich view of the nature of ta phainomena, which include observable facts and endoxa, see G. E. L. Owen, “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” in Articles on Aristotle vol. 1, eds. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1975), 113–126; Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) esp. Ch. 8; John J. Cleary, “Phainomena in Aristotle’s Methodology,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 no. 1 (1994): 61–97; Christopher P. Long, “Saving Ta Legomena: Aristotle and the History of Philosophy,” The Review of Metaphysics 60 no. 2 (2006): 247–67.
- 71.
Aristotle, Met. 3.1.995a34–6.
- 72.
Aristotle, Met. 3.1.995a26–30; see also NE 7.1.1145b3–7.
- 73.
Sophocles, Oedipus The King, in Sophocles I: Oedipus The King, Oedipus at Colonos, Antigone, 2nd ed., trans. David Green (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 483–486.
- 74.
Poet. 11.1452a22-34.
- 75.
Met. 1.2.982b12-22.
- 76.
See Poet. 9.1452a3 and above p. 10.
- 77.
See Met. 1.2.983a13-21.
- 78.
Met. 6.2-3.
- 79.
Post. An. 1.9; DA 1.1.402a7.
- 80.
“All science is either of that which is always or for the most part” (Met. 6.2.1027a20).
- 81.
I am referring to tragedies that, like the Oedipus, show a passage from good to bad fortune; tragic actions can also, however, show averted disaster and thus a passage from bad to good fortune. See Poet. 7.1451a11-15; 9.1452a22ff; 1452a31ff; 13.1453a8-17; 14.1453b35-36, 1454a4-9; 18.1455b28.
- 82.
Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 67.
- 83.
On Aristotle’s view of the universals of poetry see, e.g., Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad, 55–60; Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 193–201; Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 40–41; Heath, “Cognition in Aristotle’s Poetics,” 70; Heath, “The Universality of Poetry in Aristotle’s Poetics,” 390; Carli, “Poetry is more Philosophical than History.”
- 84.
As noted above, however, this understanding is limited by the inclusion of the plausible that at times takes the place of objective necessary connections. See n. 67 above.
- 85.
Poet. 8.1451a17-23; 23.1459a21-30.
- 86.
NE 1.7.1097b11–13; 1.10-11. On this point see Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad, 64–65; Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 190–92.
- 87.
It is worth noting that in Poet. 7 Aristotle writes that the length of the action must be such as to allow the spectator/reader to remember it as a whole: “In the same way, then, as bodies and animals must be of some size, but a size to be easily taken in at a glance (eusonopton), so a story or plot must be of some length, but of a length easy to remember (eumnēmoneuton)” (Poet. 7.1451a4-6).
- 88.
Met. 6.2.1026b4-5; 1027a20; 1027a27-28.
- 89.
“Everyone delights in imitations. … The reason … is that learning gives the greatest pleasure not only to philosophers but equally to others, although the latter have a smaller share of it” (Poet. 4.148b8-14).
- 90.
This is not to say that poetry does not also contribute to the refinement of practical intelligence. Indeed, given the similarity between the domain of praxis and the poetic world, it is likely to enhance the audience’s capacity to read real life events. See e.g., P. Donini, “Mimèsis tragique et apprentissage de la phronèsis,” P. D’estrèe (trad.) Les Études philosophique, 4 (2003): 436–50; P. Donini, “La Tragedia senza la catarsi,” Phronesis 43 (1998): 26–41; M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, esp. Ch. 2 and Ch. 10; Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad, esp. 60–67.
- 91.
M. Heath argues that, although works of poetry can be understood at different levels, the cognitive capacity to follow a muthos is minimal. See Heath, “Cognition in Aristotle’s Poetics.”
- 92.
“Second-best is the plot that it is said by some people to be best: the kind with a double structure like the Odyssey and with opposite outcomes for the better and the worse characters. It is thought to be best because of the weakness of the audience; the poets follow the audience’s lead and compose whatever is to their taste” (Poet. 13.1453a33-35; emphasis added). On this point see also Poet. 13.1453a13-14. Similarly, Aristotle notes that “the same mistake [as made by those who prefer double plots] is made by those who complain that Euripides does this in his plays, and most of them end in misfortune. For this, as explained, is the correct way” (Poet. 13.1453a24-27). The philosopher also writes that while some poets compose episodic plots—the ones in which the sequence of events is neither necessary nor probable—because they are bad (Poet. 9.1451b33-37), good poets do too “on account of the actors: in writing pieces for competitive display they draw out the plot beyond its potential and are often forced to distort the sequence of events” (Poet. 9.1451b37-1452a1). It seems plausible to assume that the actors’ display was for the sake of (at least a significant part of) the audience, who enjoyed virtuoso performances and therefore gratified them as well as the poets who bent to the actors’ demands. On this point see M. Heath, “Should There Have Been a Polis in Aristotle’s Poetics?” Classical Quarterly 59 (2), 478.
- 93.
In addition, in the Politics he writes that “spectators are of two kinds, the one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed of mechanics, laborers and the like” (Pol. 8.7.1342a18-20). One might go further and ask whether Aristotle regarded all spectators of the first kind as inclined and capable to appreciate tragedy in the way that he suggests.
- 94.
See Poet. 4.1448b20-1449a15.
- 95.
Similarly, comedy is the telos of the species of poetry that depicts the laughable (to geloion). See Poet. 4.1448b28-1449a6.
- 96.
See Poet. 4.1449a7-32. At Poet. 4.1149a14-15 Aristotle explicitly writes that “after undergoing many transformations, tragedy came to rest, because it has attained its proper nature.”
- 97.
These are the two plays that Aristotle regards as the best specimens of their kind. See Poet. 13.1453a8-13; 1453a19-20; 11.1452a23-27; 1452a33-34; 14.1453b4-8; 1454a5-8.
- 98.
See Aristotle’s sobering comments on the nature of actual citizens in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he writes that most people are ruled by emotions and follow the laws primarily because they fear punishment (NE 10.9.1179a33-1180a4).
- 99.
Creatures like us, who by nature love to learn, are likely to be drawn to what is intelligible even if they don’t understand why.
- 100.
Contrary to Sifakis’ view, who writes: “we may be certain that the audience he [Aristotle] had in mind when he spoke of the effect of tragedy was the real Athenian audience of the fifth and fourth century.” See G. M. Sifakis, Aristotle on the Function of Tragedy (Herakleion: Crete University Press, 2001), 133.
- 101.
On this point see Donini, “Introduzione,” CXXI–CXXXIV.
- 102.
See also Poet. 14.1453b4-7; 26.1462a11-14; 1462a17.
- 103.
See Leon Woodbury, “Aristophanes’ Frogs and Athenian Literacy: Ran. 52–53, 1114.” Transactions of the American Philological Association 106 (1976): 349–57; G. Cavallo, “Alfabetismo e circolazione del libro” in M. Veggetti (a cura di), Introduzione alle culture antiche, I: Oralità, Scrittura, spettacolo (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1992), 166–186; G. Cerri, “La tragedia” in G. Cambiano, L. Canfora e D. Lanza (a cura di), Lo spazio letterario della Grecia Antica, Vol. I/: La produzione e la circolazione del testo (Roma: Salerno editrice, 1992), 301–334.
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Carli, S. (2015). Aristotle on Narrative Intelligence. In: Speight, A. (eds) Narrative, Philosophy and Life. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_7
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