Abstract
This essay responds to skeptical queries directed against narrative by examining two views of the self in contemporary philosophical literature which can be traced back to two differing interpretations of Locke’s account of the relation between persons and selves. On the first (or “narrative self-constitution”) view, a persisting subject exists only by its (essentially, even if only implicitly, narrative) appropriation of different experiences over time. On the other (“minimalist”) view, selfhood is not something actively accomplished, but rather a (pre-reflective, pre-linguistic, pre-narrative) given of some sort, one that is shared not merely by self-conscious adult human beings but also by animals, children and the cognitively impaired; on this view, selfhood in this more restricted sense is a necessary precursor of, but not coextensive with, personhood, which requires in addition some form of higher-order cognition or reflection.
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Notes
- 1.
Galen Srawson (e.g. 2004, 2009, 2011), offers another famous example of a similar complaint. I believe that the analysis I am offering her can be modified to address Strawson’s objections as well, but doing so would require additional analysis since there are important differences between Strawson and Zahavi, especially concerning the duration of the self.
- 2.
Often there are additional requirements about the cause of the continuity and the uniqueness of the relation. For a discussion of these views with an example of a fully–developed psychological continuity theory see Parfit (1984).
- 3.
This is not an uncontroversial claim of course, and Strawson (see note 1), has argued extensively against it. Obviously developing this strategy to answer challenges to the account of self described here requires more extensive description of and argument for the diachronic view of self than I am able to give here.
References
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Schechtman, M. (2015). “The Size of the Self”: Minimalist Selves and Narrative Self-Constitution. In: Speight, A. (eds) Narrative, Philosophy and Life. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_3
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